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ABSTRACT
Czechoslovak Foreign Policy, 1989-1992: 
The Problems of Translating Ideas into Policy
The h is tory  of Czechoslovakia is the  contest of ind iv idual w ill against the  
la rg er, determ inistic forces of the in ternational system. From before the  
creation of the  country  in 1918 to its  d isin tegration  a t the end of 1992, 
Czechoslovakia’s su rv iva l was predicated on the s tab ility  of the  
in ternational system. P a rtly  because of the co u n try ’s geographical 
location, Czechoslovak th in k in g  has been characterised by a tendency  
towards what can be broadly called ’humanism’, and was evident 
p artic u la rly  in the w ritings  and politics of TomaS Masaryk and Vaclav 
Havel.
This thesis examines the 3 0 -month period of Czechoslovak foreign policy  
from the  loss of Communist control in December 1989 to the June 1992 
election, the  results of which foreto ld the co u n try ’s d is in tegration  and 
a fte r  which the two key figu res  in foreign policy le ft public office. The 
thesis examines the problems of translating  a series of ideas which it  
terms ’c iv ic ’ into political practice. These ideas are  drawn from the  
w ritings of Czechoslovak dissidents in the 1970s and 1980s and which, 
when th ey  entered public office, they maintained had become even more 
appropriate .
The thesis begins by placing the tension between ideas and systemic 
pressures in Czechoslovak foreign policy in its pre-1989 historical 
context. Then, a fte r establishing the civic ideas which formed the  
in te llectual basis fo r the post-Communist foreign  policy, it  considers the  
obstacles in th e ir  implementation in fiv e  aspects of Czechoslovak foreign  
policy. These are: the nature  and s tru c tu re  of foreign  policy decision­
making; views on the unification of Germany and the moral reconstruction  
of b ila teral relations; transform ation of ties with the Soviet Union and 
socialist bloc institutions; the geopolitical, cu ltu ra l and economic bases fo r  
regional cooperation; and proposals fo r creating a second ’New Europe’.
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INTRODUCTION 
IDEALS IN CLASH WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Few countries have had the ir historical development contoured by relative  
geographic size and location as much as Czechoslovakia. A small country, 
even though endowed with some natural resources, an advanced industrial 
base and an educated and talented people,^ it was more a consumer than  
a producer of international order, and often one of the f irs t  victims of its 
convulsions.
The breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993 now allows for its history to 
be studied in its en tire ty . That history can be seen as the synthesis of 
in terrelated but competing influences which come to the heart of the 
study of international relations: the contest of the free  will to pursue 
national aims, hopes and mission against the systemically determined 
conditions of size, resources and location.^
This struggle was particu larly  accentuated in the case of 
Czechoslovakia. The country ’s geographic location made it central to the 
struggle for power in Europe. A liza rd -like  country with its nose nudging 
Bavaria, its head and shoulders nestled between Germany and Austria, 
and its body and tail stretching between the lengths of Poland and 
Hungary to Ukraine, Czechoslovakia always occupied v ita l geopolitical and 
strategic space. The te rrito ry  comprising the Czech Lands of Bohemia and 
Moravia have been strategically and economically important to Europe
Halford J. Mackinder described the Czechoslovaks as having 'the most 
extraord inary political capacity’. Democratic Ideals and Reality  (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1962), p. 159.
 ^ For the d ifferen t terms used to describe this tension, particu larly  in the 
context of foreign policy analysis, see Walter Carlsnaes, 'The Agency- 
Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis’, In ternational Studies 
Q uarterly  Vol. 36, No. 3 (September 1992), pp. 245-70; and generally, 
Alexander E. Wendt, 'The A gent-S tructure Problem in International Relations’, 
International Organization Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-70.
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since the earliest times when Moravia served as a prim ary passageway 
between southern and northern Europe.^
The geography and re lie f of the Czech Lands helped to develop its 
culture and polity in the face of external challenges into the late modern 
European era. The distinction of mountains cloaking the Czech Lands 
provided for natural defence and allowed for continued cu ltura l and 
political evolution. ^
Under Austrian domination, resulting from Czech defeat at the 
Battle of White Mountain in 1620, ’The isolated situation of the land 
secured [the Czech nation’s] stability , and the natural concentration of its 
re lie f created a strong centre of civilisation which was able trium phantly  
to maintain its ground alongside the centres that competed against it, 
Vienna in particu lar’.^
For all the protection geography afforded the Czechs, it also made 
that space strategically valuable. These lands were often the site of and 
the prize in decisive battles and conquests in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. The 1805 Battle of Austerlitz, or Slav ko v, in Moravia, 
saw Napoleonic victory over the Russians and the Austrians, and dowsed 
the embers of the Holy Roman Empire. Defeat of Austria at Hradec Krâlové 
east of Prague ensured Prussian dominance over the German states. So 
crucial was the region that the grand strategist Otto von Bismarck 
proclaimed ’who rules Bohemia, dominates Europe’, and ’Let Bohemia, that
“ Jaromir KorCak, ’The Geopolitical Foundations of Czechoslovakia’, in Karel 
Hoch, et a l  World Peace and Czechoslovakia 1919-1934 (London and 
Maastricht: A.A.M. Stols Ltd., 1936), p. 26.
’Bohemia’s frontier mountains were for long into the Middle Ages covered 
with broad belts of forest, feared by Roman and Barbarian alike. Bohemia is 
the one Czechoslovak land into which the Roman legions did not penetrate. 
This protected situation is one of the main geopolitical factors of Central 
Europe. I t  was, above all, the reason why the f irs t more or less firm ly  
organised Germanic kingdom -  the realm of Marobud at the beginning of the 
firs t century - had its centre precisely in Bohemia’. Ib id ., p. 22.
 ^ fhfd., p. 23.
fo rtified  camp in the centre of Europe established by God, be inviolable -  
above all in the in terest of Germany’.®
When H itler boasted German prowess, he described post-Anschluss  
Czechoslovakia as held in a German vicegrip; when he feigned German 
insecurity , he condemned the country as a dagger or an a irc ra ft carrier  
piercing the heart of the Th ird  Reich.^
In  addition to its strategic importance, the te rr ito ry  of 
Czechoslovakia was also valued fo r its natural resources and industria l 
potential. ’A fter Austria lost Silesia to Prussia in the m id-eighteenth  
century, the Czech lands remained the only place in the Austro-Hungarian  
empire with rich  resources of coal. Bohemian and Moravian industria l 
centres were all well-connected, through riv e rs  and railways, not only 
with the res t of the Empire, but with Germany and western Europe as 
weir.® The location of brown coal in the Czech lands meant that the 
region was the logical area for the beginning of the industrialisation of 
the Austrian empire. Im perial Austria offered concessions to investors and 
entrepreneurs without discrimination of location, which meant that the  
Czech Lands were allowed to benefit from capital investment in early  
industrialisation.
Many countries can be said to have a special mission. Just as 
Czechoslovakia’s location has had, if  not unique then a t least profound 
significance for Europe, so too have its founders and subsequent political 
leaders a ttrib u ted  special importance to the philosophical place of the  
Czechs and Czechoslovaks in humanity.
® Cited, for example, in Ivan  Svitak, The Unbearable Burden o f History. The 
Sovietization o f Czechoslovakia. Volume 2: Prague Spring  Revisited  (Prague: 
Academia, 1990), p. 3; and cited in KorCak, 'Geopolitical Foundations’, p. 24.
 ^ C.A. Macartney and A.W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe  (New York: 
St. Martins Press, 1966), p. 302.
® Radoslav Seluckÿ, ’From Capitalism to Socialism’, in H. Gordon Skilling  
(ed.), Czechoslovakia 1918-88: (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 155.
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Texts by leading Czech thinkers, many of whom would become the 
founders of the Czechoslovak state in 1918, concentrated not only on the 
Czech condition and on Czech aspirations. They placed these questions in 
broader, even universal terms. Masaryk’s works included World Revolution 
and The Road to Democracy. His treatments of Czechoslovakia were 
philosophical and framed in terms of ’the meaning of its h is tory ’.®
Foreign (or émigré) w riters continue this trad ition , or perhaps 
simply observe the fact of the trad itio n ’s existence. Josef Korbel’s 
authorative study Tw entieth-Century Czechoslovakia follows Masaryk’s 
work with its subtitle The Meaning o f Its  H i s t o r y . Czechoslovakia’s 
supporters and admirers have re ferred  to its leaders in terms larger than  
simply as a national leader. Louis Eisenmann’s in terw ar biography of 
Beneâ called him Un Grand Européen, common parlance in the Europe of 
the 1990s, but unusual in the 1930s.  ^^
What is particular in Czechoslovak history about the competition 
between the sense of mission and the struggle against systemic forces is 
the intensity of each. There is a circuitous, mutually reinforcing element 
to these two features of Czech history. Because the Czech Lands are  
important European crossroads and strategic space, they have been 
sought and violated. This heightens Czech self-awareness and sense of 
national mission. At the same time, however, expressions of Czech mission, 
be they Hussites and Taborites, Masarykian liberalism, or Prague Spring 
revisionism, e ither challenged the status quo or impeded the expansionist 
designs of neighbours who did not share or appreciate Czech humanism.
® For works by and on Masaryk, see bibliography, part 2.
Josef Korbei, Tw entieth-century Czechoslovakia: The Meaning of Its  
History  (New York: Columbia U nivers ity  Press, 1977).
Louis Eisenmann, Un Grand Européen: Edouard BeneS (Paris: Paul
Hartman, 1934).
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As a result of the struggle between the national mission of 
humanism and the conditions of the international system, the history of 
Czechoslovakia has often been depicted as predetermined. A slogan of the 
Czechs is ’0  nas, bez nas a proti nam’; about us, without us and against 
us. The slogan was even re ferred  to by the f irs t US government official 
to address a post-Communist Czechoslovak a u d ie n c e .T h is  contrasts 
with the proactive elements of the national th inking and ethos, but is also 
a result of asserting the Czech national mission. Because of the position 
of the te rr ito ry  comprising Czechoslovakia, efforts  to extol humanist 
values have, in fact, made the maintenance of national independence more 
difficu lt.
Consequently, the outcomes of, and turn ing  points in, Czechoslovak 
history appear to be depicted as distinct from human in itia tive, as if part 
of a calendar or the result of the climate. Crucial events or crises in 
Czechoslovak history are associated with months: October (1918) the 
foundation of the Republic; March (1939) the Nazi German occupation of 
Bohemia and Moravia; February (1948) the Soviet-inspired Communist coup: 
August (1968) the Warsaw Pact intervention which aborted the Action 
Programme; November (1989) the Velvet Revolution and the downfall of 
Communist ru le from within and of Soviet hegemony from without.
Similarly, its history is referred  to by the symbolic number 8 in crucial
James Baker, Speech to Charles U n ivers ity , 7 February 1990, United 
States Information Service, US Embassy (London), mimeo, p. 3.
See Svitak, Unbearable (Vol. 1), p. 137. While Svitak challenges the 
determinism of the months, he nevertheless calculates twice as many national 
catastrophes as triumphs.
Following the association of months, Czechoslovaks often use 'November’ to 
describe the protests of 1989. See Oldfich Tùma, 'Listopad 1989 v 
memoarech’, Soudobé dèjiny  1 /2-3  (1994), pp. 374-80.
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years such as 1618, 1918, 1938, 1948 and 1968, all but one of which 
’denote the insecure condition of the nation’s statehood’/^
Czech historians have re ferred  to the country as the ’Doomed 
Democracy’ and its fate in terms of ’The Unbearable Burden of 
History’.'® Specific events have been characterised by climatic 
descriptions, as if  they are the result of systemic conditions beyond the 
control of humans. Zdenëk M lynaf’s English-language account of the 
crushing of the 1968 reform movement was called ’N ightfrost in Prague’. 
One scholar labels a collection of documents ’Wintertime in Prague’; 
another calls the same event the ’In te rru p ted  Revolution’, perhaps 
reflecting the sense of incompletion and disruption of national paths due 
to influences from without
I t  is not the contention of this thesis that Czechoslovakia’s history, 
geographic location or post-communist experience is s tr ic tly  unparalleled. 
Its  experiences, particu larly  in foreign policy, can be compared with other 
medium-sized landlocked European states. There can be little  doubt, 
however, that Czechoslovakia has often been an excellent international 
citizen but an early sacrifice in systemic crises. Czechoslovakia has also 
been, disproportionately to its size, a significant producer of ideas. Its  
leaders have seen the Czechoslovak ’problem’ as having European, even
George Liska, Fallen Dominoes, Reviving Powers: Germany, the Slavs, and 
Europe's Unfinished Agenda (Washington: The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy 
Institu te , 1990), p. 39.
Vëra Olivova, The Doomed Democracy: Czechoslovakia in a Disrupted  
Europe, 1914-1938 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972).
16 Svitak, Unbearable,
M lynaf’s original Czech-language account had the less deterministic title  
Mraz pNchazi z Kremlu (N ightfront from the Kremlin): Zdenëk Mlynaf, 
Nightfrost in Prague: The End o f Humane Socialism (New York: Karz
Publishers, 1980): Robin A. Remington (ed.). Winter in Prague: Documents on 
Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969): and H. 
Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s In te rru p ted  Revolution (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976). This is not to suggest that any author 
wholly attributes the outcomes of Czechoslovak h istory to actions external 
to the country. See Skilling, pp. 3-8.
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universal significance, and that they offer ideas and solutions which they 
believe to be applicable more widely.
The humanist tendencies in Czech th inking , however, are not 
stric tly  idealist, the unlimited belief in the ab ility  of ideas to effect 
outcomes. Throughout Czech history, force and resistance have been allied 
with this th inking.
Masaryk often re fe rred  to the legacy and example of the Tabor ites 
and General Jan Zi2ka. They were fighters; they fought for a cause, and 
perhaps a noble one, but figh ters they were nevertheless. Historian 
Korbei has Masaryk ask figu ra tive ly  in 1918: 'Had not the Tabor ites 
reconciled the gospel of Christianity with the necessity of arms in its 
defense? Masaryk too, would bridge that contradiction....The inevitable  
question [for Masaryk was] would the nation and its leaders be willing 
and capable of picking up the thread of history, of fu lfilling  the humanist 
ideals that were M asaryk’s vision of his cou ntry ’s destiny?’ ®^
The Czechoslovaks proved unable to withstand outside pressures. 
This is not to say that their allies did not also share responsibility for 
these outcomes. But the ultimate form of national endurance and 
deterrence is what some have suggested is a 'willingness to suf fer ’. A  
study of Czechoslovak foreign policy from the interw ar period onwards 
suggests that Czechoslovaks lacked the willingness to suffer. Instead they 
rested on the belief and expectation that the values for which they stood 
were universally shared. Consequently, while they might be threatened, 
they would either not find themselves isolated or defeated.
Korbei, Czechoslovakia, p. 40.
Steven Rosen, 'War Power and the Willingness to S u ffe r’, in Bruce M. 
Russett, (ed.), Peace, VJar, and Numbers (Severely Hills: Sage Publications, 
1972).
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Czechs may characterise themselves in terms of Jaroslav HaSek’s 
lite ra ry  character the 'good soldier S ve jk ’.^° Svejk enrols in the  
Austro-Hungarian Army to wage the Great War. Through lethargy and 
ineptitude, Svejk subverts his commander’s orders. The question is 
whether Svejk was naturally  incompetent or whether his clumsiness and 
idiocy was a deliberate form of passive resistance. The question and 
nature of Czech resistance is asked at crucial points in its history. An 
historian of Czech origin entitles the Czech response to the German 
occupation 'The Failure of a National Resistance’, while an account of the 
Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 is entitled 'Passive 
Revolution’.^  ^ Josef Skvoreckÿ’s stories and novels such as 'The Bass 
Saxaphone’ and The Engineer o f Human Souls, mention acts of resistance, 
but the overwhelming p rio rity  fo r his characters are jazz and the 
opposite sex. One of his works is entitled The Cowards.
Physical resistance to communism was often comparable to the  
purported passive resistance to Nazism. I t  d iffers, f irs t, because there  
was, at firs t, genuine support for communism among the many parts of 
Czechoslovak society. However, even when the disadvantages of 
communism became evident, the resistance was at best passive.
These considerations are not unique to Czechoslovakia; nor, indeed, 
are they unique to a particular time in Czechoslovak history. The goal of 
this thesis is to examine the in terp lay between the country ’s philosophy 
and the challenges that existed beyond the leadership’s immediate control 
in the 3 0 -month period from the Velvet Revolution to the June 1992
Jaroslav HaSek, Osudy dobrého vojaka ève jka  za svëtové valky  (Praha: 
Ôeskoslovenskÿ sp iso va tel, 1990). See Cecil P arro t’s introduction to the 
English version for a qualification of S v e jk ’s representativeness of the 
Czechs. The Good Soldier Svejk  (London: Penguin, 1973), p. xv.
Vojtech Mastny, The Czechs under Nazi Rule: The Failure o f a National 
Resistance (New York: Columbia U n ivers ity  Press, 1972): and Jon Bloomfield, 
Passive Revolution: Politics and the Czechoslovak Working Class, 1945-8 
(London: Allison and Busby, 1979).
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elections which made the breakup of the country certain and a fte r which 
President Vaclav Havel and Foreign Minister J if i Dienstbier le ft public 
office.
At the same time, the thesis argues that the nature of post­
communist foreign policy is deeply rooted in the philosophical nature of 
the country. This philosophy is admirable but it also tends to ignore 
realities. I t  mimics the contention of Samuel Huntington that ’the primary  
problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions  
behind social and economic change’. I n  post-communist Czechoslovakia 
intellectuals stayed in office a fte r the 1989 revolution longer and more 
effective ly  than elsewhere in the region (although they would be defeated 
or marginalised there too), and thus had the opportunity to t ry  to bring  
political institutions in line with the social changes that they were so 
instrum ental in fostering.
Once in power a fte r the November 1989 Revolution, the Czechoslovak 
dissidents sought to translate into foreign policy a series of ideas which 
this thesis calls ’c ivic’. Formulated by the dissidents during the 1970s 
and 1980s, these ideas argued that tru th , morality, and responsibility  
could over come existing power structures. They contended that, in 
domestic and international political life, power and security need not come 
from the powerlessness and insecurity of others.
The thesis begins by tracing the tension between Czechoslovak 
ideals and the ’realities’ of world politics. I t  does so by looking at the 
major turn ing points in Czechoslovak history and the ir relation to 
systemic events. These include the efforts to create the Czechoslovak 
state; the nature of the F irs t Czechoslovak Repub He (1918-1938) and its 
foreign policy; the crises of Munich and March 1939; the wartime and 
postwar balancing act between East and West; the Communist assumption
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: 
Yale U nivers ity  Press, 1968), p. 5.
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of power in Feb ru ary  1948 and ru le  until 1960; reform s of the 1960s 
culm inating in the Prague Spring and Warsaw Pact in tervention  in August 
1968; post-in tervention  'norm alisation’ and the  rise  of dissent; and, 
fin a lly , the anti-Communist revolution  of November 1989.
The second chapter examines the personalities of two key post- 
Communist Czechoslovak foreign  policy-m akers, Vaclav Havel and J if i  
Dienstbier. Czechoslovak dissident ideas are examined and th e ir post­
communist app licab ility  established to determ ine the  form and content of 
th e ir  civic foreign policy.
In  o rder both to explain how post-Communist foreign  policy was 
made and to demonstrate problems of policy implementation, the th ird  
chapter examines the sources and processes of fore ign  policy decision­
making.
The next four chapters provide policy cases studies. These are  
defined by countries and regions in recognition of Czechoslovakia’s need 
to d irect its foreign policy towards specific actors. The fo u rth  chapter 
considers Czechoslovakia’s relations with Germany in  which the post- 
Communist Czechoslovakia leadership not only discounted geopolitical and 
historical pressures but also sought to create a new basis fo r relations  
by apologising fo r Czechoslovak crimes towards Germans.
Chapter 5 demonstrates th a t although humanist values are sim ilarly  
extended to the Soviet Union, the  Czechoslovak leadership showed itse lf 
sensitive to changes in  Soviet policy.
Numerous in itia tives  fo r regional cooperation, p articu la rly  the  
Visegrad Group are examined in chapter 6 to illu s tra te  how dissident 
experience and ethos was necessary for the  process and how 
Czechoslovakia recognised and used geographic and systemic pressures.
Chapter 7 concerns th e  central plank of post-Communist 
Czechoslovak foreign policy: the ambitious programme to redefine relations  
in Europe by elim inating geopolitics. While Czechoslovakia sought the
17
elim ination of m ilitary alliances as p art of th a t process, the country  
ultim ately resorted to an antithetical policy of seeking m ilitary alliances 
and security  guarantees and of adopting trad itiona l rea lis t language to  
support th a t claim.
Through these aspects of post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign  
policy th is  thesis w ill examine the problems of trans la ting  into policy the  
Czechoslovak dissident ideas of civic politics. I t  is necessary firs t, 
however, to place post-Communist Czechoslovak fo re ign  policy into its  
historical context.
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CHAPTER 1
IDEALS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM IT S  CONCEPTION TO THE VELVET REVOLUTION
THE CREATION OF A STATE THROUGH THE POWER OF IDEAS
The foundation of Czechoslovakia in 1918, by no means preordained, was a 
combination of in ternational circumstances and the work of its founders. 
The Russian revolution and the ideology of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, in 
addition to 'the Great War itse lf, provided fo r ’a favorable reception of the  
effo rts  of smaller nations fo r independence’ .^  The Czechoslovak 
leadership c learly  used these conditions fo r the achievement of th e ir  
political goals and the creation of the state in  1918 was v e ry  much the  
resu lt of th e ir  endeavours. Such human achievement should have augured  
well fo r the surv iva l of the Czechoslovak state.
A contribution to the creation of the state came from M asaryk’s own 
philosophy. As was so often the case, his work on th is issue was not 
directed specifically a t Czechoslovakia but a t a universa l problem which 
he sought to rec tify . He addressed some of these issues during the F irs t  
World War when he gave the founding speech of the School of Slavonic 
and East European Studies in 1915.^ His view of how the  small nation  
could achieve v ic to ry  against superior odds was not characterised by  
political or m ilitary stra tegy, the creation of alliances or general 
scheming. Rather, it  was a call to humanism, to v ic to ry  through decency 
and diligence.
 ^ Radomir LuÉa, The Transfer o f the Sudeten Germans: A Study o f Czech-  
German Relations, 1933-1962 (London: Ron tied ge & Kegan Paul L td , 1994), p. 
27.
 ^ T.G. Masaryk, T h e  Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis’, in 
R.W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk In England (Cambridge: Cambridge U n ivers ity  
Press, 1943), pp. 135-52. See also, T.G. Masaryk, Problém malého nâroda 
(Praha: NEUTRALITA, 1990).
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Specifically regarding the Czechs, in his 1895 work Ceska otazka
(The Czech Question), Masaryk denounced 'the mendicancy and weakness
of will of our public life ’. Of politicians he said 'Because they do not
know how to be lions, they become foxes; because they do not know how
to be heroes, they become lackeys and promote themselves by lackey-like
cunning’. The 'oppressed, small and weak’ nation, however, was not forced
to rely on 'Machiavellianism and lackeyism’, according to Masaryk, but
could attain its aims honourably through 'w ork’ and 's trug g le ’.
Not by violence, but peacefully, not by the sword but by the 
plough, not by blood but by work, not by death but by life  
for the sake of life  - this is the answer to the Czech genius, 
that is the sense of our history and the legacy of our great 
predecessors.^
It  was in this context that Masaryk recognised and drew upon two 
competing tendencies in Czech action. He called one the 'invincible  
gallan try ’ of Czech m ilitary heroes like the Hussite leaders Zi&ka and 
Prokop, those who took up arms to support the c a u s e . T h e  other strand, 
which Masaryk considered more enduring and widespread, came from 
moral and religious figures of Czech history, such as Hus, Komenskÿ and 
the Bohemian Brethern.
Whatever mission Masaryk believed the Czechs to have, and 
whatever means he prescribed to achieve the ir aims, the creation of a 
Czechoslovak state was not preordained. Certainly, the Czechoslovak state 
benefitted from the general principle of national self-determ ination. 
Expounded by US President Woodrow Wilson, national self-determ ination  
was to form the basis of peace in the wake of the F irs t World War, and
 ^ H. Gordon Skilling, 'Lions or Foxes: Heroes or Lackeys?’, in Skilling (ed,), 
pp. 3-4.
 ^ For a brief historical account, see J.V. PoliSenskÿ, History of 
Czechoslovakia in Outline, [originally published 1947] (Prague: Bohemia 
International, 1991), ch. V. See also Howard Kaminsky, A History of the 
Hussite Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
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was pronounced on 8 January 1918 as part of the Wilsonian peace 
programme of the Fourteen Points.
Nevertheless, the breakup of Austria-Hungary, an obvious 
prerequisite for the creation of Czechoslovakia, was not a specific 
American objective. The best the Fourteen Points did for Czechoslovak 
hopes was to o ffer the peoples of the Empire 'the freest opportunity of 
autonomous development’. This statement was wholly unsatisfactory to 
Masaryk, whose task was made more d ifficu lt when it became clear that 
none of the victorious powers thought d iffe ren tly  from the Americans. For 
Masaryk to achieve his aim of an independent Czechoslovak was all the 
more an enormous undertaking.^ I t  is in ligh t of this that the active and 
skilfu l diplomacy of the Czechoslovak founders can be seen to have 
shaped Czechoslovak history.
On 14 October 1918, Masaryk launched the Declaration of 
Independence. Finally, on 28 October, a 'bloodless revolution’® occurred 
with the proclamation of independence of the independent Czechoslovak 
republic.
The end result of these in itiatives was that Czechoslovak leaders 
were able to impose the ir demands on the peacemakers: 'The Peace 
Conference found itself faced, so far as the question of Czechoslovakia 
was concerned, with a fa it accompli. The Czechoslovak State was already 
in existence by v irtu e  of the will of the people at home and of the 
successful struggle abroad for independence -  with the concurrence and 
support of the Allied Powers’.^
® William V. Wallace, Czechoslovakia (London: Ernest BennLimited, 1976), p. 
114.
® A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918: A H istory of the Austrian  
Empire and A ustria-H ungary  (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948).
 ^ Karel Hoch, 'The Peace Conference and the Rise of the Czechoslovak 
Republic’, in Krofta, p. 13.
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The determination of the country’s borders was helped by 
geographic factors. Just as the geographic locations of the Czech Lands 
at the north-south and east-west crossroads of Europe were recognised 
throughout history for strategic reasons, so too were they acknowledged 
by the Committee on Czechoslovak Questions at the Paris Peace talks. This 
was to the advantage of nascent Czechoslovakia. The Committee 
pronounced that ’Bohemia forms a natural region, clearly defined by its 
frin g e  of mountains. The mere fact that a German population has 
established itself in the outlying districts at a re la tive ly  recent date did 
not appear to the committee a sufficient reason for depriving Bohemia of 
its natural fro n tiers ’. The Committee also recognised, with some foresight, 
that the country’s national security would ’depend on geographical 
considerations. The chain of mountains which surrounds Bohemia 
constitutes a line of defence for the country. To take away this line of 
mountains would be to place Bohemia at the mercy of Germany’.®
While Czechoslovakia’s new boundaries benefitted from the 
recognition by the Allies of such natural borders, the nascent country’s 
leadership nevertheless had to argue for them. I t  also used m ilitary force 
to secure a border with Hungary. The result, however, was that the  
country emerged ’with more than adequate recognition of her te rrito ria l 
needs’. I t  was due to these successes that Czechoslovakia became a 
champion of the new order.®
In  addition to the re lative benefits of its geographical layout, the  
potential of Czechoslovakia for economic success and prosperity was high.
® E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds). Documents on British Foreign Policy 
1919-1939Third  Series (London, 1949), Vol. I, p. 302, cited in Lu2a, Transfer,
p. 2.
® Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy o f Czechoslovakia 1918-1935 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 43.
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The industrial capacity inherited from Austro-Hungarian empire ranked  
Czechoslovakia among the world’s ten leading industria l powers.
The new state had certain geographic advantages but also some 
weaknesses. The Czech lands were allowed to retain what were considered 
historic borders, with the Peace Conference refusing to allow the German­
speaking minorities of the northern areas to seek union with Germany and 
those of the south with Austria. The Delegation of the Austrian Republic 
to the Peace talks included representatives of the Sudeten Germans.
While Poland gained the coal-rich area of TèSin, Czechoslovakia was 
permitted to retain the lands south of it, thereby preserving intact the  
northern railroad which connected the Czech lands to Slovakia. At other 
points, however, the border was drawn to strategic disadvantage. ’The 
fro n tie r between Czechoslovakia and Hungary was...demarcated on the 
basis of observing as closely as possible the principle of nationality. I t  is 
thus a fro n tier rather d ifficu lt of defence against possible a ttack’. The 
border arrangement also meant that Czechoslovakia would not have an 
East-West railway in the South.
Despite some problems, on the whole Czechoslovakia was a 
geographically-defined country: ’A glance at the orographical map of 
Europe shows that no country in the in terior of the Continent has such 
an outstanding re lie f as the central te rrito ries  of Bohemia and Slovakia -  
the mountain-quadrangle of Bohemia, and the mountain-ellipse of 
S l o v a k i a , a l t h o u g h  this author also acknowledges that only three of
See, for example, Radoslav Seluckÿ, ’From Capitalism to Socialism’, p. 154; 
and John J.N. Bradley, Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution: A Political Analysis 
(Boulder: East European Monographs, 1992), p. xiii.
Emil Sobota, ’From Political Separatism to Political Symbiosis’, in Krofta, 
p. 40.
Hoch, ’Peace Conference’, p. 16-7.
Kortak, ’Geopolitical Foundations’, p. 20.
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Czechoslovakia’s four sides had natural frontiers, the southern being 
’open ’ /'^
Not only did Masaryk have to win over the Allies to the cause of 
Czechoslovakia, he had to win the Slovaks. I f  the realisation of a 
Czechoslovak state can be attributed  to an idealistic realism, the creation  
of a Czechoslovak nation was much more idealistic. The lands which were 
to become Czechoslovakia were multiethnic, containing more Germans than  
Slovaks, as well as significant numbers of Poles, Ruthenians, and 
particu larly  Hungarians. In  order to take advantage of Allied support for 
the principle of national self-determ ination, the Czech leaders, in 
particular, recognised the imperative to create a number of citizens  
substantial enough to ju s tify  a new state. That required a fusion of the 
two west Slavic peoples. Although the Czechs and Slovaks may be said to 
share re lative ly  common language, they each had substantially d ifferen t 
political, religious and economic orientations. The Czechs had had the ir  
own kingdom, underwent a Protestant reformation (thereby becoming a 
central battleground in the T h irty  Years’ War), and by 1914 had 
developed one of the most advanced industria l economies in Europe, with 
a large urbanised middle class. The Slovaks, by contrast, had been under 
nearly a millennium of Hungarian ru le (with the Hungarians even using 
Bratislava Castle to enthrone their own monarchs), and were 
predominantly Catholic and largely agrarian.
The creation of a ’Czechoslovak’ citizen in 1918 was notional, with 
the consequence that the ’fu ll meaning of the political union of Slovaks 
and Czechs in 1918 was nebulous and d ifficu lt for the Czechs to grapple 
with or even understand. Prior to 1917 such a union had been given  
hardly any real consideration’.^ ^
14 Ib id., p. 22.
Edita Bosak, ’Slovaks and Czechs: An Uneasy Coexistence’, in Skilling  
(ed.), p. 66
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When Masaryk campaigned in 1918 in the United States for support 
for the creation of a Czechoslovak state, his audience was not simply 
American public opinion but also Slovak. To win Slovak-Americans, who 
constituted one-th ird  of the whole Slovak population, to the idea of a 
common Czechoslovak state, he made pledges. Writing in Slovak, he 
promised that the new state would guarantee Slovakia 'its own 
administration, its own Diet, and its own courts’. He also promised that 
Slovak would serve as the official language 'in the schools, in government 
offices, and in public life generally’. The resulting Pittsburgh Agreement 
was signed by Masaryk signed on 30 May 1918 and promised Slovaks 
'equality and autonomous development’.^ ® Achieving the fact of, and 
particu larly  the perception of equality between the two nations became 
much harder, and would show that the country was founded on a notional 
concept ra ther than a firm cultural allegiance.
Confusion over this new identity  was evident from the outset of the 
Czechoslovak Republic. The Declaration o f the Slovak Nation of 30 October 
1918, the f irs t  political declaration of the Slovak National council, 
pronounced the Slovaks to be a nation as well as part of the  
Czechoslovak nation. This resulted in 'an enormous amount of 
misunderstanding, confused government policies, enmity and even tragedy’ 
which continued as long as the duration of Czechoslovakia existed.
Of Slovak heritage (but an American mother), born in Hodonin on 
the Moravian-Slovak border, living much of his adult life  in Prague, 
Masaryk was the ideal example of this new identity. He was not, however, 
representative of either the experience or the thinking of much of the  
rest of the population.
Cited in Josef Kalvoda, The Genesis o f Czechoslovakia (Boulder: East 
European Monographs, 1986), p. 284.
Peter Petro, 'Slovak Literature: Loyal, Dissident and Émigré’ , in Skilling  
(ed.), p. 197.
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The two peoples were not the same: ’Slovakia was clearly quite 
unlike the Czech lands in language, customs, religious attitudes, economy 
and political consciousness. After the emergence of Czechoslovakia, there  
were not a few Slovak politicians who accused Czech politicians of failing  
to pay heed to these differences, and of a rtfu lly  creating the myth of a 
single Czechoslovak nation, by inventing a Czechoslovak language and a 
distinct Czechoslovak lite ra ry  trad ition ’.^ ®
Ignoring the tenuous foundations of the Czechoslovak identity, as 
seems to have been the case rig h t to the end of the Czechoslovak 
Federation, has been detrimental to the country. As much as the creation  
of the country was an achievement over conditions that suggested it 
should not have been created let alone flourished, its history thereafter  
would test the ab ility  of its leadership to navigate in hostile seas.
THE INTERWAR YEARS
The new Czechoslovak state was challenged by numerous problems, 
in ternally and externally. In te rn a lly , the new country replicated the 
multiethnic composition of its predecessor, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
The firs t  Czechoslovak census, taken in 1921, put the total population at 
13 600 000. The Czechs were the largest group, accounting for 6 747 000, 
which put them at ju s t over 50 per cent of the total population. Germans 
were the next largest ethnic group at 23.4 per cent, outnumbering the  
Slovaks who constituted only 15 per cent. Hungarians and Carpatho- 
Rusyns numbered 5.6 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively, and other 
minorities made up the rest.^^
Frederick M. Barnard, ’Political Culture: Continuity and Discontinuity’, in 
Skilling (ed.), Czechoslovakia 1916-88, p. 134.
Paul Robert Magocsi, ’Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns’, in Skilling, (ed.), p. 
105.
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In  a sp irit of re lative democracy and humanism, its leaders sought 
to make Czechoslovakia the Switzerland of Central Europe. While the 
Slovaks, who again numbered 2 million of the country’s 12 million people, 
or the Hungarians could be said to have had disproportionately small 
representation, ’The permanent participation of the German parties in the 
Czechoslovak parliamentary m ajority and in the Cabinet [was] the outcome 
not only of a Real polit ik on the part of the Germans, but also of the 
conciliatory attitude and conduct of the Czechs’. I n  the f irs t  
parliamentary elections, through proportional representation, the Germans 
received 25.6 per cent of the seats in the f irs t  P a r l i a m e n t . T h e  
gestures of the Czechoslovak leadership were not always accepted. Karel 
Kramaf, one of the founders of the Republic, had invited both the 
Bohemian Germans and the Hungarians to participate in the new 
government. Both, however, r e f u s e d . M e a n s  for representation certainly  
existed.
As much as the Czechoslovak leadership acknowledged the 
precarious internal s tructure of the country, so too were they aware of 
the fragile international surroundings in which Czechoslovakia found 
itself. The fledgling country was surrounded by the defeated and 
potentially revisionist countries of Germany, Austria and Hungary. 
Czechoslovakia was a product of the Versailles Peace; its surv iva l was 
predicated on peace generally and the durab ility  of the postwar Peace 
specifically. The country’s leadership therefore pursued a foreign policy 
which supported that Peace and its defining principles and institutions  
such as collective security and the League of Nations.
Hoch, ’Peace Conference’ , p. 18. 
Sobota, ’Political Separatism’, p. 42. 
Vondracek, Foreign Policy, p. 17.
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The Czechoslovak leaders followed this route not only out of 
necessity but also because they believed in these principles. The essence 
and origins of interw ar Czechoslovak foreign policy is a ttribu tab le  quite  
neatly to Edvard BeneS. This is not simply a result of BeneS having  
served as Foreign Minister un interruptedly from the foundation of the 
Republic in 1918 to Masaryk’s retirem ent as President in 1935 (when 
BeneS succeeded him to that Office). According to BeneS's wartime 
personal assistant, historian Edward Taborskÿ, it  was BeneS who made 
foreign policy in the F irs t Republic. Even though the democratic 
structures of the country ensured that the Foreign Minister was 
responsible to the Cabinet, and the Cabinet in tu rn  to Parliament, BeneS 
’became the deciding voice in foreign p o l i c y a n d  ’really  personified  
the nation’s foreign policy
Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy in the interw ar period rested  
substantially therefore with BeneS and it was his liberal Europeanism  
which provided the guiding principles. He undertook to demonstrate his 
personal and Czechoslovakia’s national commitment to liberal practices in 
the continent: ’He emerged as a major figure at the League of Nations, 
where he served six times as chairman of its Council, once as president 
of its Assembly, and several times as rapporteur on important issues 
brought before the League. In  his seventeen years as head of the  
Foreign Ministry, he made meaningful contributions to most major 
international conferences’.^ ^
Czechoslovakia adhered religiously to the principles of the League, 
collective security, and supersession of force with arb itration . The 
country ’pursued a policy of international loyalty ’ and did its ’best
Edward Taborsky, President Edvard BeneS: Between East and West, 1938- 
1948 (Stanford: Hoover Institu tion  Press, 1981), p. 2.
Wallace. Czechoslovakia, p. 157.
Taborsky. President p. 2.
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sincerely to allay tension wherever it existed’ . Writing in 1934, its 
intellectual representatives said that Czechoslovakia’s ’rise and existence 
[were] not merely the outcome of a victory but represented an important 
moral value’.
The ethos of the new country may have been encapsulated by one 
of its two most prominent interw ar authors, Karel Capek, whose sense of 
civic responsibility has been equated to his commitment to his lite ra ry  
work.^^
Although Benefe was said to be optimistic or idealistic, he was also 
’a realist who knew that optimism could surv ive only if the conditions 
that had nurtured it could be maintained or improved upon’ and he 
sought to achieve this aim in tangible forms once the series of Peace 
Treaties were finalised.
To prevent revisionism, BeneS undertook to create a series of 
defensive alliances. Czechoslovakia completed treaties f irs t with Yugoslavia 
in August 1920 and then with Romania in April 1921; those two completed 
the alliance triang le with a bilateral treaty  in June 1921.
The intention was to include Poland in the structure as well. This 
was perhaps the most promising of the successor-state treaties as 
Masaryk’s conception of relations with Warsaw extended as far as a 
Polish-Czechoslovak confederation.
With the rise of Hitler in Germany, the danger of revisionist claims 
on Czechoslovakia intensified. The Czechoslovak leadership was proactive  
in the face of this threat. Czechoslovakia renewed its support, both in 
principle and in practice, of the League and collective security. As if 
representative of the sp irit of his foreign policy, BeneS was in the Chair
Hoch, ’Peace Conference’, p. 19.
Igor Hajek, ’Traditions of Czech L iterature: Curses and Blessings’, in 
Skilling (ed.), p. 180.
Wallace, Czechoslovakia, p. 157.
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of the Plenary session of the League which moved to impose sanctions 
against Ita ly  for its invasion of Abyssinia.
Regardless of Czechoslovakia’s faith  in collective security, it also 
sought to expand its alliance system of the L ittle  Entente. Prague took 
advantage of Paris’s interest to counterbalance German revisionism with 
an ’eastern Locarno’ by securing an alliance in 1935 which pledged 
French m ilitary assistance in case of attack on Czechoslovakia.
Not satisfied with a security guarantee from Europe’s preeminent 
land force, BeneS sought to tie the Soviet Union into the system as well. 
In  the context of the trea ty  of mutual assistance signed between France 
and the USSR on 2 May 1945, BeneS completed one between Prague and 
Moscow two weeks later.
An important caveat was included in the Soviet-Czechoslovak 
agreement, namely, that the USSR would only come to Czechoslovakia’s aid 
in the event of French assistance being provided firs t. A practical 
geographic caveat arose as well. The Soviet Union shared no common 
border with Czechoslovakia through which to transport troops and Soviet 
forces dispatched to its assistance would have to transverse e ither Polish 
or Romanian te rrito ry . The Polish government was more hostile to the 
Soviet Union than to Germany and was known not to tolerate the idea of 
Soviet forces on its te rrito ry , even in transit. Studies of Romanian 
documents showed the Soviet Union expressly declined transporting  
m ilitary forces through Romania.
Historians have accused BeneS of an undue optimistic tru s t in the 
system of collective s e c u r i t y .H is  unflagging belief in common Western 
values probably prevented him from assessing how the changing  
distribution of power in Europe would force his allies to adopt self-
J ifi Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 
1934-1938 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U n ivers ity  Press, 1984), esp. pp. 194-201.
See, for example, Lufa, Transfer, as summarised in the foreword, p. xvii.
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serving policies which threatened his state. Referring to BeneS as 
'western’, Korbel writes that he had 'a profound faith  in the values of 
humanism and Western cultures’ and was 'a democrat dedicated to the 
evolutionary progress of justice and lib e rty ’.
At the same time, his policies were proactive and constructive. The 
same historians who attack BeneS’s naivety also acknowledge that 'To the  
eve of Munich...no other Central European state appeared to possess 
sturd ier guarantees of its te rrito ria l in teg rity  and national sovereignty  
than democratic Czechoslovakia’.^  ^ The Czechoslovak government did not 
rely exclusively on the m ilitary prowess of its larger allies. I t  undertook 
to build extensive defenses along its borders with Germany, and drew on 
its vast and sophisticated arms industry.
This meant that 'the defenses of Czechoslovkia would have proved 
more formidable in 1938 than in those of Poland and in 1939’ .^  ^ In  
retrospect, rather than simply being a one-way consumer of security, 
Czechoslovakia actually provided a substantial amount of potential m ilitary  
and diplomatic support to its Western democratic allies. I t  was only a 
question of those allies reading and assessing the situation in a similar 
fashion to Czechoslovakia.
Geography, however, scuttled Czechoslovakia’s adherence to, and 
propagation of, international morality as well as its efforts  to create an 
alliance system. 'Czechoslovakia’s geo-political placing did not help 
matters. Neither one nor the other of its mighty neighbours showed any 
readiness to understand or even tolerate its p luralist institutions or the 
in tegrity  of its democratic s p ir it ’.A m o n g  the earliest lessons was
Korbel, Czechoslovakia, p. 129.
Foreword, Lu&a, p. xvii.
Gerhard L. Weinberg, 'Munich After 50 Years’, Foreign A ffairs  67 (Fall 
1988), p. 174.
Barnard, ’Political C u lture’, p. 136.
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Poland’s designs to expand its possessions around TèSin in the northeast 
of Moravia.
The internal as well as external stability of Czechoslovakia suffered  
with the advent of the Great Depression. By 1933 the country had 738,000 
unemployed.^' The German minority was particu larly  affected as it was 
the industrial and consumer goods sectors that contracted most and they  
were located predominantly in the German areas. The resulting economic 
condition of the Sudeten Germans ’contributed to anti-Czech resentments 
and rendered them receptive to Nazi ideology’. T h e s e  sentiments both 
fed the success of, and were exploited by, Czechoslovakia’s indigenous 
National Socialist movement, headed by German Konrad Henlein.
THE FAILURE OF MUNICH
As Great Powers, Britain and France beUeved they understood their role 
in maintaining the international status quo. This involved conceding 
Germany’s demands to the incorporation of German-speaking peoples and 
their areas in Czechoslovakia.
For all the explicit agreements to defend Czechoslovakia against 
aggression, in July 1938 the French government issued a ’formal and 
explicit, but confidential, warning to Prague...that under practically no 
circumstances would it come to the defense of its Czechoslovak a lly ’.^  ^
French military intelligence also concluded that Czechoslovakia was not
Bradley, Velvet Revolution, p. xiii. The population was approximately 14 
million.
Seluckÿ, ’From Capitalism’, p. 158.
Weinberg, ’Munich’, p. 170.
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position, British support for Czechoslovakia was also eroding. In  June
1938, Winston Churchill told a Czechoslovak official that, despite his
attacks on Prime Minister Chamberlain's appeasement policy, he might
have adopted the approach were he in power.
There has been much debate on the extent to which the Soviet
Union was genuinely willing to assist Czechoslovakia. Throughout the
Munich crisis, the Soviet leadership made clear its willingness to support
beleaguered Czechoslovakia. A particular example was the speech Soviet
Foreign Minister Litvinov gave at the League of Nations on 21 September:
We intend to fu lfil our obligations under the [Franco-Soviet] pact, 
and together with France, to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia by 
the ways open to us. Our War Department is ready immediately to 
participate in a conference with the representatives of the French 
and Czechoslovak War Departments, in order to discuss the  
measures appropriate to the moment...the Soviet Union is prepared, 
in accordance with the Soviet-Czech pact, to render Czechoslovakia 
immediate and effective aid if France, loyal to her obligations, will 
render similar assistance....
Soviet gestures, however, have been seen in retrospect, not least by
many Czechoslovak participants like Taborskÿ, as insincere on S talin ’s
part. French unwillingness to commit assistance to Czechoslovakia
certain ly justified  Soviet inaction under the terms of the Treaties of
Mutual Assistance. But French inaction was also exploited by Moscow as
an excuse for its own inaction.
In  addition to signalling the end of the Czechoslovak state, Munich
was also a trag ic  and personal defeat for BeneS. I t  reversed the
achievements of his pre-1918 foreign policy career, 'when he had managed
Weinberg, 'Munich', p. 170.
Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. Volume 3 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 303.
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to secure representation in high international councils without having a 
state behind him’. With Munich, he 'had to suffer the humiliating  
experience of having his county’s destiny decided without the benefit of 
consultation with him. I t  was an ignominious end to a diplomatic career 
that had begun so b rillian tly ’.'*^
Much as the Committee on Czechoslovak Questions at the Paris Peace 
had warned, the loss of Bohemia’s mountain areas under the Munich 
agreement left Czechoslovakia vulnerable to German attack. This strategic  
loss is attributed to the Czechoslovak decision not to take up arms 
against Germany.
The way in which the Munich Agreement was constructed and the 
conditions it carried demonstrated how all of Czechoslovakia’s diplomatic 
efforts could not change the Great-Power management of the international 
system. The subject of the Agreement, Czechoslovakia was not invited to 
the talks (nor was the Soviet Union). Signed on 29 September, the 
Agreement allowed German troops into the ceded te rr ito ry  immediately on 
1 October and demanded that Czechoslovakia to complete its withdraw by 
10 October.'*^
The practical and security implications of the Agreement also 
underscored how the country had no say in its fate. Czechoslovakia lost 
all of its border areas with Germany and Austria. In  total, 29 percent of 
Czechoslovakia’s land was ceded, including 34 percent of the country’s 
population (of which a th ird  of those transferred  were Slavic). The lost 
land included 58 percent of Czechoslovakia’s coal industry , 65.3 percent 
of its glass, almost 60 percent of its textiles, and half of is paper
Paul E. Zinner, 'Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Eduard Benes’, in 
Gordon A. Craig and Felix G ilbert (eds). The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 122.
See, especially, point 4 of the Agreement, reproduced as Appendix I in 
John W. W heeler - Ben n ett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy  (London: Macmillan & 
Co. Ltd., 1948)., pp. 465-7.
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industries /^  Moreover, although the incorporation of German populations 
into the Reich served to ju s tify  the Munich Agreement, it still left a 
quarter million Germans within the redrawn Czechoslovak frontiers, a 
potential subversive element to undermine fu rth e r  the truncated state/"* 
The ceded te rrito ry  also included the bulk of Czechoslovakia’s 
m ilitary defenses, built into their own Maginot Line, as well as much of 
the country ’s heavy arms industry. From the annexation of the 
Sudetenland, Germany gained 1,213 a irc ra ft, 2,253 pieces of a rtille ry , 501 
an tia irc ra ft guns and 1,966 antitanks guns; 810 tanks; nearly two million 
pieces of smallarms; more than one billion rounds of smallarms ammunition 
and three million a rtille ry  shells. Ironically, ’Czechoslovak equipment 
exacted a heavy toll from the Allies’ in the course of the coming war."*^ 
The German desires were not satisfied. Less than a half a year 
after the Munich Agreement, German forces occupied Bohemia and Moravia 
despite a pledge by Britain and France in the Munich Agreement to 
guarantee Czechoslovakia’s new frontiers.'*^ Hitler personally celebrated 
the annexation into the Third Reich of the Czech Lands with a visit to 
Prague Castle on 15 March 1939. The political obliteration of 
Czechoslovakia was completed the next day when an independent Slovak 
Republic was created, unambiguously aligned with the Fascist powers.
To an extent, the post-Munich destruction of Czechoslovakia can be 
attribu ted  to Czechoslovak action. Its  in ternal ethnic divisions ensured 
that 'Czechoslovakia effective ly  dismembered itse lf’ , and the complete 
dissection of the country in March 1939 has been described as ’the
Korbel, Czechoslovakia, p. 152.
See Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 194.
Korbel, Czechoslovakia, p. 158.
See 'Annex to the Agreement’, re ferring  to paragraph 6 of the Anglo- 
French Proposals to the Czechoslovak Government (September 19, 1938). For 
the former, see Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, p. 466; and the latter at p. 457.
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in terp lay of historical factors reach [ in g ] its logical conclusions'/^ BeneS 
attempted to reverse the effects of Munich by diplomatic means. He 
despatched telegrams to the Munich signatories and to the League of 
Nations, condemning the Agreement as the ’great international crime’. He 
closed his appeal for assistance to the United States, delivered on 18 
March 1939 at the Univers ity of Chicago, in characteristic fashion: 'To all 
r ig h t-th in k in g  men and women everywhere, I give the motto of my 
beloved nation -  ''T ruth  Prevails'"
In  the same year as Munich, Karel Ôapek died. As the crisis of that 
year worsened, he wrote 'A Prayer for Tonight’, the last line of which 
read: 'Never can a nation be called small whose faith  is great enough to 
build a better fu tu re ’."^® When Capek died, it was as if his values of 
humanity went also.'’® I t  would fa ll to BeneS to build Czechoslovakia’s 
'better fu tu re ’.
THE FAILURE OF BENES’S BRIDGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Much as Masaryk had done during the F irst World War, BeneS constructed  
and pursued what would become his postwar foreign policy during the 
Second World War well before hostilities were concluded.
The nature of that policy, a combination of idealistic support of 
humanist values combined with practical security measures, mimicked 
aspects of its post-World War 1 predecessor.
Bradley, Velvet Revolution, p. xiv.
Cited in Hubert Ripka, Munich: Before and A fter  (London: Victor Gollancz 
Ltd., I939).iVu77ic/?, pp. 407 and 409.
Karel Capek, 'A Prayer for Tonight’, in Robert J. Kerner (ed.), 
Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years o f Independence (Berkeley: U n ivers ity  of 
California Press, 1940).
Paraphrased from Hâjek, 'Traditions’, p. 180.
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In  keeping with its tradition of universal humanist values, 
Czechoslovakia was an original signatory of the UN Charter. True, all 
Allies were effective ly such. Nevertheless, BeneS and Masaryk were 
personally active in the C harter’s conception and wording.
The humanism of the in ter war era, however, was not to be carried  
over fu lly  to BeneS’s postwar government. The policy of co-habitation  
with the large German minority was ended. Nearly three million Sudeten 
Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia on the grounds of collective 
guilt. The morality of the measure was not questioned at the time; in fact, 
it probably carried an a ir of rectitude, having been accepted by the 
Allies at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945. The nature of the 
expulsion, however, would re tu rn  as a moral problem among Czechoslovak 
dissidents in the 1970s and would play a significant part in defining 
post-Communist Czechoslovakia’s relations with Germany.
The practical aspects of BeneS’s post-World War 11 policy involved 
conceptualising the geographic location of the country; Czechoslovakia was 
to serve as a bridge between East and West. Bridges serve various 
purposes, but irrespective of the purposes, a bridge can only operate if 
it is secured at both ends. BeneS relied very  much on the bridgehead in 
the East, with the Soviet Union, in part because the Munich experience 
made him distrustfu l of the West. But he misunderstood the foundations of 
that eastern bridgehead. The question is the extent to which he was 
forced by circumstance to tru s t and re ly  on the Soviet Union or whether 
he was personally responsible for that failure.
BeneS bears substantial blame for at least two reasons. The firs t is 
because he seemed himself to have assessed the Soviet threat but 
misperceived it; the second lies with his determination to resist 
aggression and subterfuge, but, this all the more damning, his distinct 
failure to act when the need arose.
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BeneS sensed the untrustw orthy nature of Soviet policy as early as
15 December 1939. BeneS was informed by the head of the Czechoslovak
legation in Moscow, Zdenêk Fier linger, that Soviet authorities demanded
its activities terminate by January 1940. BeneS called the message 'quite a
sad message’. Even six weeks earlier, BeneS expressed his expectation
that, despite the results of Soviet inaction during the Munich crisis,
Czechoslovak-Soviet relations would enjoy 'mutual sympathy and
friendship ’. He also hoped that the Soviet Union 'would do nothing that
would do us harm in the political sphere’.
When the legation was closed down eight months later, he was more
fierce in his judgment of Soviet designs:
The Soviets will be brutal and egotistic in the making of 
the ir politics and will change them whenever they find it 
suitable. The goal will be twofold. The protection of their 
te rrito ry  and their interests by means of using other states 
for that purpose. And that includes Czechoslovakia. Their 
ultimate revolutionary aims will continue; otherwise, though, 
our co-operation with them here and at home must continue.
Do, however, keep these facts continuously in mind, don’t 
forget them and proceed carefully.
Despite his suspicions, BeneS remained sympathetic to the Soviets.
This probably accounts for his willingness to negotiate with Stalin
during the war, and, particu larly, for his determination to tru s t the
Soviet leader. In  fact, he had little  option, illustrating  how the nature of
the international system contoured his actions. The betrayal of Munich
caused Czechoslovak disillusionment with Britain and France. He was also
displeased with their hesitation to recognise his wartime government and
the time taken before each rescinded the Munich Agreement. BeneS
therefore was inclined to approach the Soviets more openly than he might
This paragraph draws from Walter Ullmann, 'BeneS Between East and 
West’, in Skilling (ed.), p. 55.
Beneâ to Czechoslovak underground, 2 August 1940 in Edvard Taborskÿ, 
Presidentûv sekretaP vypovîdâ, Vol. I I  (Zurich, 1978), p. 302, cited in ibid.
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have o t h e r w is e . In  1943 he began concrete negotiations with Stalin, 
offering Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. One concession he received in 
re tu rn  was Soviet consent to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. 
Although BeneS might have found his dealings with Stalin workable and 
advantageous, developments following the close of the war gave a 
d ifferent scenario.
The three years a fte r 1945 were 'an uneasy interregnum  which 
nourished hopes both within the communist and the non-communist camp 
that Czechoslovakia could serve as a bridge between East and West, and 
work out its own solution within a possible fusion of Masarykism and 
Marxism’.
However, BeneS’s policy of giving Czechoslovakia a delicate bridging  
role in Europe was overtaken by realpolitik, giving credence to Jan 
Masaryk’s more crass definition of the u tility  of bridges: they endure  
indignities from the people and horses who cross them.""^
THE 1948 COMMUNIST PUTSCH
The ability  of the Czechoslovaks to exercise choice was put to decisive 
test in the three years a fte r the end of World War 11. By 1948 the Soviet 
atomisation and penetration of all countries in the region was nearly  
complete and clear lines of division were being drawn across Europe. In  
that context, it is fa ir to conclude that 'As 1948 approached, 
Czechoslovakia’s position between East and West was becoming
See Taborsky, Bene5, passim.
Barnard, 'Political Cu lture’, p. 137.
Paraphrased from George Klein, 'Czechoslovakia: Views of the Bridge’, 
Problems of Communism Vol. XXVI, No. 6 (November-December 1977), p. 60.
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untenable’.N e v e r th e le s s , many actions were available to the 
Czechoslovak leadership and people that could have resulted in d ifferen t 
outcomes. F irst, Czechoslovakia’s international position was d iffe ren t from 
that of any of its neighbours. More importantly, the series of events 
within Czechoslovakia leading up to February 1948 suggest th a t the  
Communist takeover could have been prevented.
Czechoslovakia had been an allied country. Therefore, it conceivably 
could have received d ifferen t treatm ent than belligerent countries like  
Hungary and Romania. Unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia faced no clear and 
specific designs on its te rr ito ry  (other than Ruthenia, which BeneÈ had 
offered to Stalin) or on its sovereignty. The Soviet Army was voluntarily  
withdrawn from the country a fte r the war, although the secret security  
forces remained.
In tern a l developments might also have had a decisive impact. The 
terms given to the events of February 1948 define the d iffe ren t 
interpretations given to them. For democrats, what happened was a ’coup’ 
or ’subversion’.C o m m u n is ts  used indecent and unjust tactics against 
democratic, if  naive, coalition partners who would not have expected such 
an outcome. This was particu larly  because domestic politics in 
Czechoslovakia were resumed in a positive, inclusive and conciliatory  
fashion.
Before analysing the responsibility for the Communist takeover in 
Czechoslovakia, it is f irs t  necessary to o ffer a factual account.
In  October 1945 a provisional National Assembly of 300 deputies was 
established. A coalition Cabinet was created with the Communists in 
charge of eight ministries, including the In te rio r and Inform ation. The
Condoleezza Rice, ’The Czechoslovakian Secret Police’, in Jonathan R. 
Adelman (ed.). Terror and Communist Politics: (Boulder: Westview, 1984), p. 
160.
For example, Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion o f Czechoslovakia 
(Princeton: Princeton U nivers ity  Press, 1959).
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latter post allowed the Communists to engage in censorship by exercising 
control over the d istribution of n e w s p r in t . In  May 1946, fu ll elections 
were held which have generally been deemed free and fa ir. (As much as 
Communists might have been said to have enjoyed extensive popular 
support, the November 1947 U niversity student elections, 'always a 
reliable indicator of the political mood of the country, resulted in a 
telling 74 percent v ictory  for democratic candidates, while the Communists 
garnered only 20 percent’ .^ ®) The Communist Party  (CCP) won not a 
majority but a clear p lu ra lity  of votes. As a result, it gained a ninth  
Cabinet post. The Communists proceeded to extend Communist influence 
over key aspects of society, especially by appointing their supporters to 
positions under the ir m inisterial control, especially the police. When the  
non-Communist Minister of Justice, Prokop Drtina, exposed this practice 
the polarisation of internal Czechoslovak politics came to a head. This 
provoked the most severe disagreement among the coalition members. 
Ultimately, the non-communist ministers resigned to protest tactics of 
Communists, expecting that they were simply making a gesture. BeneS 
however, accepted their resignations.
International developments during the period helped to polarize 
internal politics. In  March 1947 President Truman pledged US support to 
those fighting internal or external threats to the ir sovereignty in the  
doctrine that took his name and the Soviet Union blocked Czechoslovakia’s 
aspirations to join the Marshall Plan.
Even though a Communist takeover seemed imminent, and BeneS at 
best was unw ittingly perm itting it, BeneS attempted to stand up to 
Czechoslovak Communist leader, Element Gottwald. He challenged Gottwald 
on 23 February by declaring 'I  will act as I did in September 1938. I
Wallace, Czechoslovakia, p. 257. 
Korbel, Czechoslovakia, p. 244.
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shall not give up, be sure of th a t’. In  the end, as in 1938, BeneS 
acquiesced to what seemed a fa it accompli. On 25 February, BeneS 
accepted a list of appointees to a new Cabinet. I t  was thoroughly  
dominated by Communists and Com mu nist-ap pointées. The period of 
pluralist government, one which included genuine non-Communists, had 
ended.
Czechoslovakia’s fall into the Communist orb it has often been 
described as inescapable. Considering the Soviet Union’s commanding 
presence in Central Europe, the heightening tensions of the Cold War by 
1947, and Stalin ’s personal determination to dominate the region, it is 
d ifficu lt to suggest that Czechoslovakia’s fate could have been made any 
different.
Blame has often been attributed to two general modes of action 
which could have otherwise halted the takeover. One was the way in 
which democracy functions: it was perhaps naive of democratic activists  
and supporters to expect in February 1948 that liberal-dem ocratic niceties 
and constitutionalism would save the day. The historiographic question 
asked is whether the non-Communist ministers ’really  believefd] that 
militant communists would be swayed by the niceties of democratic and 
constitutional usage? They somehow must have, because we have no 
evidence that they even contemplated a lternative plans. There were 
[generally] no democratic mass rallies and demonstrations to counteract 
well-organized communist shows of force, there were no param ilitary  
formations on the side of the democrats to meet the well-armed, 
communist-controlled factory militias, no thought whatsoever that force  
might have to be met with force. Did the democractic ministers really  
think that in handing their resignations to the ailing president they had 
done all that was expected of them?’ ®^
Ullmann, ’BeneS’, pp. 59-60.
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The second aspect of blame was BeneS’s own mode of behaviour 
during the crisis. In  particular, he has been accused of making critical 
errors  which, if not d irectly  aiding the Communist subversion, then at 
least created conditions that permitted it. F irst, he returned to liberated  
Czechoslovakia 'b itte r about the Munich agreement and without Masaryk’s 
magnanimity’. While he proclaimed the construction of a new democracy, 
the consequence of his vindictiveness was that he 'disadvantaged his 
former conservative Allies, 'because they had betrayed him at the time of 
Munich," and shortsightedly favored the communists with disproportionate  
political concessions’.®^
Even though BeneS had suffered two strokes, observers discounted 
his health as significant grounds to diminish his personal responsibility  
for events.®^ Joseph Korbel spoke to him on 12 January, as the crisis 
moved to its final stage, and found him 'a sick man’ but 'mentally 
a le rt’.®^
Whatever may have been done d ifferently  on the domestic scene, 
historical accounts of the events convey two tru ths: firs t, that, out of 
passivity or deference the Czechoslovaks permitted the takeover; and 
second, that, irrespective of internal resistance, Czechoslovakia’s 
international position dictated its fate. As one Czech historian writes: 'The 
Soviet presence in Central Europe predetermined the final outcome - the 
taking of power by the Communist monopoly’.®"^
However the events of February 1948 may be labelled and explained, 
it was quickly seen that Communist rule in Czechoslovakia disconcerted 
most people in the country, including many of those who had supported
®^ Bradley, Velvet Revolution, p. xv.
®^ See, for example, Ullmann, 'BeneS’, p. 59.
®'^  Korbel, Czechoslovakia, p. 246.
®'* Karel Kaplan, The Short March (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), p. vii.
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the revolution. Among those was Milan Kundera. The novelist had 
proclaimed unabashedly that he and his intellectual friends supported the  
advent of communism, that it was the better people in Czech society who 
wanted communism.®''
But their expectations of communism would be disappointed. A 
harbinger of the nature of communist ru le was shown in the regime’s 
subsequent depiction of Klement Gottwald marking the advent of socialism. 
On the w intery day of 28 February 1948, Gottwald proclaimed socialism in 
Czechoslovakia from a balcony over Wenceslas Square. His Communist 
colleague Vladimir dem entis put his own hat on Gottwald’s bare head. 
Later, dem entis would be denounced as an enemy of the people and 
air brushed from the photo of the proclamation every  Czechoslovak would 
come to know. All that remained of dem entis in official h istory was his 
hat.®®
Similarly, on the cu ltural front, those who ’broke into paeans’ and 
wrote tributes to the Soviet forces, like the poet Vladimir Holan, were 
denounced and had the ir work suppressed for years.®^ Political show 
trials were to follow.®®
However d ifficu lt the Czechoslovaks found the consequences of the 
Communist takeover, they received it by their own hand. Even an ti­
communist historians are willing to acknowledge that, ’The peculiarity of
®® Genuine support for Communism in Slovakia d iffered  from that of the 
Czech lands. For example, in the 1946 election, 62 percent of Slovaks voted 
for the conservative Democratic Party, and only 30 percent for the 
Communist Party, a result which demonstrated the ’continuing strength of 
conservative nationalism and the relative weakness of communism among 
Slovaks’. Skilling, In te rru p te d  Revolution, p. 24.
®® Paraphrased from Milan Kundera, Kniha smichu a zapomnéni (Toronto: 
Sixty-E ight Publishers, Corp., 1981), p. 9.
6 7 Hâjek, ’Traditions’, p. 181.
®® For an overview, see Jihi Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950- 
1954 (Stanford: Stanford Univers ity Press, 1971). A personal account by one 
of the few survivors is given by Deputy Foreign Minister A rtur London in 
On Trial (London: Macmillan, 1970).
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the Czechoslovak experience was that in February 1948 the Communists 
achieved the ir intentions with the consent and support of a large part of 
the population’.
The experience would become, as Svitak likened it, like that of The 
Grapes o f Wrath: the large character gives what he thinks is a loving 
embrace which kills his petite g irlfriend .'^
COMMUNIST RULE, 1948-1960
After 1948, Czechoslovakia became a model Stalinist state. Nationalisation 
continued and the collectivisation of agricu ltu re proceeded.
The regime also initiated political transformation. The totalising  
nature of the regime was fe lt as the whole of society, as elsewhere in 
socialist regimes, was brought into the P arty -S tate  system. This was done 
by the forcible inclusion of v irtu a lly  all of the population in official 
organs, while unofficial organisations like the important and popular p re­
communist youth movement Sokol were disbanded.
Not content with the complicity of the population, it underscored its 
power through coercion and brutal example. As in the Soviet Union in the 
1930s and in neighbouring East European regimes a fte r 1948, model show 
trials were held. Leading victims included General Secretary Rudolf 
Slânskÿ and dementis, who was Foreign Minister from 1948 to 1950. 
Emprisonment or execution was not reserved for the best sons of the 
Communist movement, but extended into the broader population. The 
Minister for Security, Karol Bacilek, was responsible for the purges. He
Kaplan, Short March, p. vii.
Svitak, Unbearable.
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explained during the Prague Spring that he was fu lfilling  Soviet 
instructions/^
After 1953, in nominal response to Soviet liberalisation after Stalin’s 
death, the Czechoslovak regime embarked on the 'New Course’, relaxing 
the industrialisation and collectivisation drive of the preceding five years. 
E fforts  were made to improve the standard of living, with some economic 
reorientation towards agricu ltu ra l, light industria l and consumer goods.
Between 1948 and 1960, the Communists were able if not to erase 
then at least to suppress dominant Czechoslovak national trends but they  
were resurgent by the beginning of the 1 9 6 0 s .T h a t  resurgence was 
combined with recognition, even and especially by the so-called ’victors  
of Feb ru ary ’, of the negative effects of the Communist course.
In  the early 1960s, therefore, the regime attempted new political 
tactics. The report of the Central Committee (CC) of the CCP in November 
1961 'adopted a clever line of symbolic de-Stalin isation’. On the visible  
side this extended to the removal of the world’s largest statue of Stalin, 
erected rem arkably in 1955 as Khrushchev prepared his programme of de- 
Stalinisation. (The monument was later sold to West Germany as scrap 
metal). Gottwald’s body, on public display since his death in 1953 was 
fina lly  in terred . Substantive political change, however, did not occur, and 
President Antonin Novotnÿ, himself associated with Czechoslovak Stalinism, 
proclaimed that there was no need to revise the verdicts on the purge 
tria ls.
Korbel, Czechoslovakia, p. 255.
Skilling, In te rru p ted  Revolution, p. 30.
Ib id., p. 3.
See, for example, Kaplan, Short March, p. vii. 
See Skilling, In te rru p ted  Revolution, pp. 39-40.
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The few political concessions that were made backfired. This was, 
f irs t, because they recentralised as much as they allowed for initiative; 
and second, because the political changes failed to address an objectively  
worsening and ever-increasing ly visible economic decline. More than even 
the resurgence of interw ar Czechoslovak political culture, the looming 
economic crisis compelled the regime towards a liberalisation programme.
1960-1968: FORCED INTO REFORM
By 1960 the country began to notice the effects of economic decline. 
Largely unscathed by the Second World War, the recovery of industria l 
and agricu ltu ra l output in Czechoslovakia was smoother than in 
neighbouring states. This allowed the economy to float along, although the 
rea lity  was that the productiv ity  of capital declined continuously.
In  1961-63 economic growth stopped altogether, 'an event without 
parallel in the communist world’. The fall of national income in 1962 and 
1963 was accompanied by a scarcity of consumer goods.
The regime responded by attribu ting  the economic decline to the 
(limited) decentralisation permitted in 1958 which it tried  to reverse at 
the 1962 Party Congress. Nevertheless, the fa ll in productiv ity  continued 
and became unmistakably evident to all as the use of street lights was 
curtailed to conserve e lectric ity .
Under the th ird  Five-Year Plan which was to run  1961-65, the 
stipulated increases in national income was 42%, industria l output 56%, and 
agricutural output 22%. The results, however, were substantially lower, 
with national income increasing only by 10%, industria l output by 29% and 
agricu lture actually contracting by 0.4%.
Vladimir V. Kusin, In te llectual Origins o f the Prague Spring  (Cambridge: 
The University Press, 1971), p. 88.
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The economic situation both called for and permitted wider, more 
free  economic discussion and important economic studies emerged from 
this debate. More than providing solutions to the economic malaise, these 
studies represented attacks on specific policies in Czechoslovakia and on 
tenets of Soviet-bloc socialism.
Among these works were the Commission Report headed by Radovan 
Richta entitled Civilization a t the Crossroads: Social and Human 
Implications o f the Scientific Totalitarian Revolution, which was firs t  
published in 1966.^^
The study claimed that it was in keeping with Communist Party, 
explaining its methodology as 'the f irs t steps in a Marxist approach to the 
scientific and technical revolution, contained in the Programme of the 
CPSU’.^  ^ The authors also pronounced that American studies failed to 
confront the 'sociological and anthropological dimensions’ of the Scientific 
Technological Revolution (STR);^^ no doubt this was a genuinely-fe lt 
observation, but it was also one that could serve to appease ideological 
scrutineers in the Czechoslovak or Soviet Communist Parties.
The economic impulses behind reform were crucial. At the same time 
a general intellectual and cultural revolution was occurring in the early  
1960s. Scholars 'as contributors to cultural weeklies and in scholarly 
journals and conferences, in the daily round of lectures and discussions, 
in books, were carrying through what amounted to an intellectual 
revolution'.
Radovan Richta and a research team. Civilization at the Crossroads: Social 
and Human Implications o f the Scientific and Technical Revolution (Prague: 
International Arts and Sciences Press Inc., 1968).
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 14.
Skilling, In te rru p ted  Revolution, p. 91.
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The whole reform movement could be seen, especially in its cultural 
aspects, as a departure from Soviet norms. T h e  basic quality underlying  
the transition from Stalinism to democratic socialism was seen in a "retu rn  
to Europe" in the general cu ltural sense. Practically, this was taken to 
mean that socialism should be coupled with the best of world culture in 
the field of economy and technology, in the democratism of the political 
system and in spiritual culture. The goals, thus conceived, had no 
precedent’. While such reforms promised a hybrid  of socialist and Western 
practice, at least cu lturally  the Czechoslovak reformers were also 
dispensing with the ’"Russian"’ , "Asian" likeness of Communism’, and 
instead were reverting  back to ’the ir own traditions, they had to reve rt  
to Europe’.81
1968 AND INTERVENTION
On, or about, 20 January 1968, an array  of various Party  specialists 
assembled. The group’s chairman Drahomir Kolder explained that their  
purpose was to enumerate ’the things which h u rt us most and make 
people discontent’.8^  Ironically missing from the distinguished group was 
any representative of the working class. While the Action Programme has 
been labelled a ’managerial and technocratic manifesto’ drawing on the 
works of Rich ta, economist Ota Sik, and Zdenèk Mlynah,8^ it also 
reflected the diverse philosophical undercurrents of the period. I t  
similarly attempted, in a programmatic form, to present a mediation 
between these conflicting views, in particular through the works of
81 Kusin, Intellectual Origins, pp. 100-1.
81^ Ib id ., pp. 63-64, citing Pavel T igrid , 'Czechoslovakia, 1969: A Post-mortem’, 
Survey  (Autumn 1969), p. 152.
88 Benjamin B. Page, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, 1963-1968 
(Amsterdam: B.R. Gruner B.V., 1973).
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philosopher Karel Kosik and Richta/"^ and thereby provide an alternative  
formula to remove the corruptions in socialism caused by Stalinism. The 
Action Programme sought to overcome alienation through the provision of 
institutions by which man can again possess some control of the  
determination of his life. Many of the reforms which came to bear 
Dubfcek’s name were undertaken by others, although of course he 
represented and exemplified 'the s p ir it’ of the programme.
In  its firs t section, the Action Programme concluded, as did the 
Richta Commission and economist Radoslav Seluckÿ, that implementation of 
socialism in Czechoslovakia had harmful consequences. Likewise, it 
attribu ted  those problems to centralised control and decision-making, 
which resulted because '[sjocialist democracy was not expanded in time, 
[so that the] methods of revolutionary dictatorship deteriorated into 
bureaucracy and became an impediment to progress in all spheres of life  
in Czechoslovakia’ .^ ^
The Party, in addition, according to the Action Programme, removed 
sub jectiv ity  from society. I t  is here that the Action Programme made its 
noted attack on Lenin’s notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat: 'In  
the past, the leading role of the Party was often conceived as a 
monopolistic concentration of power in the hands of Party  bodies. This 
corresponds to the false thesis that the Party  was the instrum ent of the 
dictatorship of the pro letaria t’. The Action Programme declared '[tjh is  
harmful conception weakened the in itia tive and responsibility of the State,
Karel Kosik, Dialectics o f the Concrete: A S tudy on Problems o f Man and 
World (Dordrecht, Holland: D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1976). Following the 
book’s appearance in 1963, 'it  was no longer possible for Czech philosophy 
as a whole to reve rt to apologetics of policies and political systems’. Kusin, 
In te llectual Origins, p. 51.
Hugh Lunghi, 'In troduction’, in Paul Elio, (ed.), Dubcek’s B lueprint fo r
Freedom: His Original Documents Leading to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia
(London: William Kim her, 1969), p. 18.
Action Programme, p. 10, in Blueprint, p. 132.
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economic and social institutions and damaged the P a rty ’s authority , and 
prevented it from carrying out its real function’. The role of the Party, 
the trac t elaborates, "is not to become a universal 'caretaker of the 
society, to bind all organizations and every  step taken in life  by its 
directives’ . Instead, the mission of the Party  lay 'prim arily  in arousing 
socialist in itia tive, in showing the ways and actual possibilities of 
communist perspectives, and in winning over all workers for them 
through systematic persuasion, as well as by the personal examples of 
communists’.^ ^
For the sake of economic development, the Action Programme called 
for the contraction of the commanding role of the Party. Only through  
allowing the free  activ ity  of interests can the political environment for 
the New Economic Mechanism be laid, so that, following from reasoning of 
the Richta group, the scientific and technological revolution could begin 
in Czechoslovakia.
The recognition of interests in society was not only a precondition  
for economic development, but also served to re in tegrate  the atomised 
elements of society into a totality . The Action Programme referred  to 
specific 'in terest groups’®® both in an appeal for political support, but 
also in its practical assessment of the philosophical means by which to 
achieve political participation in democracy. I t  is necessary to examine the  
interests which the Action Programme acknowledges in order to assess 
how it sought to reformulate a social to ta lity .
The nationalities question received substantial attention in the 
Programme, particu larly  the political and constitutional status of the 
Slovaks. This concern was not limited to the Programme. For example, in 
his famous 1 April 1968 speech, which reflected his humanist concerns.
8 7 Ib id., p. 22, in ibid., p. 144.
®® This is not a term found in the Action Programme, but will be used to 
indicate the atomized entities that the trac t identified.
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Dubtek called for a federative system to resolve the nationality question 
in accordance with Leninism, and stated that this would be provided for 
under the Action Programme, although he acknowledged that the  
arrangem ent would still require  improvement.®®
The Action Programme conceded that the powers of Slovak national 
organizations had been undercut throughout the 1950s and then in the 
1960 Czechoslovak Constitution,®® a document which Skilling cites as 
having 'openly articulated extreme centralism and reduced even the forms 
of Slovak self-governm ent to n il’.®^  The Action Programme submitted 
numerous corrective measures, including: Awarding of ju risd iction  over 
economic planning for Slovakia to an strengthened Slovak National 
Council, assurance of equal e lig ib ility  of the two nationalities for national 
appointments, and guarantees that the Slovak minority could not be 
outvoted on matters concerning the constitutional v iab ility  of Slovakia,®^ 
and guarantees of equal education opportunities for minorities and 
minority say on nationality education.®®
The reform efforts were codified in the Action Programme which was 
approved by the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) Plenum on 5 April 
and published five days later. Despite all of the doctrinal and policy 
changes implied by its contents, care was also taken so that it would not 
be construed as revising or deviating from socialist principles, it was 
w ritten 'in the traditional jargon of apparatus documents’.®"*
®® 'The Speech by Comrade Alexander Dubcek’, p. 35, in Elio, (ed.), B lueprin t 
p. 97.
®® Action Programme, p. 37, in Blueprint, p. 37.
®^ Skilling, In te rru p ted  Revolution, p. 10.
®® Action Programme, pp. 36-40, in Blueprint, pp. 158-62.
®® Ib id., p. 78, in Blueprint, p. 200.
®“* Skilling, In te rrup ted  Revolution, p. 218.
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Nevertheless, many of the practical domestic proposals of the 
Prague Spring challenged communist orthodoxy. The promise of freedom of 
assembly and association meant that voluntary popular organisations could 
emerge and thereby necessarily challenge the supremacy and centrality  of 
the P arty -S ta te  system. Provisions were made to limit the excesses of this  
freedom, so that while minority views were to be tolerated, they were 
only to be so in the context of majority rule. Personal and property  
rights were to be ensured, with the added provision for compensation 
resulting from 'illegal decisions of state organs’.
The reform movement was cautious with regards to the 
reformulation of Czechoslovak foreign policy. Official declarations 
generally avoided foreign policy matters en tire ly  for the f irs t  three  
months. As in other areas of government, the reform regime installed new 
people in positions of foreign-policy decision-making. These included 
Prime Minister Cernik who was also responsible for defence and foreign  
policy: ValeS who was made Minister of Foreign Trade; General M. Dzur as 
the new Defence Minister and Jihi Pelikan as Chairman of the Federal 
Assembly’s Foreign Affairs C o m m itte e .J o s e f Smrkovskÿ specified that 
the cou ntry ’s foreign policy orientation would not change. As if to avoid 
the fatal mistake of Imre Nagy’s regime in 1956 declaring that it would 
withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Treaty, Smrkovskÿ affirm ed that 
Czechoslovakia was 'part of the socialist camp’ and that its relations with 
the Soviet Union were 'untouchable’, even if he did also say those 
relations had to be based on equality (which, s tric tly  as rhetoric, 
presumably was acceptable to Soviet doctrine).
Ibid., p. 220. 
fb/d., p. 622.
G Skilling, In te rru p ted  Revolution, p. 629.
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At the same time however, Dubtek’s Foreign Minister Jihi Hajek 
made statements on at least two issues which must have disconcerted the 
Soviet Union, and expressed views on others which diverged from bloc 
policy. The firs t was his positive assessment of Czechoslovakia’s interw ar 
participation in the Trip le Entente, which he called a 'great and useful 
idea’ which was 'at the least, an expression of an independent, active 
foreign p o l i c y H e  wrote this in later July, as most of Czechoslovakia’s 
WTO partners intensified the ir verbal attacks on the reform programme.
Hajek also seemed to make conditional Czechoslovakia’s permanent 
alliance with the Soviet Union. He questioned the universal applicability of 
the tenet 'with the Soviet Union for e te rn ity ’ by stating it needed to be 
considered in the context of Czechoslovakia’s 'specific conditions’. In  
addition to the two doctrinal departures, he commented on Soviet bloc 
foreign policy. He disparaged Czechoslovakia’s severance of relations with 
Israel after the Six Day War, which all bloc countries save Romania did, 
and proposed modification of his country’s relations towards West 
Germany.
The Soviet Union was alarmed for several reasons. Among them were 
the pressures exerted by personalities and interests w ithin the Soviet 
Union and the bloc. The former included the concern of the F irs t 
Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party that there would be a 
nationalist spillover; the la tte r the threat fe lt by the East German regime 
by what it deemed Czechoslovak revisionism.^®^
Cited in Korbel, Czechoslovakia, p. 295.
Ibid.
u)o pqj. fears of revisionism in d ifferent parts of the Soviet bloc, see 
especially J ifi Valenta, The Soviet In tervention in Czechoslovakia (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins U n ivers ity  Press, 1979/1991); and Grey Hod nett and Peter 
J. Potichnyj, The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra; Australian  
National University, 1970).
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A standard assessment of the motivation behind the intervention  
was the strategic fear Czechoslovakia’s allies had in case the reforms 
were taken fu rth e r. I f  Czechoslovakia deviated enough to weaken or even 
remove the bonds of international socialism, such as the supremacy of the  
Communist Party, commonality of the socialist language, and allegiance to 
M o s c o w , t h e n  it would threaten the strategic in te g rity  of the bloc.
The m ilitary supply and communications lines linking the northern and 
southern tiers of the WTO ran through Czechoslovakia.
Although the reform movement was cautious about its foreign policy 
orientation, Dubfcek im plicitly recognised Czechoslovakia’s central 
geographic position in a February 1968 public speech, when he called for 
the introduction of normal relations with all European states irrespective  
of divergences in political-social s y s t e m s . T h e  fa ta lity  of location was 
later re iterated by Dubfcek when he answered a question as to why 
Czechs and Slovaks did not resist the intervention of 1968 with: 'Look at 
the map’.^ "^*
To accept Dubbek as a simple victim of geography, however, is 
inaccurate. As with BeneS in 1948, options were open to him. The Soviet 
Union gave clear signals as to its objection to the reform ist course.
In  March 1968 the heads of WTO Communist Parties (including the 
CCP), save Romania’s Ceau^escu, met in Dresden. The meeting issued a 
communiqué which called for 'vigilance against the 'aggressive intentions 
and subversive actions of the imperialist forces,’ emphasized the necessity
For an overview of the 'ties that bind’ in relations among socialists see, 
Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of In ternational Relations, and Karen 
Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform (2nd ed).
See, for example, Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring  
(Berkeley: U n ivers ity  of California Press, 1984).
See Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring  (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles and London: Un ivers ity of California Press, 1984), p. 18.
1 0 4 The Times, 21 August 1990.
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for ’fu rth e r  consolidation of the socialist countries / and expressed 
confidence that 'the working class and all the working people of the 
Czechoslovak Republic, under the leadership of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia, will ensure the fu rth e r development of socialist 
construction in the country ’/^ '’
Representatives of the WTO Communist Parties that had met in 
Dresden assembled again on 15 July in Warsaw. This time representatives  
from Czechoslovakia were not included. The meeting produced the 'Warsaw 
le tte r ’, addressed to the Czechoslovak Central Committee which apprised 
the Czechoslovak leadership that the socialist community could not 'assent 
to hostile forces pushing your country o ff the path of socialism and 
creating the threat that Czechoslovakia may break away from the socialist 
commonwealth’. T h e  le tter instructed the Czechoslovak leadership that 
its political course was 'no longer your own internal a ffa ir ’ and stipulated  
that every Communist Party had 'responsibility not only to its own 
working class...but also to the international working class’.
Unambiguously, it added, 'In  this struggle, you may count on the 
solidarity and comprehensive assistance of the fra terna l socialist 
countries’.
In  addition to issuing public warnings to the Czechoslovak regime, 
the Soviet Union also undertook direct talks. They began on 29 July in 
Cierna nad Tisou, the border crossing on the Czechoslovak side of the 
common fron tier. The pressure on the Czechoslovak leadership to consent 
to Soviet demands should have been obvious. Preceding the meeting, 
Soviet press accounts of the Czechoslovak reforms were characterised by 
increased hostility. In  addition, the Soviet Army, having entered the
Korbel, Czechoslovakia, pp 301-2, citing Remington, Winter in Prague, pp. 
55-7.
Cited in Skilling, In te rru p ted  Revolution, p. 290.
Cited in Korbel. Czechoslovakia, p. 303-4.
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country for exercises, remained in Czechoslovakia as the talks commenced, 
while the largest postwar movement of Soviet forces was underway in 
Czechoslovakia’s three East European neighbours.^®® Dubfcek, however, 
left the talks firm ly supporting the reform programme and believing that 
Czechoslovak sovereignty was secure.^®®
Dubfcek’s confidence may have been buoyed by the popular support 
for his stand. The Warsaw le tte r generated unprecedented support among 
Czechoslovaks for Dubtek’s government, which was seen as 'a significant 
factor underlying the firmness of the leadership’s resistance to Soviet 
pressure and may have warded off m ilitary intervention by demonstrating 
the absence of local support for such action’.^ ®^
Although Dubfcek may have understood the warning given to him by 
the Soviet Union, he chose not to re treat from the Action Programme. He 
would also have faced domestic criticism for backing down, as was 
demonstrated by playw right Vaclav Havel. He wrote to Dubtek in August 
1969 warning him against recanting and noting the morahty of such an 
act which, even if it not immediately, could have political results in the 
longer-term.
Throughout the evening of 20-21 August, however, forces of five  
Warsaw Pact countries entered Czechoslovakia. Soviet m ilitary forces, some 
already present in the country from the earlier ’exercises’, numbered the 
most and secured strategic and communications points. Hungarian forces 
came into southern Slovakia; East German forces crossed the northwestern
®^® Skilling, In te rru p ted  Revolution, p. 297.
®^® Ibid., p. 306.
^^ ® Ibid., p. 324.
Vaclav Havel, Dàikovÿ vÿslech (Praha: Melantrich, 1989), pp. 102-3.
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frontiers; and Bulgarian units were flown into Prague’s a irport.
Soviet ambassadors informed the Western governments to which they were 
accredited that the events constituted a ’domestic’ a ffa ir and was assumed 
in order to ensure peace.
In face of both the Warsaw Pact’s m ilitary intervention and the 
Soviet Union’s political manipulations, the Czechoslovaks did t r y  to take  
action of their own. The foremost political ac tiv ity  was the holding of the 
extraordinary Congress of the CCP, which had orig inally  been scheduled 
for September. I t  was moved ahead to 22 August and held in secret in a 
factory in the Prague quarter of Vysofcany, from which the Congress 
subsequently took its name.^^^ Small, individual in itiatives included the 
removal of street signs in order to obfuscate the Soviet occupation. 
Otherwise, resistance was limited. This was in part due to what might be 
considered the balanced view of the Czechs of national survival: as in the 
Second World War, it is better to avoid large-scale, potentially fu tile  
resistance which could result in the obliteration of the nation. In  that 
way honour might not be preserved, but the nation would be.
On a practical level, the Czechoslovak m ilitary and security services 
were deeply penetrated by Soviet personnel. During the negotiations 
leading up to, and then during the events of the crisis itself, Dubfcek 
found that his Soviet interlocutors knew more of the activities of his 
security services than he did. So fu lfilling  of Moscow’s demands were the 
Czechoslovak secret services that it was they who forced Dubfcek and his
Debate has arisen as to the nature and number of non-Soviet WTO forces 
used in the intervention. See, for example, Douglas L. Clarke, 'Rewriting  
History from the Grave: East Germany and the 1968 Invasion of
Czechoslovakia’, Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 1, No. 20 (18 May 1990), pp. 
43-45.
An account is given in J ifi Pelikan, The Secret Vysotany Congress (New 
York: St Martins Press).
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senior colleagues to Moscow to consent to the post-in tervention  
a g re e m e n t/^ '^
The Soviet leadership astutely, if with some d ifficu lty , forced  
Dubhek to sanction its actions and to install the Soviet puppet regime in 
Prague. Prague Spring leaders Dubtek, O ldfich Cernik, Josef Smrkovskÿ 
and Svoboda were taken to the Soviet capital. There, on 26 August, the  
Moscow Protocol -  or, as Czechoslovaks called it, the 'Moscow d ik ta t - 
was constructed. The Protocol proclaimed fra tern a l socialist relations and 
the need for the defence of socialism; absent from it, however, was any 
reference to national sovereignty or in tegrity . Under the Protocol, the 
Dubfcek government itself consented to reverse all of the major planks 
and achievements of its reforms, particu larly  in the area of political, 
cultural and social pluralism. The Vysofcany Extraordinary Congress was 
therefore annuled, 'anti-socialist’ political parties terminated, centralised  
Party control of media reinstituted, and leading reformers removed. The 
la tter measure marked the start of 'normalisation’, the expulsion of Party  
members from the ir membership and occupations.^^^ This process of 
political purification would claim Dubfcek as well.
Ultimately the Soviets saw Dubfcek as less than an independent 
actor. To finalise the manipulation of Dubfcek as a Soviet tool, he was 
made ambassador to Turkey in January 1970. This was perhaps similar to 
the 'exile’ of Molotov as Soviet ambassador to Mongolia. But Dubfcek was 
soon recalled from the post, stripped of his Party  membership, and, like  
Malenkov who was made manager of a remote cement factory, he was 
relegated to menial work with the Slovak Forestry Commission. Dubfcek’s
Rice 'Secret Police’, p. 169; and Adelman, 'Conclusions’, p. 277. For the 
relationship between the Soviet and Czechoslovak m ilitary, and to an extent 
secret services, see Condollezza Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak 
Army (Princeton: Princeton Univers ity Press, 1984).
See Milan Simefcka, The Resortation o f Order: The Normalization of 
Czechoslovakia (London: Verso, 1984).
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compliance with Soviet demands demonstrated clearly how self-w ill had 
been replaced by dictation from without. However, Dubfcek re-entered  
public life at a crucial time, in the denouement of the November 1989 
Revolution.
'NORMALISATION’ AND THE SPECTRE OF DISSENT
The end -resu lt of the reform movement was that some 75,000 Soviet forces 
were stationed in Czechoslovakia on a ’tem porary’ basis. Czechoslovaks 
took to defining tem porary as e te rn ity  minus one day.
The achievements of the reform movement were all reversed. The 
only real lasting result of the Prague Spring was the federal nature of 
the country. I t  was a concession which would encourage Slovak demands 
for autonomy while being insuffic ient to satify them. The Prague Spring 
provided a legal framework which contributed to the disintegration of the 
Federation a fte r Communism.
By 1970, Prague Spring leaders had been removed from public life. 
The purging of the Party then extended into its mass membership. As 
many as 500 000 members, half the Party, resigned, were expelled or 
’deleted’ from the n o m e n k la tu r a .V ir tu a lly  anyone loosely associated 
with the reform movement -  journalists, artists, teachers, economists, 
bureaucrats -  were removed from their jobs and forced into generally 
unskilled labour. Much of the adu lt population was forced into signing 
denunciations of the Prague Spring or face retributions. Nearly 200,000 
Czechoslovaks also fled the country, or if already abroad, declined to 
re tu rn . They lost their citizenship and were barred by the new regime 
from ever return ing.
Bernard Wheaton and Zdenék Kavan, The Velvet Revolution: 
Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991 (Boulder; Westview Press, 1992), p. 7.
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The new regime sought not to function s tric tly  by coercion. As the 
Hungarian regime had done a fte r the crushing of Nagy’s reforms/^^ so 
too the Czechoslovak regime sought to make a notional social contract 
with the population whereby people could benefit from modest 
improvements in the ir standard of living in exchange for abstinence from 
politics. The trend  among the bulk of the population became ’inner 
em igration’: the removal of the self from public life.
For all its efforts  to subdue the population -  through modest 
economic incentives underscored by threat - challenges continued to 
confront the regime. However, substantive dissent was limited to a few.
What ’dissent’ there was in p os t-1968 Czechoslovakia met regular 
and harsh treatm ent from the regime. State persecution helped to coalesce 
the limited opposition that existed. The tr ia l of the underground rock 
group ’Plastic People of the Universe’, so named to mock political 
leadership, united and made the opposition more public. The core of 
Czechoslovakia’s independent th inkers coalesced during the 1970s. On 1 
January 1977, Charter 77, a loose grouping of independently-m inded  
citizens, was launched. Its  leading members were arrested even as they  
posted an open declaration of their cause to the Czechoslovak President 
and other officials.
Charter 77 certain ly provided an important intellectual core to 
dissent but its membership never exceeded 2,000. More importantly, 
however, it probably served as a national conscience and certainly, when 
the protests began on 17 November 1989, it provided a nucleus and 
structure for maximising opportunity and carry ing  through the  
Revolution.
Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, Hungary 1956 Revisited  (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 146.
For an account, see H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in 
Czechoslovakia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. I f f .
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A change of regime could not, however, come about simply by 
individual in itia tive. I t  required change in Soviet policy and profound  
developments throughout the region before the Czechoslovak regime itself, 
and its subjects, undertook in itiatives of the ir own.
THE VELVET REVOLUTION
From the ’normalisation’ of 1969 to the Revolution of 1989, Czechoslovakia 
was a country under ice. Much of its cultural elite, such as leading 
novelists like Josef Skvoreckÿ and Milan Kundera, were in exile; those 
who remained at home, like Havel, faced regular persecution, phone 
tapping, police surveillance and prison sentences under Articles 202 and 
203 which gave the regime license to a rrest on the vague pretext of 
disturbances to the peace.
Politically, the regime obediently followed Moscow’s cue and 
undertook no significant policies of its own. Any change that was to 
occur had to come from without.
The firs t impulse in this direction was the promotion of Mikhail 
Gorbachev to G eneral-Secretary of the CPSU. His in itia l references to 
strengthening ties within the socialist bloc and of drawing on the  
underused potential of socialism doubtless gave comfort to a Czechoslovak 
leadership which owed its legitimacy to the Soviet intervention.
Gorbachev’s proposed domestic reforms for the Soviet Union, such 
as perestroika  and glasnost, appeared to be similar to the Prague Spring. 
This was confirmed by Gorbachev’s press secretary, Gennadi Gerasimov: 
the distinction between contemporary Soviet reforms and those of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 was simply twenty years.
The pressure from the Soviet Union on Czechoslovakia to change 
intensified. Gustav Husak, who had replaced Dubhek as F irs t Secretary in 
April 1969, travelled to Moscow for the 70th anniversary of the October
62
Revolution; rem arkably, he and his entourage left the Soviet capital 
before the ceremonies themselves. He returned to Prague still as head of 
the Czechoslovak Communist Party. On 17 December 1987, however, he 
resigned that post, but retained the position of President. His successor 
was MiloS JakeS.
Perhaps encouraged by the fact of the change, ra th er than the 
specific choice of leader, public protests started in the country. In  1988 
and into early 1989, in small and modest crowds, numbering a few 
thousand, Czechoslovaks for the f irs t  time since 1968 marked politically  
significant historical dates, such as the anniversaries of the intervention, 
the founding of the F irs t Republic and the self-immolation of student Jan 
Palach in protest of the Soviet occupation.
The regime responded with rio t police and arrests. Leading 
dissidents like Havel were ja iled  in January 1989, and some, like Slovak 
Jan Carnogurskÿ, were only released during the revolution later in the 
year.
Developments thoughout the rest of the bloc inspired and 
encouraged the Czechoslovaks. In  June 1989 the f irs t contested seats to 
Poland’s Sejm returned non-Communist Solidarity candidates. By v irtu e  of 
the ir parliamentary status, Polish dissidents, who had developed close 
personal ties with like-minded Czechoslovaks during the 1980s, now had 
diplomatic passports with which to trave l to Czechoslovakia. This in turn  
encouraged Czechoslovak dissidents.
The decision by the Hungarian regime to open its border with 
neutral Austria resulted not only in the pinprick which popped the  
socialist bubble in Eastern Europe, but it also gave specific example of 
individual in itia tive to the Czechoslovaks. The East Germans who
Accounted to me by Polish-Czechoslovak solidarity activ is t Markéta 
Fiaikova-N^mcova, interviews September 1994 and 1995.
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eventually stormed the West German embassy in Prague in the ir thousands 
contributed to the downfall of the East German regime.
But it was only in the context of thorough change in the rest of 
Eastern Europe that Czechoslovaks tru ly  took their fate into th e ir own 
hands. Sharon Wolchik argues that the ’collapse of the communist system 
in Czechoslovakia in November 1989 was precipitated by events outside 
the country ’.
Only a fte r the 'fa ll of the Berlin Wall’ , simply one of the many East 
German border crossings opened on 9 November, did Czechoslovak action 
intensify. At that point, all of Czechoslovakia’s East European 
neighbours -  Hungary, Poland and East Germany - had substantially  
removed Communist rule.
Czechoslovak in itiatives started almost by accident or by the  
miscalculation of the Czechoslovak regime. On 17 November a small student 
march was held to commemorate the fiftie th  ann iversary of the Nazi 
crackdown on Czech Universities and student associations. The protestors 
were beaten by riot police, which generated popular support for the 
protesters from the otherwise still hesitant Czechoslovak population. 
Rumours of a fa ta lity , possibly disseminated by the Czechoslovak Secret 
Service to suggest that the students were uncontrollable, brought more 
people onto the streets.
Ultimately, hundreds of thousands protested peacefully in town 
squares across the country, most notably in Prague’s Wenceslas Square 
which was occupied continually for ten days.
In  the face of these crowds, and having been told by Moscow not 
to expect Soviet assistance in a crackdown, the Czechoslovak regime made 
belated and limited concessions to assuage the protestors. Following a 
protest of hundreds of thousands in the large Letnâ grounds in northern
Sharon L. Wolchik, Czechoslovakia In Transition  (London: Pinter, 1991), 
p. 40.
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Prague on In ternational Labour Day on 26 November, the most disliked of 
Communist leaders were dismissed. They included Miroslav Stbpan who 
was responsible for the internal deportation of student protestors in 
January.
The Communist Party then chisled away its own legal legitimacy. I t  
annulled Article 4 of the Constitution which gave the CCP its leading role 
in political life  and Articles 6 and 16 which ended its preeminence over 
the coalition of puppet left-w ing  parties th a t constituted the ruling  
coalition, the National Front.
In  any other circumstances such changes would have been deemed 
revolutionary and would probably have fu lfilled  latent Czechoslovak 
demands for change. These measures, however, were not enough, not least 
for the revolution’s self-appointed leaders. In  Prague, Civic Forum was 
created, and an analogous group in Bratislava called Public Against 
Violence. Composed especially of leading dissidents, these groups set out 
demands on the regime which included its dismissal. Through persistent 
bargaining, backed by popular protests. Civic Forum achieved an interim  
coalition government on 10 December. Key m inisterial posts, among them 
Economy, Finance, the In te rio r and Foreign Affairs, were to be given to 
non-Communists.
While the Federal Parliament was s till filled by Communists, with 
free parliamentary elections scheduled for June 1990, on 29 December it 
unanimously elected Havel to the Presidency.
History had suggested to the Czechoslovaks that the ir own 
initiatives would be crushed by systemic forces over which they had no 
control. In  November 1989, however, Czechoslovaks had taken their 
history into the ir own hands; but they did so only a fte r developments in 
all their neighbouring states - Poland, Hungary and East Germany -  made 
success seem plausible.
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In 1918, President Masaryk announced to the Czechoslovaks that 
their country had been returned  to them. In  1989, President Havel 
proclaimed that the ir government had been returned to them.
The success of the country would re ly  again on the ab ility  of its
leaders to guide it against systemic challenges from within and without.
As suggested throughout this chapter, Czechoslovakia’s leaders have often 
been criticised for being unable to act in times of crisis. H. Gordon 
Skilling contended that, of Czechoslovakia’s leaders to 1989, ’Only Masaryk 
proved himself capable of measuring up to the high standards which he 
himself had set’. But, he considers Vaclav Havel to be ’a leader of
intellect and courage in the mould of Masaryk’.
The way in which, and the success with which Havel pursued his 
vision of Czechoslovakia’s role in the world would be thoroughly tested.
We now turn  to the personalities of Havel and his foreign minister, and 
the ideas which they pursued in their foreign policy.
Skilling, 'Lions or Foxes’, p. 19 and p. 20.
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CïiAPTER 2
THE NEW PERSONALITIES OF CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN 
POLICY AND THEIR 'IDEALISM'
[A] sense of responsibility grows out of the experience of 
certain moral imperatives that compel one to transcend the  
horizon of one’s personal interests and be prepared at any  
time to defend the common good, and even to suffer for it. 
Just as our ’dissidence’ was anchored in this moral ground, 
so the sp irit of our foreign policy should grow and, more 
important, continue to grow from it.^
So wrote Havel in 1992 on the nature of Czechoslovak foreign policy: not 
only rooted in the moral th inking he had developed prior to 1989 but also 
continuing to flourish from it.
Havel’s declaration brings to mind the definition Robert Endicott 
Osgood gave to idealism in Ideals and S e lf-In te re s t in American Foreign  
Policy. He defined idealism as ’a standard of conduct or a state of affa irs  
worthy of achievement by v irtu e  of its universal moral value. The motive 
of national idealism is the disposition to concern oneself with moral values 
that transcend the nation’s selfish interests; it  springs from selflessness 
and love’.^  In  using ’idealism’ to describe the th inking of the 
Czechoslovak dissidents who became political leaders a fte r the 1989 
revolution, the thesis does not refer specifically to the International 
Relations school of the same name.
There is, however, some useful overlap. An idealist is classically 
defined as ’one who sees such values as justice or a desire for world 
peace as potentially decisive and capable of overcoming obstacles to their 
realization. An idealist considers ideas as having important causal effects
 ^ Vaclav Havel, Summer Meditations on Politics, M orality and C iv ility  in a 
Time of Transition (London & Boston: Faber and Faber, 1992), pp. 98-9. The 
English version of the original Letn i pfem itani is used here because it was 
w ritten later and includes additions on foreign policy.
 ^ Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and S e lf-In te re s t in American Foreign  
Policy, Chicago, IL: U n ivers ity  of Chicago Press, 1965, p. 4.
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as opposed to others who see power or material factors as determinants 
of political outcomes'.^ Thus, 'idealism’ here is taken as the primacy of 
ideas over material factors, including and especially geopolitical 
determinism. The ideas of Czechoslovak 'idealism’ will be shown to be the 
belief in morality and tru th  and the pursuit of policies because of their  
universal valid ity .
While Osgood provides a useful working definition of national 
idealism against which to compare both the thoughts and the actions of 
the Havel leadership, he also provides a caveat: 'In  neither personal nor 
international relations does one find pure idealism or pure se lf-in terest 
but only a strange mingling of ambiguous and contradictory ends and 
motives’.'^
I t  might be that every pronouncement and policy by Havel’s 
government could be deemed realism cloaked as idealism. Ascribing selfish 
national interest to post-communist Czechoslovak foreign policy suggests 
that the dissidents were dishonest or misguided in the ir pre-1989 beliefs. 
As the thesis will demonstrate, Czechoslovakia’s post-Communist leaders 
sought to translate their pre-1989 ideals into policy, but they were also 
aware of national interest. The outcome was indeed 'a m ingling’ of idealism 
and pragmatism. The concern here is the extent to which those ideals 
were compromised
This chapter seeks to outline who the dissidents were and what 
they believed. In  addition to providing an outline of the dissident ideas 
to which reference is made in the rest of the thesis, this chapter will 
apply these beliefs to instances of foreign policy. In  the chapter 
biographies are given of the two figures most central to the
Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (eds). In ternational Relations Theory 
(2nd edn) (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 583.
* Osgood, Ideals, p. 4.
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conceptualisation of post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign policy, President 
Vaclav Havel and Foreign Minister J ifi Dienstbier.
The second section of the chapter demonstrates how the post­
communist leadership believed and used the content of p re-revo lu tionary  
dissident writings as a b lueprint for the conceptualisation and conduct of 
politics once in power. The reasons for taking the dissidents, and then  
the dissident-leadership at the ir word are then considered. F inally, the  
use of the term 'd issident’ is justified  and the extent to which dissident 
th inking can be called an ideology is considered.
The content of, and influences on, the ideology of the dissidents 
are considered in the th ird  section: geography and economic 
backwardness; parallel polis or parallel society; tru th ; irony; symbolism; 
two elements of the 'common cris is ’ between East and West: alienation and 
'megamachinery’; responsibility; apology and forgiveness; resistance; and 
legality. Two final subsections consider free  will in the dissident th inking  
and then how 'rea lis t’ the dissidents might be said to have been.
Examples of how this th inking might be evident in post-communist foreign  
policy are given.
PERSONALITIES OF POST-COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY
The two people examined here were considered most influential and 
responsible for conceptualising and directing post-communist Czechoslovak 
foreign policy: Vaclav Havel and J ifi Dienstbier.
Vaclav Havel
Perhaps the most famous Czechoslovak dissident, Havel as an individual 
has come to personify the changes of 1989. His role in the development of 
dissident thinking and the pursu it of dissident causes is well-known, and 
his voluminous writings are examined. Space does not allow for a detailed
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examination of his personality but there are some personal details which 
may be relevant to the development of his ideas.
Havel considers himself to have been an outsider all of his life. As 
he told an audience at Hebrew University in April 1990, ’I  am even 
convinced in my heart of hearts that if Kafka had not lived, and if I 
could w rite a little  better than I can, I  would have w ritten  his complete 
works myself’ . Explaining that 'I  have always found in Kafka a part of my 
own experience of the world, myself, and my way of being in this world’, 
he added ’there is the strong sense of both my not belonging and of the  
inappropriateness of everyth ing  that contributes to these feelings’ .^  In  
the same speech, he even went so far as to a ttr ib u te  all the good he has 
undertaken to his sense of exclusion: ’my inner feelings of exclusion or 
non-inclusion, of a sort of disinheritedness and essential ineptitude...are  
the hidden motor of all my persistent endeavours....Indeed, I  would be so 
bold as to say that anything good I have ever done, I possibly did only 
to try  to conceal my w ell-nigh metaphysical feeling of g u ilt’.®
Havel’s biography substantiates such a s e lf-p o rtra it. Born in 1936 
in Prague to a prominent and wealthy family, he considered himself 
somewhat ’socialist’ and thus fe lt alienated from his station. His bourgeois 
background contributed to his misfortune under communism, which 
included the denial of formal education. I t  might be significant to note 
here that many of the Czech w riters who gained fame abroad, like Ivan  
Klima, Pavel Kohout, Milan Kundera, and Ludvik Vaculik had at one time 
been Party members and thus entitled to state-sponsored artis tic
' Vaclav Havel, ’Franz Kafka and My Presidency’, in Tim D. Whipple (ed.), 
After the Velvet Revolution (New York: Freedom House, I9 9 I)  pp. I0 I-2 .
® Quoted in Robert B. Pynsent, Questions o f Id e n tity  (Budapest, London and 
New York: Central European University Press, 1994), p. 12
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fo ru m s / Havel, however, for his efforts to gain access to the official 
l ite ra ry  circles, if only to be an iconoclast, was never a Party  member.
Liberalization during the Prague Spring, however, gave Havel’s 
works a public audience but he was subsequently banned from official 
cu ltu ra l activities under normalization and subjected to constant police 
surveillance. His dissident campaigning included co-founding Charter 77 
and serving as one of its leading spokesmen. His simultaneous membership 
of the Committee for the Defence of the U n ju s tly  Persecuted (known by 
its Czech acronym of VONS), put him in ja il  fo r four and a half years. 
During the Velvet Revolution he emerged as the leading figure , 
addressing crowds of hundreds of thousands in Wenceslas Square and in 
the enormous parade ground of Letnâ. In  so doing, he appeared at 
various times together with Alexander Dubfcek and Communist Premier 
Ladislav Adamec (whose reception by the crowds was mixed).® Arguably, 
Havel thereby appeared as a representative of change but also as 
someone who could bridge numerous societal divides and deal with the  
communist regime which he was to do as head of the opposition team in 
negotiations with the regime. As his w ritings show, and as is discussed 
below, forgiveness and inclusion even of enemies were central themes in 
his th inking . As a German journalist wrote, ’Havel was never a raging  
w arrior against the communist state, badgering the regime with 
Solzhenytsin-type hate: He offered dialogues, one a fte r another, which the  
regime either ignored or accepted as a reason for renewed repression’.®
 ^ As observed in ibid., p. 1. An account of the official w rite rs ’ association 
is given in Duâan HamSik, Writer Against Rules (New York: Random House, 
1971).
® See Wheaton and Kavan, Velvet Revolution, p. 89.
® Michael Frank, ’CSSR: Will Vaclav Havel Be State President’, Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung, 12 December 1989, in Foreign Broadcast Inform ation Service. Daily 
Report. East Europe, 2 January 1990, p. 16. Cited hereafter as FBIS, with 
citations from the East Europe series unless otherwise indicated.
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As Communist officials resigned from the Presidium and Central 
Committee in the wake of mass demonstrations and a general strike, 
Havel’s name was quickly and ubiquitously chanted in the slogan ’Havel 
na Hrad’, ’Havel to the Castle’ , seat of the President. On 29 December 
1989, the Federal Assembly elected him the f irs t  non-Communist President 
in more than fo rty  years, and he was re-elected on 5 July 1990.
Despite agreeing twice to stand for President of the Czechoslovak 
Federation and once for th a t of the Czech Republic, it  is well known that 
Havel has consistently maintained that he never sought to be nor 
considers himself a politician. This view stems from, and also contributes  
to, his conception of an ti-po litica l politics. Havel wrote of himself: ’I  am 
not, have never been, nor have I  the slightest intention of becoming a 
politician, a professional revolutionary or professional "dissident". I  am a 
w riter, w riting what I  want and not what others might like me to, and if 
I get involved in any other way except by my w riting , then only because 
I feel this to be my natural human and civic duty, as well as my duty as 
a w rite r ’.
I f  this is true, then it is an interesting insight which explains 
Havel’s approach to politics. Politics is, for him, an extension of a moral 
civic duty. This might help to explain the seemingly unorthodox practices 
of his diplomacy.
Jihi Dienstbier
Born in 1937, Dienstbier is a contemporary of Havel, but un like him, 
enjoyed formal education at the prestigious Faculty of Philosophy of 
Charles University. He joined the Party in 1958 and subsequently won 
plum foreign correspondent posts for Czechoslovak radio, including in the
\ac lav  Havel, '" I Take the Side of T ru th " ’ , in Open Letters  (London and 
Boston: Faber and Faber, 1991), p. 247.
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Far East and Washington before being expelled under normalization and 
forced to undertake manual labour.
Considering himself a reform communist, Dienstbier was an original 
Charter signatory and subsequently spokesman and VONS member. He was 
convicted with Havel and spent three years in ja il. He edited an 
underground international relations journal entitled Ctverec  (Square) and 
in 1985 he published the samizdat work Snënï o Evropè  or Dreaming 
about Europe, his reflections on international a ffa irs  which, from his 
subsequent statements, are relevant to post-communist Czechoslovak 
foreign policy. He was given the chance to implement his th ink ing  on 
foreign affa irs in December 1989 when he quickly found a replacement for 
his work as a coalstoker in order to be sworn in by Gustav Husak as 
Foreign Minister in the post-Revolution coalition government.
DISSIDENT THINKING AND POST-COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY
Much of this thesis is predicated on the idea that the pre-1989 dissident 
lite ra tu re  explains the principles behind Czechoslovakia’s post-Communist 
foreign policy. Before examining the ideas themselves, therefore, it is 
necessary to establish th a t th e ir pre-1989 th in k ing  actually did provide 
the intellectual basis for th e ir post-1989 foreign policy. But an important 
prior question which must be addressed is extent to which the dissidents 
can be believed.
Havel’s main EngUsh language biographer. Guardian  reporter Michael 
Simmons, maintains th a t Havel has an almost obsessive preoccupation with 
the tru th .
Both the form and content of words are themes in Havel’s writings. 
He wrote to his wife in one of his letters from prison of the Orator in 
Ionesco’s The Chairs. The Orator is asked by the Old Man and the Old 
Woman to deliver for them 'the meaning of life ’. Havel concludes that he
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does not want to sound like the O r a t o r . H e  uses the example to show 
that 'the meaning of life ’ is not something to be passed on like  an item. 
But it is not simply the content which bothers him in this case, it also 
demonstrates his dislike for indirect communication.
As President, Havel took direct responsibility for that which was 
attribu tab le  to him. Even though he was accused of being aloof and 
removed from the people by having built around him layers of advisers  
composed of friends (see chapter 3), and despite the taxing demands of 
public office, Havel generally authored and delivered his own addresses. 
He and his Executive gave numerous press conferences, public  
declarations and interview s. Havel also broadcast a weekly Sunday radio  
address from Lanÿ, M asaryk’s presidential re tre a t which Havel came to 
use as his own, which was reproduced in p rin t in such newspapers as 
Lidové noviny.
Of course, Havel used a spokesman, his friend  Michal Zantovskÿ, 
but the fact that Zantovskÿ had to qualify , apologise or re tra c t  
statements suggests that Havel’s adm inistration was careful to keep 
statements clearly a ttribu tab le  to Havel. As fa r as his own addresses were 
concerned, he was described not only as ’a leader who writes his own 
speeches; he is an iconoclast who rehearses’.
I f  the form of his message is important to Havel, the content is 
even more so, for, much of the content of his philosophy concerned the  
now pat-phrase 'liv ing  in t ru th ’ . This has led him to re ject any neat 
summation of his th inking , as will be discussed presently. For the  
purposes of establishing the cred ib ility  of the main personages and also 
the sources used in this study, it is helpfu l to cite Havel on his beliefs:
Vaclav Havel, Dopisy Olze (Toronto: S ix ty -E igh t Publishers, Corp., 1985), 
pp. 257-260, at p. 260.
Michael Simmons, The Reluctant President (London: Methuen, 1991), p. xvi.
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Even though I  naturally  do have my own opinions on a 
varie ty  of issues, I  don’t  hold with any particu lar ideology, 
doctrine, or, even less, any political party  or faction. I  serve  
no one -  much less any superpower. I f  I  serve anything, 
then only my own conscience. I  am neither a communist nor 
an anticommunist, and if  I  critic ize my government, then not 
because it happens to be a communist government but 
because it is bad. Were this government a Social Democractic 
or Christian Socialist one, or any other, if  it ru led badly I  
would critic ize  it in the same way as I  critic ize  the  
Czechoslovak government. I  am not on the side of any  
establishment, nor am I  a professional campaigner against any 
establishment -  I  merely take the side of tru th  against lies, 
the side of sense against nonsense, the side of justice  
against injustice.
If  we are to see any va lid ity  in the message of the dissidents, then we 
must believe th e ir  language. This is because the use and abuse of 
language itself is a cornestone of the dissident critique  of the Soviet- 
type system and the correct use of language (as well as moral conduct) is 
central to th e ir vision of conducting political and social life  decently and 
correctly. Thus, the separation of thought from rea lity  which results  
from the use of ideology (a fundamental issue to the dissidents) comes 
about 'chiefly through a ritualization  of language. From being a means of 
signify ing rea lity , and of enabling us to come to an understanding of it, 
language seems to have become an end in itself. In  th is process, language 
-  and, because it is related to it, thought as well -  may appear to have 
increased in importance (the duty to name things having been superseded 
by the duty to qualify  things ideologically), but in fact language is thus 
degraded: the imputation to language of functions that are not proper to 
it has made it impossible fo r language to fu lf ill  the function it  was meant 
to fu fill. And thus, ultim ately, language is deprived of its most essential 
importance'.
Whatever term or shorthand might be used to describe the  
dissident philosophy (see below), there  is nevertheless consistency within
Havel '" I Take the Side of T ru th ”’ , pp. 247-48.
Vaclav Havel, 'On Evasive Th ink ing ’, in Open Letters, p. 12.
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the voluminous work of Havel and substantial consistency, not to mention 
cross-referencing, between the writings of all the major Czech and Slovak 
dissidents. T o  maintain one’s position silently and constantly means more 
than shouting it out and then quickly abandoning it. A silent partner, of 
whom you can never predict when he will speak and what he will say, 
though you are certain  that when he does speak it  will be as clear as the 
strik ing  on a bell, is fa r more capable of disquieting the world than  
someone everyone has figu red  out, as it were, beforehand’ .^ ^
When the dissidents came to power as a resu lt of the Revolution, 
they were intent on putting  the ir th inking  into practice. On 20 November, 
when the Revolution was in its fourth  day, Havel maintained that his 
values were already coming into political life . Speaking to foreign  
journalists in his fla t, Havel said that 'the ideals fo r which I  have been 
struggling for ve ry  many years and for which I  have been in prison are  
beginning now to enter real political life as an expression of the will of 
the people’.
Even close to the end of his service as President of the  
Czechoslovak Federation, Havel maintained that the beliefs he had 
developed while a dissident were valid. In  March 1992, in the foreword of 
Summer Meditations, he wrote 'Naturally, faced with the increasing  
complications of our public life at home, I  have become aware of how 
immensely d ifficu lt it is to be guided in practice by the principles and 
ideals in which I  believe. But I  have not abandoned them in any way’.^ ^
He reiterated these views in an April 1992 Mew York Review o f Books 
article. Replying rhetorically  to the expectations of foreign journalists  
that he has had to re trea t from his dissident th ink ing  in the realities of
Havel, 'Two Letters from Prison,’ [5 February  1983], in Open Letters, p. 
236.
Cited in Simmons, Reluctant President, p. 183.
Havel. 'Foreword’, Summer Meditations, p. xiii.
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political life, he declared: T h e re  may be some who won’t  believe me, but 
a fte r more than two years as president in a land fu ll of the kind of 
problems that presidents in stable countries never even dream of, I  can 
safely say that I  have not been compelled to recant anything of what I 
wrote earlier, or to change my mind about anything. In  fact, my opinions 
have been confirmed’ .^ ® And, while admitting that such a route is 
difficu lt, he added 'My experience and observations confirm th a t politics 
as the practice of morality is possible’.
I f  the content of Havel’s beliefs were applicable a fte r socialism as 
before, so too was his methodology. To an audience at George Washington 
U nivers ity  on 22 April 1993 he explained: 'I  th ink we must not understand  
postcommunism merely as something that makes life  d ifficu lt fo r the rest 
of the world. I certa in ly  d idn’t  understand communism that way. I  saw it 
chiefly as a challenge, a challenge to thought and action. To an even 
greater extent, postcommunism represents precisely that kind of 
challenge’.^”
Other dissidents have perhaps not been as firm in the view that 
the ir pre-1989 discussions were the b lueprint for post-Revolution politics. 
As Jan Carnogurskÿ wrote, 'Without knowing it, these dissident groups 
[in Czechoslovakia] were discussing the changes that Eastern Europe 
brought about’ in 1989.^^ I f  Carnogurskÿ was suggesting that the  
dissidents were not th inking in terms of a b lueprint for a fte r communism, 
then Dienstbier was clearer about the relationship of pre-1989 ideas and 
practices to post-1989 policies. Shortly a fte r becoming Foreign Minister,
Vaclav Havel, 'Paradise Lost’, The New York Review o f Books (9 April 
1992), p. 7.
Ibid., p. 8.
Havel, 'The Post-Communist Nightmare’, The New York Review o f Books (27 
May 1993), p. 8.
Jan Carnogurskÿ, 'Physics, Psychology and the Gentle Revolution’, in 
Whipple (ed.), p. 110.
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he told the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza ’I  would like to work in 
the same sp irit as when we were in op position
A cornerstone of post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign policy was 
the reunification of Germany and its role in the reunification of Europe. 
According to senior foreign policy advisor SaSa Vondra, this programme 
was formulated under the Prague Appeal of 1985.
Outside observers affirm  that the ideological foundations for post- 
1989 foreign policy came from dissident w ritings. Radio Free Europe’s Jan 
Obrman wrote in September 1990 'it  is important to keep in mind that 
most of those responsible for the formulation of Czechoslovak foreign  
policy are former dissidents who have known each other and exchanged 
views on international matters for years’. Furtherm ore, 'While these 
former members of the dissident community (today’s decision makers) have 
differing opinions on v irtu a lly  all domestic issues, they seem to be of 
almost one mind on international relations’. He added that 'Foreign policy 
concepts discussed within Czechoslovakia’s dissident community under 
communist rule was dismissed as utopian by many experts and 
policymakers in the West. Some of these concepts, however, have become 
guidelines for postrevolutionary Czechoslovak foreign policy. Indeed, it 
could be argued that some concepts even foreshadowed developments in 
post-communist Europe’.
Questions of the soundness and quality of dissident th inking can of 
course be asked. The coherent translation of those premises into policy 
can be challenged. The success of those policies is also subject to 
criticism. Nevertheless, it is clear that the dissidents believed that their 
writings provided the basis, even a blueprint, not only for the specifics 
of Czechoslovak foreign policy but also as a normative programme for
22 Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 December 1989, in FBIS, 2 January 1990, p. 22.
Jan Obrman, 'Foreign Policy: Sources, Concepts, Problems’, Report on 
Eastern Europe, Vol. 1, No. 37 (14 September 1990), p. 7.
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international relations. I t  is to the content of the dissident th inking  to 
which this chapter now tu rns .
Terminology
Two problems emergence in references to the people and work relevant to 
the study of post-communist Czechoslovak foreign policy. The f irs t  is the 
meaning of the term 'd issident' and the second is the question of whether 
dissident ideas can be called an 'ideology'.
Since the meaning of language was central to the id e n tity  of the 
dissident intellectuals, they w ere discerning in th e ir use of terminology.
In  fact, the people that many Western observers called 'd issidents’ 
generally perferred  the term 'independent th in kers ’. According to Jacques 
Rupnik, Havel even resented the  term 'dissident',^'* and in his 'Power of 
the Powerless,’ Havel re fe rred  to 'so-called' dissidents, and placed the 
term in quotation marks.
However, in accordance, w ith common usage, th is thesis will re fer to 
Czechoslovak and other independent th inkers before the collapse of 
communist power in the respective countries as 'd issidents ', while mindful 
of the fact that they generaUy saw themselves not as dissenting from 
particu lar beliefs or practices but, ra th er, deliberately choosing to think  
independently of pronouncements made by anyone else.
In  the same way th a t they  qualified the term 'd iss ident', so too did 
Czechoslovakia’s independent intellectuals raise objections to the term  
'ideology’. From an analytical point of view, Havel did not use the term  
'ideology' to describe 'the system of ideological norms, prohibitions, and
Jacques Rupnik, The O ther Europe  (London; Weidenfeid and Nicholson, 
1988), p. 131.
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limitations that ensured the prolongation’ of the communist system, but 
ra ther the ’metaphysical o rd er’.^ ^
Havel certainly did not use the term to describe his own th inking. 
In  fact, he was hesitant about the coherence of his th inking: He 
described his use of language as ’figurative, abbreviated, ten ta tive ’, with 
his words being ’chosen fo r the occasion and are meant to serve only in 
particular sentences or to make specific observations’. This observation  
led Havel to re itera te  ’that my meditations are not, nor are they meant to 
be, a philosophy, much less a philosophical system intended to add to the  
common property of mankind in that department. They are more the 
testimony of a man -  myself -  in a particular situation, of his inner 
murmurings. They are only (perhaps) an existential document (like  
poetry), an imprint in progress of the flow of my inner life, nothing 
more’. He added, even unnecessarily modestly, that he lacked the  
education and the experience to be a tru e  philosopher.^®
Havel seems almost contemptuous of the weakness of those who need 
ideology. In  one of his last letters during his longest prison sentence, he 
wrote: ’Someone who does not draw strength from himself and who is 
incapable of finding the meaning of his life  w ithin himself will depend on 
his surroundings, will seek the map to his own orientation somewhere 
outside himself -  in some ideology, organization, or society, and then, 
however active he may appear to be, he is merely waiting, depending’.
Ideology destroys the ind iv idual’s ab ility  to act and be responsible. 
Havel explained in ’The Power of the Powerless’ that ’Ideology is a 
specious way of relating to the world. I t  offers human beings the illusion 
of an identity, of dignity, and of morality while making it easier to part
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics (New York: The Free Press, 
1992), p. 138.
Havel. Dopisy Olze, p. 272.
Havel, ’Two Letters from Prison’, [22 January 1983], p. 231.
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with them’.^  ^ I t  is even more dehumanising because, once the political
programme begins to fail, demoralisation sets in. This demoralisation. Havel
contends, represents not simply demoralisation itself 'but ra ther one’s
own loss of certa in ty and a sense of the meaning of life. To quote myself:
the world is lost only to the extent that I  myself am lost’.^ ^
This is illustrated in Havel’s seminal 'Power of the Powerless’. The
greengrocer plants among his vegetables the placard 'Workers of the
World. Unite!’, even though it means nothing to him and he would at least
be better served with a call to the international proletariat to buy
vegetables. Personal identity is consumed by ideological conformity.
Freedom of action and responsibility is unambiguously central to
dissident th inking, and any form of ideology is therefore antithetical.
Havel was also aware of the danger that a set of beliefs could inh ib it an
understanding of, and response to, the 'real world’. This is demonstrated
in his 'On Evasive Thinking’, a piece dissecting the way the communist
regime sought to direct people’s attention from local affa irs , which had
both immediate salience to and potentially quick solutions for the larger
issues of mankind and the fu tu re . He writes:
any intention can become its exact opposite if  it is carried  
forward in the conventionalized, pseudoideological th inking  
that has become so dangerously domesticated in all areas of 
our social life. This way of th inking, in my opinion, is 
causing immense damage. The essence of it  is that certain  
established dialectical patterns are deformed and fetishized  
and thus become an immobile system of intellectual and 
phraseological schemata which, when applied to d ifferen t 
kinds of reality , seem at f irs t to have achieved, admirably, a 
heightened ideological view of that rea lity , whereas in fact 
they have, without our noticing it, separated thought from its  
immediate contact with reality  and thus crippled its capacity 
to intervene in that rea lity  effectively.
Vaclav Havel, 'Moc bezmocnÿch’, in O lidskou identitu  (Purley, Surrey: 
Rozmluvy, 1989), pp. 55-133; 'The Power of the Powerless’, in John Keane, 
(ed.), The Power o f the Powerless. Citizens Against the State in Central and  
Eastern Europe (London: Hutchinson, 1985)'Power of the Powerless’.
Havel, 'Two Letters from Prison’, [22 January 1983], p. 233.
Havel, 'On Evasive Thinking’, p. 11
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Concern about terms was not idle dissident discussion. Tlie preoccupation 
continued after the revolution. Dissident Milan Simefcka, for example, 
recounted how in the fifteen years prior to 1989 'I  gradually had to 
eliminate words like "socialism," "communism" and "capitalism." Ideological 
abuse had colored their meaning to such a degree that I  decided to get 
by without using them’. But, he wrote, the problem continued a fte r the  
Revolution’. ’Now three months have passed since the beginning of the 
revolution, and I  feel like dropping the words "democracy" and 
"democratic" as well -  or at least stop pretending that we’re  all good 
democrats, even the people who aren ’t ’.
In  office, Havel regu larly  warned of the dangers of succumbing to 
ideologies. This is evident throughout his speeches and, as late as a 1994 
Foreign Affairs  article, he cautioned against ’rational utopia’, one of his 
names for ideology.
Since terminology formed an integral part of the w ritings of the 
dissidents, the words used to explain that w riting must also be chosen 
carefully. The term ’ideology’ will not be used here as a catchphrase for 
dissident writings. Havel’s modesty demfinds that even the term  
’philosophy’ is unsuitable. Thus, ’th ink ing ’ has been adopted, with the 
caveat that it is meant in a va lue-free  way.
CONTENT OF THE DISSIDENT THINKING
Material Origins of Dissident Thinking
Much of the dissident th inking , as will be discussed, revolved around the 
idea of no limitations to action. As indicated at the beginning of this
Milan Simefcka, ’Good Democrats AH’, May 1990, in Whipple (ed.), p. 261.
Havel, ’A Call for Sacrifice: The Co-Responsibility of the West’, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2 (M arch /A pril 1994), p. 7.
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chapter, 'idealists' believe th a t ideas, and not necessarily power and 
material conditions, can shape outcomes. Nevertheless, what might be 
called 'objective' limitations, such as re lative  economic condition and 
geographic location, seem to have had an influence on dissident th inking.
The economic influence
Outside observers have often commented on the backwardness of Eastern
Europe and the impact of th a t on indigenous thought and action. As a
leading political scientist rem arked:
While Americans live  in  the present and th in k  about the  
fu tu re  almost compulsively, East Europeans are  inclined to 
seek solace in the past, fo r th e ir recent experiences have  
been fu ll of ad vers ity . I t  is nor perhaps too outlandish to 
say that had Darwin or Spencer been born in  Poland or 
Hungary, they would never have gotten the idea th a t h istory  
was tantamount to evolution or progress, and would today be 
remembered as great theorists of decline and decay.
I f  'backwardness' is synonymous with the premodern age of science and
industry, then Havel can be read as nostalgic fo r th a t era. In  ’Politics
and Conscience', he re fers  to his childhood observations of the
degradation of the natural world. He likens his reactions to th a t of a
preindustrial peasant, seeing a factory for the f irs t  time. Each is more
powerfully rooted in the n atu ra l world than the m ajority  of th e ir modern
counterparts.^'^ For Havel, it  is in this pastoral world where personal
responsibility -  a key to Havel's essence -  and the v irtu e s  of decency
prevail.
The re lative economic backwardness of the region also contributes  
to the thinking that the dissidents sought to oppose. Carnogurskÿ writes; 
'Anger at their perpetual backwardness makes East Europeans look for
Andrew C. Janos, 'Continuity  and Change in Eastern Europe: Strategies 
of Post-Communist Politics', East European Politics and Society  Vol. 8, No. 1 
(Winter 1994), p. 8.
Havel. 'Poiitika a svêdomi’ , in Do rûznÿch stran, pp. 41-2.
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quick, dram atic solutions. The solution often has to be a psychological 
one, since we’re  not up to much technologically....Of all the East European  
countries, Czecho-Slovakia has been the one most influenced by the West, 
and shows the greatest combination of physics and psychology. In  times 
of crisis, we seem to find psychological solutions ve ry  a llu ring , although  
they tend to mean a reduction in action more than a real solution’.
The dissident th inking  might be motivated in part by the need to find  
solutions to this apparent ’fixed fac to r’ of economic backwardness’.
The geographic influence
Similarly, the in terp retation  of Czechoslovakia’s re lative geographic size
and location is a probable influence on the development of the ’idealism’
as put into practice by the post-communist government. As Havel
explained to the US Congress:
As you certa in ly  know over the centuries most of Europe’s 
major wars and other conflagrations have trad itionally  begun 
and ended on the te rrito ry  of modern Czechoslovakia, or else 
they were somehow related to that region. The Second World 
War was the most recent example. This is understandable: 
w hether we like it or not. we are located in the ve ry  heart of 
Europe..
By v irtu e  of the fact that much of the dissident lite ra tu re  concerns itse lf 
with the ’possible’ and, in its international dimension, specifically with the  
idea that geopolitics can be eliminated from international affa irs , this  
suggests th a t geography was a background influence on the formation of 
the dissident th inking .
Recognising that economic and geographic factors could have 
provided a background on which the dissident th inking was constructed, 
this section now turns to aspects of that content, beginning with the 
central concept of parallel society.
Carnogurskÿ, ’Physics’, p. 106
'G Speech to Congress, in Whipple (ed.)
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The Ideas Themselves
The ideas of dissident th inking  included: parallel society, symbolism, 
alienation, responsibility, apology, resistance and legality .
Civil o r Parallel Society and 'Second C u ltu re '
I f  any concept is central to dissident th inking  it is civic or parallel
society. This is an umbrella term which, because of its broad meaning, is
not d irectly  applicable to foreign  policy. The f irs t  irony of a 'c iv ic ’
foreign policy was that its in itia to rs  had occupied the seats of
government and were forced to use o ffic ial instruments in the pursu it of 
th e ir objectives.
C ivil society represented any form of thought or action which was 
outside the control of the o ffic ial, or s ta te -p a rty  s tru ctu re . C ivil society 
thus formed a parallel society which existed alongside the o ffic ia l. The 
nucleus of civic society, as Havel explained in 'Power of the Powerless', 
came from the Czech dissident Iv a n  Jirous.
According to Havel, Jirous's orig ina l intention was lim ited to 
'nonconformist rock music and only certa in  lite ra ry , a rtis tic  or 
performance events close to the sensibilities of those non-conform ist 
musical groups’. 'The term "second cu lture" very  rap id ly  came to be used 
fo r the whole area of independent and repressed cu ltu re  th a t is, not only 
for a rt and its various curren ts  but also fo r the humanities, the social 
sciences and philosophical thought. This "second cu lture", qu ite  naturally , 
has created elementary organizational forms: samizdat editions of books 
and magazines, private performances and concerts, seminars, exhibitions 
and so on....Culture, therefore, is a sphere in which the "paralle l 
structures" can be observed in th e ir most highly developed form. The 
Catholic philosopher and mathematician Vaclav Benda (who was later 
elected to the post-Communist Federal Parliament) gave thought to
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potential or embryonic forms of such structures in o ther spheres as well: 
from a parallel inform ation network to parallel forms o f education (p riva te  
universities), paralle l trade  unions, parallel foreign contacts, to a kind of 
hypothesis on a parallel economy'.
Symbolism
The use of symbolism was one expression of unorthodox th inking , and was 
important to Havel in particu la r, and to the Czechoslovak dissident 
movement as a whole. As H. Gordon Skilling wrote, 'Symbolism can be 
found in the fact th a t C harter 77 appeared on the scene in January, the  
month of the beginning of the Prague Spring of 1968. Moreover, as was 
pointed out in the declaration, its name had been chosen to denote that it  
had come into being at the s ta rt of a year which had been proclaimed as 
the Year of Political Prisoners, and the year in which a conference was to 
be held in Belgrade to review the implementation of the  obligations 
assumed at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe’.^ ®
As President, Havel used symbolism Ti his choice of dates. For 
example, Richard von Weizsacker was invited to Prague Castle on the 51st 
anniversary of H itler's  trium phant en try . Havel planned to have French 
President François M itterand and British Prime M inister Margaret Thatcher 
come to Prague on the ann iversary  of the Munich Conference, the official 
outcome of which neither leader had yet form ally renounced.
Symbolism also contributed to Havel’s diplomatic appointments, 
especially the choice of Rudolf Slànskÿ, son of the 1953 Stalin ist show 
tria l victim of the same name, as Ambassador to Moscow. In  his firs t 
meeting with Gorbachev, Havel offered the General S ecretary  a peace-pipe
Havel. 'Power of the Powerless’, p. LOI. 
Skilling, C harter 77, p. 3.
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given to him by Native Americans, suggesting that they both smoke from 
it.^^ Havel’s own personal presentation -  such as his refusal to use a 
teleprom pter fo r his address to the US Congress -  serves to underscore  
the authen tic ity  of his actions.
Alienation
Alienation could be the origin (as Havel’s autobiographical comments, 
above, suggest) of dissidence, but it certa in ly  also constitutes a theme of 
dissident lite ra tu re . Havel contends, as did the Czechoslovak reform ist 
Marxists of the 1 9 6 0 s , t h a t  indiv idual morality and responsibility is 
being corrupted by modernisation. In  'Politics and Conscience’, Havel 
juxtaposes trad itional Czechoslovak small family farm ing to Communist 
collectivisation, the la tter being an invasion of impersonalising  
bureaucracy. He is concerned generally with the effect of modernisation, 
attacking the emergence of 'megamachinery’,  ^ but blaming not science 
itself for the consequences, but its misuse by man."*^
Through modernisation, man is thus separated from his natural 
world and is deprived of personal responsibility. The alienating effects of 
modernisation could only be overcome, according to a Charter 77 
document, by society as a whole and by 'people’s spontaneous in itia tive ’. 
The problem of Czechoslovakia’s Communist regime was the lack of 
channels for indiv idual in itia tive. Society was atomised by
Interv iew  with SaSa Vondra, 4 September 1994.
Karel Kosik, Dialectics of the Concrete. A S tudy on Problems o f Man and  
World (Dordrecht, Holland: D.Reidel Publishing Company, 1976); and Radovan 
Richta, Civilization at the Crossroads. Such comparison is not to suggest that 
Havel belongs to this tradition.
Havel, Dâlkovÿ vÿslech, p. 14.
Havel, 'Poiitika a svèdomi’ , p. 146.
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'institutionalization, coercion and bureaucratic in terference,’ preventing  
the creation of necessary t ru s t /^
For Havel, the solution lies in reformulating how we th ink, prioritise  
and act. This was true as much during communism in the East as in the 
West. To the US Congress Havel explained: 'Without a global revolution in 
the sphere of human consciousness, nothing will change for the better in 
the sphere of our being as humans, and the catastrophe towards which 
this world is headed - be it  ecological, social, demographic, or a general 
breakdown of civilization -  will be unavoidable. I f  we are no longer 
threatened by world war, or by the danger of absurd mountains of 
nuclear weapons blowing up the world, this does not mean that we have 
fina lly  won. This is actually fa r from being a final v ic to ry ’.'*'*
He also saw the commonality of crisis. In  a 1994 Foreign Affairs  
article, he warned that if the West failed to take a more active role in 
Central and Eastern Europe, it would be not only a fa ilu re  for the East 
but also for the values of the West. Such fa ilure to act, he contended, 
'could ultimately demonstrate that the democratic West has lost its ability  
realistically to foster and cu ltivate the values it has always proclaimed 
and undertaken to safeguard....Such a state of a ffa irs  would be far more 
than ju s t a crisis of the East: it would be a crisis of the West, a crisis of 
democracy, a crisis of Euro-American civilization itself. Let events in the 
former Yugoslavia stand as a warning: this is nor ju s t a Balkan 
predicament’.'*='
For Havel, the crises of one region are necessarily those of the  
world, and large powers have a particular duty and responsibility. Thus,
■*'^  Charter 77, Document No. 9/85: On the Fortieth A nniversary  o f the End 
of WorJd War Two, cited in Janusz Bugajski, Czechoslovakia: Charter 77's 
Decade o f Dissent (New York: Praeger 1987), pp. 6-7.
Address to Congress, in Whipple, (ed.), p. 78.
Havel, 'Call for Sacrifice’, p. 3.
88
the crisis in Yugoslavia was not simply an 'Eastern form of nationalism’ if 
the West remained ind ifferen t, the crisis would signal the reemergence of 
nationalism in the West. Similarly, for the West to ignore the ecological 
catastrophe caused by Communism in Eastern Europe would 'sooner or 
later bring on its own ecological catastrophe, and ultim ately a global 
one ’ ."*^
Havel thus saw international responsibility arising from what he 
considered the common threat. In  an April 1983 interview , Havel said of 
those abroad who lent support to persecuted intellectuals in 
Czechoslovakia: 'These people understood that whenever freedom and 
human dignity are threatened in any one country, they are under threat 
everywhere, that this signifies an attack on humanity itse lf and of the 
fu tu re  of all of us’.'*^
He was aware of the the difficulties of achieving the necessary 
common understanding. In  'Politics and Conscience’, he observed, for 
example, how the Western peace movement misunderstood the purpose of 
Soviet bloc dissidents and the nature of the East-West arms race.
Nevertheless, some have suggested that Havel had limited personal 
experience. As Robert B. Pynsent observed, 'Even in the 1960s Havel did 
not have easy access to any societies but his own’. This means that while 
Havel deliberately sought that, for example in Largo desolate, that his 
plays not be performed abroad with a specifically Czech or socialist 
staging, the plot nevertheless, with a character awaiting the secret police, 
would still be atypical of the West."*^
Ibid., p. 7.
Havel, "'1 Take the Side of T ru th " ’, p. 239. 
Pynsent, Questions o f Identity , pp. 6-7.
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still, 'the philosophical problem of this play may be u n iversa l'/^
One of the features central to Havel’s view of the common crisis is the 
role of ’responsib ility .’
Responsibility
Havel emphasised the role of personal responsibility. For him. The 
individual cannot act and cannot be free without assuming responsibility  
for his actions. The essence of antipolitical politics has been defined as 
the ’unobtrusive attempt to restore the d ignity  of the ind iv idual’.
So key is responsibility to Havel’s identity  that Pynsent argues: 
’Havel’s central conception of identity  is that it  consists in the sum of 
one’s responsibilities’."*^  For Havel, responsibility is governed by one’s 
sense of morality. As he explained to the US Congress: ’...we s till don’t 
know how to put morality above politics, science and economics. We are  
still incapable of understanding that the only genuine grounding for all 
our actions -  if  they are to be moral - is responsibility. Responsibility to 
something higher than family, country, company, success. Responsibility to 
that level of being where all our actions are indelib ly recorded and where 
they will be properly judged ’. I t  was this idea of taking responsibility  
for one’s own thoughts and deeds -  as embodied in ’Power of the  
Powerless’ -  which convinced a young Czech like SaSa Vondra to become 
a dissident and a member of Charter 77.^^
Personal responsibility extends to the national level. Havel wrote in 
his 'Anatomy of Reticence’ that ’ [t]o my countrymen I have always
Ibid., p. 7.
Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, p. 146.
Pynsent, Questions of Iden tity , p. viii.
Address to Congress, in Whipple (ed.), p. 79.
*’ This is based on the personal experience of Vondra. In terv iew .
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stressed that we should not lie our way out of our responsibility and 
blame everyth ing  on overall conditions, on the superpowers and on the 
bad, bad world at large'/"*
Just as national responsibility could be seen as the aggregate of 
personal responsibility, so for Havel the responsibility of a co u n try ’s 
leadership is immense. He wrote to Dubfcek a fte r he had consented to 
Soviet demands in 1968 and 1969 that it is the leadership which decides 
how the populations are to behave: 'Society is also, to a certain extent, a 
"function" of its politicians and its elites. These elites act on society and 
mobilize those forces within it that can be mobilized. Cowardly policies 
encourage cowardice in society; courageous policies stimulate people’s 
courage’. In  terms of how the Czechoslovaks behave, Havel wrote: 'Our 
nations have a capacity for both cowardly and courageous behavior, for 
demonstrating holy zeal or selfish indifference. Czechs and Slovaks are  
capable of struggling  heroically or shamelessly denouncing their  
neighbors. Which of these propensities prevails at a given moment, both 
in society and in individuals, largely depends on what situation the 
political elite has created, the choices it places before the people, the  
qualities it encourages in them: in short, it depends on what the e lite ’s 
activities and examples stim ulate’.
Very clearly, Havel sees the ab ility  to act -  and the ab ility  to 
challenge the en tire  system -  in the individual taking responsibility. As 
such, he tends very  much towards accepting responsibility as well as 
guilt. For political life to proceed, past misdeeds must be accounted for.
Havel, 'Anatomy of Reticence’, pp. 169-70.
Havel. 'Letter to Alexander Dubfcek’, in Open Letters, p. 47.
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Apology and Forgiveness
A theme common to much of the Czechoslovak dissident lite ra tu re  follows 
from Havel’s sense of ’responsibility ’: self-examination and improvement.
As Simehka wrote in April 1990, as the debate in Czechoslovakia 
intensified over whether to remove Communist specialists from office: ’I 
object to radicals offering people an easy way to cleanse themselves. 
You’re all innocent, and i t ’s only the owners of Party  cards who are  
guilty. There’s no great morality in pointing an accusatory finger and 
thus wiping the slate clean of any shared guilt. Scrutiny of one’s own 
sins, as every believer knows, is the best way to achieve self- 
improvement’.
Havel told the West German magazine Der Stern  shortly  a fte r having  
become President that ’there is something good in each person, whether 
the person in question is a ju s tly  sentenced prisoner or a tyrannical 
w arder’. He was confident of success in ’creating an atmosphere that 
evokes better qualities in people’.
Havel’s view of prisons helps to illustrate  his concern not for 
punishment but for forgiveness: 'Again and again I realized that prison 
was not intended merely to deprive a man of a few years of his life and 
make him suffer for that length of time, rather it was intended to mark 
him for life, destroy his personality, score his heart in such a way that 
it would never heal completely. Prison thus seems to me something like a 
futurological laboratory of totalitarianism ’.^ ^
In  practical terms, this belief explains Havel’s decision soon after  
becoming President to issue a general amnesty to prisoners. This act was
Milan Simeôka, ’Between Danton and Robespierre’, in Whipple (ed.), p. 258.
Prague Domestic Service, 11 January 1990, in FBIS, 12 January 1990, p. 
16. commenting on interview with Havel published in Der Stern, 11 January  
1990.
Havel, ”'T Take the Side of T ru th " ’, p. 240.
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heavily criticized, since common criminals went free  and several new 
murders were committed by amnestied convicted killers.
But Have went even fu rth e r  than forgiveness. The personal side of 
both Havel and Dienstbier shows their understanding and compassion for 
their persecutors. When asked after release from prison if  he ever felt 
hatred towards his ja ilo rs , Havel replied: 'No, I  don’t  know how to hate, 
and that pleases me. I f  for no other reason, then because hatred clouds
the vision and makes it d ifficu lt to seek the t ru th ’ .^ ^
Similarly, when asked how he fe lt about being sworn in as Foreign
Minster by Husak, who had been ultimately responsible for his
persecution, Dienstbier told interview ers ’I  never took it personally, so I 
did not experience any of the feelings that you are no doubt th inking  
o f ’ .^°
On the national level, Havel’s sense of responsibility  and the need 
to apologise converge in his response to normalization. In  a le tte r, Havel 
called on Dubfcek to apologize on behalf of the nation for agreeing to a 
falsehood: ’I t  may occur to you...that I am actuaUy asking you to wash 
away the sins of all of us, to make the symbolic, redem ptive sacrifice that 
our nations are themselves incapable - unsymbolicaUy -  of making’.
A combination of related elements discussed so fa r  can be observed 
in Havel’s foreign policy. These are individual responsibility , the  
responsibility of the leader, the need to base actions on morality, and the 
need to cleanse previous wrong-doings in order to proceed. They assert 
themselves most s ta rk ly  in Havel’s declaration of the need for 
Czechoslovakia to apologise for the postwar expulsion of nearly 3 million 
Sudeten Germans. The apology was framed in terms of that expulsion
Ibid., p. 243.
Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 December 1989, in FBIS, 2 January 1990, p. 22. 
Havel, 'Letter to Alexander Dubfcek, pp. 46-7.
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having been possible only by an embryonic totalitarian system. This would 
mean an indigenous Czechoslovak totalitarianism which preceded 
Communism. The only way for a democratic society to be reconstructed, in 
Havel’s view, was to undo the processes that allowed for such totalitarian  
practices in the f irs t place.
Apology not only contributed to the content but also the form of 
Havel’s diplomacy. As the f irs t  leader of a Warsaw Pact country to 
address NATO, he apologized ’fo r the lies which my predecessors were for 
years telling you about’.
I t  is this combination of responsibility, apology and forgiveness  
that makes the domestic practice of lustration, as discussed in chapter 3, 
so peculiar in Czechoslovakia.®"* I t  also helps to explain how VONS, which 
became an official organization a fte r the Revolution, and continued to 
issue reports, censured the a rres t of two communists for ’slandering the 
president’ in an autumn 1990 report.®®
Resistance
Havel’s sense of responsibility is all the more s trik ing  in a country in 
which external threat were fe lt so strongly. An important theme in 
Czechoslovak history has been the way in which a nation, which defines 
itself as ’small’ , could withstand systemic threats. Havel believed that 
resistance was always possible. This belief arose in part because his 
interpretation of the role of personal responsibility in political life  
(above) and his re in terpretation  of the sources of power (below). As a 
result, he could see the possibility of resistance in various circumstances.
62 Havel, ’ "I Take the Side of T ru th " ’, p. 240.
®® Cited in John Palmer, 'Nato Misguided in Keeping Out East Europeans, 
Havel Says’, The Guardian, 22 March 1991.
®"* This is detailed in the decision-making chapter.
®® Noted in Open Letters, p. 109.
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Dübtek explained his lack of resistance in 1968 with the phrase 'Look at 
the map’. By contrast, while acknowledging Soviet pressure on Dubtek, 
Havel prodded the ousted Communist Party General Secretary in an 
August 1969 le tte r to '[r]emember the dilemma Edvard BeneS faced at the  
time of Munich. In  those days it was not demagogy -  there  was a real 
danger that the nation would be exterminated’. Havel also pointed out that 
Communists were capable of effective resistance: 'And at that time [1938], 
it was you, the communists, who resisted the persuasive arguments for 
capitulation, and who r ig h tly  understood that a de facto  defeat need not 
be a moral defeat: that a moral v ictory may later become a de facto  
v ic to ry ’.
This thinking dovetails with themes in Czechoslovak h istory about 
the meaning of resistance and victory and about how to prevent what 
Czechoslovak historians and th inkers, from Masaryk to Kundera, have 
referred  to as the problem or fate of small nations.
The dissidents believed that v ictory did not necessarily lie in arms, 
but that the definition of v icto ry  had to be changed. One of the tactics 
was to 'win’ in the terms that the regime was using. This meant using 
legality to the dissidents’ advantage.
Legality
Part of the tactics of Czechoslovak dissidents, and of dissidents 
throughout the Soviet bloc, was to resist w ithin the terms of existing 
laws of Czechoslovakia. In  his account of Article 202 of the Czechoslovak 
Criminal Code, one of the charges which gave Communist authorities  
considerable flex ib ility  to a rres t people such as the dissidents, Havel 
describes anecdotally how his possible reactions to provocation would only
Havel, 'Letter to Alexander Dubfcek’, p. 40.
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result in his arrest and treatment as a common c r im in a l .T h is  situation, 
he writes, prevents him from acting 'as a man' and defending himself. 
Thus, not only would other means have to be found, but, as the  
dissidents would argue, more effective means existed. Not surpris ing ly , 
therefore, the ir resistance did not take the form of armed insurrection. 
Indeed, it did not, as discussed elsewhere, even take the form, in their  
view, of political opposition.
While the dissidents suffered from the elastic nature of the regime’s 
laws, as Havel details of his own experience under Articles 202 and 203, 
they worked all the more to take state laws at face value. This was not a 
tactic exclusive in the Soviet bloc to Czechoslovak dissidents but it had a 
profound effect on post-revolutionary politics, as will be evident in 
chapter 7.
International agreements to which the regime consented were 
particu larly useful to the Czechoslovak dissidents. Foremost was the  
Helsinki Accords. This allowed Charter 77 to condemn the Czechoslovak 
declaration on the seventeenth anniversary of the Soviet intervention as 
being 'in breach of the principles of international law, including the 
provisions of the Warsaw Pact’.®®
In  their foreign policy, the Czechoslovak dissidents took 
international agreements very  seriously, not least because of the value 
they attributed to the adoption and application of the Helsinki Accords.
Universality
The care with which Havel describes his own thoughts is evident. He 
offers the caveat '1 don’t claim that any of my formulations are
'202’ and '203’, in Havel, O lidskou identitu, pp. 156-62 and 163-69. 
®® Cited in Bugajski, Czechoslovakia, p. 4.
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The totality of such th inking is that the nature of political power is 
reconceptualised.
The Form and Content of a ’Civic" Foreign Policy
This chapter showed that Czechoslovakia’s dissidents believed th a t the ir  
pre-1989 beliefs constituted a ’civic’ politics which was applicable to post- 
Revolution society. Similarly, the chapter illustrated  how the new 
Czechoslovak leadership believed that its foreign policy was to grow from 
the same sp irit and values. I t  is therefore necessary to determine the  
form and content of a ’c ivic’ foreign policy.
The overriding feature is the belief th a t ideas have powerful causal 
effects and that outcomes are not, cannot be conceived as determined by 
power or material factors. A civic foreign policy could thus be expected 
to take a d ifferent view from other foreign policies on power distributions  
in the international system and potential changes to it, such as the  
unification of Germany. I t  would also aim to eliminate power politics from 
the international system
A civic foreign policy would be concerned with morality. I t  would 
see morality as an aim in its own rig h t but would also view the lack of 
morality as a hindrance to other aims. Outstanding historical wrongs 
would have to be addressed before other policies could be pursued.
A civic foreign policy would transcend parochial national interests  
to be concerned with what it  identifies as global crises. Because such a 
foreign policy would be deeply concerned with personal and national 
responsibility, it would in te rp re t crises as a common responsibility of 
mankind. Demonstrations of solidarity with those persecuted by corrupt 
regimes would stem not only from the morality of the civic foreign policy 
but from the practical experience the dissidents had of international 
support before 1989.
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The makers of a c iv ic  fo re ig n  policy would expect it  to be an 
expression of democratic w ill and to serve as a means fo r man to regain  
control over his destiny. Just as the Havel did want * megamachinery ' to  
influence the direction of domestic policy, n e ither would he want it  in  
foreign policy.
A civic fo re ign  policy would observe th e  leg a lity  of existing  
structures, even i f  they  sought to change them, in  th e  same way th a t  
dissidents worked w ith in  the legal systems o f th e  Communist regimes. But 
because of the restric tions on th e ir  ab ility  to  express themselves, 
unconventional forms of expression like  symbolism took on greater 
importance. Thus, the form of a civic foreign  policy could be expected to  
be d iffe ren t from conventional practice.
The success w ith which th e  Czechoslovak dissidents implemented 
such a programme is the  focus of the rem aining chapters. But le t us tu rn  
f irs t  to post-Communist fore ign  policy decision making in  Czechoslovakia.
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CHAPTER 3
PLURALISM, FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND 
THE RETURN OF THE ENTRENCHED INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS
Czechoslovakia’s democratic revolution of November 1989 saw the  
involvement of v irtu a lly  every segment of society and government agency: 
Slovaks, Hungarians, and Czechs, academicians and industria l workers, 
students and elderly cleaning women, artists  and theatre workers, 
deposed communists and the acclaimed dissidents. Members of the state  
news agency supplied equipment and facilities, and the secret police, the  
hitherto  bulwark of one of the most hardline regimes in the socialist bloc, 
actually had its agents lead the student marches which culminated in the  
protests of hundreds of thousands.^
Such widespread involvement of the population might suggest that 
decision-making after the revolution would be characterised by greater 
societal involvement than was the case before. Instead, however, a 
contraction of decision-making occurred, particu larly  in the realm of 
foreign policy. The inputs into post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign  
policy that are identified here will be shown to have been either 
uninintended or the expression of entrenched interests. Whatever the ir  
origins, they demonstrate the inability  of the new leadership to achieve 
the type of foreign policy they sought and believed possible.
This chapter seeks to establish how such a situation has arisen.
Two developments in politics in the fo rty  years of communist ru le  are  
relevant: the gradual decentralization of absolute, centralized party  
control; and the continuous and sustained development of a parallel 
society, with increasingly significant organizations of the population being 
outside party and state control.
 ^ For accounts of the 1989 Revolution, see bibliography, part 7.
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Political decision-making in the post-Communist countries of Central 
and East Europe cannot be divorced from the legacy of socialist rule." In  
order to understand more comprehensively the decision-making processes 
in contemporary Czechoslovakia, and indeed in any of its neighbours, it is 
indispensible to consider how decision-making evolved in the Soviet bloc.
The chapter begins by examining the original model and ’the best- 
known and most w idely’ accepted model devised^ for the in terpretation  of 
politics in the Soviet-type system: Carl J. F ried ric h ’s and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski’s totalitarian model.'’ Also examined are modifications to this  
model and their implications for our understanding of these political 
systems. The strength and influence of groups and bodies not connected 
to the Party-S tate  structure  - an ’opposition’ -  are then considered. The 
argument is made that the existence and strength of unofficial civic  
movements also indicated a pluralisation of politics in Soviet-type regimes.
The next section examines decision-making in post-Communist 
(Czechoslovakia, and argues that a contraction in the number of people 
and bodies involved in foreign policy decision making occurred a fte r the  
Revolution. I t  does so by examining the impact of the lustration law 
generally on the political process, as well its particu lar effect on 
institutions which may have been expected to contribute to foreign-policy  
making: the secret services and the m ilitary. The roles of the Federal
 ^ This is the argument in what like ly  constitutes the f irs t academic work on 
post-Communist Czechoslovakia: Wolchik, Czechoslovakia, passim. This theme 
is approached more broadly in Zoltan Barany and Ivan Volgyes (eds). The 
Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995).
Jerry  F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard U n ivers ity  Press, 1979), p. 519.
Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U nivers ity  Press, 1956). Citations are  
from a later printing (New York: Praeger, 1964), but remain valid for 
reference to the original publication. References hereafter to the to talitarian  
model, unless stated otherwise, re fe r to the F riedrich -B rzezinski model.
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Foreign M inistry, Federal Finance Ministry and the Federal Foreign Trade  
M inistry will also be examined.
The final section examines the rapid re-emergence of old 
institutional interests or the institutionalisation of new ones, which 
resulted in contradictions of Federal Czechoslovak foreign policy and 
which undermined the Foreign M in istry ’s monopoly. The policy areas 
examined include arms sales and nuclear energy, as well as the  
institutionalisation of Slovak ’foreign policy’ issues through the  
establishment of the Slovak M inistry of International Relations.
FROM THE TOTALITARIAN MODEL TO PRESSURE GROUPS
It  is necessary to establish how bureaucratic interests came to manifest 
themselves in Soviet-type systems, particu larly since the widely accepted 
totalitarian model contended a high degree of centralisation in such 
polities. B riefly, the well-known characteristics of the Friedrich  and 
Brzezinski model are: (1) an official ideology; (2) a single mass party; (3) 
a network of ’te rro ris tic  police control’; (4) control of media; (5) control 
of military; and (6) the central control of the complete economy by means 
of adm inistrative co-ordination of previously autonomous corporate  
agencies.^ The central assertion of the totalitarian model is that the  
leadership aims to destroy any b arrie r between the state and society, 
thereby gaining unchallenged and ’total control over society and the  
c itizen ry ’ .^
In spite of its acceptance in the study of Soviet-type regimes, the 
applicability of the totalitarian model, as embodied in Stalin ’s Russia, to 
Eastern Europe is questionable. The creation of socialist regimes in that
 ^ Ib id,, pp. 9-10. The characteristics are each described in detail in the 
appropriate chapters of the book.
® See, among others. Hough and Fainsod, Soviet Union, p. 519.
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region occurred towards the end of the 1940s, leaving little  time for them 
to consolidate power and implement programmes, particu larly  in the  
economic sphere, that would fu lly  mimic th e ir Soviet inspiration. As 
Brzezinski chronicles in The Soviet Bloc, Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe 
still had a strong bourgeoisie possessing political forces, workers  
remained to an extent under ’rig h t-w ing  socialists,’ and the peasant 
parties generally proved hostile to the indigenous Communist Parties. The 
concept of the 'People’s Democracy’ as a transitional phase in the  
development of the fledgling East European regime demonstrated the view  
of Soviet Marxists that they were unready even for a socialist revolution, 
let alone the advanced stage of the Soviet state. ^  Robert Sharlet concurs, 
arguing that the process of Stalinization in Eastern Europe was unable to 
run its fu ll course before Stalin ’s death in 1953. As a result. Eastern  
European Communist Parties were unable to conclude 'the social 
penetration and politici2^tion  of their respective societies’ , although they  
gained control of the state bodies which assured significant control over 
those societies.® These views caution that the to ta litarian  model cannot be 
fu lly  applied to at least some Eastern European regimes. We are forced, 
however, to proceed with the investigation because Friedrich and 
Brzezinski declare that a fte r the death of Stalin in 1953, Communist 
societies became more totalitarian.^
The inadequacy of the totalitarian model in explaining the nature of 
politics, and the nature of change in politics, in Soviet-type systems was
 ^ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge: Harvard U n ivers ity  
Press, 1967), pp. 23-27.
® Robert Sharlet, 'Human Rights and Wrongs: Dissent and Repression in 
Eastern Europe’, in Nicholas N. K ittrie  and Ivan  Volgyes, (eds). The 
Uncertain Future: Gorbachev's Eastern Europe  (New York: Paragon House: 
1988), p. 85.
® Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship, p. 300. See also H. 
Gordon Skilling, 'In teres t Groups and Communist Politics’, World Politics Vol. 
18, No.3 (March 1966), pp, 436-7.
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aptly demonstrated by the emergence of many totalitarian 'sub -types ’ 
which emphasised or de-emphasised the characteristics advanced by 
Friedrich and Brzezinski. In  the two decades following the publication of 
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, as many as ten major variations  
were devised.
One of the more significant, according to some commentators,^^ was 
the notion of 'tendencies’ or interest groups in Communist politics. This 
approach argued that group conflict in Soviet politics had previously  
been viewed as struggles between factions at the upper-m ost levels of 
the Party. H. Gordon Skilling disputed the contention of that model, which 
implied that 'groups’ in Soviet politics were simply tools to be 
manoeuvred in the jockeying for power. Instead, he argued, they  
possessed, and pursued interests of their own. He defined these groups 
as having common 'characteristics and attitudes on public issues’ and 
which actively pursued the ir own interests in a bargaining process.
The corporatist theory adopted a similar approach to Communist 
politics as the interest group model, but emphasized that it was the state 
that determined the groups or agencies which would have representation  
in the decision-making process. The model perceived an agreement 
between the state and the institution: In  re tu rn  for the la tter's  monopoly
A genealogy of these models is offered in Andrzej Korbonski, 'Ideology  
Disabused: Communism Without a Face in Eastern F^urope’, in K ittrie  and 
Volgyes (eds), p. 46; and Andrew C. Janos, 'Systemic Models and the Theory  
of Change in the Comparative Study of Communist Politics’ , in Andrew C. 
Janos, (ed.), Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe. Uniform ity & 
D iversity in One-Party States  (Berkeley: In s titu te  of In ternational Studies, 
University of California, 1976), p. 1.
Andrzej Korbonski calls the interest group model the 'most important 
watershed’ in Soviet bloc politics since the to ta litarian  model. 'The "Change 
to Change" in Eastern Europe', in Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Cocks (eds). 
Political Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1977), p. 3.
H. Gordon Skilling, 'Groups in Soviet Politics: Some Hypotheses’, in H. 
Gordon Skilling and Franklyn G riffiths (eds). In te re s t Groups in Soviet 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 19-24.
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of representation in its area of concern, it must function within  
perim eters established by the state.
The interest group and the corporatist models were important 
because each challenged the totalitarian model on the grounds that it  
disregarded the role of semi-autonomous institutions in the policy process 
in Sovie t-type regimes. S ignificantly, however, neither of them made a 
substantial break with the to talitarian model, for they did not dispute the  
overall supremacy of the Party . These models, however, helped to 
confront the problem of the static nature of the totalitarian construct, 
which Brzezinski himself recognized with his ’convergence th eo ry ’ in 
Political Power: USA/USSR,^^ in which the term totalitarian is 
deliberately not used.^^
In  spite of its re lative  acceptance in the study of Soviet politics, 
the in terest group model, as Korbonski remarks, has not been applied to  
the East European setting,^® even though by 1970 authors such as 
Samuel Huntington saw it as appropriate.^^ One rare  attempt was Carl 
Beck’s ’Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe’. The 
emphasis of his work, which predated the in terest group model, is a 
study of the relationship between the bureaucracy and political 
development by applying classical bureaucratic theory to Eastern Europe
A concise explanation is given by Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel 
Ok sen berg. Policy-m aking in China: Leaders, S tructures and Processes 
(Princeton: Princeton U nivers ity  Press, 1988), p. 397.
Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington Political Power: 
USA/USSR (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), pp. 419-436.
Skilling, ’In te res t Groups’, p. 441.
Korbonski, ’Change to Change’, p. 11.
Samuel P. Huntington, ’Social and Institu tional Dynamics of O ne-Party  
Systems’, in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, (eds). A uthoritarian  
Politics in Modern Society (New York and London: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 
437-50, cited in ibid., p. 12.
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to assess the impact of modernization.^” He finds that in the early  1960s, 
'pressure toward professional autonomy’ by bureaucratic groups such as 
those later identified by the proponents of the interest group model was 
already evident, but it was not great enough to form a major challenge to 
the East European political systems.^” Nevertheless, he foresaw the  
emergence of a 'second New Class’ composed of managers created by the  
modernization efforts of the respective regimes. The p rio rity  of these new 
societal groups, he contends, would not be ideological zeal but the  
protection of their own interests and well-being.
What the interest group and corporatist models, and variations on 
these theories, demonstrated was the devolution of absolute power in 
Communist regimes. They argued that some influence was now^  held by 
institutional entities; but these institutional entities were integral parts of 
the system, and were thus in partnership with the regime.
Such a devolution of power came as a resu lt of modernisation of the 
economy and the increased importance given to technocrats and 
specialists. Whereas in the Soviet Cultural Revolution of 1928-32, during  
which Stalin’s Communist Party deemed itse lf the firs t, last and only 
authority  on science, industry, culture and technology, and set political 
re liab ility  over professional e x p e r t is e , th e  post-Stalin leadership, with 
the exception of the continued prominence of biologist Trofim Lysenko,
Carl Beck, 'Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe’, in 
Joseph LaPalombara (ed.). Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 268.
Ibid., pp. 288-9.
Ib id., p. 292.
Sheila F itzpatrick (ed.). The Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 
(Bloomington: Indiana Univers ity Press, 1978).
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began to realize the indispensable role of the specialists on the basis of 
their own professional merits.
The correlation between the p a rty ’s loss of power and the gain of 
power by technocrats and specialists is evidenced, as Vladimir Kusin 
illustrates, in the crackdown in Czechoslovakia a fte r the Prague Spring.
In  order to forestall the resurgence of such a reform movement, or to 
punish it, 'the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist P arty  and 
Moscow had to sacrifice some of the modernisation requirem ents which 
were indispensable for the attainment of technical rationality and economic 
effic iency’.^  ^ As François Fejto observes, Marxist revisionists throughout 
Eastern Europe recognized that 'neither the working class, nor its 
vanguard (the party ), nor even the vanguard ’s vanguard (the "new 
class") are equipped to manage a modern industria l society e ffic ien tly ’ .^ "^  
Neither charismatic leadership nor coercion can effective ly  substitute for 
a rational economic mechanism. The regime which sought the fru its  of 
modernisation, therefore, had, in re tu rn , to surrender some of its absolute 
power.
In  spite of the challenge presented to the to talitarian model by the 
advent of bureaucratic and institutional in terest groups, many, perhaps 
even most, commentators retain  several of the original to ta litarian  model 
components. As Paul M. Johnson points out, what emerged because of the  
recognition of the role of modernization in changing how we looked at 
politics in Eastern Europe were models which only redefined the 'really
This was later redressed, as one of the f irs t  in itiatives of the post- 
Khrushchev leadership was to remove Lysenko from any involvement in the  
agricultural and biological sciences. Hough and Fainsod, Soviet Union, p. 254.
Vladimir V. Kusin, 'Challenge to Normalcy: Poltical Opposition in
Czechoslovakia, 1968-1977’, in Rudolf L. Tokes, (ed.). Opposition in Eastern  
Europe (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979), p. 26.
François Fejto, A History of the Peoples Democracies (New York: Praeger, 
1971), p. 275.
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essential’ features of the model, removing the 'contingent’ characteristics  
which were not indispensable to the totalitarian configuration."''
The inadequacy of what Johnson calls 'sub -types ’ of the totalitarian  
model is illustrated by the emergence of some ten d iffe ren t ones, none of 
which were satisfactory enough to earn wide-spread acceptance. Only one 
such example of these 'su b -typ es ’ will be examined here.
Andrzej Korbonski, w riting before the developments of the final 
months of 1989, argues that four of the original six components of the  
tota litarian model still apply to contemporary Eastern Europe. These are: 
(1) the leading role of the Communist Party; and its continued monopoly 
over (2) the instruments of coercion; (3) the media; and (4) the  
economy.
How d ifferent is Korbonski’s model from its to ta litarian predecessor? 
In  effect, he argues t'nat not only four, but at least five  of the original 
tenets are still pertinent. When he refers to the Communist P a rty ’s 
control over the means of coercion, it implicitly includes more than  
characteristic (5) of the Friedrich-B rzezinski model, control over the  
military, although it is likely de-emphasizing the notion of a ttr ib u te  (3) 
'te rro ris tic  police control’. The potential fo r the la tter remains, and shall 
be discussed below.
While Korbonski suggests the Communist Party also retains a 
monopoly over the economy, he seems to ignore the assertions of the  
interest group and corporatist models. Possibly he feels that in e ither of 
those frameworks, it is the Party that grants autonomy to such entities  
(as indeed the corporatist model argues), and thus can reclaim it. But in 
time, these 'independent' economic interests can become animated entities  
in their own right.
Paul M. Johnson, 'Modernization as an Explanation of Political Change in 
East European States’, in Triska and Cocks (eds), p. 30.
Korbonski, 'Ideology Disabused’, p. 47.
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Power and influence evolved out of the hands of the P arty , 
generating sources of competition within the official structures. This 
development in itself challenged the to talitarian model; and while these 
changes were acknowledged by many of its sub-types, they too did not 
portray the development of sources of influence completely outside the 
P arty -S ta te  system. I t  is to these forces to which the discussion now 
turns.
THE MEANING OF ’OPPOSITION’
The concentration on official structures in the litera tu re  on Soviet-types  
regimes stunted the discipline’s ab ility  to assess the formation and 
significance of what might be called an ’opposition’. The definition of 
’opposition’ added to this methodological problem. I t  ranged from simply 
th inking d ifferen tly  from how the regime intended to assuming an active  
and organised programme.
Representative of the f irs t position was Werner Volkmer, for whom a 
dissenter or dissident comprises anyone who simply bears opinions 
’c ritica l’ of party policy, and he did not specifically state that those 
views must be e x p re s s e d .S im ila r ly , in ’The Power of the Powerless’, 
Vaclav Havel, had maintained that opposition begins with ’liv ing  w ithin the  
tru th ’ , a conscious rejection of the lie propagated by the state which 
forces the greengrocer to place perfunctorily  a sigh among his vegetables  
reading: ’Workers of the world, u n i t e ! F o r  these authors, dissent 
begins with denying the legitimacy of the ru ling  ideology.
Occupying a middle position would be Jacques Rupnik, who defined 
dissent as ’spontaneous, sporadic or continuous manifestations of
Werner Volkmer, ’East Germany: Dissenting Views during the Last Decade’, 
in Tokes (ed.), p. 138.
Havel, ’Moc bezmocnÿch’, pp. 55-133.
no
dissatisfaction or disagreement with official policies in all spheres of 
social life ’. But he added that dissent must include the actual public 
expression of d is c o n te n t.S o v ie t  activist Roy Medvedev defined a 
dissident as a person 'who disagrees in some measure with the ideological, 
political, economic, or moral foundations that every  society rests on’. But, 
like Rupnik, he defined the dissent by the demonstration of opposition.
George Schopflin adds two additional factors to the definition: that 
the individuals involved be physically organized, and that they apply 
pressure on the government in pursuit of specific g o a l s . W e  have thus  
gone from a definition of opposition which includes simply the existence 
of views at odds with the official ideology, to the actual application of 
pressure by an organized en tity  on the regime by an organized entity .
An effective distinction of the various nuances of 'discontent’ is 
contained in Sabrina Ramet’s Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The 
Sources and Meaning o f the Great Transformation.^^ She contends that 
there are three levels of discontent: dissatisfaction, disaffection and 
dissent. The firs t manifests itself as malaise over particular issues, such 
as food prices, but it does not inherently challenge system legitimacy. 
Disaffection might involve discontent with the system without a 
corresponding belief in one’s capacity to alter it but with possible 
manifestations of anti-societal behaviour such as the fashionable th e ft of 
state property. While entailing potential reprisal against the system.
Jacques Rupnik, 'Dissent in Poland, 1968-78: The End of Revisionism and 
the Rebirth of Civil Society’, in Tokes (ed.), p. 61.
Cited in Robert Sharlet, 'Varieties of Dissent and Regularities of 
Repression in the European Communist States: An Overview ’, in Jane Leftwich  
C urry (ed.). Dissent in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 2.
George Schopflin, 'Opposition and Paraopposition: Critical Currents in 
Hungary, 1968-78’, in Tokes (ed.), p. 142.
Sabrina P. Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe. The Sources and  
Meaning o f the Great Transformation (Durham, N.C.: Duke U n ivers ity  Press, 
1991). A second edition has since been published.
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disaffection is not synonymous witti dissent, the la tter possessing the 
distinct feature of a belief in one’s capacity to modify the system, 
denoting an outside standard against which to assess system performance.
Having considered the definitional facets of opposition, we tu rn  to 
how the rise of opposition in economics, in culture and in the arts, and 
by religion challenge the relevant tenets of Korbonski’s revised  
totalitarian model.
As Korbonski notes, the Yugoslav League of Communists created an 
economic opposition by introducing w orkers’ self-management and 
abolishing collectivization and all-inclusive central p la n n in g .Y u g o s la v ia  
provided an example of the regime deciding to surrender its absolute 
monopoly of economic control. More relevant illustrations of workers  
opposition to economic measures, including those that included the  
prospect of reform, occurred with Czechoslovakia’s New Economic System 
and Hungary’s New Economic Mechanism.^'’
What developed in the 1980s surpassed even the Action Programme 
in 1968, which had pledged: ’the r ig h t and real possibility of d iffe ren t 
groups of working people and d ifferen t social groups to formulate and 
defend their economic interests in shaping the economic policy’ .
Intellectual and cultural dissidents undermined the to ta lity  of the 
regime’s control over the media. The natural result of a strong, v ib ran t 
intellectual opposition was the emergence of underground ’media’. This 
was certainly d ifficu lt, and often dangerous, in East' European states, 
such as Romania, where control measures had included the mandatory 
state registration of every typew riter. Samizdat and the Polish Zepis, 
maintained a small but hard-core readership, one that, given the rig h t
3 3 Korbonski, ’Ideology Disabused’, p. 49.
See Alex Pravda, ’Industria l Workers: Patterns of Dissent, Opposition and 
Accommodation’, in Tokes (ed.), esp. p. 216.
Action Programme, p. 50, Blueprint, p. 172.
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circumstances, was instrumental in developing and directing a much 
larger opposition network. Polish author Ryczard Kapuchinski observed  
that in Poland underground publications were read in public, such as on 
trams, by the mid-19 8 0 s . E v e n  in Party media organs, the press has 
been manipulated against the government. Examples include the prin ting  
on the fro n t page of the Communist Chinese official newspaper People’s 
Daily of a speech by a Hungarian official denouncing the use of violence 
as a means of solving domestic problems. I t  was published fourteen days 
before the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Taking Korbonski’s scheme, we see at least two of his 
characteristics of the totalitarian model were chaffed at by the opposition: 
Party control of the media and of the economy. Already that represents a
challenge to the supremacy of the party.
The supremacx of the Party as the fount of wisdom and inspiration  
was also undercut b\ the survival of organized religion throughout 
Eastern Europe, of which the Polish Roman Catholic Church was probably  
the most prominent for its successes in usurping Party authority .
Referred to as ’hegemonic,’ representing eighty per cent of the Polish 
population, it successfully remained independent of the regime.
Korbonski argues that the Catholic Church in Poland became so powerful 
after the release from prison of Primate Stefan Wyszynski, that in effect
a ’co-leadership’ e m e r g e d . T h e  importance the Communist regime
accorded good relations with the Church was demonstrated by the meeting 
between General Secretary Gierek and Wyszynski on 29 October 1977, 
followed by Gierek’s audience with the Pope one month later. Before the
Comment at Institu te  of Contemporary Arts, London, June 1992.
Sheryl WuDunn, ’Boldly and Subtly, China’s Press Tests Lim its...’ , The New 
York Times, 24 May 1989.
Rupnik, ’Dissent in Poland’, p. 86.
Korbonski, ’Ideology Disabused’, p. 47.
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June elections which gave Solidarity its Parliam entary v ictory , the Sejm 
enacted legislation on 17 May 1989 fina lly  giving legal status to the Roman 
Catholic Church. This might have been the final concession of the  
Communist Government to the opposition forces before its own 
disintegration."^®
All of the totalitarian-based models, in theoretical terms, are made
redundant by the growth of an opposition, although, im portantly,
dissidents have maintained that totalitarianism in practice is not extinct
until each and every of its constituent elements has been removed. As
Martin Hybler and Jihi Nhmec wrote in ’In  Search of an Answer’, the
belief predominated among the ir fellow Czechoslovak dissidents that 'any
fundamental systemic change in to talitarian socialism is impossible; that
this system is incapable of perm itting any essential change because it
would thus endanger its very  being’. C z e c h o s l o v a k  dissident Rudolf
Batthk stipulated that 'the totalitarian system can only be eliminated by
eliminating all the elements of political dictatorship that are essential to
that system’. S u c h  a consideration must be factored into the constructs
examining East European politics.
Andrew C. Janos attempts to deal with the many overlapping 'sub-
type ’ models by devising a d ifferen t set of measurements of the
distribution of power. These are:
(1) the 'political formula,’ or beliefs concerning the 'fundamental 
purposes,’ or 'ultimate principles,’ of the political order; (2) the  
nature of the governing elites, with particu lar reference to the 
imagery they use of sustain the ir legitimacy; (3) the nature of 
typical obligations incurred by subordinates (auxiliaries) and non- 
elites; (4) the political process, or the routinized ways of making 
binding decisions for the community as a whole; (5) the nature of 
the restraints imposed on governing elites; (6) politics, or the
4 0 The Globe and Mail, 18 May 1989.
Martin Hybler and J ifi Nëmec, 'In  Search of an Answer’, in Skilling, 
Charter 77, pp. 324-26, at p. 324.
Rudolf Battèk, 'Spiritual Values, Independent In itia tives and Politics’, in 
Havel, Power, p. 106.
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exercise of power in the pursuit of particular preferences; and (7) 
centralization, or the degree of decisional and leadership autonomy 
reposited in individual social units.
Janos’s approach provides a scale by which to measure the extent 
to which regimes retain control over institutional and societal bodies. I t  
still presumes that power does not rest overwhelmingly with the non­
regime end of his spectrum. His fourth  criterion, especially, shows the  
fra g ility  of his model. I t  presupposes that binding decisions can still be 
made.
As long as oppositional groups remain separate and the regime 
controls the mechanisms of coercion, it can enforce its decrees. When 
opposition groups unite, however, the demise of the regime is at hand. I t  
is to these developments that the thesis now turns.
Economic demands have been one of the largest and most vocalised 
concerns in East Europe. Alex Pravda contends that even though many of 
the demands of workers in Eastern Europe have political consequence, 
'demands of an openly political nature do not figu re  prominently in 
workers’ protests’. S u c h  claims, can become p o l i t i c a l . F o r  example, 
workers in East Germany struck over the unavailability of coffee. The 
regime responded by introducing a coffee substitute, made partly  from 
chicory. The workers again struck, demanding real coffee. The incident 
grew so serious that f if ty  workers were arrested on charges with the  
political crime of scheming on behalf of the class enemy. The protest was 
viewed seriously by the regime, even though it had 'no real political 
motivations.'*®
Janos, 'Systemic Models’, p. 2.
'*'* Pravda, 'Industria l Workers’, p. 226.
See, for example, Jan S. Prybyla, 'The Great Malaise: Economic Crisis in 
Eastern Europe’, in K ittrie  and Volgyes, (eds), p. 72.
'*® Volkmer, 'East Germany’, pp. 119-20. He does not provide dates for the 
incident.
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According to Jacques Rupnik, the opposition groups in Poland, 
having worked at cross-purposes, finally  came together in mutual 
support. The Catholic Church lent support to the w orkers’ movement. For 
example, on 26 September 1976, three days after the establishment of the 
Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR), Cardinal Wyszynski proclaimed in a 
sermon that it is 'painful when workers must struggle for th e ir righ ts  
from a workers’ government’.''  ^ On the following Sunday, all Church 
collections went to the families of arrested or dismissed workers."'^ The 
reciprocal support of the KOR and the workers’ movement was 
demonstrated by the membership of Father Jan Zieja in the former and by 
the designation of Lech Walesa as an honourary monk."^
The East German Church proved instrumental in the demonstrations 
of 1989, but it also had a long history of nourishing various opposition- 
type groups. These have included effo rts  to involve alienated German 
youth in the growing dissent movement, with the parish in K arl-M arx- 
Stadt inviting rock bands to perform and lead its congregation in singing  
Christian lyrics to the tune of 'Yellow S u b m a r i n e . T h e  cooperation of 
differen t strands of opposition was evident in Czechoslovakia, when 
Charter 77 spokesman Jihi Hâjek explained that three types of people 
were signatories: intellectuals, ousted reform Communists, and 
Christians.
With a build-up of popular discontent, and the convergence of the  
organisational structures behind it, the use of force'and violence by the  
state became increasingly ineffective. As Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller
Cited in Rupnik, 'Dissent in Poland’, pp. 89-90. 
Tbid., p. 90.
Sharlet, 'Varieties’, pp. 97-8.
Volkmer, 'East Germany’, p. 123.
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demonstrate in their work on the Hungarian uprising of 1956, while the 
movement was m ilitarily crushed and its leaders executed, coercion alone 
was not sufficient to keep the population in its place; the people ’also 
had to be bribed  Even though the regime used force, it had to 
surrender some control.
There were smaller manifestations of discontent than the large  
revolts of 1953 and 1956. For example, workers at a large tracto r factory  
outside Warsaw responded to the June 1976 price hikes by destroying the  
main railroad. On 25 June, when the Party did not respond, they torched 
the local Communist Party  headquarters.^^
Such displays of opposition should not occur in an effective  
totalitarian system. For when socialising instruments like the media and 
the education system fail to indoctrinate the population, the P a rty ’s 
control over the police and the m ilitary remains to suppress symptoms of 
discontent.
Naturally, few would argue that the East European regimes lacked 
the capability of physically destroying any popular opposition or 
uprising. In  m ilitary terms, the weapons available to a c itizenry  could not 
effectively challenge all of the resources at the disposal of the  police, 
and the armed forces of Eastern Europe. But a key factor in a regime’s 
ability  to deploy its security and m ilitary forces against an internal 
threat is the political re liab ility  of those f o r c e s . T h i s  is a cardinal 
issue ignored by the to talitarian model. Friedrich  and Brzezinski contend 
that in spite of some problems of attaining fu ll political indoctrination of 
a regime’s m ilitary forces, the la tter would only become a challenge to the
Feher and Heller, Hungary 1956, p. 146. Emphasis in the original.
Rupnik, ’Dissent’, pp. 80-1.
Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability o f the Warsaw Pact Armies: The 
Southern Tier (Durham: Duke U niversity Press, 1982), p. 6.
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regime in the face of 'a major challenge from the outside’.'’ ' But once 
other pillars of the to talitarian system have been weakened, internal 
forces could undermine the re liab ility  of the security forces, and thereby  
challenge the leadership by passively refusing to fu lfil orders, or actively  
aiding or even leading a revolt.
In  the face of a widespread opposition movement, the army is faced 
with a crucial question: will soldiers shoot the ir fellow countrymen? Street 
demonstrations in the Fall of 1989 in Czechoslovakia, and in East Germany 
swelled to include as many as one-tenth and one-th ird , respectively, of 
the total populations. By contrast, the Chinese protests of A pril-June 1989 
were limited to a few urban areas, and the number of partic ipants rarely  
exceeded one million, or under 0.1 per cent of the total population.''^ 
Naturally, the size of a demonstration is not the only factor in 
determining the willingness of the instruments of coercion of a regime to 
crackdown with the required physical force.
Adam Michnik commented that by 1989 in Poland a protest involving  
as few as 100,000 people (presumably in one location) would make the  
security forces decline to disperse it."^ Indeed, Poland’s M ilitary  
Commander General Wojciech Jaruzelski during the 1976 bread riots  
declared: 'Polish soldiers will not f ire  on Polish w orkers’."  ^ This 
suggests that the East European Communist regimes had not atomised 
th e ir societies, and fragmented personal and family loyalties, in the way
Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship, p. 281.
This is not to suggest that urban areas are not key. The Beijing protests 
were a watershed for Chinese demonstrations, being the f irs t  time that 
intellectuals and workers organized themselves to jo in students. See Sheryl 
WuDunn, '150,000 Students, Workers and Intellectuals Raise Their Voices for 
Change’, The New York Times, 16 May 1989.
Adam Michnik, U n ivers ity  of Toronto, 24 November 1989. A uthor’s note. 
Michnik did not elaborate on this point.
Cited in Ivan Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe (Chicago: The Dorsey 
Press, 1986), p. 94.
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that Hannah Arendt, for example, had p r o p o s e d . J a r u z e i s k l ’s 
declaration did not, of course, mean that the protest, or Solidarity later, 
were not supported. But the wholesale slaughter of demonstrators did not 
occur e ither. Michnik shocked Poles by declaring that he 'understood’ 
Jaruze lsk i’s decision to impose martial law in 1981, explaining that martial 
law provided recourse for the side in a political conflict that was forced 
on the defensive, and even 'frightened of losing all control’.
The gradual emergence of separate opposition groups, f irs t  as a 
by-product of the process of modernization, then as more broadly-based  
societal groups, followed finally  by their gradual unification in purpose 
and in strategy made 'opposition' a permanent player in the politics of 
Soviet-type r e g i m e s . B u t  when the opposition becomes the government, 
does it reta in  its plural origins?
In  post-Communist Czechoslovakia, decision-making, particu larly  in 
foreign policy, became highly exclusive immediately a fte r the revolution  
and, in principle, remained so. Moreover, the re-em ergence of institutional 
interests, both deterred 'democratic’ inputs into foreign policy and forced 
the Foreign M inistry to redefine or even abandon several of its major 
policy positions. The chapter now turns to post-communist foreign policy 
decision-making in Czechoslovakia.
Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism  (2nd edn) (New York: World 
Publishing, 1958).
See William Echikson, 'Facing the Limits of Reform Under Communism’, 
Christian Science Monitor, 15-21 June 1989.
Not even East European socialist governments could choose the option 
proposed by Bertolt Brecht a fte r the crushing of the East German revolution  
of 17 June 1953:
Would it not be easier 
in this case for the government 
to dissolve the people 
and elect another?
Bertolt Brecht, 'The Solution’, Poems 1913-1956 (1976), p. 440, cited in George 
Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), p. 124.
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FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING AFTER THE REVOLUTION
The argument made in the previous section was that, while still 
repressive and centralised, communist regimes had become more pluralistic  
than was previously assessed. The nature of the 1989 revolution  
suggested that the level of popular participation in politics would remain 
high.
Part of this reasoning comes from the broad-based nature of the 
revolution. While certain personalities were crucial, the success of the  
revolution lay in the convergence of societal pressures, both of people 
and agencies within and without the official structures. To the extent any 
ideology underpinned the revolution, it was an ideology that reaffirm ed  
existing values, namely liberal democracy.
Most East European states attempted the same in practice. Non- 
Communist activists worked within collective movements which assumed the  
ubiquitous name of 'Forums’, such as that of the Democratic Forum in 
Hungary, the New Forum in East Germany, and Civic Forum in the Czech 
Lands. Even in Romania, where revolution was not preceded by a trad ition  
of independent civic in itiatives, the transition government sought to 
project itself as broadly representative by calling itself a Front.
Dissidents who formed the transition government in Czechoslovakia 
had previously prescribed a highly inclusionary and non-partisan  
approach to p o l i t i c s . W h e n  be became President, Havel attempted to 
implement two related ideas: firs t, his belief in anti-po litica l politics; and, 
second, a resumption of the tradition of the F irs t Republic in which 
President Masaryk remained above party  politics. Havel therefore
Timothy Carton Ash, We the People: The Revolutions o f 1989 (London: 
Granta, 1990); and Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution In Europe  
(New York: Times Books, 1990), passim.
See chapter 2.
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pronounced himself above all parties and movements, including even 
Charter 77 and Civic Forum.
Even in democratic societies, foreign policy remains among the most 
closed forms of decision-making. The leaders of Czechoslovakia’s 
revolution pledged a high degree of pluralism; in foreign policy they  
spoke of a people’s diplomacy. Czechoslovak foreign policy a fte r the  
revolution contradicted these claims, however, becoming centralised and in 
many cases ind ifferent to public pressures. In  addition, it became hostage 
to entrenched institutional interests.
Two general developments account for this phenomenon. The firs t  
occurred when agencies w ithin the official structures fe lt threatened by 
post-Communist transformation and sought to protect the ir institutional 
interests in the face of systemic change. This was tru e  of the intelligence  
services, the military and the Department of Foreign Trade. The second 
development, considered in the section below, was the Foreign M in istry ’s 
increasing awareness that policies introduced a fte r the revolution were 
unsustainable when challenged by the realities of politics. Two examples 
of this were arms sales and nuclear energy. In  both cases, the post- 
Communist government created or maintained governmental agencies that 
would promote those issue areas, thereby ensuring that they were 
included in the institutional process. Other political interests sought to 
institutionalise themselves at the expense of the Federal foreign m inistry, 
thereby undercutting its ab ility  to conduct a unified and coherent policy. 
This was demonstrated in particular by the establishment of a Slovak 
Ministry of International Relations to undertake foreign relations for the  
republic. Finally, the creation of a large Presidential s tructu re  had two 
implications for foreign policy. I t  ensured that Havel could harness his 
considerable personal stature and place his personal stamp on foreign
Bradley, Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution, p. 129.
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policy. I t  also meant that, despite close cooperation between the 
Presidential Castle and the Foreign M inistry, reinforced by the friendship  
between Havel and Dienstbier, there were nevertheless occasions when the 
President acted out of concert with the M inistry.
As will be shown, the widely held view was that the Foreign  
M inistry dominated foreign policy-making. This section will demonstrate 
that such an assertion is incorrect. I t  will also show how the idea of a 
civic foreign policy was compromised through the decision-making  
process.
Consensus on Foreign Affairs
The post-Communist Czechoslovak leadership agreed on the general 
directions of its foreign policy. To the extent that foreign policy was 
'made’, it was made among a number of people who had known each other 
well through their years as dissidents. Key people identified with foreign  
policy were Havel, Dienstbier, Vondra and Dobrovskÿ. Their personal 
connections made the divergences in actual policy all the more s trik ing . 
The previous chapter indicated how, even though Czechoslovak dissidents 
disagreed on many issues, those concerned with foreign a ffa irs  agreed on 
the solutions. The point is re iterated  by RFE analyst Jan Obrman: 'it  is 
important to keep in mind that most of those responsible for the  
formulation of Czechoslovak foreign policy are former dissidents who have 
known each other and exchanged views on international matters for years. 
While these former members of the dissident community (today’s decision 
makers) have d iffering  opinions on v irtu a lly  all domestic issues, they  
seem to be almost of one mind on international a ffa irs ’.
Obrman, 'Foreign Policy: Source, Concepts, Problems’, p. 6.
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Foreign M inistry Monopoly
The Foreign M inistry was v irtu a lly  unchallenged in foreign policy-making. 
In  January 1992, towards the end of the period under study, an American 
scholar observed that no institutions confronted its authority: T h e re  is 
no National Security Council such as exists in the USA; no th ink tanks  
that could promote a lternative policies;...no un ivers ity  institutes or 
centers for developing independent foreign-policy concepts; and no 
institutional alternatives elsewhere in the government’.^ ® Where the  
Foreign M inistry could call upon outside advisers it did not seek to do 
so. For example, the Ministry had the benefit of the Ins titu te  of 
International Relations, ostensibly an independent foreign policy think  
tank. The Minister appointed the Director and the M inistry partia lly  
funded the Institu te . Shortly a fte r the Revolution Dienstbier appointed  
émigré Czech political scientist J ifi Valenta as In s titu te  Director.
Nevertheless, the Institu te  was not used as a debating forum for 
foreign policy.®^ According to some attached to the Institu te , th is was 
partly because Valenta was concerned to use the In s titu te  for personal 
interests, and partly  because Dienstbier did not see the need for a th ink  
tank contribution to foreign policy debate.®® In  addition, at least a part 
of the Foreign M inistry believed that long-term  planning was 
'unnecessary’ and ’unwise’. M inistry officials claimed that they could not
®® James P. McGregor, 'Czechoslovakia: A New Style for the M inistry of 
Foreign A ffa irs ’, RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No. 3 (17 January 1992), p. 
22.
®^ In  1992, it published accounts of debates with elected officials, but these 
cannot be taken as evidence of the In s titu te ’s direct contribution to the  
foreign policy process.
®® Interviews.
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absent themselves from immediate concerns in order to develop long-term  
plans.
The apparent monopoly on foreign policy exercised by the M inistry  
was a result of particu lar circumstances. These included the personality 
of Foreign Minister Dienstbier; the attacks on potential institutional rivals  
in the foreign-policy arena as a result of political reorganisation, such as 
the security and intelligence services and the armed forces; the nature of 
post-revolutionary politics in which the Parliam ent’s role in foreign policy 
was minimised through inexperience or political deadlock; and the  
consensus that existed among senior decion-makers on the overall aims of 
foreign policy.
While observers contended these circumstances gave the Foreign  
Ministry control over foreign policy, the M inistry itse lf was in flux, if not 
disarray. When Dienstbier took it over on 11 December 1989, it was the  
f irs t organisation he had ever m a n a g e d . H e  went into what he 
considered to be a potentially hostile environment, stacked with 
bureaucrats fearfu l of change and saturated by the traditions of the old 
order, aided only by two dissident-colleagues, Jaroslav Sedivÿ and Dana 
Huhatova, and shortly thereafte r by Dobrovskÿ. Together they  
undertook to rearrange the structure  of the M inistry and to effect 
substantial personnel changes.
Dienstbier’s f irs t  objective was to remove anyone who had 
collaborated with the Communist regime. By this he meant persons who 
had actively supported the regime, particu larly  by reporting on fellow 
workers to the security services. Despite his intentions, he confronted  
the reverse of the ’red versus expert’ dilemma that Communist regimes
McGregor, ’New S tyle’, p. 26.
Interview  with the author, 13 September 1995.
Jana Klusakova a JîM  Dienstbier rozm louvaji nadoraz  (Praha: Primus, 
1993), p .12
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faced when they came to power: the need to find a balance between 
ideological dependability and bureaucratic experience of running  
government. Dienstbier invited all Foreign M inistry officials purged after 
1968 to re tu rn  to the diplomatic service. They formed a th ird  category: 
former Communists, like Dienstbier, who would be considered politically  
reliable but whose expertise would have gone unused for two decades.
One appointee to the M inistry who belonged to this category commented. 
These were the people that Dienstbier liked
Dienstbier recalled many ambassadors,^^ and between March and 
July appointed new ambassadors to principal posts such as West Germany, 
Austria, Britain, and the U N /'' Slovak nationalists attacked him for 
overrepresenting Czechs in the diplomatic corps. Milan KAa&ko, an adviser 
to Havel for Slovak affa irs and later head of Slovakia’s M inistry of 
In ternational Relations, maintained that of Czechoslovakia’s ten most 
important ambassadorial appointments, only one was Slovak.'^ While 
Dienstbier insisted that his ambassadorial appointments were made s tric tly  
on the basis of professional judgm ent and the suitability  of an individual 
to a particular c o u n t r y , K f i a ^ k o  discounted his argument and referred  
to the example of Belgium’s scheme of parity  in such appointments.^^ 
Ironically, Dienstbier appointed Slovak Rudolf Schuster as 
ambassador to Canada (one of the posts cited by Kfta^ko), on the basis of
Author’s interview with Dr Milos lav Had, Head, Department of Policy and 
Planning, M inistry of Foreign Affairs, 1990-92, 30 August 1994 and 12 
September 1995.
McGregor claims all. ’New Style ’.
Moravskoslezkÿ den, 2 August 1990, cited in Jan Obrman, ’Diplomatic 
Activities at Home and Abroad’, Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 1, No. 35 (31 
August 1990)’Diplomatic Activities’, p. 14.
The ten posts included the Group of 7, Belgium for its in s t i t o t io n s ,  C h in a
arid fbn *=:oviet Union. Lîdové noviny, in JPRS, 15 July 1991, p. 10
Interview  with the author, 13 September 1995.
Lîdové noviny, in JPRS, 15 July 1991, p. 10
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what the Foreign Minister conceded was 'a political agreement’ because it  
'was not possible to send only Czech ambassadors’/^  Schuster, however, 
was later recalled on charges of having collaborated with the StB.
Dienstbier acknowledged that he could not effect a fu ll tu rn o ver of 
M inistry staff, opting for what he called a 'gradual approach’ to 
change/9 Nevertheless, key positions within the M inistry, such as the  
heads of all but one Department, had been replaced by the middle of
1990.
Despite problems of reorganisation and personnel changes, the  
M inistry of Foreign Affairs was still seen as commanding the making of 
foreign policy. This was due in part to political circumstances.
The Absence of Institu tional Pluralism
One of the reasons for the apparent lack of institutional interests being 
expressed in the 'pulling and hauling’ of bureaucratic politics is that, 
since the 1989 revolution, many institutions th a t could have been expected 
to assert the ir own interests have instead had to contend with the core 
issue of preserving the ir institutional in te g rity  and existence.
Before tu rn ing  to the experience of specific M inistries and agencies, 
it is necessary to examine a process which was part of the post- 
Communist transformation in Czechoslovakia and which by its nature  
limited or even paralysed the functioning of several 'governmental actors.
Lus trace
A post-Communist procedure which affected many institutions in
Author’s interview , 13 September 1995.
9^ WaJJ Street Journal, 10 May 1990, cited in Obrman, 'Diplomatic A ctiv ities’, 
p. 13.
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Czechoslovakia was lustrace. The term does not translate d irectly  into 
English but has nevertheless been dubbed ’lustra tion ’, derived from Latin 
meaning sacrificial p u r i f i c a t i o n . I t  suggests shining ligh t into  
otherwise unexposed areas and undertaking cleansing.
The lustration law was fina lly  passed by the Federal Parliament in 
October 1991 after substantial controversy. A commission of 14 MPs was 
created to remove Communist P arty  members from higher public office, 
government bureaucracies, the media. Universities and the police and 
armed forces for a period of five  years. Because of the requirem ent in 
Communist systems of Party  membership to hold state positions, lustrace  
meant that an overwhelmingly large number of people in such posts were 
subject to removal. There were rumours that 77 percent of civ il servants  
would be affected, and nearly a th ird  of the Chartists would also be 
included.81
Even before the screening process was worked out by the Federal 
Parliament, it  began to claim political careers. One example was Josef 
Bartontik, leader of the Peoples Party which had formed one of the four 
parties constituting the ru ling  Communist-controlled National Front. He 
was summoned to Havel and told of evidence proving that he had 
informed for the StB. Despite f irs t  agreeing to resign, Bartonfcik 
continued as leader of the Peoples Party  and as a candidate in the  
elections. His credib ility , however, was greatly reduced and he also 
suffered heart failure.®^
Another h igh-profile  but dubious target of lustrace  was Jan Kavan 
who went into exile in Britain a fte r 1968 and was active in the
80 The Financial Times, 11 November 1991.
8^  Jessica Douglas-Home, 'Vigilant Defence of L ib e rty ’, The Sunday Telegraph, 
3 November 1991.
8^  For an account in English, see John Lloyd, 'Where are all the Spies?’, The 
Financial Times, 10 November 1990.
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dissemination of Czech samizdat abroad, including Havel’s 'Power of the 
Powerless’. Charges of informing for the Czechoslovak secret police while 
in exile were brought against him afte r the Revolution when he was 
serving as a Federal MP a fte r the November Revolution and suffered a 
unanimous vote demanding his resignation.^^
These examples indicate the a rb itra ry  and sweeping nature of the 
lustrace. The application of lustrace  to and the general depoliticisation of 
the intelligence services and the armed forces undercut their ab ility  to 
function as coherent agencies and to influence foreign policy. But there  
were other features of post-Communist Czechoslovak polity which 
contributed to an apparent dominance by the Czernin Palace over foreign  
policy.
Prime Minister and Parliament: Governmental Bodies Without In te res t in 
Foreign Affairs?
Both the Prime Minister and the Federal Parliament may have been 
expected to assert themselves in foreign policy matters. The Prime 
Minister, however, was dedicated to the internal, and especially legal 
aspects of transition. While he commented on important and controversial 
issues such as German foreign i n v e s t m e n t , a l l  of the interviewees  
questioned during research fo r this thesis stressed that Calfa was not 
involved in foreign affa irs, and some were even surprised that he was 
interested enough to make such comments.
The Federal Parliament had a Committee on Foreign Affairs to which 
Dienstbier reported. Far from contesting his policies. Parliament approved
For a recent article, see Jonathan Steele, 'When the Saints are Accused 
of Sinning’, The Guardian, 2 March 1996.
See chapter 4.
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all the treaties he concluded as Foreign M i n i s t e r . B y  contrast.
Parliament debated, contested or even rejected proposals on lustration, 
the official name of the Federation, and reform of the security  
s e r v i c e s . I f  one Federal fig u re  faced resistance in Parliament to his 
proposals, it was not Dienstbier but President Havel.
Thus there were no significant challenges to the overall nature of 
foreign policy from the Prime Minister or Parliament .
Political Apathy
A fu rth e r reason why the Foreign M inistry could dominate policy was 
popular perceptions of politics generally. In  the post-revolutionary period 
there was a decline in in terest in politics. Foreign policy, in particu lar, 
was an area which was seen by the public as either abstract or 
superfluous.
Czechoslovak social scientists suggested that even a fte r the Velvet 
Revolution, 'many citizens continue[d] to view political a ffa irs  as largely  
the business of government ra ther than the responsibility of individual 
citizens’. A f t e r  the exceptional 95 percent voter participation in the 
June 1990 Parliamentary elections, tu rn  out fell in subsequent elections.
Students, who had been crucial to the revolution both for their  
organisational contributions and for the ir numbers, largely opted out of 
politics. Those who remain were often the same people who led the  
Communist Youth Movement.
Stanislav Benda and Jan Kulhavy, Dva ro k y  pro budoucnost (Praha: Alfa, 
1992), p. 27.
86 For an example of the la tter, see Lîdovâ demokracie, 8 November 1990.
Jan Obrman, 'President Havel’s Diminishing Political In fluence’, RFE/RL 
Research Report Vol. 1, No. 11 (13 March 1992).
Quotation from Wolchik, Czechoslovakia, p. 158. See ibid., for Czechoslovak 
sources.
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A weariness among the population emerged in light of the 
ineffectiveness of 'democracy’ to confront crucial problems, especially the  
weeding out of old communists. Parliamentary deadlock over apparently  
tr iv ia l issues such as the name of the country caused many to lose faith  
in démocratisation, Havel acknowledged this b luntly  in April 1992, w riting  
'Citizens are becoming more and more clearly disgusted with all this, and 
their disgust is understandably directed against the democratic 
government that they themselves have elected
Most importantly, political pluralism failed to deliver immediate 
economic prosperity. The standard of living fe ll during the life  of the 
post-Communist Federation, and buying power depreciated to less than  
that of the Great Depression.
A combination of consensus about the direction of foreign policy 
and a growing indifference to politics generally provided a political 
backdrop in which the Foreign Minister could formulate and execute 
policy. The monopoly exercised by the Czernin Palace, however, was aided 
by changes in other governmental agencies.
CHANGES IN OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
The firs t section of this chapter showed the cen tra lity  to the Soviet-type  
system of security, intelligence and military structures. Not surpris ingly , 
the post-Communist Czechoslovak government undertook to transform the
Havel, 'Paradise Lost’, p. 6. For an account of continued Communist 
control over the economy and government bureaucracy, see J iri Pehe, 'The 
Controversy over Communist Managers’, Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 1, No. 
36 (7 September 1990), pp. 6-10.
90 a critique of the application of 'shock th e rap y ’ to Czechoslovakia, see
Jan Adam, 'Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former 
Czechoslovakia’, Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 45. No. 4 (1993), esp. pp. 641ff. For 
a review of initial support for economic reforms, see Jan Obrman, 'Public  
Accepts Economic Changes’. Report on Eastern  Europe Vol. 1, No. 10 (9 March
1990), pp. 21-2.
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domestic functioning of those agencies and the means by which the ir  
activities were monitored and made accountable. These changes are  
relevant to explaining how the Czechoslovak Foreign M inistry was 
apparently able to exercise extensive control over foreign-policy decision­
making.
Security Services
One of the foremost aims of the post-Communist governments of Central 
and East Europe was to transform and make accountable the in ternal and 
external secret services. The roles of each of these institutions in 
communist politics in Czechoslovakia, and how changes to those 
institutions since the 1989 revolutions have modified their role will be 
considered.
Like most socialist states, and indeed similar to many countries, 
Czechoslovakia had two secret services, one ostensibly for in ternal and 
the other external matters. The internal security service, however, 
provided more than a domestic function, being a crucial mechanism in the 
forced cohesion of the Soviet bloc system. The domestic security service, 
therefore, had significance also for the ab ility  of Czechoslovakia to 
reassert œ ntro l over its own foreign policy.
Statni bezpetnost (StB) - State Security
Czechoslovakia differed from other socialist states in that its in ternal 
security network, Statni bezpetnost (StB), the title  of which translated  
innocuously as State Security, did not produce a head of either the state  
or the CzCP.^^
Yuri Andropov in the Soviet Union, Erich Honecker in the GDR, Hua 
Guofeng in the PRC, and Stanislaw Kania in Poland all boasted careers in 
their country’s respective state security agencies before assuming senior 
posts in the party -s ta te  apparatus. Adelman, ’In troduction ’, in Adelman,
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Unlike many of its interw ar neighbours, the F irs t Republic did not 
have a precursor to the StB, which was founded by the coalition 
government only a fte r the Second World War. The only democratic state in 
Central Europe throughout the inter war period, the Czechoslovak state 
deliberately did not construct a secret police. The CzCP, unlike its 
regional counterparts, was allowed to operate openly and free ly , removing 
much of the impetus for the creation of a secret police.
Once the StB was established, however, it was not under direct 
Czechoslovak control. Before the Communist ’coup’ of February 1948, the 
StB was under the M inistry of the In te rio r, one of the portfolios held by 
the Communists in the postwar coalition government. Even so, the StB was 
believed to have been beyond the reigns of CzCP General Secretary  
Gottwald, and therefore probably only responsible to the Soviet Union.
After 1948, the StB continued to remain largely outside CzCP 
control: ’Though the Party assumed responsibility for the security  
apparatus through a new Defense and Security Affairs Committee within  
the Central Committee, the presence of Soviet advisors and the role of the 
police in purging the KSC itself meant Lhai the police often was able to 
exercise any authority over the police. The security apparatus, unlike the 
Party, was a group on which Cominform and the U.S.S.R. could count’. 
Rather than controlling the StB, the CzCP found itself monitored by that 
organ. Secret police agents were inserted in CzCP cells in work places 
and throughout the m ilitary, including in the basic unit. A fter the  
February coup, the budget of the M inistry of the In te rio r was calculated
(ed.). Terror, p. 2.
Condoleezza Rice, ’Czechoslovakian Secret Police’, in Adelman (ed.).  Terror, 
p. 159. citing J iri Pelikan, The Czechoslovak Political Trials  (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1971).
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to surpass by one billion dollars the eleven percent share of the national 
budget allocated to the mill tar y.^^
The attack by the Action Programme on the im punity of the secret 
police, as well as its trad ition  of loyalty to Moscow before Prague, 
supports speculation that the secret police would have had motive to aid 
the WTO intervention.^'' The secret police were certa in ly  responsible for 
the arrest of the leaders of the Prague Spring.
Because of the power of the security services, made all the more
pertinent by the personal experiences of the dissidents, the post-
Communist Czechoslovak government sought to overhaul its s tructu re  and 
accountability. When Havel travelled to Moscow in February  1990, one of 
his demands was the cessation of cooperation between Czechoslovak secret
services and the KGB.
While the StB as an organ was neutered, prosecution of its 
functionaries began slowly. By March of 1990, 1,900 StB officers had been 
investigated for their activities under the Communist regime, but only 
eighty had been d i s m i s s e d . I n  September 1990, former dissident and 
Deputy In terio r Minister Jihi Ruml expressed concern over the continuing  
activities of secret police agents, stating that a possible 140,000 
collaborators were continuing to work against society.
Despite fears of the residual power of the security services, their 
connections to the Soviet Union were clearly cut and e ffo rts  were made to 
divide the agencies and make them publicly accountable. In te rio r Minister
Rice, in Adelman, (ed.), p. 163, 164 and p. 165, the la tte r citing The New 
York Times, 6 January 1953.
Ibid., p. 169, citing Karel Kaplan, T h e  Secret Prague’, Panorama, 11 July 
1978.
Ibid.; and Adelman, in ibid., ’Conclusions’, p. 277.
The Independent, 24 March 1990.
Le Monde, 12 January 1991.
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LangoS pledged that since the disbandment of the State Security, 
intelligence monitoring equipment was not being used. Phone tapping  
could only be undertaken a fte r appropriate legal procedures were 
fulfilled.**"
Measures were also taken to restructu re  and red is tribu te  the  
au thority  of the secret services. A particular e ffo rt was to create a 
Czechoslovak equivalent of the FBI to be called the Federal Service for 
the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy. Only after suitable  
means of democratic accountability were in place (which Parliament did 
not find suffic ient) was the agency to be allowed to engage in 
international c o n t a c t s . F u n c t i o n s  such as counterintelligence, 
previously in the remit of the secret police, were reassigned to the  
Defence M inistry. The Head of M ilitary Counterintelligence Pavol Gavlas. 
explained that it would no longer be used for in internal spying, that 
contacts between the existing M ilitary Counterintelligence and the StB had 
been severed and that its s taff was being reduced both through political 
screening and reorganisation.
Institu tional reorganisation of the domestic security services 
diminished the ir autonomy and their ab ility  to influence the orientation of 
Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy. They would certa in ly  no longer be the 
agents of a foreign power.
Prague Domestic Service, 27 November 1990, in FBIS, 30 November 1990, 
p. 25.
See comments J ifi Muller, Director of the Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution, Lîdové noviny, 10 November 1990.
S VO bod né slovo, 12 July 1990.
Deputy Defense Minister Antonin RaSek explained in November 1990 
that the activities of M ilitary Counterintelligence had stopped and that its 
staff would be reduced to one-fifth  of its cu rren t size. Prague Domestic 
Service, 28 November 1990, in FBIS, 29 November 1990, p. 21.
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External Intelligence Services
The new Czechoslovak government undertook to reform both the 
composition and role of the external wing of its intelligence agency, 
renamed the Federal Information Service. I t  worked with MI6, the CIA, as 
well as Italian, Austrian and possibly Israeli agencies to remove 
Czechoslovak operatives planted abroad, and received tra in ing  for Havel’s 
bodyguards, and in combatting terrorism  and drug smuggling.
Traditional spying abroad by Czechoslovak intelligence services was 
pledged to be terminated by the post-Communist government, but not 
before the embarrassment caused by the expulsion of two Czechoslovak 
diplomats from the Netherlands for attempting to procure Western m ilitary  
secrets and classified material on the Bush-Gorbachev summit meeting in 
Malta in December 1990.^°^ Deputy Foreign Minister Dobrovskÿ said in 
July 1990 that Czechoslovak embassies had been cleaned of spies since 30 
June of the same year.^°^
Understandably, the Czechoslovak Government was cautious about 
the role of its intelligence agency abroad. On 10 April 1991 Federal 
In te rio r Minister Langos referred  to comments on 29 March by his 
spokesman Martin Fen dry  ch that LangoS had made ’a sort of gentleman’s 
agreement’ with several Western intelligence agencies. The Minister 
pronounced that the CSFR ’does not and will not conclude any more 
w ritten agreements on cooperation with other intelligence services’, and
The Daily Telegraph, 1 June 1990. The exact nature of these links were 
not revealed, and will likely remain elusive.
international Herald Tribune, 17 July 1990. Czechoslovak agents 
apparently attempted to obtain information from NATO. In ternationa l Herald  
Tribune, 20 July 1990.
international Herald Tribune, 20 July 1990.
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promised that 'the Czechoslovak intelligence service will not operate on 
the te rrito ry  of another state with the aim of harming its interests
The Secret Service’s most consequential act since December 1989 
was the submission to Havel of a report delineating a covert German 
masterplan to affect the political domination of the Czech lands through  
economic imperialism. Rather than being a report from the Service as a 
whole, however, it was produced by a single officer and the In te rio r  
M inistry labelled the report unfounded.
In spite of the lack of abundant and frank  information on its 
duties, the foreign intelligence service was not considered to have an 
overwhelming impact on foreign policy making.
The Armed Forces
The M ilitary never enjoyed a prominent role in Czechoslovak life. While 
the Czechoslovak Legion distinguished itself in the Great War, the Army 
was ordered to its barracks by BeneS during Munich and the Communist 
takeover and by Dubhek during the 1968 intervention.
None of the CzCP General Secretaries or Czechoslovak heads of 
state had made the ir careers in the armed forces, and the Army has 
never been seen as a riva l to the government, as occurred in Poland in 
the early 1980s.
While the M ilitary may have posed no real th reat to Czechoslovakia’s 
post-Communist democracy, its leadership wanted to ensure that Armed 
Forces would be loyal to it. I t  was only in the ir transform ation that the 
Armed Forces could be said to have had any role in politics.
CTK. 10 April 1991, in FBIS. 15 April 1991, p. 15. 
Christian Science Monitor, 28 February-5 March 1992.
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The limitations on the Czechoslovak m ilitary to exert institutional 
interests in post-Communist political life  can be deduced from its inability  
to resist the assault on its ranks caused by démocratisation. Less than a 
year a fte r the revolution, 9,380 professional soldiers, of whom nearly five  
thousand were officers and seventy-four generals, le ft the m ilitary. 
T hree -qu arters  of these had voluntarily  resigned or refused to swear 
allegiance to the new G o v e r n m e n t . A n y  prestige enjoyed by the Army 
under Communism ebbed as m ilitary parades were minimised and m ilitary  
tra in ing  in schools annulled. The Army, e ig h ty -fiv e  percent of the officers  
of which were CzCP members, was being d e p o l i t i c i s e d . A  15 March 
1990 decree banned membership in political parties while in m ilitary  
service, a measure which was s tric ter than in most other countries. 
Officers who remained in the Armed Forces probably disliked this decree. 
A survey conducted in autumn 1990 found that almost half of 
Czechoslovakia’s Army officers considered démocratisation had resulted in 
chaos within army un its ’.
Political changes in the Armed Forces extended to Defence Minister 
Miroslav Vacek. Originally hailed as the Communist who went over to the  
people, and lauded by Havel for ’controlling the m ilitary and not letting it 
be used against the people’ during the Velvet R e v o l u t i o n , h e  was 
dismissed a fte r the belated discovery of his role in preparations for
106 The Daily Telegraph, 10 September 1990.
Jan Obrman, ’The Czechoslovak Armed Forces: The Reform Continues’, 
Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 1, No. 6 (7 February  1992), p. 48.
108 Report on Eastern Europe (6 April 1990), p. 12.
Radio Czechoslovakia, 25 October 1990, cited in Jan Obrman, ’Civilian  
Appointed New Defense M inister’, (9 November 1990), p. 5.
Radio Czechoslovakia, 17 October 1990, cited in ibid., p. 2.
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repression of the Velvet R e v o l u t i o n . H i s  successor, LuboS Dobrovskÿ, 
became the f irs t  civilian head of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces since 
before the Second World War.^^^ I t  was only with the appointment of a 
former dissident that the Armed Forces were seen to have taken up more 
of a role in broader aspects of foreign policy.
While the m ilitary never occupied a pivotal role in policy formation 
in Czechoslovak politics regardless of type of government, its role after 
the revolution seems tig h tly  limited.
One of the roles of the m ilitary in the Communist era was, it is 
claimed, to tra in  both soldiers of allied socialist countries and also to 
provide subversive tra in ing. The post-Communist government sought to 
halt the use of its m ilitary facilities for such purposes. The Defence 
Minister revealed in Parliament that some 250 students from socialist 
Czechoslovakia’s allies such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Laos, Libya, and 
Vietnam were studying at the M ilitary Academy in Brno, and 80 Ira q i 
students were suspended. A fu rth e r 45 students were at the M ilitary Air 
Force Academy in Kosice. The Minister said that contracts for providing  
such education in the fu tu re  would be made on the basis of th e ir  
'economic and political usefulness for our republic’.
While the m ilitary underwent substantial changes in the way it 
operated, the new government also found new ways of using it  to fu lfil 
foreign policy goals. For example, it contributed a chemical weapons unit 
to Operation Desert Shield, and was one of the few national forces to 
enter Iraq i te rrito ry . But it was clear that the Armed Forces would
For Vacek’s relation to plans to crush the revolution, see ibid., pp. 2 and 
4. Vacek provides a defence in his Prod bych mél mldet... (Praha; Nadas,
1991).
Cepicka was made a General before he assumed the post in 1950. 
Interview s with Had.
Prague Domestic Service, 27 November 1990, in FBIS, 30 November 1990, 
p. 25.
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continue in the Czechoslovak tradition of being servants of the political 
process, rather than being in trusive in it.
With the changes to the intelligence services and m ilitary resulting  
from démocratisation, the Foreign M inistry could be assured that any 
potential r iv a lry  in foreign policy-making would be minimal. In  view of 
the foreign policy consensus and the disinterest in that area shown by 
Parliament and the Prime Minister, there are strong reasons for agreeing 
with assessments that the Foreign Office held a 'monopoly’ on foreign  
policy.
Nevertheless, it had to revise and even contradict its own policies 
in the face of interests which were expressed by or through  
governmental structures. In  analytical terms, the Foreign M inistry had a 
proverbial best case scenario to exercise fu ll control over foreign policy, 
but it proved unable to do so.
The following section examines how those interests arose and what 
impacts they had on a consistent and coherent federal foreign policy.
INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS REVISITED
Arms Sales
Arms production was a central feature of Czechoslovakia’s advanced 
industrial economy. Between the two World Wars, the country was the 
principal manufacturer of weapons in Central Europe 'and with the 
interw ar restrictions on German rearmament, Czechoslovakia became a 
center of production for all Europe’. T h e  tradition of arms 
production continued a fte r the February coup and Czechoslovakia became
Rice, Soviet Union, p. 49.
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the world’s largest per capita arms exporter and came to account for 47 
percent of Czechoslovakia’s total exports.
After the Velvet Revolution, Dienstbier was adamant that arms sales 
would stop, a position re iterated  by Federal Deputy Prime Minister Josef 
Hromadka.'^^ Yet the sales continued, to the embarrassment of the 
Foreign Ministry. At three of four addresses given by Czechoslovak 
representatives of the Foreign M inistry, they were asked aggressively  
whether arms sales had stopped and why the decision had been taken, in 
particular, to arm Syria, and, later, Peru. Foreign M inistry Spokesman 
Egon Lansky acknowledged that the arms sales were 'bad business’.
Further embarrassment must have been caused when a German- 
registered ship carrying  T-72s to Syria was stopped exactly on the day 
that the CSCE Summit was convening in Prague. Calfa said the timing was 
'peculiar’, not least because the ship had already le ft Germany three  
weeks before.
Despite the Foreign M in istry ’s intentions, it was faced with 
pressure from arm s-producing constituencies, especially in Slovakia, and 
the fact of export licenses being granted >y the M inistry of Foreign  
Trade. Ultimately, both Havel and Dienstbier conceded that the export of 
weapons could not be stopped.
Nuclear Power
The post-Communist leadership was forced to reverse on another policy 
issue: that of nuclear energy. As dissidents, they had never been
Guardian, 5 January 1991.
International Herald Tribune, 25 January 1990; and The Daily Telegraph, 
10 February 1990.
Lidové noviny, 8 February 1992.
CSTK 31 January 1992, in FBIS, 3 February 1992, p. 14.
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outright opposed to nuclear energy but, as Havel told Austrian television: 
'I  am not an outspoken advocate of nuclear energy ’. T h e  tw en ty -  
second of Charter 77’s numbered documents, issued on 27 November 1978, 
addressed the safety of the country’s nuclear power stations. The Charter 
77 spokesmen, one of whom was Havel, noted that such documents need 
not have reflected either the ir own opinions or a preponderance of 
signatories. Nevertheless, the document focused particu larly  on Jaslovské 
Bohunice which had experienced accidents in January 1976 and February  
1977, and called upon the government to inform the public on the safety  
of nuclear power stations and to provide specialists with necessary 
information facilitating proper management.
The Government of Marian Calfa, himself not a dissident, in itia lly  
favoured the discontinuation of nuclear e n e r g y . B u t  that policy had 
to be abandoned in the face of several considerations: preserving  
autonomy against Austrian interference; lack of alternative energy  
supplies; the interlinkage of energy lines in the country; possibilities of 
energy sales to the West; and the emergence of bureaucratic politics.
Austria was eager to force Czechoslovakia to close down the  
Bohunice nuclear power station, in Western Slovakia near Vienna, which 
has two W ER-440 reactors, of the Soviet type  installed in the now-closed 
Kozlodui reactor in Bulgaria. In  addition to Austrian Environment Minister 
Marilies Flemming calling Bohunice a ’Chernobyl at Vienna’s gates’, 
and numerous meetings with Federal and Slovak officials, the Austrian  
government undertook ’scare-tactics’, such as the distribution of 
potassium iodide tablets (which replace potassium iodide absorbed by
2^0 Austrian TV, 5 May 1991, in SWB, 9 May 1991.
This paragraph is drawn d irectly  from Skilling, Charter 77, p. 92.
The Financial Times, 9 May 1991.
Cited in, for example, Ian Tray nor, ’Havel Visit Breaks Waldheim 
"Boycott"’, The Guardian, 27 July 1990.
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thyro id , brought about by radiation), to children, pregnant women and 
nursing mothers. On 13 December 1990, Austrian Chancellor Franz  
V ran itzky demanded the closure of Bohunice following the publication of a 
report by international experts on the potential risks posed by the 
installation.
Czechoslovak officials objected to Austria’s m ultifarious effo rts  to 
force Bohunice’s termination. On 20 July 1990, the Czechoslovak 
government presented communicated its 'concern over a "new an ti-  
Czechoslovak campaign in A u s t r i a " H a l f  a year later, Calfa found the 
Austrian behaviour so unbecoming that he told the Austrian daily Die 
Presse 'This campaign has already reached the limits of decency’. He 
added, 'Please tru s t us to be responsible enough to immediately shut 
down the plant if human life  is in danger ’. T h e  Western press viewed 
Austria as attempting 'to ca,jole’ Czechoslovakia into shutting down the 
Bohunice reactors.
As an incentive, Austria offered free e lectric ity  to Czechoslovakia, 
at estimated cost of S330 million per year.^^" But Czechoslovakia lacked 
sufficient power lines to ca rry  the electricity, even if it were to have 
agreed to the proposal.
Alternatives to nuclear energy were either financially costly or 
environ mentally detrimental; nuclear energy, with the eventual installation  
of Wes tern-standard  (and like ly  Western-made) safety devices, was 
advocated by the Government as the only energy a lternative . Calfa told
1 2 4 Prague Domestic Service, 13 December 1990, in FBIS, p. 35.
Peter Martin, 'Tough Choice Faced on Nuclear Power’, Report on Eastern 
Europe, 24 August 1990, pp. 10-11.
The Independent, 30 January 1991. 
The Economist, 27 July 1991.
The Independent, 28 January 1991. 
The Economist 27 July 1991.
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the Austrian ambassador to Czechoslovakia that the country was forced to 
re ly  on nuclear power because of the ecological and medical risks posed 
by lignite and that already Czechoslovakia relied on nuclear power for a 
quarter of its e n e r g y . ( T h i s  figure  did not include the use of 
several planned, and partially-com pleted reactors, which would have 
increased Czechoslovakia’s dependency on nuclear power). Even Havel 
conceded that nuclear power had to remain. When he travelled to 
Salzburg for his controversial meeting with Austrian Chancellor Waldheim, 
he replied to protests that his country cu rren tly  could not stop using 
nuclear energy. In  May 1991 he conceded that 'we will not be able to do 
without nuclear energy for a long time to come’.^ ^^
Additional incentives for Czechoslovakia to reta in  and expand the  
production of nuclear energy resulted from Soviet reductions in the 
supply of oil.^^^ Because of a 30 percent reduction in Soviet oil supply 
(and the decision to close several mines for environmental reasons), the  
Czechoslovakia proceeded with nuclear power as 'the cleanest and 
cheapest solution for the fu tu re ’.
There appears to have been a fu rth e r reason fo r the maintenance 
of nuclear energy: the emergence of a distinct economic interest on the  
part of the Czechoslovak Government emerged. Other than ïa lfa , the 
Czech Republic’s M inister of the Environment Bedf^ich Moldan was the only 
government official to oppose nuclear energy. His opposition was curtailed  
when he was forced to resign as one of the f irs t  victims of the screening 
process.
CTK, 14 December 1990, in FBIS, 17 December 1990, p. 34.
131 For Havel’s meeting with Waldheim, see chapter 4. Prague Radio, 24 July
1990, in SWB, 26 July 1990; and Austrian TV, 5 May 1991, in SWB, 9 May
1991.
13^  See chapter 5.
133 The Daily Telegraph, 23 July 1990.
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Since early 1991, Czechoslovakia sought to export energy to Western 
Europe. A March 1991 agreement to supply Munich’s u tility  Bayernwerk  
with 1,400 megawatts of e lectric ity  from the Mochovce nuclear power plant 
under construction in Western Slovakia illustrated this goaL^^"* The 
Federal Government institutionalized this in terest by placing the export of 
electric ity  under the portfolio of the Deputy Economics Minister for Fuel 
and Energy.
The creation of a governmental office with a mandate to sell energy  
abroad for desperately-needed hard currency may have laid the  
foundations for a bureaucratic-political input into decision-making, one 
which could challenge and even contradict the Federal and Republic 
Environment ministries, which had consistently advocated an end to 
nuclear energy production.
Slovak National Aspirations and Foreign Policy
In a May 1991 interview Havel reiterated that all the major political 
groups in Slovakia upheld the federation, and that they 'all acknowledge 
that foreign policy, currency, and defence are federative tasks’. T h e  
law of December 1990 which delineated the division of powers between the 
federal and republic levels of government, however, permitted both levels 
to undertake activities in the international arena with the proviso that 
the Federal Government be apprised of the Republic level’s activities.
In  early September 1990, the Slovak M inistry for In ternational 
Relations was established. Its  f irs t  head, Milan Kha&ko, symbolised the
The Financial Times, 16 March 1992.
The Financial Times, 9 May 1991.
Austrian TV, 5 May 1991, in SWB, 9 May 1991. 
See Wolchik, Czechoslovakia, p. 74.
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significance of the M inistry itself. Fluent in French, a famous actor, and a 
founder of Public Against Violence, KAaÊko had been Havel’s principle  
adviser on Slovak issues a fte r the revolution. He represented a defection 
from the country’s centre in Prague to the republic level.
The M inistry’s in itiatives might have seemed ra th er limited in scope 
and result. Russian and Ukrainian Foreign Ministers Andrei Kozyrev and 
Anatoli Zlenko met KAa&ko in B r a t i s l a v a . T h i s  may have been a low- 
level meeting, but the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet republics might also 
have been seeking to engage in 'foreign policy’.
Kna^ko’s successor Pavol Demes, accompanied Havel on his second 
v is it to Washington in October 1991, and attended the dinner at the White 
House. Demes also travelled to Warsaw in January 1992, where he met with 
various Polish officials.
The Slovak M inistry for International Relations was not necessarily 
an institutional expression of nationalism or a desire for national self- 
determination. Roman Zelanÿ, another organizer of VPN, maintained that 
the new Ministry did not aim to supersede the federal Foreign M inistry, 
but to cultivate 'economic and cultural relations with other states’.
The Ministry might actually have deflated some of the more extreme 
manifestations of Slovak nationalism. When some th ir ty  Federal Slovak MPs 
began a petition demanding UN observers to monitor the political situation  
in the republic, for example, the M inistry called the demand excessive and 
counterproductive.
The Times, 18 September 1990.
139 pi-ague Domestic Service, 28 November 1990, in FBIS, 29 November 1990. 
PAP and CSTK in SWB, 24 January 1992.
The Times, 18 September 1990.
Report on Eastern Europe, 6 December 1991, p. 35.
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Regardless, such meetings show that Slovakia was attempting to 
engage in foreign relations of its own. Certainly, those who observed or 
had to deal with the Slovak M inistry held a d iffe ren t view of its 
intentions, and, indeed, of its consequences. Slovak dissident and leading 
human rights lawyer Miroslav Kusÿ maintains that the M inistry  
unambiguously sought to undermine federal foreign policy. Milos lav Had, 
Head of Policy and Planning in the Federal M inistry, was equally categoric 
that the Ministry undermined national foreign policy.
Government Economic Ministries and Foreign Policy
Havel was not d irectly  concerned with money. He often emphasised that 
his country wanted to learn from others and that Czechoslovaks did not 
expect condescending economic h a n d o u t s . R a t h e r ,  he was the  
intellectual architect of a foreign policy vision which included, not least 
the reformulation of Europe’s security architecture.
His detachment from financial issues was compensated for by the 
Finance Minister, Vaclav Klaus. Their visit to Switzerland serves to 
illustrate their d iffe ren t priorities and approaches. Klaus met with the  
Swiss Minister of the Economy and the heads of key banks and Havel 
commented, ’The prospects in this field seem to be hopeful’. 
Characteristically, however, he added, 'Of course, the main or only aim of 
the v isit was not to borrow money.’
Depending on one’s point of view, e ither an effective division of 
labour occurred, or a competition arose between the 'political w ing’ of 
foreign policy and the economic. But as an unambiguous free-m arketeer.
Interviews.
See the section on the US in chapter 7.
Prague Television Service, 23 November 1990, in FBIS, 29 November 1990.
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Klaus had set a clear economic foreign policy which clashed with the more
idealistic programmes advanced by the Foreign M inistry.
This was visible in three large policy areas. The f irs t  was in 
relations with former socialist states. While most members of Havel’s 
government were actually in tent on retain ing the Warsaw Pact and using 
it in the transformation of European security, Klaus was fo rth rig h t in 
demanding the dismantling of COMECON and of moving to s tric tly  dollar- 
exchanges between its members. While Dienstbier did not object to that 
particular policy, but it showed that the Finance M inistry set clear plans
for relations with the rest of the former socialist bloc.
Relatedly, the second clash concerned regional cooperation, 
particu larly the Visegrad group. While Havel and Dienstbier extolled the  
value of that cooperation and were probably inspired by the possibility of 
enacting a Central European supranational identity , Klaus argued that 
such cooperation hindered Czechoslovakia’s domestic economic 
transformation and its chances of early e n try  into the EC. At times, the  
Hradhany refuted Klaus’s comments. Klaus’s comments that Czechoslovakia 
had limited interest in Visegrad cooperation and that in fact it  could 
delay the country ’s en try  into the EC were countered by the Hradhany 
For example, in July 1991 a Presidential spokesman qualified Klaus’s 
comments by saying that economists look at both cooperative and 
competitive issues and then re iterated Havel’s interest ’in close 
cooperation’ with the two countries in all aspects of political, social and 
economic life, and in the pursu it of membership of European bodies.^'*®
The th ird  disagreement arose from D ienstbier’s so-called Harvard  
Plan. This envisaged having Western governments funding the Soviet 
Union to enable it to buy Central European goods. Klaus attacked the
Mlada F ron ta  Ones, 8 J u ly  1991.
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programme as non-sensical. Dienstbier saw it as an excuse fo r an attack  
on him personally and on his political party , which rivalled Klaus’s.
The challenges to the Foreign M in istry ’s mandate for external policy 
were not limited to the Finance M inistry but also came from the Ministry  
of Foreign Trade. A company under its control was responsible for 
issuing the exit licenses for the T-72 tanks which caused the Foreign  
M inistry substantial embarrassment.
The economic, nationalistic and political implications of curta iling  arms 
exports and the production of nuclear power were examples of how the  
Foreign M inistry’s foreign policy was derailed. But there  were other 
challenges to the dominance of the Czernin Palace in foreign policy. One 
challenge emerged from the restructured  Presidential Office, and thus, 
ironically, from Dienstbier’s close friend . President Havel.
Personality and the Bureaucratic Presidency
Czechoslovak politics in the in ter war period was characterised by the 
omniscient, grandfatherly image of Tomas Garrigue Masaryk. His successor 
Eduard BeneS, President from M asaryk’s death in 1937 to the Communist 
coup in 1948, while less charismatic, continued the trad ition  that the 
Presidency derived its influence not so much from the constitution as 
from respect for the President himself. This condition of political 
deference was recreated under Havel.
Ten months into the post-communist period. Le Monde wrote that 
Havel appeared to be the only solid centre of power in the country.
In November 1991, in spite of the continuing economic hardships
Interview  with Dienstbier.
Le Monde, 13 September 1990.
148
experienced by the Czechoslovak population, Havel had a seventy-one  
percent approval rating nation-wide, which grew to e ight-tw o percent in 
February  1992/"^^
Havel did not re ly  on trad ition  or popularity to implement 
Presidential in itiatives. In  fact, his constitutional powers were highly  
limited, but he tried  to enhance his executive abilities, if not also power, 
immediately upon taking up residence in the Presidential Castle.
The day he was elected President, Havel began to reorganise the  
Office of the Presidency, appointing close friends as a d v i s e r s . O n  18 
January 1990, he established yet another advisory group named the 
Collegium of the President. Later that month, he appointed the expelled 
heir to the Bohemian crown. Prince Karl Johannes von Scharzenberg. to 
lead an advisory group composed of exiled émigrés. In  February, that 
body was expanded when Havel added leading émigrés MiloS Forman, Pavel 
Kohout, Nicholas Lobkowicz, J ir i Pelikan, Jacques Rupnik, Ota Sik, Josef 
Ékvoreckÿ and Pavel T igrid . Havel told the Federal Assembly six months 
later, on 29 June 1990, that the Office of the President needed to be a 
’real political office’. O n  11 July, the Office was fu rth e r  enlarged, to 
eight political sections overseeing domestic policy, foreign policy, social 
policy, cu ltural policy, economic policy, human righ ts , legal policy, and 
the press and information. Each section was then divided into numerous 
departments. To manage the burgeoning Presidential edifice,
Schwarzenberg was made Chancellor of the Office of the President.
Former dissident Rudolf Zukal questioned Havel’s assumption of 
some many duties and the risks posed thereby to existing constitutional
149 varodna obroda, 28 November 1991, and CSTK, 6 February  1992, cited in 
Obrman, ’Havel’s Diminishing Political In fluence’, p. 18.
J iri Pehe, ’Office of the President Reorganized’, Report on Eastern Europe 
Vol. 1. No. 31 (3 August 1990), p. 5.
Cited in îbid., p. 5.
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o r g a n s . A s  a Radio Free Europe report concluded, ’The sheer size of 
the Office of the President, with its hundreds of employees, is ...likely  to 
lead to the creation of what Havel says he does not want: a shadow 
cabinet or a center of executive power competing with the  
government’.
I t  is unrealistic to suggest that Havel should not have appointed  
his own advisers, not least when they ranked among the world’s most 
talented artists . I t  is also natural to suggest that in a time of political 
change, when, as Dienstbier found in the Foreign M inistry, Havel entered  
circumstances in which he knew no one, that he would want chosen 
pœple around him.
The result, however, was a bloated adm inistrative structure  
unaccountable to anyone. Doubtless Havel had no malicious designs, even 
though his critics accused him of seeking to undermine other bases of 
authority, especially Parliament. The effect on foreign policy was that the  
Presidential Office engaged in two of the most controversial and 
potentially embarrassing acts of post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign  
policy. The f irs t  was an invitation to the Dalai Lama, which provoked an 
outcry from China and the cancellation of major trade agreements (which 
in the end were largely rectified). The second was Havel’s consent to 
meet Austrian Chancellor Kurt Waldheim, isolated by the international 
community for his wartime service in Yugoslavia. The meeting was 
attributed to S c h w a r z e n b e r g . I n  neither case was the Foreign  
Ministry consulted or aware of the in itia tive, even though relations  
between the Castle and Czernin Palace were deemed extremely close.
Lîdové noviny, 9 July 1990.
Pehe, 'Office of the President’, p. 7.
See chapter 4 for details of the meeting. For Schwarzenberg’s hand in 
the affa ir, see Anne McElvoy, ’Fairyta le  Prince Awakens Sleeping Heritage’, 
The Times, 31 October 1990. Officials asked about the responsibility for the 
meeting would not confirm or deny Schwarzenberg’s role.
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The bureaucratic edifice erected around the Presidential Office not 
only constructed a possible r iv a l to the Foreign M inistry, it also gave 
Havel greater institutional means to express his own views on foreign  
policy.
Foreign policy presented the best opportunity for the post-Communist 
leadership to eliminate the influence on policy of entrenched bureaucratic  
interests. Most practioners and observers suggest that the Foreign  
M inistry enjoyed a monopoly over foreign policy and consensus existed 
among post-Communist leaders on at least the general content and 
direction of foreign policy. This view, however, is mistaken.
Perhaps for reasons particu lar to the transition, institutions and 
offices which might have been expected to engage in foreign policy 
(irrespective of whether in conjunction with the Foreign M in istry  or at 
crosspurposes to it) had truncated roles in foreign policy making. The 
Prime Minister and Parliament, however, were universally seen as 
remaining outside of foreign policy.
In  addition, the personalities behind post-Communist foreign  policy 
decided to work with one another, having debated politics in dissent for 
two decades. Thus, a best-case scenario for the management of foreign  
policy by the Ministry could be said to have existed.
The bureaucratic-political explanation for foreign policy decisions 
advanced by Graham Allison was contextualised in terms of th ree  models. 
The firs t constituted a rational actor model while the hybrid  of the  
second and th ird  models, organisational behaviour and bureaucratic
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politics, studied foreign policy as the result of the exercise of 
institutional interests w ithin a common governmental s tructure .
The treatm ent of the models as discreet entities was subsequently  
challenged, and Lawrence Freedman made the modification of placing them 
at opposite ends of a c o n t i n u u m . E a c h  of the entrenched interests  
examined here could be said to have served an aspect of Czechoslovak 
national interest. Nevertheless, in many cases, foreign policy as expressed 
by the Foreign M inistry was contradicted in practice by the actions of 
others.
I f  the rational actor model can be placed at one end of a continuum  
and the bureaucratic politics model at the other, the continuum could be 
said to represent individual influence at one end and institutional 
interests at the other.
I f  such a continuum is applied to post-Communist Czechoslovakia, 
its foreign policy decision-making can be seen as having been dominated 
in itia lly  by personalities, particu larly  Havel and Dienstbier. However, the 
government found that it had to accept s tructura l limitations which forced 
changes in policy. These included recognition of economic problems and 
Slovak nationalism as they related to the need to resume arms sales. This 
also accounts for the government’s need not only to defend the use of 
nuclear energy but to create governmental agencies to sell power abroad. 
These policy areas not only forced changes in policy but resulted in the
Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 
1971). Reference to Allison’s model of bureaucratic politics does not presume 
its suitability  to other political systems. See, for example, William Wallace, 
’Old States and New Circumstances: The In ternational Predicament of Britain, 
France and Germany’, in William Wallace and William Paterson (eds). Foreign  
Policy Making in Western Europe  (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978), pp. 31- 
55.
Lawrence Freedman, ’Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A 
Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model’, In ternational A ffa irs  Vol. 52, No. 
3 (July 1976), pp. 434-49.
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deliberate creation or enhancement of bureaucratic  s tructu res  to advance 
these interests.
The democratic ideals of the Czechoslovak dissidents and the  
expansive societal partic ipation in the V elvet Revolution suggested th a t  
post-Communist fore ign  policy should have been an expression of popular 
will. Instead, it  became a reflection of ins titu tiona l interests.
People in socialist Eastern Europe joked  th a t socialism was the  
longest road from capitalism to capitalism. I t  might also now be said that 
'democracy’, as represented by the revo lu tion  in  Czechoslovakia, became 
the  shortest rou te  between bureaucratic politics and bureaucratic  politics.
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CHAPTER 4:
GEOPOLITICS DISCOUNTED AND MORALITY CHAMPIONED: 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA’S RELATIONS WITH GERMANY
The civic th inking constituting post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign  
policy was clearly demonstrated in its relations with Germany. Havel 
rejected the idea that the German-speaking lands surrounding  
Czechoslovakia would resume their historical leverage over Czech political 
life; he also believed that Czechoslovak-Germans relations could not 
recommence without the Czechoslovaks apologising to the Germans for 
historical wrongs.
The chapter begins by putting post-communist Czechoslovak-German 
Relations into an historical context. I t  then considers Havel’s dismissal of 
geopolitical implications of German unification. His position illustrated  the  
achievement of a major Czechoslovak dissident in itia tive, the Prague 
Appeal of 1985 which called for the elimination of the division of Europe 
by eliminating the division of Germany. Havel’s policy on German 
unification also demonstrated the re lative selflessness of Czechoslovak 
foreign policy, in view of the avoidable consequences unification had on 
the country.
The moral content of Czechoslovakia’s civic foreign policy is then  
examined in the cases of Havel’s apology for the postwar expulsion of the  
Sudeten Germans and his refusal to maintain the international 
marginalization of Austrian Chancellor Kurt Waldheim.
The last section considers the challenges and contradictions posed 
to Czechoslovak foreign policy by the trade and cultural practices that 
resulted from large German investment in Czechoslovakia. The chapter 
concludes with an assessment of how some of the selfless civic qualities
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in Havel’s policy towards Germany harmed Czechoslovak interests, while 
others aspects can be seen to have served national interests.
CZECH AND CZECHOSLOVAK-GERMAN RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
Czech history has been profoundly influenced by the relationship between 
the Czechs and the Germans, to the extent that the Germans have been 
the 'constituting o ther’ of the Czechs before 1918 of the Czechs, and of 
the Czechoslovaks thereafte r. I t  is therefore necessary to o ffer at least a 
cursory account of the German influence on the Czechoslovaks.
Czech and German Id e n tity
As with studies of cu lture generally, this issue is one that perhaps 
provokes as much debate about its methodology as in its conclusions.
Some examples, however, drawn from lite ra tu re  and secondary sources and 
representing a period of hundreds of years help to give some indication  
of the centrality of the Germans to the Czech and Czechoslovak identity.
First, however, at least one explanatory word is imperative. The 
term 'German’ is perhaps not as helpful as 'Germanic’ or 'German­
speaking’. From 1620 to independence in 1918, the Czechs were under 
Austrian rule. At the same time, however, they co-habited with Germans in 
these lands. Thus, the influence of both Germans and Austrians on the  
Czechs was important. To be sure, 'A distinction must...be made between 
nationality conflicts [between the Czechs and the Germans] on the one 
hand and the conflicts of the Czechs with Vienna Centralism ’ .^
Nevertheless, as much as there is a necessary distinction between the
 ^ Hoch, 'The Peace Conference’, p. 15.
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Austrians and the Germans, there is also much commonality in their impact
on the Czechs. Probably as a consequence, Czechoslovaks have not always
made a distinction between the Germans and the Austrians. As Milan
Hauner notes, ’the ’’German Problem” from the Czech perspective has
always meant ”Austro-Germ an"’.^
The overlapping nature of German and Austrian influence was
observed at crucial junctures in pre-1918 Czechoslovak history. For
example, Masaryk’s decision to change his position on retain ing the
Austro-Hungarian empire has been explained to a large extent by his
recognition of the dominance of Germany over the Empire’s policies. ’We
know from his [M asaryk’s] testimony that it was the anticipation of
German hegemony in Europe which gave the final edge to his resolution
to fight Austria-Hungary.
Much ’Germanisation’ occurred throughout the Austrian empire as a
function of imperial rule, affecting minorities throughout the Empire.
A.J.P. Taylor has characterized this process anecdotally:
The enterpris ing son of a Czech, Roumanian or Serb peasant 
entered a town, learnt a German a rt and spoke German to his 
fellow shopkeepers; his children despised their fa th e r’s 
peasant dialect, and his grandchildren, safely arrived  in state 
jobs, forgot that they had ever been anything but Germans 
and town-dwellers.^
Such formal assimilation aside. Germanisation in the Czech lands 
before 1918 has been assessed as occurring largely due to the presence 
of Germans, ra ther than Austrians. A fter the Battle of White Mountain 
1620, it was the Germans who ’endeavoured to assimilate the entire
“ Milan Hauner, ’The Introduction of German Studies in the Czech Republic: 
a "Denkschrift”’, German History, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1993).
 ^ Masaryk, Svetova revoluce, pp. 36-7, cited in Kovtun, 'Problem of a Small 
Nation’, p. 36.
" A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), pp. 
24-3.
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in terior of the country where the great m ajority of the inhabitants spoke 
Czech’/ ’
Ethnic tension arose between the Czechs and Germans in the 
nineteenth century with the advent of industrialisation and modernisation. 
This was because so much of A ustria -H ungary’s industry  was established 
in Bohemia. For example, by 1914, 60 per cent of the Empire’s metal 
industry  and 75 per cent of its chemical industry  were located there.
I t  was not simply the fact of industrialisation but its relation to the  
ethnic groups living in Bohemia that gave rise to tension.
Industrialisation ’had begun largely w ithin the German community’. The 
resulting prospect of prosperity caused the migration of Czechs to the 
German industrial areas so that in ju s t the tw enty years between 1880 
and 1900, half a million Czechs moved to areas which had previously been 
minimally 80 per cent German.® This became a problem, which was not 
necessarily preordained, because of the sense of te rrito r ia lity  of the two 
groups. A mental border was said to have existed between the two ethnic 
groups. Dienstbier took it for granted that a ’border’ (presumably a 
political one) had existed between the Czechs and the Germans for a 
thousand years, which obviously predates by half a millennium the advent 
of the modern state.^ That ethnic groups should also identify  and define 
themselves by te rrito ria l allegiance is not unique to the Czechs and 
Germans. What is important to their relationship is that it was the 
defining relationship for the Czechs, and that the relationship was both
Sobota, ’Political Separatism’, p. 38.
® Ronald M. Smelser, ’Castles on the Landscape: Czech-German Relations’, in 
Skilling (ed.), Czechoslovakia, p. 84; and Ronald M. Smelser, ’German-Czech 
Relations in Bohemian Frontier Towns: The Industria lization-U rbanization  
Process’, in Keith Hutchens (ed.). Studies in East European Social History  
(Leiden, 1981), pp. 62-87.
• Speech a t Chatham House, 5 May 1992.
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one of a specific identifiable border (between the two states) but also an 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural one between the peoples themselves. This 
was particu larly tru e  among the individuals of each ethno-lingu istic  
community who co-inhabited the same geographic space, namely the Czech 
border regions until the post-Second World War expulsion. The problems 
of the Czech-German relationship in the curren t cen tury and the ways 
by which the post-Communist Czechoslovak government attempted to 
confront this legacy was to great extent determined by the evolution of 
that relationship before the twentieth century.
One reason why co-existence did not occur between the two groups 
before the creation of the Czechoslovak state was the way in which those 
communities developed. The Czech settlement fu lly  replicated Czech 
society, recreating all the necessary societal institutions, thereby  
delimiting either integration into, or encroachment, by the German 
communities. So deep was this division, and so complete the construction 
by both communities of parallel structures, that 'even the in ternationalist- 
oriented socialists found themselves split in Bohemia before the dawn of 
this century into separate Czech and German branches’.®
Such parallel and discrete socio-economic development w ithin each 
of the two ethnic communities suggests that contacts between them were 
limited. The relationship could not. and did not remain that way. The 
significant lesson to draw is that Germanisation was a process undertaken  
both formally by the Austrian Empire and inform ally by Germans residing  
in the Czech lands.
To return  to the Germanic influence on the Czechs, Havel provides 
a contemporary statement with which to consider this influence in an 
historical context. He re ferred  to the 'thousand-year-long Czechoslovak-
® Smelser. 'Castles on the Landscape’, p. 87.
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German drama in which the motifs of tension, quarrels and war were 
interwoven with those of fru it fu l common life  and deep mutual 
influence'.^ At least for the Czechoslovaks, as represented by Havel, 
Germans have had a profound impact on the Czechs. I t  will be argued  
that a fte r the Velvet Revolution Havel engaged in what he believed was a 
dialogue with the German people. In  fact, he was delivering a monologue 
to, on occasion, either a deaf or an absent or a m isinterpreting audience. 
The explanation for this outcome lies in his misunderstanding of the  
disproportionate importance, in terms of national self-awareness, for the  
Czechs of the Germans and the v irtu a l irrelevance of the Czechs to the  
Germans.
Havel was not alone among Czechs in a ttrib u tin g  immense importance 
to the Germans in the constitution of the Czech identity  and of the 
similarities of the peoples. Dissident Communist Ivan  Svitak, who is 
perhaps a particu larly  good example here for the disagreements that he 
and Havel have had, concurred in his answer to the question 'Who are  
the Czechs?’ Acknowledging that he risks insulting both groups, Svitak  
quipped: 'one could say that the Czechs are Germans who speak Czech’. 
While acknowledging that German influence on the Czechs has been both 
positive and negative, he writes, adding the emphasis himself, that 'the  
evidence shows very  convincingly that Czech-German antagonistic contacts 
were the most important factor in Czech h istory  and that they remain 
crucial fo r fu tu re  develop men f
The Germans in the borders of what was to become the new 
Czechoslovak state were so numerous that a 'Czechoslovak’ nation had to 
be created in order to ju s tify  its creation. While the Czechs and the
Cited in Edward Luca, 'Rewriting a Historical Wrong’, The Independent, 16 
March 1990.
Svitak, Unbearable Burden. Volume 1, p. 3.
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Slovaks had the most linguistic commonalities of all Slavic peoples and, 
debatably, the closest relations as well, prior to 1918 they had never 
been classified or re ferred  to as ’Czechoslovak’. The creation of a 
’Czechoslovak’ nationality served two related aims. I t  allowed the Slovaks, 
who numbered fewer than the Germans, to have a claim to the new state 
and it also supported an overall Slavic claim to the governance of the  
country.
Thus, with the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 
based on the idea of the r ig h t to self-determ ination of a ’Czechoslovak’ 
nation, Germans became a minority in the new state. By the same measure, 
however, the Sudeten German -  a term and concept which had not existed 
before -  was also created .“
The construction of a Czechoslovak people and the establishment of 
the Czechoslovak Republic did not indicate that the Czechoslovaks sought 
to dominate or discriminate against their German minority. In  the interw ar 
period relations between Czechs and Germans were generally believed to 
be good. In  1934, one Czech academic observed: ’Bohemia, Moravia and 
Silesia...is the classic area of racial co-existence’. The relationship was 
categorised as symbiotic, having developed ’organically’ and possessing 
'deep roots’. To prove the point fu rth e r, the concept of symbiosis was 
advanced by a German Professor who was also in the Czechoslovak 
Cabinet.
Despite the symbiosis of the two communities in the F irs t Republic, 
many Sudeten Germans supported Nazi Germany’s assertion of the rig h t to 
national self-determ ination and the claim that German minorities 
throughout Europe had the rig h t to live under a common regime. Specific
'  ^ Smelser, ’Castles’, p. 88.
Sobota, ’Political Separatism’, p. 37.
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daims against Czechoslovakia’s rig h t to govern the Sudeten Germans were 
made by Konrad Heinlein’s National Socialist Movement. Heinlein’s demands 
on Czechoslovakia exceeded his Karlsbad Programme of 24 April 1938 
which entailed an autonomous German area in Czechoslovakia; he also made 
clear that the appropriate policy for the Sudeten Germans was that of 
National Socialism. Furtherm ore, he wanted Czechoslovakia to reconfigure  
its foreign policy so that it  no longer ’led the State into the ranks of the 
enemies of the German people’. T h e s e  demands were obviously 
untenable for Czechoslovakia.
The formal dismemberment of Czechoslovakia began in September 
1938 with the Munich Agreement and ended in March 1939. As we have 
seen in chapter 1 the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany. This te rrito ry , 
running along all of Czechoslovakia’s borders with Germany (including  
those of annexed Austria) was not only a significant loss of land; it  also 
removed Czechoslovakia’s defenses and much of its arms industry. On 15 
March 1939 Germany announced the formal absorbtion of the remainder of 
the Czech Lands into the Th ird  Reich under the name the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia. H itler celebrated the annexation with a personal 
visit to Prague Castle. The next day, an independent Slovakia was 
proclaimed under Josef Tiso, who made his country ’s allegiance to Nazi 
Germany unambiguous.
The Munich Agreement and the subsequent destruction of 
Czechoslovakia produced at least two legacies for Czechoslovak foreign- 
policy th inking . F irst, political ideals such as national self-determ ination, 
which had justified  the creation of the Czechoslovak republic in 1918, 
could be manipulated against the ir benefactors and supporters. Second, 
Czechoslovakia had ample and vivid  evidence that no matter how good an
Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, pp. 46-7.
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international citizen the country may have been in the interw ar era, the 
interests of the Great Powers could override Czechoslovakia’s interests. 
Third , the resulting d istrust of the British and French led, if only out of 
desperation, to undue tru s t in the Soviet Union.
Even at the height of the Second World War, BeneS was charting a 
post-war foreign policy which relied heavily on the Soviet Union. The 
answer to the perennial tension between Czechs and Germans was to be 
found in BeneS’s wartime deal with Stalin. In  1943 Bene§ formalised what 
was expected to be Czechoslovakia’s post-war relations with the Soviet 
Union. As part of that agreement BeneS received the support of Stalin for 
the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, ’long before BeneS could secure similar 
consent from London and Washington’. Whereas the British and Americans 
were hesitant about the idea, as one historian writes, BeneS received  
’instant approval from the Soviet government for his Sudeten German 
solution’. By contrast, the Anglo-American hesitation over approving the  
expulsion came from the ir ’best humanitarian trad itions ’.^ '^
Whatever the morality of the decision to expel the Sudeten Germans, 
nearly three million Germans were forced to leave Czechoslovakia a fte r the  
war. The decision was justified  because of the complicity of the 
overwhelming m ajority of the Sudeten Germans with Heinlein’s nationalist 
and revisionist party.
The result of the expulsion was that Germans accounted for a single 
percent of the Czechoslovak population in 1950, whereas they had been 22 
percent in 1930. Government practices sought to limit the identity of 
those Germans who remained in Czechoslovakia, and they ’were prohibited  
from setting up the ir own schools or cult organizations and were not
Ullmann, ’BeneS’, p, 57.
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recognized as an ethnic m inority until the Prague Spring reform s’.
A fter the Velvet Revolution only 62,000 Czechoslovak citizens considered 
themselves to be German.
The expulsion can be seen as outside the trad ition  of Czech 
dealings with the German m inority. In  another context, George Kovtun 
maintained T h e  Czech-German settlement had been under discussion since 
1848, and the discussion could have continued, now in Prague [after  
independence in 1918] instead of Vienna. There was no justification  for 
the political and physical violence of Nazism which came into play a fte r a 
long h istory of d ifficu lt, sometimes b itte r, but always peaceful Czech- 
German negotiations. At least the Czech-German problem had a democratic, 
civilized political environment in the F irs t Republic.’ In the 1970s 
Czechoslovak dissidents began debating the morality of the expulsion. The 
consensus was that the expulsion was based on the principle of collective  
guilt and was therefore unjustified. This th inking underscored Havel’s 
need to apologise to the German people for the expulsion. The political 
implications of doing so, however, went fu rth e r than simply enacting an 
ethical principle.
German Id e n tity  and Central and East Europe
Germany has clearly been important in the development of Czech and 
Czechoslovak identity. But, the relationship has not been reciprocal. 
Instead, Germany sees itself as having a unique and profound role in, 
and relationship with, the whole of Central and Eastern Europe.
Janusz Buga,jski, Nations in Turmoil (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 93. 
Le Monde, 16 October 1990.
Kovtun, 'Small Nation’, p. 37.
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Germany’s image of itse lf in this region was most s ta rk ly  presented 
in the two world wars with the conception of Drang nach Osten and the 
German state’s organic need for te rrito ry  and material, which was to be 
found in Eastern Europe. At various times in the Cold War, West Germany 
undertook a special role for itse lf with regard to Eastern Europe in the 
form of its Ostpolitik.^^
This is not to suggest that this policy towards the Soviet bloc was 
irreconcilable with overall Western policy or that it did not ind irectly  
serve other Western goals.
Regardless of its intentions, Ostpolitik distinguished Germany from 
other Western countries in its role in and dealings with Eastern Europe. 
As P ierre Hassner has observed: Tn a way, the Federal Republic is the  
only Western country which really  has an Ostpolitik and which really  
cares about Eastern Europe, since the two are connected both by 
immediate problems and by fundamental concerns.’ These connections are  
all the stronger because ’The notion of Eastern Europe, and even less of 
Central Europe, cannot be an abstract issue in German eyes. Eastern  
Europe is inextricably involved in the question of German identity  and 
o r i e n t a t i o n . G e r m a n  observers reinforce the idea of Germany having a 
special role with regard to Central and Eastern Europe. Dr Bernhard  
Vogel, President of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and former Minister
See William E. G riffith , The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic o f Germany
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978); and, more recently, Timothy Carton Ash,
In  Europe's Name (London: Vintage, 1994).
See, for example, the comments of representative of the German
Chancellery which suggest that Ostpolitik is actually a Western, rather than 
German policy: ’Germany’s Ostpolitik  was, is and remains embedded in the 
collective policy of the West, in the formation of which Germany itself is 
actively involved’. Uwe Kaestner, ’West Germany’s Ostpolitik', in Peter R. 
Weilemann, Georg Brunner and Rudolf L. Tôkés (eds). Upheaval Against the 
Plan (Oxford & New York: Berg, 1991), p. 158.
P ierre Hassner, ’West Germany’s Ostpolitik: A Western View’, in ibid., p. 
170.
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President of Land Rhineland-Palatinate, argued T e rr ito r ia lly , cu ltu ra lly  
and, in spite of the sometimes b itter experiences of the past, historically  
we are closer to the countries of East-Central Europe than are most of 
the Federal Republic’s Western partners’.R e p re s e n ta t iv e s  of the  
German government concur, a ttribu tin g  Germany’s distinct role to 
'elementary geographical and geo-strategic facts, with Germany’s position 
as a cu ltural and economic mediator, a position which developed from the  
time of the early Middle Ages’.
With th e  demise of the Cold War presumably this special role would 
be allowed to resume its historical significance. With German reunification  
presumably also the country would eventually be able to assume that role  
with greater vigour. Was the Czechoslovak leadership, unlike many others, 
correct to assess benevolently German unification and Germany’s 
subsequent intentions?
GEOPOLITICS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
The defeat of communism in East Germany, which preceded the Velvet 
Revolution in Czechoslovakia by a few days, soon raised the now- 
completed fact of German reunification. Within a year, Europe’s strongest 
economy had added five  provinces and become the continent’s second 
most populous country. Reaction from the international community was 
generally one of alarm, which François Mauriac summarised with 'I  love 
Germany so much that I p refer to have two of them’.^  ^ Le Monde noted
Bernhard Vogel, 'East-Central Europe: A Challenge to the Germans’, in 
ibid., p. 155.
Kaestner, 'Ostpolitik*, p. 159.
Quoted in , among o the rs . The F inanc ia l Times, 27 O ctober 1989.
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that Czechoslovakia was the only country to border both Germanies, and 
that it had greater historical justification  than others to be concerned by 
the prospect of a strong Germany in the centre of Europe.
Havel, by contrast, adopted a distinctive position on German 
reunification. In  keeping with his belief in the importance of the  
individual word, Havel deliberately refra ined from using the word 
'reunification ’ because it invoked reference to Germany’s 1937 borders. 
While Zbigniew Brzezinski, as the most celebrated among many, called 
German unification 'the most significant geopolitical change produced by 
the end of the Cold War’,^ ® Havel seemed to disregard any geopolitical 
consequences arising from the event. I f  anything, he saw unification as a 
necessary and positive development which would benefit all of Europe.
In  addition to discounting the geopolitical implications of unification, 
Havel also ignored what an observer might consider the closed nature by 
which the process of unification was allowed to happen. This may have 
contradicted Havel’s principles of open discussion.
Havel should not be considered naive in his views of German 
unification and he was not completely unaware of its nature and 
consequences. I t  was even commented that occasional elements of 
realpolitik  could be seen in Havel’s approach to German r e l a t i o n s . H i s  
view presumed that political consciousness, ra ther than historical
Le Monde, 4 January 1990.
See his comments on Havel’s v is it to Berlin, 2 January 1990, in 
In ternational Herald Tribune, 3 January 1990. In  keeping with Havel’s choice, 
'unification’ will be used hereafter.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'The Consequences of the End of the Cold War for 
International Security’, in Mew Dimensions in  In ternationa l S ecurity  (London: 
IISS Adelphi Paper No. 265, Winter 1991/92), p. 8.
’Realpolitik nudged its way into the mutual adoration’. See, for example, 
Edward Lucas, 'Rewriting a Historical Wrong’, The Independent 16 March 
1990.
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experience, would determine united Germany’s behaviour. V isiting Berlin  
on 2 January 1990 as part of his f irs t  state v is it abroad, he said emotions 
had to be calmed before unification occurred. Stating that ’Germany 
v irtu a lly  surrounds us,’ he asked Germany to ’free  its neighbors of fear, 
specifically the fear of a Greater Germany’, and added that ’A democratic 
system in Germany (is) more important than the possibility that it  might 
become one nation’.^ ® He reiterated , ’I f  Germany is a democratic state I  
will not be afraid of it, even if  it had 100 million people. On the other 
hand, I would be afraid  of Germany if it were a to ta litarian  state with two 
million people.’ ^^
Havel even encouraged the unification of the Germanies. While in 
Berlin, he stood near the reopened Brandenburg Gate and the Wall. 
Berliners applauded him when he offered to send Czechoslovak workers to 
tear down the remainder of the Wall. He repeated the words of President 
John F. Kennedy, ’Ich bin B erliner’ (omitting the use of ’e in ’ ) but 
qualifiying the statement to ’a new era and in a new context.’ This was 
but one example of how Havel tried  to reassure the world of Germany’s 
democratic inclination. He was even ’at pains’ to do so for the Poles.
I t  was, however, particu larly  because Havel concerned himself with 
the process of unification that the way it occurred may reflect poorly on 
his policy. This is not to say that Czechoslovakia could have influenced  
the process; nevertheless Havel expressed views on how politics generally  
should work and how reunification should occur.
Marc Fisher, ’East Germany To Raze Rest Of The Berlin Wall; Czechoslovak 
Leader Visits Both Germanys’ , The Washington Post, 3 January 1990.
Cited in, for example, Lionel Barber, ’Havel Wins US Pledge of Trade Ties’ , 
The Financial Times, 21 February 1990.
Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, ’Havel in Poland: Beyond Bilateral Relations’, 
Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 1, No. 7 (16 February 1990), p. 37.
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Havel was not alone in assigning crite ria  to the process by which 
German unification should occur. On 9 December 1989, the European 
Council endorsed it, but qualified it through the requirements of ’free  
self-determ ination in a peaceful and democratic process, in fu ll respect of 
the relevant agreements and treaties and of all the principles defined by 
the Helsinki Final Act, w ithin a context of dialogue and East-West 
cooperation’.'^ ^
Regarding the process of unification, for example, Havel warned 
against, as a journalis t put it, ’an over hurried and chaotic unification  
process’, one that Havel especially feared might occur ’as a mere result of 
election f ever ’. A n  overview of scholarly assessments of the unification  
process indicate that quite a d ifferent process allowed for the united of 
the two Germanies.
Tn contrast to Havel’s apparent desire for openness in politics, the  
process of deciding unification occurred with little  public discussion; even 
major powers at times felt excluded from the process. While the history of 
German unification cannot be revieued in detail here, it is generally  
thought that the process occurred with i;tie consultation by Germany 
with other states. This was more than simply an expression of Germans 
enjoying their entitlement to self-determ ination, as NATO Secretary  
General Manfred Worner called it.'^ '^
Commentators, for example, have judged German consultation with 
its key allies as minimal: ’German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s original
Communication from the EC Commission, The Community and German 
Reunification SEC(90) 751, 20 April 1990, p. 1, cited in Peter van Ham, The 
EC, Eastern Europe and European Unity: Discord, Collaboration and 
Integration Since 1947 (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1992), pp. 
162-3.
Lucas, ’Rew riting’.
’German Unification’, NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner’s address 
to the Council on 3 October 1990, in \ATO  Review Vol. 38, No. 5 (October
1990), p. 1.
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proposal for reunification was presented following only minimal 
consultation with Washington; indeed, it annoyed the United States and 
several Western states at the time. The Kohl-Gorbachev agreement in July  
1990 that confirmed Soviet acceptance of unification and established a 
timetable for the w ithdrawl of Soviet forces from eastern Germany was 
almost ostentatiously a bilateral German-Soviet a ffa ir. U.S. participation  
occurred in the margins.’ ’^  I f  Bonn undertook to inform the US of its 
10-point plan for unification, France and Britain were apparently not even 
entitled to that.^"" Ita lian  Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis was 
positive that the participation of the two Germanies in tw o-p lus-four talks  
showed acknowledgement of international interests in the unification  
process, he believed that the process did not fu lfil Ita lian  interests, and 
by implication, those of other states excluded in the Talks.
Regardless of whether France and Britain actually opposed the  
principle of reunification, it seemed that they were presented with an 
accomplished fact. A fter Kohl promised Bush that a united Germany would 
not reduce the FRG’s commitment to the West, the US essentially forced 
Britain and France to agree to the four conditions enabling  
reunification.^"
An indication of Havel’s desire to have the implications of 
unification discussed more widely was his support for the inclusion of 
Poland in the 4-plus-2 talks. But that was not to be. His fu tu re
Ted Galen Carpenter, 'The New World Disorder’, Foreign  Policy No. 84 (Fall
1991), p. 28
William Horsely, ’United Germany’s Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique of 
German Foreign Policy’, Millennium  Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer 1992), p. 230.
Interview  with Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, La Repiibblica, 
15 February 1990, in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Europe Transformed (London: 
Tri-S erv ice Press, 1990), p. 489.
See Alexander Moens, ’American Diplomacy and German Reunification’, 
Survival Vol. XXXIII,  No. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1991), p. 533.
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ambassador to Warsaw was content to say that Poland got a guarantee of 
its western border, calling that fact itself a victory.^® On the eve of the 
signing of the Czechoslovak-German Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, 
Finance Minister Klaus declared that Czechoslovakia had in fact lost out 
in the process.
As will be discussed in the penultimate chapter, Czechoslovak 
integration into West European institutional structures became 
increasingly important to the Havel government. Relations with Germany 
were seen as a means, perhaps even the prim ary means, to that end.
Some commentators have been blunt in the ir assessment of Havel’s 
motivations for endorsing German unity; ’Havel publicly supported German 
reunification and appeared to underscore Czechoslovak-German 
reconciliation as the cornerstone of his new European foreign policy and 
of economic integration with the West.’"^  ^ Others have asked why 
Germany lent the kind of support to Czechoslovakia (and also to Poland) 
for admission into Western institutions: 'Was the in itiative, most positively, 
a gesture of good will toward former victims or, neutrally , the expression 
or desire to push the German defense I'roritier forward while stilling fears 
of a too forward and unilateral German foreign policy or, lastly and 
negatively, an attempt to facilitate the area’s political-economic 
colonization under NATO’s m ilitary cover?
Whatever Havel’s motivations in supporting German unification, he 
believed Germany to be democratic and the process of unification to have 
occurred democratically and he undertm k to reassure others of that. Most
Interview  with former Ambassador to Poland Markéta Fialkovâ-Némcovâ. 
14 September 1995.
REE B-Wire, 27 February 1992.
Bugajski, Nations in Turmoil p. 204.
George Liska, Return to the Heartland & Rebirth o f the Old Order 
(Washington: The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institu te , 1994), p. 92.
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rem arkably, the unification of Germany was the fulfilm ent of the 1985 
Czechoslovak dissident proposal entitled the 'Prague Appeal’. As Vondra 
said in 1990:
As far as the general line of our foreign policy is concerned, it is 
to be noted that our strategy regarding the pan-European process 
and the re-unification of Germany was formulated much earlie r than 
January 1990. This strategy was formulated in 1985 in an inchoate 
form, but nevertheless in very  concrete terms, when Charter 77 
issued the Prague Appeal. What then seemed a utopia is now 
reality .
For Czechoslovak decision-makers, German unification vindicated their  
dissident conception of international politics.
The Costs to Czechoslovakia of German Unification
The uninhibited support of the Czechoslovak government for German 
unification did not detract from the concrete effects of geographical 
proximity. Smaller problems of geography were ignored, such as that 
because much of the country’s frontiers are contiguous with Austria and 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, with its subsidized economy, immediately became 
a shopping paradise. On 5 March 1990 the export of numerous consumer 
goods had to be banned en tire ly  because Germans and Austrians were 
emptying s h o p s . O t h e r  minor developments included unprecedented  
tra ffic  jams caused by travel without restrictions between West Germany 
and Czechoslovakia in the beginning of July 1990.
Disrespect for Czechoslovak interests in the process of German 
unification was revealed in the impact on Czechoslovakia of the 
integration of East Germany’s economy into West Germany’s. While some 
unforeseen friction had to accompany the process, both German and
'View from the Castle’, p. 12.
The Daily Telegraph, 6 March 1990.
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Czechoslovak sources fe lt that nothing was inevitable and that more could 
have been done to limit the consequences for Czechoslovakia.
German radio acknowledged that Czechoslovak 'Trade contacts with 
the former GDR are a "sore point" for Prague because the commitments 
from these mainly economic cooperation contacts were hard ly  kept at all 
by the German side’. German Radio also quoted the Czechoslovak Prime 
Minister as saying ' I t  is not possible to suspend old ties to the economy 
of the former GDR within one, two, or three years’. T h i s  may have 
been the Czechoslovak hope or expectation but the reality  proved 
d iffe ren t as trade between the two former socialist allies shrivelled, 
leaving Czechoslovakia with substantial debts owed to it by the GDR. East 
Germany doubled its exchange rate and did not complete trade agreements 
with Czechoslovakia, leaving the latter with a trade deficit of almost 700 
million convertible roubles. The loss of such trade has been considered 
among the most severe external shocks post-Communist Czechoslovakia 
faced.^^
The effect was serious enough for Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenko 
Pirek to inform the European Parliameni hat unification was 'already  
hurting the Czechoslovak economy. Trade between Czechoslovakia and the 
GDR had fallen because the GDR had reduced its inports from 
Czechoslovakia.’'’® Emerging from meetings on bilateral trade with East 
German officials, the Czechoslovak Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade
44 Hamburg DPA, 27 November 1990, in FBIS, 29 November 1990, P. 23.
 ^’ Li via Klausova places German unification with the breakdown of East bloc 
trade and the collapse of Iraq i oil. 'Economic Challenges and Opportunities  
in Central Europe; The Case of Czechoslovakia’, in Otto Pick (ed.). The Cold 
War Legacy in Europe (London: Pinter, 1991), p. 116.
RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, 13 July 1990, p. 59.
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Miroslav Cuker said on 19 July 1990 that the balance of payments was 
deteriorating to the detrim ent of his co u n try /^
The Czechoslovak government retaliated by increasing its exchange 
rate, and Federal Trade Minister Strancaf said he would seek steps to 
halt Czechoslovak firms from conducting all but v ita l trade with the 
GDR/^ One Czechoslovak newspaper observed that Strancah 
demonstrated 'an anger unusual in foreign re la tions '/^  The view from 
the Czechoslovak side was that the collapse of Czechoslovak-East German 
trade, and especially the residue of debts was not a necessary 
consequence of unification but avoidable.
Regardless of these problems, the Western media extolled Havel for 
his disregard for the geopolitical factors of German reunification. The 
Guardian wrote 'his argument is refreshingly straightforw ard: I f  the only 
good Germany is a democratic Germany, then we should have enough 
vision to disregard the chill contingencies spelt out on the geopolitical
map'.^o
Havel may well have assessed, better than most contemporary 
commentators or leaders, the benevolence of Germany. Doubtless, the 
m ilitary-political threat that Germany represented to the Czechoslovak 
state after 1989 was probably less than at any other time this  
century. The geopolitical considerations surrounding German unification  
which preoccupied West European leaders and Western academics were
CTK, 19 July 1990 , in FBIS, 20 July 1990, p. 14.
The Times; and The Financial Times, 8 August 1990.
Mlada fronta dnes, 8 August 1990.
The Guardian, 3 January 1990.
Sir Michael Howard maintained 'as one whose conscious political experience 
now extends over half a century, I can say that I  would rather be living in 
1989 than in 1939 - or indeed at any date between the two'. The Lessons of 
distory  (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1991), p. 5.
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almost v irtua lly  ignored by Havel; instead, he saw unification as the firs t  
and necessary stage for the reintegration of Europe. The Czechoslovak 
leadership, in Dienstbler’s words, was satisfied that Germany was 
'democratic and European
For all the apparent benevolence in Havel’s policy towards Germany 
it also served the two-fold aim of Czechoslovakia foreign policy: the 
integration of the country into a wider European order and the 
reconstruction of the European order. The firs t programme can be seen 
as a direct, expression of national interest; the second belongs to the 
broader Havel-Dienstbier idealist programme. While the Czechoslovak- 
German Treaty of Good Neighbourliness is discussed below, it is necessary 
here to recall that Havel said the Treaty would pave the way into the 
European Community.
I t  is clear that Germany, for whatever reason, was prominent, even 
predominant in Havel’s foreign policy. Even if his government did not 
mean this, his actions were certain ly taken by others to signify that. 
Whatever his larger designs and v.diate\ er Germany’s place in them,
Havel’s civic foreign policy was seen as giving more to Germany than 
most Czechoslovaks or Germans, expected or believed necessary.
For their part, 'West German officials say Havel has made a special 
point of stressing ties with Germany. They say Havel deliberately made 
von Weizsaecker the firs t foreign head of state to v isit Czechoslovakia 
since its revolution. They also note Havel made his f irs t  foreign visit as 
head of state to Germany -  to East Berlin and Munich’ . A s  a practical 
indication of the importance of Germany in Czechoslovak foreign policy, 
by the time of von Weizsacker’s March 1990 visit, Dienstbier had already  
met four times with his German counterpart.
Mlada fronta dnes, 6 February 1992.
'Von Weizsaecker to CS Tom orrow ’ , RFE/RL B-W ire, 14 March 1990.
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Such pragmatism seems to compromise the notion of disinterested  
idealism in Havel’s foreign policy. But a moral foreign policy need not 
obstruct the achievement of national interests. Nevertheless, the  
antagonism between selflessness and self-in terest in Havel’s relations with 
Germany and Austria continued in his treatm ent of mutual historical 
issues.
APOLOGY AND FORGIVENESS IN RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND AUSTRIA
In effect, Havel began his Presidential political relations with the  
Germanies before he was elected President. He did this by addressing  
what he believed to be an unresolved moral issue in Czechoslovak-German 
relations. He declared that Czechoslovakia was morally obliged to apologise 
to Germany for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans following the end of 
the Second World War. His comments were used against him once he was 
in office by a politically desperate Czechoslovak Communist Party . But 
this did not deter him. His view was confirmed as a governmental position 
by Dienstbier, who accompanied Havel on their f irs t  state v is it abroad, 
which was, significantly, to the GDR and the ERG. During the v is it, Havel 
formally reiterated the need to apologise, and subsequently equated fear 
of the Germans to anti-Semitism.^'*
As we have seen in chapters 1 and 2, Havel’s apology has its roots 
in a debate among Czechoslovak dissidents in the 1970s. The postwar 
expulsion was seen by many as the conclusion to, or even the ’ultimate 
vic to ry ’ in, the thousand-year struggle of the Czechs against the  
Germans.’'" The grounds for the expulsion and the means by which it
International Herald Tribune, 17-18 March 1990.
For a Western analyst’s reference, see Wingfield, 'Velvet Revolution", p. 
94; for a reference by a Czechoslovak, see MiloS Hajek, 'Nëkolik poznamek 
k Danubiové ëlânku "Tézy o vysidleni ëeskoslovenskÿch Nemcov"’ , in Cet i^
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was conducted led Czechoslovak independent intellectuals to consider the 
action morally indefensible and illegal.'’^
While some, notably the acclaimed Czech-born film director MiloS 
Forman, contended that Havel’s declaration of the need to apologise 
represents a 'noble civilized e ffo rt’ to commence the reconstruction of 
Central and East E u r o p e , t h e  Sudeten issue reanimated historic Czech 
hostility on a popular level toward G e r m a n y . I n  fact, it  could be said 
that average Czechoslovaks did not fear German unification itself, but 
demands on them by the Sudeten Germans. Czech Prime Minister Petr 
Pithart acknowledged that Czechoslovak public opinion was 'not completely 
ready to accept’ German reunification. However, he suggested, the fear 
was not of a large Germany, but of the consequences of the removal of 
the Sudeten Germans: 'People, especially in the regions bordering the 
frontier, feel afraid that Germans will seek to re tu rn ’.
Some Western commentators cautioned in 1990 against demands that 
Germans apologise for the ir crimes.^" Havel went in the opposite 
direction. To an extent it can be said that Havel’s apology sparked similar 
gestures from the German government. \ Iritish  newspaper headline, for
\'èmci odsun, p. 152.
For dissident debates on the revisions of the official policy of the 
expulsion, see the reproduction of essays in CeSi Némcî odsun. For a 
synthesis of the debate in English, see Bradley F. Adams, 'Morality, Wisdom 
and Revision: The Czech Opposition of the 1970s and the Expulsion of the 
Sudeten Germans’, East European Politics and Societies Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring  
1995), pp. 234-55.
Milos Forman, 'Havel is Right About Reconciliation’, International Herald 
Tribune, 10 January 1990.
See comments in In ternational Herald Tribune, 5 January 1990.
International Herald Tribune, 26 February 1990.
'Germans quickly tire  of lectures from foreigners demanding that they  
apologize once again for crimes committed before most of the curren t German 
population was born’. John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instab ility  
in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security  Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 
1990b p. 56.
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example, exclaimed 'Bonn pleads for Prague’s forgiveness over H itler 
There may have been benefits to Czechoslovakia of Havel’s stage-managing 
of his reconciliation with Germany. As the same report affirmed: 'The 
symbolism of Herr Richard von Weizsacker’s a rriv a l on this ann iversary  
[of H itler’s ceremonial a rriva l in Prague] -  Mr Havel’s deliberate choice - 
was not lost on his West German counterpart’.
Von Weizsacker acknowledged this point, declaring 'Everyone in our 
country understands the profound symbolism of this step we take  
together for peace. F ifty -one years ago the German people marched 
m ilitarily into your country. A profound in justice was brought to your 
peoples by the Germans’.
But such a gesture on the part of Germany was clearly limited.
First, that von Weizsacker acknowledged what Havel’s symbolic gesture  
meant probably reflected more on von Weizsacker, and on Havel’s opinion 
of him, than on Germany as a whole. He had a personal history of 
accepting German contrition such as in his 'in ternationally adm ired’ 
address on the fortieth  anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.
Havel spoke of him almost as he might have described Masaryk: as a 
grey-haired wise professor with charm. 4^
Second, as much as von Weizsacker claimed to speak on behalf of 
the German people, substantial limitations to that quickly and forcefu lly  
demonstrated themselves. Expellees and th e ir descendants began 
deliberating a return  to the Sudetenland. Some politicians, such as 
Bavarian Prime Minister Max Strebl, an expellee, demanded the
Peter Green, 'Bonn Pleads for Prague’s Forgiveness over H itle r’, The 
Times, 16 March 1990.
Cited in ibid.
'Von Weizsaecker to CS Tom orrow ’ , RFF/RL B-W ire, 14 March 1990.
*'4 Havel, Let n i phemitani. p. 78.
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Czechoslovak government a p o l o g i s e . T h e  strength of the Sudeten 
German claims were all the more notable considering political-economic 
conditions at the time. Czech author Ota Filip, residing in Germany, said 
that what he called the 'usual a ffa ir ’ of the Sudeten Germans was 
uninteresting in Germany and was overshadowed by problems of financing 
German unification.^®
Nevertheless, the apology was seen by much of the Czechoslovak 
population as unnecessary and unfounded. While the ’c iv ic ’ nature of 
Havel’s foreign policy dictated moral considerations, it also called for a 
high degree of democratic input. On this issue at least, the ’c ivic’ foreign  
policy could not accommodate both morality and public opinion. A civic 
foreign policy, like a realpolJtik foreign policy, can have contradictory  
and mutually exclusive components. That dichotomy was fu rth e r illustrated  
in the negotiations for and the content of the German-Czechoslovak 
Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness.
The German-Czechoslovak Treaty  on G(X)d Neighbourliness
The Treaty was to lay the foundations of new relations, as a Czechoslovak 
Foreign Ministry spokesman explained two days before its signing.®^ I t  
succeeded in fu lfilling  demands on both sides. The Czechoslovak 
government acknowledged the wrongfulness of the postwar expulsion of 
Germans; the German government abandoned demands for their 
compensation and reiterated its lack of te rrito ria l claims against 
Czechoslovakia. Germany also pledged to assist the cou ntry ’s en try  into
The Guardian, 15 March 1990.
®® '0 N^mcich, Ceâich a narodni hrdosti" Rozhovor se spisovatlem Otou 
Fiiipem’, Listy  (Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 1994), p. 47.
®' OP A. 25 February 1992, in 5k7?, 26 February 1992.
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the EC. For all of the positive elements of the Treaty, it was, however,
'uncivic’ in both the way it was devised and how it was conceived.
The reformulation of the Treaty, which the Czechoslovak government
presented as the new foundations for relations with Germany, effectively
occurred in secret. Details of the contents of the T reaty were limited to
’occasional rumours’ in the press. Dienstbier was overt in his intention to
keep the content of the Treaty out of the federal parliam entary elections
of 1992. He said that if  the Treaty were not signed according to schedule,
namely in February 1992, ratification would also be unlikely before the
elections. Dienstbier told Genscher in January 1992 that the Treaty
needed to signed by 15 February to avoid become an election issue,^®
which allowed a German report to summarise D ienstbier’s feelings that
Czechoslovak-German relations ’were too serious a matter to be exposed to
the bright lights of an election campaign’.
Dienstbier’s concern, while seemingly undemocratic, was also
understandable. Even before the precise content of the Treaty became
public, popular sentiments attacked the Czechoslovak government’s
actions. One commentator wrote,
Poland emphatically held out for and won from the united Germany 
a treaty  on the permanency of the Oder-Neisse border while we, 
thanks to our moderation, indolence, and perhaps our national 
characteristic of a tendency to dither, remain empty-handed on 
countering demands by Sudeten Germans on Czechoslovakia.
Similarly, once the Treaty was initialled by German President von
Weizsaker on 7 October 1991, the left-w ing  Czechoslovak press mounted a
campaign to derail it.^^
Jan Obrman, ’Czechoslovak Assembly Affirms German Friendship T reaty ’, 
BFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No. 21 (22 May 1992), p. 19.
69 ADN in German, 19 January 1992, in SWB, 24 January 1992.
Olga Jerabkova, Prague Domestic Service, 19 May 1991, JPRS-EER, 31 May 
1991, p. 9.
'  ^ Obrman. ’ Assembly Affirms T rea ty ’, p. 19.
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The hostile response of sections of the Czechoslovak public to the 
prospect of an 'apologetic’ and conciliatory trea ty  with Germans proved 
the tactical necessity of D ienstbier’s silence on its contents. But by its 
nature, this tactic also meant that public debate and popular participation  
on a key issue was deliberately stifled.
The Czechoslovak government could take solace that boisterous 
opposition to the Treaty was limited to specific groups. For example, when 
the Treaty was being signed in Prague Castle, only one or two thousand 
predominantly elderly Czechoslovaks protested. Havel said the 
demonstration 'did not appear to me as being especially big, important 
and dramatic’, although he added 'I do not at all underrate these 
manifestations’.^  ^ What the Czechoslovak government may have 
underrated was the popular support for the principle of the 'expulsion’ of 
the Sudeten Germans, which rated 58 percent among Czechs, 49 percent 
among Moravians and 30 percent among S l ova ks . Spec i f i c a l l y ,  the  
Treaty did not address the concerns of any of the groups that opposed 
aspects of the Treaty. For example, the Treaty was seen as giving  
concessions to the Sudeten Germans. \ liile not compensating, as a 
Czechoslovak Foreign M inistry spokesman conceded, Czechoslovak victims 
of German wartime c a m p s . D e s p i t e  this, Czechoslovaks from varying  
persuasions expressed dissatisfaction with the way the Treaty was 
w ritten, conceived and implemented.
In terms of content, the Treaty reversed Czechoslovak Communist 
practice. The Communist regime officially referred  to the removal of the 
Sudeten Germans as a 'tra n s fe r’. The Treaty  adopted the word 'expulsion’. 
Dienstbier defended this, declaring that only three sentences of the
Radio Czechoslovakia, 27 February 1992, in SWB, 29 February 1992. 
Rude pravo, 27 March 1992.
DPA in German, 25 F e b ru a ry  1992, In SWB, 26 F e b ru a ry  1992.
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Treaty dealt with the past while the remainder looked to the fu tu re  and 
provided for a specific form of cooperation/^
On a practical level, the Czechoslovak government discounted 
reversing any legislation which would have assisted in strengthening the 
Sudeten German claims. Dienstbier, for example, rejected ou trig h t the 
suggestion of annulling the decrees by President BeneS which laid out 
the e x p u l s i o n . A n d  throughout the controversy, Havel and Dienstbier 
avoided granting citizenship or return ing  property to the Sudeten 
Germans. Dienstbier frequently  stated that the Treaty did not allow for 
the repossession of property, a fear which was circulating widely. 
Nevertheless, German radio reported that he had 'pointed out that the 
trea ty  deliberately left open the question of the assets of the Sudeten 
Germans’.
John Mearsheimer advised that 'others should not ask today’s 
Germans to apologize for crimes they did not commit’. B y  the same 
token, the Germans should not have expected contemporary Czechoslovaks 
to accept guilt for a previous generation’s crime. As one Czechoslovak 
commentator wrote, ' I f  we re ject the collective guilt of the German nation, 
then there can be no collective apology on the part of the Czech nation, 
either for the acts of individuals or fanatical groups of misguided 
people’.
Interviewed in Mlada Cronta dnes, 6 February 1992.
Ibid.
See, for example, his interview on Radio Czechoslovakia, 25 February 1992, 
SkR, 27 February 1992.
ADN in German, 19 January 1992, in SWB, 24 January 1992.
79 viearsheimer, 'Back to the Fu ture ’, p. 56.
Jerabkova, Prague Domestic Service, p. 9.
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While an outside observer might place Czechoslovakia favourably on 
a balance sheet of guilt between itself and Germany, Havel’s leadership 
dispensed with such equations, seeing the apology as morally necessary. 
Whatever the domestic pressures on Kohl’s government, the end result 
was that the morally correct Czechoslovak gesture not only failed to 
generate reciprocity but probably only encouraged greater demands by 
Sudeten Germans, and through them, by the German government itself.
The issue of Sudeten Germans continued a fte r the signing of the 
Treaty and the breakup of Czechoslovakia. While Havel had previously  
been categoric on not responding to Sudeten claims that were made 
unofficially, he later acknowledged discussions with Sudeten Germans were 
being undertaken at ’level of localities and of institu tions’ and said he 
sought to engage the foreign affa irs  committee of the Czech parliament in 
such discussions. The Germans saw Havel as conciliatory towards the 
Sudeten Germans. For example, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel 
'pointed out the interest of the German government in dialogue between 
the Czech leadership and Sudeten Germans’, and a German government 
spokesman 'said that President Havel stressed the readiness of the Czech 
side to conduct a dialogue with Sudeten Germans in the interest of 
understanding between the Czechs and Sudeten Germans’."^
The Case Of Kurt Waldheim
A similar case of unilateral forgiveness was made by Havel in his dealings 
with Austrian Chancellor Kurt Waldheim. Waldheim was diplomatically 
marginalised by the international community following the belated release 
of details on his wartime service as a German officer in Yugoslavia. While
CTK, 26 A p ril 1993, in  SlvH, 30 A p r il 1993.
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the findings of an independent international commission on his guilt were 
inconclusive, his international censure included being placed on an 
American 'watch lis t’ of unwanted persons and his ostracism by all world 
leaders, with the exception of Cyprus’s George Vassiliou.
Despite this international censure, Havel agreed to meet the 
Chancellor at the ceremonies opening the Salzburg Music Festival on 26 
July 1990. He did this even a fte r an open le tter by Charter 77 asked him 
to reconsider his d e c i s i o n . H e  explained his actions by equating the 
international boycott of Waldheim to a game and calling it a cliche and a 
ritual devoid of moral qualities’. He said politicians behaved toward 
Waldheim not out of moral concern but because they feared each other 
and had to conform to the boycott; any morality the act once had was 
therefore lost.^^
Waldheim introduced Havel at the Festival as 'liv ing proof that the 
explosive power of culture can be stronger than weapons and repressive  
force’. H a v e l ,  however, used his keynote address to make a 
charateristic reference to the need to be tru th fu l about one’s past, 
declaring that those 'who rew rite  the ir biographies...bring harm upon 
themselves and the ir fellow citizens’. He qualified his comments by stating  
'Tn our geographic area, in which I include Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
everyone has stains in his life h i s t o r y . S u c h  didacticism coincides 
with what Havel explained early in his Presidency: 'there is something
82 The letter was published in Lidové novîny, 18 July 1990.
The original comments were made in an interview with the Austrian  
newspaper Salzburger Nachrichten. See Michael Z. Wise, 'Havel Defends Visit 
to Austrian Festival’ , The Washington Post, 26 July 1990.
Cited in Michael Z. Wise, 'Havel Cautions Waldheim on "Lies", The 
Washington Post, 27 July 1990.
Salzburger Nachrichten, 22 July 1990, cited in J iri Pehe, 'Havel’s 
Controversial Visit to Austria’, RFE, Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 1, No. 32 
(10 August 1990), p. 10.
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gooci in each person, whether the person in question is a ju s tly  
sentenced prisoner or a tyrannical w arder’. He was also adamant that an 
atmosphere that evokes better qualities in people could be created.*^ I f  
that was his intention, it had no effect on his target. The Mew York Times 
wrote, ’no amount of Mr. Havel’s lite ra ry  indirection could disguise to 
whom’ the speech was addressed, but Waldheim was adamant that Havel 
was not re ferring  to him and pronounced ’I  did not rew rite  my 
biography. I  have denied nothing’.
Certainly Havel dismissed the international community’s treatm ent of 
Waldheim and demonstrated this in his willingness to meet and shake 
hands with the Chancellor and sit beside him during the Festival. But he 
was forced to re treat in practice from his position. He made clear that he 
deliberated on his decision to attend and emphasised that it had been 
extended to him a year before, when he was a private person and, in 
addition, that he had agonised over the decision to attend. Waldheim, 
however, countered his statements by arguing that he had accepted the 
invitation already in J a n u a r y . A s  if it were a rebutta l, Havel said he 
was not intending to make an official v is it to Austria before the summer 
of 1992, when Waldheim’s term would have expired.
Because of Havel’s effo rts  to diminish the significance of the 
meeting, its venue consequently increased in importance. The Festival 
substituted for an official state meeting, thereby downgrading its status 
and importance. Havel also qualified his meeting as an ’expression of my 
respect for the festival and especially for the Austrian people.’ He added
Prague Domestic Service, 11 January 1990, in FBIS, 12 January 1990, p. 
16, commenting on Der Stern's  interview with Havel, 11 January 1990.
The Mew York Times, 27 July 1990, cited in Pehe, 'Havel’s Controversial’, 
p. 11; and Wise, 'Havel Cautions’.
Associated Press, 'W eizsaecker Plans Meeting w ith  Waldheim', 20 J u ly  1990.
Wise, 'Havel Defends’ .
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that 'Austrians are our close neighbors, linked with us by thousands of 
connections, including our jo in t h istory.’ ®^ The meeting was limited to 
six hours, which Czechoslovak Chancellor Prince Schwarzenberg (who 
resided in Austria since his fam ily’s expulsion from Czechoslovakia in 
1948) defended by saying that the President ’is a very  busy man’ and 
that he immediately thereafte r had to attend the largest international 
meeting of Romanies in Brno.^^
That Havel was forced to re ly  on the Festival itself as the
justification for the meeting and that he qualified the nature and purpose
of the meeting suggests that he ultimately believed he could not forgive
in the way he wanted.
Havel’s sense and implementation of apology and forgiveness could 
not be fu lly  realised. Neither his domestic constituency accepted it nor 
was the external audience accepting and satisfied. In  the case of the 
Sudeten Germans, they were probably encouraged by Havel’s apology to 
seek fu rth e r concessions. Havel cannot even be said to have remained 
fu lly  true to his principles. Ironically, he would use the 56th anniversary  
of H itler’s occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, and also the fifth  
anniversary of his symbolic invitation to von Weizsacker, to call on 
Czechs and Germans to cease making mutual apologies.
FOREIGN TRADE, CULTURE AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Radio Czechoslovakia, IB July 1990, cited in Pehe, ’Havel’s Controversial’ .
Die Kurier, 28 July 1990, in FBIS, 30 July 1990, p. I I .
J iri Pehe. ’Czech Intellectuals Demand Dialogue with Sudeten Germans’, 
OMRT Daily Digest I I ,  No. 63 (29 March 1995).
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Tn discounting geopolitical or strategic risks to Czechoslovakia from
Germany, Havel kept company with columnist George F. Will, who in early
1990 illustrated the absence of such a m ilitary threat anecdotally:
On the f irs t  day of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
August of 1968, a Czech enjoying coffee and croissant at a 
border-town cafe was startled when a tank rolled by, and a 
German-speaking head popped from a tu rre t to say, 'Wir sind 
wieder da.’ Here we are again. As the Soviet Union tries to 
orchestrate worries about German reunification, it is well to 
remember that the only time since 1945 that German forces violated 
a border, they did so under Soviet orders.
But the position of Havel and Will was uncommon among both
Czechoslovak public figures and foreign observers. While a m ilitary
challenge was unlikely, another form of German threat against
Czechoslovakia was identified: economic colonisation. Already in February
1990, former dissident and Czechoslovak Ambassador to Washington Rita
Klimova declared that the opening of socialist economies to world markets
meant that:
The German-speaking parts of Europe, including Austria, 
succeeded where the Hapsburgs, H itler and Bismarck were 
unsuccessful - in Germanizing Central and Eastern Europe by 
purely peaceful and laudable methods of market economic 
development.^'*
It is necessary f irs t to establish the nature and origins of 'Germanizing'; 
then the significance of this development for Czechoslovakia’s civic  
foreign policy will be examined.
Germanization was identified through the amount of German 
investment in Czechoslovakia, its place in Czechoslovakia’s trade  
relationship and the impact that its economic position had on Czechoslovak 
society.
George F. Will, 'Surreal Talk About Germany’, The Washington Post 8 
February 1990.
Cited in Gene Kramer, 'US Urged to Help Czechoslovakia Avoid 
"Germanization"’. Associated Press, 20 February 1990.
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Foreign investment in and trade with Czechoslovakia between 1989 
and 1992 clearly manifested German dominance. More than 80 percent of 
all foreign investment in this period was German, with several major 
Czechoslovak economic concerns being purchased. The German economic 
position in Czechoslovakia was underscored by the extent of its 
investments. Volkswagen succeeded in making the largest investment in 
the post-Communist world to that time with its bid for Czechoslovakia’s 
automotive firm Skoda. The image of German domination of Czechoslovak 
industry  was heightened when Volkswagen also secured 80 percent control 
of the Slovak-based automotive enterprise BAZ.^  ^ A 1992 poll of found 80 
percent of Czechs believed that German capital generally ’had too large a 
stake in Czechoslovakia’.^ ^
In  addition to the German preeminence in investment in 
Czechoslovakia, the volume of German trade with the country vastly  
surpassed any other Western partner, both in relative and absolute terms. 
Total Czechoslovak exports in 1991 to Britain, France the US and Japan 
combined were approximately on e -fifth  of those to Austria and Germany 
and one-quarter of imports.
Not only did the scale of German investment and the predominance 
of Germany in the country ’s new trading relationships concern 
Czechoslovaks, but also the assets German business appeared to seek. 
Always sensitive to assaults on their culture,^® Czechoslovaks believed
The Financial Times, 6 March 1991.
Stephen F. Szabo, ’The New Germany and Central European Security ’, in 
John R. Lampe and Daniel N. Nelson (eds). East European Security  
Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U nivers ity  Press, 1993), pp. 35-54.
Calculated on the basis of statistics supplied in Country Profile: Czech 
Republic and Slovakia (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993), p. 32.
For dissident views during Communism, see, A. Heneka, Franitâek Janough, 
Vilem PreCan and Jan Vladislav (eds), A Beseiged Culture: Czechoslovakia Ten 
Years A fter Helsinki (Stockholm and Vienna: The Charta 77 Foundation and 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 1985).
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that a fte r 1989 Czechoslovak culture was being eroded or corrupted by 
the impact of foreign money. German money in particular was seen as 
buying Czechoslovak family heirlooms: the few precious commodities the 
dilapidated economy possessed, usually of pre-w ar age, and therefore  
irreplaceable. Cultural relics, such as the rights to castles, were being 
bought by German consortiums. Renovations of historical towns such as 
Ceskÿ Krumlov could only be afforded through the purchase of buildings 
by foreigners, typ ically  German.
German economic influence extended not simply to the acquisition of 
concrete assets but also of human resources and talent. The lure of 
money also meant a drain of Czechoslovak talent from the country. The 
Financial Times reported that Czechoslovaks saw the ir leading and most 
promising musicians accept jobs in Germany and Austria, and 
consequently feared the country would 'su ffer the same drain of music 
talent to foreign parts as in the eighteenth and nineteenth  
centuries’, w h e n  they were assimilated under the Hapsburg 
empire.^^^
Added to this was the nature of ' he German response to concern 
regarding its German economic predominance. I t  was of little  consequence 
that German analysts responded that German trade with Central European 
countries in the period under study formed a small share of Germany’s 
total foreign trade, using spurious terminology such as ’peanuts by 
American standards’. A  senior German diplomat stationed in Prague
'The New Europeans’, BBC Radio 4, 9 January 1994.
Andrew Clark, ' Czech Music a fte r the Revolution: Prague is Paying the 
Price for Years of Artistic  Stagnation’, The Financial Times, 23 February  
1991.
See A.J.P. Taylor’s comment, referenced in footnote 4.
See, for example, Rainer Eisfeld, 'M itteleuropa in Historical and 
Contemporary Perspective’ , German Politics and Society Issue 28 (1993), p. 
44.
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stated that no such thing as ’German capital’ exists, only ’international 
capital’ and he repeated that fact to Czechs. There may be logic to that 
statement in view of globalisation, but it, too, offered little  comfort to the 
Czechoslovak population.
Thus, it seemed that Germans had achieved a commanding position 
in the Czechoslovak economy, which then translated into fear of German 
political dominance. Resentment of the German neighbours in the period 
under study was occasionally expressed publicly, but became profuse 
when one asked questions. I t  also garnered coverage in foreign media.
The lack of British investment was sorely missed, a Guardian reporter  
found, but Czechoslovaks had little  choice but to accept business from 
the Germans who continue to be ’mistrusted by a population which still 
remembers their last, less prosperous and peaceful invasion’.
I f  the population was merely m istrusting, the Czechoslovak Secret 
Service was altogether alarmed. A senior officer of the Service submitted 
a report to Havel that warned that German investment constituted part of 
plan to achieve economic and political dominance over the c o u n t r y . A  
leading Czech figure , Jan Urban, who ran Civic Forum, declared in April 
1992 that Germany’s economic dominance, particu larly  in Czechoslovakia, 
presented a political challenge to European unity. In  the case that any 
type of intervention might be required to address post-Communist turmoil, 
it would be Germany, and not Europe as a whole, that would decide the 
measure.
103 The Guardian, 25 January 1991.
The Czech M inistry of the In te rio r considered the accusation groundless. 
Christian Science Monitor, 28 February-5  March 1992.
^^""Interviewed on ’Sunday Morning’, Radio Documentary ’The New Europe’, 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 4 Apr. 1992.
A chief example of German unilateral behaviour on crises in Europe 
was Bonn’s decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia without the agreement 
of the EC. See. for example, Horsley, ’United Germany’s Seven’.
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Even the pro-Castle, form erly d issident-run newspaper Lidové 
novîny  expressed concern over the flood of German investment. One 
political cartoon in the newspaper portrayed Kohl nonchalantly driving a 
Mercedes, its jaws tearing into B o h e m i a , w h i l e  another featured a 
roadsign in the shape of Czechoslovakia exclaiming 'Tshechoslowakei 
Zimmer F re i’ .^ ®^  US Ambassador to Prague Shirley Temple Black labelled 
the Germans in Czechoslovakia as ’very  aggressive’. While she conceded 
that so, too, were the Americans, the fact that German investment 
constituted, as much as e igh ty-s ix  per cent of foreign investment in the  
period under study suggests that Germany’s re lative geographic position 
and historical relationship with Czechoslovakia may have been 
decisive.
Thus, in the period under study it Germany appeared to effect an 
economic domination of Czechoslovakia, and consequently was seen by 
many Czechoslovaks and foreigners as having a concomitantly large  
political influence over the country.
This result presented two ironies for Czechoslovakia’s civic foreign  
policy. F irst, the economic element of thai civic foreign policy was 
responsible for allowing private capital into the country. The 
Czechoslovak government, particularly in the form of its Finance Minister, 
recognised the imperative of private foreign investment to assist the 
transition to a market economy. But even Havel, who rejected  
commercialism and overconsumption and specified that he did not want
Lidové novîny, 31 January 1992.
Lidové novîny, 18 October 1990.
lOH chrîstîan Scîence Monîtor, 28 February-M arch 5 1992.
109 jp rn n to  S tar, 23 F e b ru a ry  1992.
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such features in post-Communist Czechoslovak society, came out clearly in 
favour of a market econom y/
Germany achieved its preeminence over Czechoslovakia through  
peaceable means and civic, non-governmental actors, ra th er than through  
the use of force or weapons. This confirmed the dissident conception that 
substantive change can occur without resort to force. But it also created 
a result which the Czechoslovak leadership did not expect or desire.
The second irony was that those who argued that a German 
colonisation of Czechoslovakia was occurring explained it in terms of an 
inescapable historical pattern. This reasoning contradicted the  
Czechoslovak dissident th inking  that free will could surmount historical 
and systemic patterns.
Even if one accepts that from 1990 to 1992, Germany achieved an 
economic, and by extension, political domination of Czechoslovakia, 
developments thereafter suggest that if German 'domination’ was indeed 
an historically preordained pattern, that pattern has not reoccurred. And 
such an argument would vindicate Czechoslovakia’s civic foreign policy. It  
is therefore necessary to assess b rie fly  some of the factors aiding  
Germany’s economic predominance over Czechoslovakia.
First, German investors were often deliberately aided by 
Czechoslovak government officials who spoke as if  the Germans were 
preordained to have economic success in Czechoslovakia. For example. 
Prime Minister Calfa^^^ explained to the French publication La Tribune
This is not an obvious conclusion as Czechoslovak decision-makers were 
split on whether to adopt fu ll m arket-reform s or to engage in a gradual 
reform which retained features of the socialist economy. The former position 
was personified by Klaus, the la tte r by Deputy Prime Minister Valtr Komarek. 
For a brief discussion, see Wheaton and Kavan, Velvet Revolution, pp. 162-3. 
Havel’s position on economic reform is given in Letn i pTemitam, pp. 44-60, 
esp. p. 48.
All of the Czechoslovaks interviewed regarding this issue were adamant 
that Calfa had little  to do with the Skoda deal and in general little  
responsibility for foreign investment. Nevertheless, he made this statement
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de l'Expansion that one reason for his support for the bid for Skoda by 
Volkswagen over Renault-Volvo was 'that the Germans are our 
neigh hours’. German radio also reported Calfa stating that German 
businesspeople knew the Czechoslovak mentality better than others.
Even though previous business experience in Czechoslovakia may have 
given German investors an advantage in investing in Czechoslovakia, 
Czechoslovak officials such as Calfa still encouraged German investors and 
seemed even to contribute to the sense of a preordained outcome.
The German economic success can also be accorded to e ffo rt and 
strategy, ra ther than historical pattern. Germans, unlike other investors, 
seemed to approach the post-Communist Czechoslovak economy with 
vigour. When Kohl made official state visits to post-Communist 
Czechoslovakia he came with German business representatives. By 
contrast, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited Prague 
unaccompanied by British investors. In addition, she blamed the lack of 
British investment on the Czechoslovak government for having not created  
the appropriate conditions and told the leading Czech newspaper that no 
investment would be forthcoming until the features of the command 
economy had been dismantled entire ly and firms could conduct business 
for t h e m s e l v e s . T h e  British had opportunities to become involved, 
and occasionally did so.^^  ^ The large British construction company
and it has been cited in numerous Western newspapers and studies, thereby  
contributed, perhaps incorrectly, to the notion of the inevitab ility  of German 
economic dominance.
Cited in Harry Hanak, 'Czechoslovak History in Great B rita in ’, Bohemia 
Vol. 32, \o . 1 (1991), p. 100.
Hamburg DPA, 27 November 1990, in FBIS, 29 November 1990, pp. 23-4.
Handelsblatt, 28 November 1990, in FBIS, 29 November 1990.
Lidové noviny, 18 September 1990.
For example, BREL signed a cooperation agreement with CKD, the world’s 
largest tram manufacturer. The Financial Times, 3 May 1990.
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Bovis, responsible for such projects as Eurodisney, is chaired by Czech- 
born Frank Lamp!. In  July 1990 the company established a Czechoslovak 
subsidiary Bovis Czechoslovakia/^^ The legacy of the command economy 
obviously did not deter other foreign investors from Czechoslovakia.
Thus, economic success in the country must be at least partia lly  
attribu tab le  to in itiative rather than systemic forces.
The Czechoslovak leadership responded to the German economic 
prowess. While most leading Czechoslovak officials declared that 
investment had to occur without political restra in t, they also 
cautioned against overinvestment by one country. For example, Havel said 
'Czechoslovakia should not pursue a policy of economic orientation to a 
single country. I t  has already learned a b itte r lesson in this respect. And 
if a great, unified and developed Germany as our biggest neighbour 
substantially penetrates our market, then it should be continuously offset 
by intensifying economic relations with various other countries’.
Eve if it cannot be said that business pursues political interests. 
Czechoslovak representatives engaged in what can only be seen as a 
campaign to alert foreign business and political circles to the extent of 
German investment. A leading example of this was Klimova’s warning cited 
earlier. I t  is remarkable that she made the statement as early as 
February 1990, before statistics on foreign investment and trade could 
really be offered. Dienstbier stated that if  other countries were concerned 
about the German position in Czechoslovakia, they should invest
1 1 7 The Financial Times, 28-29 July 1990.
For example, Petr P ithart said of the Skoda deal, 'In  this country matters 
were solved politically for too long. We cannot afford to do this; we had to 
opt for a clearly more economically advantageous o ffe r’. Christian Science 
Monitor, 25-31 January 1991.
Cited in  The Dally Telegraph, 17 Septem ber 1990.
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themselves. P ithart, on a state visit to Canada, also noted foreign concern 
over the German presence.
The success of German business in Czechoslovakia had an effect on 
at least some prospective investing firms. For example, illustra tive  of this 
was the French response to their unsuccessful bid for Skoda. As the main 
Czechoslovak economic newspaper, Hospodâî'ské noviny, wrote of the 
planned cooperation by the French food conglomerate BSN with  
Cokoladovnÿ, the ’French take seriously the ir defeat in the contest for 
the Skoda car facto ry ’ and that the new move ’is a certain satisfaction  
for them’.^ ^^
While Germans led in the amount of investment, d iversification  
nevertheless occurred. Despite its reports noting Czechoslovak regret of 
the paucity of British investment, the British media also reported that 
Czechoslovakia selected foreign aid and advice. The Independent 
commented that ’pragmatism can also be seen in the way Czechoslovakia 
selects what advice to take from where. For instance, the Prague 
authorities are going to Paris, not London, for suggestions on how to run  
a capital c ity ’. A Czechoslovak official pronounced ’There is no shortage 
of advice. W'e pick and choose. France has been particu larly  helpful on 
banking matters, American on taxation....Britain is crucial in helping with 
privatisation’.
While diversification occurred, Germany’s share of foreign  
investment also fell, so that in 1993, American foreign investment 
substantially exceed German, although the total volume of foreign  
investment fell.^^^ In  addition, even though Germany was the most
RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, 19 July 1991, p. 45. 
Hospodâhské noviny, 23 April 1991.
The Independent, 17 September 1990.
Business Central Europe (April 1994), p. 38.
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prominent of Czechoslovakia’s Western trad ing partners, its share was 
comparable to that of the Soviet Union.
Finally, it is conceivable that larger economic pressures might 
regulate against fu tu re  German economic influence in the region. As the 
politicised trading structures of the Cold War recede and the former 
socialist economies in tegrate into the General Agreement on Tariffs  and 
Trade and sign agreements liberalising the ir trade with the European 
Community, Germany’s opportunity to impose discrim inatory or preferential 
trade policies on Central Europe will diminish.
Had this study s tric tly  limited itself to 1992, it would have had to 
concur with the assessment that post-Communist Czechoslovakia was being 
Germanised. That conclusion, in tu rn , would support the contention, that 
once the ’unnatura l’ economic orientation of Czechoslovakia to the East 
had been broken a fte r 1989, the country would be preordained to face 
German domination.
In  fact, evidence suggests that these patterns are not necessarily 
predetermined and unalterable. Even if the cost and opportunity of 
rebuilding East Germany tem porarily distracted German finance from 
Central Europe, the Czechoslovak leadership used the apparent threat of 
’Germanisation’ to spur other investors. The result was a diversification  
of foreign investment and ownership. The post-Communist Czechoslovak 
government deliberately undertook to open its borders to foreign  
influences, including and perhaps even foremost, economic ones.
This section argues that statements which suggested that post- 
Communist Czechoslovakia was being ’Germanised’ were made without 
perspective of time or proper analytical context. I t  does not dispute that
Country Profile, p. 32.
Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., ’German Trade Policy in Eastern Europe, 
1890-1990: Preconditions for Applying In ternational Trade Leverage’,
International Organization Vol. 54, No. 3 (Summer 1991), p. 368.
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German finance succeeded better than any other Western competitor or 
that it had significant impact on Czechoslovak society. But it indicates 
that this process occurred in particular circumstances which may have 
temporarily favoured German business. The thesis therefore rejects the  
notion that the German economic dominance was the consequence of 
historical patterns. The thesis also acknowledges the irony that by 
opening the country’s fron tiers  and seeking private capital, 
Czechoslovakia’s civic foreign policy, provided the conditions suitable to 
German economic success. Nevertheless, Czechoslovak leaders must be 
considered successful in the ir subsequent use of the German economic 
position in Czechoslovakia to stimulate other investment and thereby  
hence the development of civil society.
That Havel’s relations with Germany can be said to have begun even 
before he was President indicates the importance of that country to 
Czechoslovak history and post-Communist politics. The civic nature of his 
politics was manifest in this policy: politics could only be conducted on 
the basis of decency and morality and if  a perceived historical in justice  
prevented that course, it had to be rectified.
There is little  evidence to suggest that any other motivation lay 
behind the apology; certain ly German policy towards Czechoslovakia 
manifested itself no d iffe ren tly  as a result of the apology. The suggestion 
made by numerous observers that Havel made the apology to gain favour 
with Germany, particu larly  in terms of support for EC and NATO 
membership, is unsubstantiable for several reasons.
F irs t, as will be discussed in chapter 7, for the f irs t  few months of 
post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign policy, there was confusion over 
which European institutions should continue, in what form and how they  
were to be interrelated. This is not to suggest that Havel ever believed
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the EC would not continue to exist or that he discounted Czechoslovak 
membership. Certainly the Czechoslovak position on NATO evolved over 
time. The assertion of a plan to enter these organisations by appealing to 
German sentiment gives too much credit to a clear Czechoslovak position 
on European institutions. Nevertheless, the Treaty on Good 
Neighbourliness pledged German support for Czechoslovak en try  into the  
EC.
Second, while the apology undoubtedly demonstrated the moral basis 
of Havel’s politics, it was counterproductive both in domestic politics and 
in relations with Germany. The domestic s trife  that arose from the 
apology, and its legal extension in the Treaty, were substantial. I t  also 
called into question the extent to which public opinion, even if  misguided, 
was deliberately ignored in the process. On the German side, the apology 
encouraged Sudeten German demands.
Third, there is little  evidence to suggest that German policy 
towards Czechoslovakia would have d iffered greatly without the apology. 
This chapter suggested earlier that German officials believe th e ir country  
to have a special role in and towards Central and Eastern Europe. 
Irrespective  of its form, th e ir involvement would therefore have 
continued, and all the more a fte r the collapse of East European 
communism. Germany saw itse lf as Western Europe’s frontline  against 
instability  emanating from the East. Therefore, Germany had at least as 
strong a desire as Poland or Czechoslovakia to stabilise Central Europe, 
and the logical way to do that was through the cou ntry ’s fu ll integration  
in major European institutions.
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CHAPTER 5
GEOPOLITICS, IDEALISM, THE SOVIET UNION AND 
THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANISATION
In  the same way that Czechoslovakia’s post-Communist leadership believed 
relations with Germany had to be made on a moral basis, so too did it 
view relations with the Soviet Union. Havel apologised to Germany for a 
perceived historical wrong. In  relations with the Soviet Union, the 
apology was to Czechoslovakia for the invasion of 1968. Thereafter, the  
Czechoslovak leadership expected that relations with Moscow would be new 
and based on a code of morality and equality. In itia lly , as with Germany, 
geopolitical considerations in dealings with the Soviet Union were taken  
by Havel to be minimal.
While Havel expected that humanist values could aid relations with 
the Soviet Union, his government nevertheless was attentive to changes 
in Soviet domestic and foreign policy and constructed appropriate  
responses.
Soviet influence had constituted a major feature of Czechoslovak 
political life since 1948; it did not. however, r iva l the historical and 
organic significance of Germany. The extent of Soviet influence on post- 
Communist Czechoslovak foreign policy was determined by four legacies: 
institutional controls, strategic requirem ents, energy, and historical 
relations. The chapter considers how the post-Communist Czechoslovak 
leadership viewed the limitations that the Soviet Union might have 
imposed on Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy, and Havel’s efforts to extend 
humanist values to relations with the Soviet Union.
The chapter then examines the negotiations for Soviet troop 
withdrawals as an example of the ab ility  of Czechoslovakia to achieve its 
objectives in its relations with the Soviet Union. The July 1990 oil crisis 
illustrated how the Czechoslovak leadership reacted to a potential
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vulnerab ility . Czechoslovak-Soviet relations a fte r the coup of August 1991 
and the disintegration of the USSR are then briefly  considered.
Finally, the chapter considers Czechoslovak policy towards the 
Warsaw Treaty  Organization (WTO) and how developments inside the Soviet 
Union resulted in Havel’s government seeking the Organisation’s 
disbandment.
THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET RELATIONS
The immense size of the Soviet Union alone meant that it  could not be 
ignored by Central Europe. The end of Soviet dominance a fte r the 1989 
revolutions was as much the result of the Soviet inab ility  to retain  
control of the region as of any in itiatives arising from those countries. 
Nevertheless, Gorbachev allowed the Revolutions to occur. Not only did he 
open the parameters of debate in the socialist bloc, but he also denied 
the use of Soviet forces to crush protests in East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia. ^
But did Gorbachev’s pre-Revolution policies give the post-Communist 
Czechoslovak government cause to view any d iffe ren tly  the possibility of 
inherent Soviet strengths in the region? This section considers the extent 
to which Czechoslovak foreign policy decisions could be said to have been 
constrained by the Soviet Union in order to contextualise the post- 
Communist Czechoslovak leadership’s in itia l minimisation of Soviet 
geopolitical influence over the country.
The Soviet Union of 1989 was very  d ifferen t from the one of 1991, 
with its vast size and immense natural and human resources still intact. 
While such attributes contributed to the projection of Soviet power into
 ^ For lite ra tu re  on Gorbachev’s role in the 1989 revolutions, see 
bibliography, part 7.
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Eastern Europe, the limitations imposed on Czechoslovak foreign policy by 
the Soviet Union came more from constructed institutions than from an 
inexorable sense of being locked into conflict, as was Czechoslovakia’s 
historical experience with Germany.
Institutional Controls
The Soviet Union possessed resources which, when combined with the  
historical opportunity provided at the end of the Second World War, 
furnished the basis for control of Central Europe. The Soviet Union, 
however, institutionalised its power. As Stalin revealed to Yugoslav 
Communist Milo van Djilas, ’This war is not as in the past; whoever 
occupies a te rr ito ry  also imposes his own system as fa r as his army can 
reach’. ^
The Soviet system was imposed in the East European countries by 
means of two reinforcing sets of structures. The f irs t  was the replication  
in each polity of the Soviet system of rule, characterised by the  
supremacy of the Communist Party and the practical control of the  
economy, media and instruments of coercion, minimising or even 
eliminating indigenous competition to Communist rule.^ The second set of 
structures were bilateral or multilateral links which sought to ensure 
Soviet dominance over the ideological, economic and security policies 
pursued by the East European regimes.
The most visible form of Soviet control in Eastern Europe was the  
presence of its soldiers. At the time of the 1989 Revolutions, over 500,000 
Soviet troops were deployed in East Germany, Hungary, Poland and
 ^ Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin  (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc.. 1962), p. 114.
 ^ See chapter 2.
 ^ See bibliography, part 3
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Czechoslovakia, and control of key domestic apparatuses were widely 
believed to be held by the Soviets. East European m ilitary in frastructures  
were gradually converted to Soviet control, a process culminating in the 
establishment of the WTO in 1955.
As the West imposed a trade embargo on Soviet-controlled Eastern  
Europe in the later 1940s, the Soviet Union, ’using political pressure, 
succeeded in decreasing East-West trade to a trick le , and in d iverting  
East European trade in an easterly direction’. The redirection of trade led 
to the establishment of the CMEA in 1949.  ^ A fter the Prague Spring, the 
CMEA became more a ttrac tive  to Moscow as an instrum ent of control, since 
the Soviet leadership believed the institution to be ’an effective means of 
alliance management’.®
The engineering of economic relations w ithin the Soviet bloc meant 
that a fte r the 1989 Revolutions ’the Soviet Union was still a pervasive  
economic force in Eastern Europe’. In  addition to the Soviet supply of 
energy, the Soviet Union was a substantial outlet market for East 
European agricu ltu ra l produce and manufactured goods. Therefore, 
regardless of leadership perceptions, these factors should have been 
’more than sufficient reasons for apprehension in Warsaw, Prague and 
Budapest’ .^  Thus while size and resources allowed for Soviet power 
projection into Central Europe, control over Czechoslovakia was exerted  
more through institutions than geographic condition with the exception of 
energy. This is borne out by a discussion of Soviet perceptions of 
Czechoslovakia’s strategic value and of historical relations.
® Andrzej Korbonski, ’Detente, East-West Trade, and the Future of Economic 
In tegration  in Eastern Europe’, World Politics Vol. X X V III, No. 4 (July 1976), 
p. 572.
® Peter Marsh, ’The In tegration  Process in Eastern Europe 1968 to 1975’, 
Journal o f Common Market Studies Vol. 14 No. 4 (June 1976), p. 315.
' Rudolf L. Tôkés, ’From the Visegrad to Krakow: Coup, Competition, and 
Coexistence’, Problems of Communism Vol. XL, No. 6 (Novemher-Decemher 
1991), pp. 106-07.
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strateg ic  Value
Ail of Eastern Europe was strategically valuable to the Soviet Union afte r  
the Second World War. An overview of Western and Soviet lite ra tu re  
suggests that East Germany was the greatest political prize of the Second 
World War and also, because of its forward position in the bloc, the most 
important strategic gain.® Poland, however, has usually been considered 
even more important. Invaded often by or through Poland, Russia, and 
then the Soviet Union, wanted that te rr ito ry  to be politically trustw orthy.
Czechoslovakia was also considered by the Soviet Union to be 
strategically important, but not to the same degree as Poland. Dawisha 
states categorically that Czechoslovakia had the same geopolitical 
importance to the Soviet Union as Poland, but later suggests that Poland 
alone held that privilege.® Within the overall context of the Cold War and 
the structure  of the Warsaw Pact, however, Czechoslovakia was 
significant. I t  bordered on the two Germanies, and it was the supply link 
between the three northern tie r WTO countries as well as with Hungary of 
the southern tier.^® I t  did not have strategic value in its own rig h t, 
however, as East Germany and Poland did: its importance was only 
relative to the Soviet Union’s standing in the region as a whole.
In  his Pravda  explanation for the m ilitary action in 1968, Soviet 
Marshall Ivan S. Konev cited Bismarck’s adage T h e  Master of Bohemia is
® For example, Christopher D. Jones, writes 'East Germany was always the  
key Soviet position in Europe’. 'Gorbachev and the Warsaw Pact,’ East 
European Politics and Societies Vol. 3, No. 2 (1989), pp. 215-34.
® Karen Dawisha, Gorbachev, Eastern Europe and Reform (2nd edn) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge U n ivers ity  Press, 1990), p. 25.
Christopher D. Jones, Soviet In fluence in Eastern Europe: Political 
Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (Brookyln: Praeger, 1981); A. Ross Johnson, 
Robert W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev East European M ilitary  Establishments: 
The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier (New York: Crane Russak, 1982); and Volgyes, 
Political Reliability.
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the Master of Europe’. D u r i n g  the Prague Spring, reformist doctrine  
was altered to conform to 'geopolitical ra th er than ideological 
considerations’/^  suggesting th a t the Dubfcek government believed the  
Soviet Union to be more concerned with the country ’s location than with 
the danger of ideological revisionism spreading within the bloc. While 
strategic concerns certa in ly  were a motivation for the intervention, they  
seem only secondary. Fear of allowing a competing form of socialism to 
take root in the bloc and its implications for various leaders and groups 
within the Soviet Union and the bloc as a whole are regu larly  cited as 
more important reasons for the invasion.
Energy Supply
As shall be seen, the security and trading structures created by the 
Soviet Union in Central Europe did not prove inalterable legacies; the  
region’s reliance on Soviet energy, however, was more enduring. While 
boasting areas of agricu ltu ra l wealth. Central Europe generally lacks 
energy reserves of its own, and in particular has no significant oil and 
gas r e s e r v e s . T h e  only indigenous energy supply -  other than  
Czechoslovakia’s small uranium deposits -  is lignite, expensive to extract 
and process, low in energ y-y ie ld , and now acknowledged as 
environm entally and medically harmful. The Soviet Union was of course
Pravda, 23 August 1968, cited in Josef Kalvoda, Czechoslovakia in Soviet 
Strategy  (Washington: U n ivers ity  Press of America, 1979), p. 1.
Johnson, et al, East European M ilitary, p. 118.
Skilling, In te rru p ted  Revolution. Ideological concerns are also given 
prio rity  in Karen Dawisha, The Kremlin and the Prague Spring  (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984). For the implications of ideological 
diversity , see especially Valenta, Soviet Intervention; and Hod nett and 
Potichnyj, Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis.
Poland and Romania have small amounts of th e ir own energy supplies. 
Korbonski, 'Detente’, p. 573.
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Czechoslovakia’s largest trading partner and of Soviet exports to 
Czechoslovakia in 1984, seventy-eight percent was raw materials and 
energy. The Czechoslovak economic programme for 1986-90, which aimed to 
red irect s lightly  the country’s predominant trad ing relationship with 
CMEA countries, s till envisioned the USSR furn ish ing all of 
Czechoslovakia’s crude oil, natural gas, ammonia and methanol. In  the  
year of the Velvet Revolution, the Soviet Union supplied Czechoslovakia 
with over half of its energy and raw materials.
The d istribution of resources meant that political freedom did not 
release Czechoslovakia from dependence on the Soviet Union. In  the 1980s, 
the East European countries, with possible ind irect encouragement from  
Moscow, sought oil from outside the bloc,^^ with the consequence that 
they became vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market or to political 
developments in oil-producing regions. This was demonstrated in 1990 
when, save Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia was the most adversely affected  
among former Soviet satellites by changes in world oil prices resulting  
from the Ira q i occupation of Kuwait. With oil priced at $30 per barrel, 
almost all Czechoslovakia’s hard currency earnings would have been 
depleted buying subsistence quantities of oil on the open market. 
Czechoslovakia stood to loose £2 billion in loans, credits and delivered  
goods to Iraq  with the onset of sanctions and the Gulf War.^^ With
Carl H. McMillan, ’Soviet Efforts to Restructure the CMEA: The Case of 
Regional Energy Relations’, in Aurel Braun (ed.), The Soviet-East European 
Relationship in the Gorbachev Era (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 26-46; and 
Planované hospodafstvi, 2 (1986), pp. 43-8, in JPRS-EER, 29 May 1986, cited 
in Wolchik, Czechoslovakia, p. 262.
’Report of the Federal Statistical Office on Socioeconomic Development in 
1989’, Statistika, 4 (April 4, 1990), in JPRS-EER, 15 June 1990, cited in 
Wolchik, Czechoslovakia, p. 262.
McMillan, ’Soviet E ffo rts ’.
Peter Martin, ’The Oil Crisis and Prospects for Foreign Trade’, Report on 
Eastern  Europe Vol. 1, No. 35 (31 August 1990), pp. 6-9; and Marvin Jackson, 
'The Impact of the Gulf Crisis on the Economies of Eastern Europe’, ibid., 
pp. 40-45.
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respect to energy supply, geographic circumstances made Czechoslovakia 
dependent on the Soviet Union. Political contingencies served to 
exacerbate that relationship.
Historical Relations
Although the Soviet Union itse lf possessed such latent power, its  
historical influence over Czechoslovakia was limited. Unlike in its relations 
with Germany which, as was argued in chapter 4, actually shaped the 
Czechoslovak identity, Russia and the Soviet Union have played a 
re la tive ly  small role in the cou ntry ’s development. Of all the Slavs, 
Russians have had the least contact with Czechs and Slovaks.
Karel Kramaf, co-founder of the Czechoslovak state, believed that 
the country owed its existence to Russia. His National Democratic Party  
maintained that as a Slavonic state Czechoslovakia was natura lly  to tend 
toward Russia and Czechoslovakia was to base its foreign policy on Russia 
(albeit non-Bolshevik) and not on the League of Nations (a position at 
odds with Masaryk and BeneS).^°
Despite his importance in p re - and early-Czechoslovak h istory, 
Kramaf’s view on Czechoslovakia’s ties and obligations to Russia was in 
the minority. Masaryk’s study of Russian th inking was regarded as the  
most authorita tive in the West to the 1940s, an in terest which contributed  
to the establishment of premier research facilities in Prague in the  
in terw ar years. However, Czechoslovak state-sponsored research on Russia 
was secondary to research on Slavs as a whole, with concentration on
19 Dawisha, Eastern Europe, p. 12.
Hans Lemberg, ’Masaryk and the Russian Question against the Background 
of German and Czech Attitudes to Russia,’ in Stanley B. Winters (ed.), T.G. 
Masaryk (1850-1937) Volume 1 Thinker and Politician  Basingstoke and London; 
Macmillan in association with the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, U niversity of London), p. 293.
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West and South S la v s .P re -C o m m u n is t Czechoslovakia’s experience with 
the Soviet Union was generally positive, particu larly  in contrast to that 
of Poland.
Only insofar as the Soviet Union was able to maintain institutional 
control over Czechoslovakia did it have an impact. The only non- 
institutional control it possessed was energy; other forms of control -  
trade, m ilitary presence, international organisations - had little  historical 
legacy. Being constructed, they could be, and were, eventually dismantled, 
Even in cu ltural relations, where Havel, perhaps as a manifestation of his 
humanist vision of relations, said that Russian cu lture had an important 
part to play in contemporary Czechoslovak society, Russian presence, let 
alone ’influence’, disappeared.^^ Objectively, it would seem that 
Czechoslovakia had few inexorable links to the Soviet Union. Did the  
perception of the post-Communist Czechoslovak leadership concur with 
objective reality?
CIVIC RELATIONS AND GEOPOLITICS IN POST-COMMUNIST 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA’S APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION
Since Soviet influence over Czechoslovakia was largely based on 
constructed control mechanisms ra ther than geographic contingencies, it 
is not surprising to find that the post-Communist Czechoslovak leadership 
discounted, at least in itia lly , Soviet ’influence’.
This view, however, did not come as much from a geopolitical 
calculation of Soviet power in Central Europe as from the Czechoslovak 
dissident belief in humanist values. Despite the animosity Czechoslovaks
Ib id., pp. 287 and 295.
For a brie f comparison, see Joseph Rothschild, Return to D ivers ity  (2nd 
edn) (Oxford: Oxford U n ivers ity  Press, 1993), p. 89.
Fawn, ’Central Europe’, pp. 73-4.
206
may have fe lt towards the USSR for the 1968 m ilitary intervention, the 
Czechoslovak leadership sought to include the Soviet Union in the family 
of democratic, European nations.
Havel seemed satisfied that once Moscow had apologised in December 
1989 for the 1968 intervention, relations between the two countries would 
be equal. Dienstbier concurred in a New Year’s address, stating that 
Czechoslovak and Soviet foreign policies had become ’much closer’ than  
they had been and affirm ed that ’the curren t Soviet policy acknowledges 
and respects Czechoslovak independence and sovereignty’.^ "^  While Havel 
said that the invasion would still be remembered, it was ’becoming 
h isto ry ’ and ’would no longer dominate life ’. He called on both countries 
to look to ’a jo in t fu tu re ’.
As evidence of such th inking, Havel made personal overtures to 
Gorbachev. When they met in Moscow in February 1990, Havel produced a 
peacepipe given to him by native Americans. He suggested that the two 
men smoke from it. Havel’s symbolic and personal overture  failed, 
however, when Gorbachev said that he did not smoke. At the very least, 
as SaSa Vondra recounted, this showed ihat Gorbachev had no sense of 
h u m o u r . I t  also demonstrated that, in order to effective, Havel’s values 
had to be shared by the interlocutor.
Havel was therefore cautious in assessing to what extent his 
humanist values were present in Czechoslovak-Soviet relations. In  March 
1990, he compared them to those in an enterprise, in which ’equal and 
friend ly  relations hardly ever develop between the boss and his 
employees’. But his idealism was visible in his belief that th e ir prior
2 4 Prague International Service, 1 January 1990, in FBIS, 2 January 1990. 
Die Welt 10 March 1990, in FBIS, 12 March 1990.
I am gratefu l to SaSa Vondra for sharing this anecdote. Interview , 
September 1994.
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relations had changed, and that the two countries had become 'equal 
partners ’.
For all the Czechoslovak leadership’s effo rts  to extend humanist 
values to relations with the Soviet Union, it was also cautious. The 
Czechoslovak leadership believed that totalitarianism would not be 
defeated until all of its features were removed. While Czechoslovak 
dissidents recognised Gorbachev’s role in perm itting the 1989 revolutions, 
they were also conscious that, regardless of his personal intentions, he 
was forced to operate w ithin the confines of the Soviet regime.
The Czechoslovak leadership showed itse lf capable of responding to 
the Soviet Union in at least two ways. The f irs t  was symbolic, in keeping 
with dissident practice. Havel emphasised civic solidarity and made 
implicit reference to historical wrongs. During his v is it to Moscow, he 
proposed an exchange of parliamentary delegations, including Dubfcek, as 
if to reverse the humiliation of his previous, humiliating visits to Moscow. 
Havel praised deceased Soviet dissident Andrei S a k h a r o v , p l a c e d  
flowers on his tomb and met with his wife Elena Bonner. Sakharov and 
Bonner had both supported Czechoslovak dissidents during Communism. 
Havel invited Bonner and other Soviet dissidents to Wenceslas Square for 
ceremonies marking the crushing of the Prague S p r i n g . I n  Prague, he 
attended a ceremony changing the name of Red Army Square, where 
Soviet liberators of Prague were apparently buried (even though no 
Soviet soldiers are known to have died in the operation) to Jan Palach 
Square, honouring the philosophy student’s self-immolation in January  
1969.
Die Welt 10 March 1990, in FBIS, 12 March 1990. 
In ternational Herald Tribune, 28 February 1990. 
Le Monde, 1 March 1990.
The Times, 17 Janu a ry  1990.
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Havel appointed Rudolf Slânskÿ as ambassador to the Soviet Union. 
Slânskÿ’s father was the leading victim of the Stalinist show tria ls  in 
Czechoslovakia. Havel called the appointment ’exactly in my symbolic and 
metaphoric way of political th in k ing ’.
The second feature of Havel’s policy towards the Soviet Union was 
practical, seeking the elimination of remaining Soviet mechanisms of 
interference, foremost the Soviet garrisons based in Czechoslovakia. The 
new leadership expressed with understatement these objectives in the 
foreign policy section of Civic Forum’s 25 November 7 -point plan: 
'Maintaining our sovereignty as a state, we nevertheless wish to revise  
agreements that were inspired by the unreasonable ambitions of the  
leading representatives of the state’. N o t  naming the Soviet Union 
explicitly for the 'agreements’ which Civic Forum wanted revised - 
namely, stationing Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia - and instead blaming 
indigenous Co mm un i s t s ,w a s  part of Havel’s humanist and conciliatory  
approach to Moscow. His view of the Soviet Union was loosely similar to 
his need to redefine Czechoslovak-German relations with an admission of 
Czech guilt. The idea of extending a form of justice to the Soviet Union, 
especially by including it in the European family of nations, and the  
belief that factors of power politics would not inh ib it this, constituted  
important elements of Havel’s and Dienstbier’s programme. One motivation 
for their attitude may have been Gorbachev’s policies.
International Herald Tribune, 14 February 1990. Dienstbier, however, 
denied that there was any symbolic value. See Rick Fawn, 'Symbolism in the  
Diplomacy of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel’, Paper presented to the  
20th Annual BISA Conference, U niversity of Southampton, 18-20 December 
19951 p. 6.
32 See the original reproduced in Bradley, Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution.
This can be an extension of Havel’s emphasis on personal responsibility. 
Chapter 2 considered, for example, how Havel fe lt that DubCek accepted 
insufficient responsibility for the 1968 outcome.
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The legacy  of Gorbachev’s East European Policy on Post-1989 
Czechoslovak Foreign Policy
The a rriv a l of a new head of the Politburo in March 1985 signalled the  
potential for policy change. Of a d ifferen t generation, trained as a lawyer, 
and seen as the acolyte of the prototype reformer Andropov, Gorbachev’s 
views on Eastern Europe suggested the s tart of a new policy line. He 
pre-empted speculation in an important earlier speech in which he 
considered the strengthening of bloc relations to be his f irs t  
commandment.^"^
Nevertheless, by 1987 and 1988, Gorbachev had indicated that
individual socialist states both could and had to confront th e ir own
particular problems in a ’national’ way. Czechoslovak dissidents remained
sceptical of Gorbachev. For example, towards the end of this period,
Jaroslav Sabata figu ra tive ly  challenged Gorbachev:
Before anything else can happen, the Soviets must withdraw their  
troops from East Germany as well as from other [socialist bloc] 
countries. I t  is necessary to understand this step as an act desired 
to pave the way for s tructura l political change. A fter all, the Soviet 
Union keeps nineteen divisions in East Germany. The disastrous 
political state of Central Europe is common knowledge. Is this not a 
situation which calls for a unilateral in itia tive  from the East?^^
While Gorbachev may not have enacted policies that satisfied Sabata,
he permitted the 1989 revolutions. Three weeks before the Velvet
Revolution, Soviet policy explicitly replaced the res tric tive  Brezhnev
Doctrine with the ’Sinatra Doctrine’, allowing each country to pursue its
Pravda, 15 March 1985. Debate r ig h tly  surrounds Gorbachev’s intentions 
towards Eastern Europe. See, bibliography, part 3 for works on Soviet-East 
European relations under Gorbachev.
For a categorisation of how Gorbachev’s policies towards Eastern 
Europe evolved, see Alex Pravda, ’Soviet Policy Towards Eastern Europe in 
Transition’, in Alex Pravda (ed.). The End o f Outer Empire: Soviet-East 
European Relations in Transition, 1985-90 (London: Sage for RIIA, 1992), pp. 
1-34.
Sabata, ’New Form of Detente’ , p. 99.
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own path.^^ Soviet complicity in the Velvet Revolution may have been 
subtly symbolised by the laying of a wreath by two uniformed Soviet 
soldiers at the site of the police clubbings of student protestors along 
National Boulevard.'^"
In  the face of the 1989 Revolutions, the Soviet leadership faced two 
options. The firs t  would have involved hostile responses in rhetoric and 
possibly in action; the second would have been general acceptance. 
Probably the most liberal of the Soviet leaders, Shevardnadze defended 
the events in Eastern E u r o p e . H e  referred  to 'common human ideas of 
equality, freedom, people’s power and democracy’ and denounced the use 
and fu tility  of violence, as demonstrated in Afghanistan.^® Shevardnadze  
may have been too atypical of the Soviet leadership to reassure  
Czechoslovak officials. For at least the f irs t  half of 1990 they suspected 
Soviet meddling in domestic affa irs, and even of a KGB coup against 
Havel.
For example, in mid-May 1990, three weeks before the f irs t  fu lly -  
contested parliamentary elections. Civic Forum warned of a 'pre-election  
smear campaign aimed at discrediting the political system’ including even 
Havel. Jan Urban blamed the SIB and suggested that it was aided by the  
KGB.^® Even as late as September 1990, Deputy In te rio r Minister Ruml 
said that the KGB continued to operate in Czechoslovakia through
The Times, 26 October 1989. (S inatra’s song 'I did it my way’ also refers  
to the 'final curta in ’ ).
In terpretations of the significance are from students.
One theory suggested that the Soviet Union engineered the Revolution 
and sought to place a reform ist Communist in power, probably Gorbachev’s 
University friend Zden&k Mlynaf. A Czechoslovak Parliam entary Commission 
discounted the scenario. See Jan Obrman, 'November 17, 1989 - Attempted 
Coup or the Start of a Popular Revolution?’, Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 
1. No. 27 (6 July 1990), pp. 4-10.
Pravda, 'Soviet Policy’, p. 29.
Pravda, 26 June 1990.
The Independent, 19 May 1990.
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Czechoslovak citizens in locations from where Soviet troops were being 
w ithdraw n/^ Nevertheless, such suspicions rested on the residue of 
institutional connections and on certain Czechoslovaks, ra th er than on any 
in terpretation  by the leadership of limitations imposed on th e ir  freedom of 
action by any organic Soviet geopolitical influence.
Whatever the role Gorbachev’s policy toward Eastern Europe placed 
in shaping the Czechoslovak leadership’s view of the Soviet Union, its 
benign perception of that country could have been motivated by three  
other possible reasons, two ’idealist’ , and the th ird  s tric tly  practical.
One was the nature of the dissidents. They had endured conditions 
that the rest of the population, especially the apparently passive but 
self -p reserv ing  Czechoslovaks, simply accepted despite moral and other 
costs. Thus, the seemingly impossible was possible. Havel’s ’The Power of 
the Powerless’, the banner of the dissident movement, marked the 
requisites and possibilities for the underdog, at least in terms of ’t ru th ’, 
to trium ph. In  the sense th a t elements of power do not stand in the way 
of the dissidents’s aim of achieving universal values of tru th  and 
equality, these considerations can be called ’idealist’.
The second reason is, in his dealings with Germany, Havel was 
motivated by the belief that countries behave on the basis of universal 
codes of decency. As shown earlier, such a policy did not prevent Havel 
from observing the in justice of Soviet actions.
Once the Soviet Union had apologised for its 1968 invasion, Havel 
seemed satisfied. Again, as in the case of Germany, what objective power 
the Soviet Union had did not detract from Havel’s desire to include the 
Soviet Union in the family of nations. I t  could be argued that the very  
recognition of the Soviet Union’s strengths prompted Havel to come to its 
aid: in his visit to Washington in February 1990, he explained that the
Le Monde, 21 September 1990.
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best way to help Central Europe was in fact to help the Soviet Union/^  
Even if this were a policy calculated to benefit Czechoslovakia, its 
indirect nature had some Czechoslovak officials private ly  calling it 
's tu p id '/^  Havel altered his views as Czechoslovak-Soviet relations 
developed, deeming certain Soviet actions suspicious or acknowledging 
that he did not realise some internal pressures facing the Soviet 
leadership and how they would reflect in Soviet foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the foremost aim was to extend humanist 
principles to the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. This very  
practice deemed factors of geography to be largely inconsequential.
The Czechoslovak leadership was also motivated by practical reasons 
to consider the Soviet Union as an equal. I t  would have been self- 
defeating for Havel to consider Czechoslovakia to be inherently  and 
inalterably weaker than the Soviet Union. Some policies were deemed 
necessary to the survival of the Czechoslovak state, principally the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces/^ and if the Czechoslovak leadership  
in terpreted Soviet influence as imposing such restrictions on its policy 
options then no policy would have been <iitempted at all. One example of 
the tem porary nature of Soviet influence on the region can be found in 
how trade patterns changed.
The End of Soviet Bloc Trade and the CMEA
The experience of the 1989 Revolutions demonstrated how ephemeral the  
institutional links had been. This was not surprising, given that 
Czechoslovakia’s economic development prior to the Communist takeover
See chapter 7.
Background interview with Czechoslovak Foreign M inistry official.
Text of the Civic Forum Programme, annex, in Bradley, Czechoslovakia’s 
Velvet Revolution.
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had always been linked to its Western neighbours, with limited economic 
links to the East. This was partly  a function of Czechoslovakia having 
been part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, but also because of the 
thousand-year socio-economic co-existence between the Germans and the  
Czechs."^
Unlike in other policy areas relating to the Soviet bloc, such as 
the Warsaw Pact from which Hungary immediately sought unilateral 
withdrawal, Czechoslovakia took the f irs t  lead in seeking the dismantling 
of a bloc organisation: the CMEA."*® Already in early  January 1990,
Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus announced that his country would propose 
the termination of the CMEA and he threatened unilateral w ithdrawal if  
re f used.
The disbandment of the CMEA cannot necessarily be seen as an 
achievement of Czechoslovak foreign policy, even though it coincided with 
Klaus’s intentions. He acknowledged that ' I t  was not us but the Soviets 
who brought about the quick end of the CMEA' when they proposed a 
conversion to hard currency accounting.^® This occurred at the firs t  
post-Revolution meeting of the CMEA, convened in Sofia on 9-10 January 
1990, when Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov proposed that bloc trade be 
converted immediately into hard currency. Other governments sought a 
gradual conversion occurring over several years. Czechoslovakia, by
For specific examples of Bohemian economic links to Western Europe, as 
well as West European - including even British -  economic involvement in 
Bohemia, see John Komlos, (ed.). Economic Development in the Habsburg 
Monarchy and in the Successor States (Boulder, CO: East European
Monographs, 1990).
This is attributable to Klaus’s economic foreign policy, discussed in 
chapter 2.
The Poles in itia lly  refused to support Czechoslovakia, and the Hungarian 
Foreign Minister, called not for the CMEA's dissolution, but its 'total 
overhaul’. Tamas Bauer, 'Economic Reforms and Bloc In teg ra tio n ’, in Weilmann, 
et ai, p. 55.
Der S p ieg e l 22 A p ril 1991, in  JPRS-EER, 3 May 1991, p. 33.
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contrast, was ’radical’, wanting a range of changes including trade  
decentralisation/^
Even before its official termination, the CMEA ceased function ing /^  
By mutual agreement on 1 January 1991 the four countries adopted the 
dollar as the ir trading unit. Whatever control CMEA had exerted, the 
currency changeover buried the organisation. The fact that trade between 
Central Europe and the Soviet Union had decreased significantly a fte r  
1989, and especially a fte r the CMEA, demonstrated that the trade was not 
’natura l’. While the termination of the CMEA had ’damaging consequences’ 
for the East European e c o n o m i e s , t h e  effect was short-lived, 
suggesting that there was nothing ’natural’ propelling that Soviet bloc 
trade in the f irs t place.
The Central European countries began developing relations with 
individual Soviet republics, to the extent that ’relations with eastern  
neighbours subsequently proved equally or even more important to 
Central European governments than did relations with Russia’. T h i s  
trend continued as Soviet reductions of oil deliveries underscored the  
need to establish separate relations with other Republics and autonomous 
regions of the Russian Federation.
I t  was in the context of revolutionary euphoria, when Communist 
Czechoslovakia’s hardline regime was upended not by violence but by 
flowers and jingled keys, that the new leadership sought to undertake
49 RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, 26 January 1990, p. 56.
On 28 June 1991, the CMEA held its fo rty -s ix th  and last meeting in 
Budapest, Members agreed to end the CMEA at its fo rth -s ix th  meeting on 28 
June 1991. A liquidation committee was given ninety days to dispense with 
CMEA property. Vladimir V. Kusin, ’CMEA: The End is Nigh’, Report on 
Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 5 (1 February 1991), pp. 38-40; and Nicholas 
Denton, 'Comecon Put Out of Misery A fter 42 Years’, The Financial Times, 29 
June 1991.
Jan Zielonka, Security  in Central Europe (London: IISS Adelphi Paper No. 
272, Autumn 1992), p. 39.
Jhvd.
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perhaps its most important foreign policy venture: the removal of the 
Soviet m ilitary presence.
DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Post-Communist Czechoslovakia’s ab ility  to deal with Soviet Union was 
challenged quickly a fte r the Revolution when Havel made clear that 
Czechoslovak sovereignty could only be ensured by the w ithdrawal of 
Soviet forces. The eventual negotiations for a Soviet troop withdrawal 
deserve study not only because they are viewed as one, or even the, 
major success of Havel’s foreign policy. They are also significant as a 
test of Czechoslovakia’s aptitude for achieving goals in relations with a 
larger power.
Negotiations fo r Soviet Troop Withdrawals
75,000 Soviet m ilitary personnel were stationed on Czechoslovak te rr ito ry  
on the basis of the 16 October 1968 Treaty on the Conditions fo r a 
Temporary Stay of Soviet Forces on Czechoslovak T e rrito ry , signed in the 
aftermath of the WTO intervention. Czechoslovaks redefined the Soviet 
euphemism of ’tem porary’ as meaning ’e te rn ity  minus one day’.
While the negotiations can be considered a success for Czechoslovak 
foreign policy, it cannot be attribu ted  to humanist values in 
Czechoslovak -  Soviet relations. Instead, it resulted from cost-benefit 
analysis by both parties.
Czechoslovakia had no hesitation in seeking a Soviet m ilitary  
withdrawal. Even while the Communists still held a m ajority in the  
government, Czechoslovakia requested negotiations at the WTO meeting in 
Moscow on 4 December 1989. D ienstbier’s f irs t  act as Foreign Minister was 
to seek negotiations on Soviet troop withdrawals. The Soviet Foreign
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M inistry announced that talks would begin in Prague on 15 January 1990. 
Thus while replying, the Soviet Union was nevertheless attempting to set 
the date, time and place, if not also the agenda, of the negotiations 
talks.
On 15 January 1990 the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia opened withdrawal negotiations in Prague. That 
f irs t meeting ended the next day without success and the next round was 
set for F e b r u a r y . A s  the talks to begin negotiations, and then the 
negotiations themselves began, popular pressure exerted itse lf on the  
Czechoslovak (and conceivably also on the Soviet) government. On the eve 
of talks some six thousand protestors in central Czechoslovakia demanded 
the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that m ilitary d i s t r i c t . O n  24 
January 1990 thousands of young Czechoslovaks demonstrated for a 
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops (as well as for changes on the law 
on m ilitary service.)''^ Five days later over 20,000 protestors  
demonstrated outside a Soviet m ilitary base in the Moravian city of 
Olomouc, and gave the base commander a petition requesting the 
withdrawal of the 20,000 Soviet personnel in the region. CTK reported  
that the base commander said that those troops were 'no longer in a state 
of m ilitary readiness and were preparing for their departure'.
Attempts were made to encourage public support for withdrawal. 
Prague Domestic Service announced a ra lly  would be held on 6 February  
in the Old Town Square to back the Czechoslovak Government 'at
Le Monde, 14-15 January 1990.
RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, 2 February 1990, p. 54. 
FT, 15 January 1990.
RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, 9 February 1990, p. 45. 
■”  The Daily Telegraph, 29 January 1990.
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achieving a speedy withdrawal of the Soviet troops from our 
te r r ito ry ’.'’®
The next day, a reporter from CTK was shown the Soviet m ilitary  
base at Milo vice. A Soviet spokesman said that the trea ty  allowing Soviet 
troops on Czechoslovak soil had not yet been altered, and the CSFR had 
only put fo rth  amendments. He also asserted that the cost of maintaining 
the Soviet forces was borne entire ly  by the Soviet Government, a view 
discounted by the Czechoslovaks.^^
Czechoslovak government radio, claiming to be ’in harmony with the  
prevailing opinion of the Czechoslovak public’, asked why, if the Soviet 
army arrived  in one day, it  needed so long to withdraw.®® Far from the  
public forg iv ing the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovaks had become 
unreasonable.
Even though as early  as 19 January 1990 the talks were said by 
Western media to have led ’in principle to total w ithdraw al,’ nevertheless 
Czechoslovak sources complained of Soviet delays and intimated that 
Moscow might seek to maintain a division in Czechoslovakia to limit the  
speed of the transformation.®^ To the Polish Parliament on 26 January  
1990, Havel said that he hoped that the Soviet Union would begin its 
m ilitary withdrawal in the interest of good relations with Central 
Europe.®^
Even so, the planned 2 February talks in Moscow were postponed, 
indicating that negotiations had run into difficulties. Czechoslovak Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Lu bos Dobrovskÿ said that the Soviet armed forces 
newspaper Krasnaya zvezda  claimed that m ilitary threats to Czechoslovakia
PDS, 31 January 1991, in FBIS, 1 February 1991.
See below.
®® PDS, 1 February 1990, in FBIS, 1 February 1990.
®^ International Herald Tribune, 19 January 1990.
®^ 'Havel Asks Coordinated Bid By East to 'Return to Europe,’" In ternational 
Herald Tribune, 26 January 1990. 218
still existed and that its leaders were seeking a premature withdrawal of 
Soviet forces. The Czechoslovak government was still pursuing the 
acceptance of the proposal before the f irs t fu ll elections in June 1990.
Once a second round of negotiations was held on 7 February 1990.
I t  dealt with deadlines for troop withdrawals; Czechoslovakia wanted the 
departure completed by the end of the 1990, giving the Soviet under 12 
months; the Soviets wanted as much 24 m o n t h s . T h a t  round of 
negotiations was in terpreted by the Czechoslovak media to constitute  
something of a victory. While the Soviet Union commenced its m ilitary  
departure, the date for completion of the withdrawal had still not been 
a g r e e d . O n e  newspaper wrote suggested that the early  withdrawal of
10,000 soldiers was a result of the negotiations, but Western m ilitary  
observers said that the unit was to be removed as part of Gorbachev’s 
previously announced withdrawals from Eastern Europe. While the problem 
of housing for return ing  Soviet troops was acknowledged, another factor 
in the agreement was that each of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union 
aimed to avert 'anti-Soviet sentiment boding over into public disorder’ .^ ® 
The Soviet Union was influenced by events in Czechoslovakia, and this, in 
tu rn , suggests that the Czechoslovaks were aware of the limitations of 
Soviet influence over them.
Gorbachev made a ’personal appeal’ to Havel on 13 February 1990, 
after which Havel acknowledged 'there were aspects [of Soviet politics] I 
was not aware of previously’ and relaxed his demand for completion of
See Gerard Davies, 'Hitch in Czech Withdrawal’, The Guardian, 1 February  
1990.
6 4 RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, 23 February 90, p. 53
For a summary, see RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, 23 February 1990, p.
53
Independent, 26 F e b ru a ry  1990.
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the withdrawal within the year. At the same time, however, public 
pressure and disclosures of Soviet environmental damage forced the
Czechoslovak government to remain firm in the negotiations.®^ Havel thus
demanded an even tigh ter deadline from Gorbachev, wanting the final five  
main Soviet combat divisions to leave w ithin a year. Havel reported that 
Gorbachev 'did not rule this out if it proved feasible’. Havel said he 
'listened with understanding to the other side,’ and added that any 
withdrawal schedule 'should not be too short’.®® On a practical note,
Havel offer to send prefabricated housing for the return ing  Soviet 
soldiers. Despite, and not because of these concessions. Le Monde 
nevertheless called him and Dienstbier ve ry  determined’ to achieve the 
removal of this 'army of occupation’, but cognizant of the practical 
problems that Gorbachev was facing.®®
The Soviet Union had an interest in being conciliatory toward the
Central European nations. The risk of losing Western public opinion was a
likely factor in Moscow’s behaviour. So, too, was the fear that Central 
Europe would either be prompted to create a security alliance of its own, 
or, still worse, align with NATO against the Soviet Union. The 
determination of the Czechoslovak leadership in seeking negotiations 
demonstrated not only its urgency to eliminate a mechanism of Soviet 
interference, but also that it perceived the aim as achievable. The process 
of withdrawal largely vindicates the Czechoslovak view that, in foreign  
policy, existing structures did not necessarily predetermine outcomes.
®^ Independent, 14 February 1990.
®® In ternational Herald Tribune, 27 February 1990. 
®® Le Monde, 28 February. 1990.
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The Process of Withdrawal
Despite problems in the negotiations, which proceeded re lative ly  smoothly 
in view of many potential sources of disagreement, the withdrawal was 
concluded earlier than dictated by the agreement.
The withdrawal was agreed to occur in three stages: from 26 
February 1990 to 31 May 1990 26,000 soldiers, 551 main battles tanks, 859 
armoured vehicles, 92 attack helicopters and 19 m ilitary a irc ra ft were to 
be withdrawn, predominantly from Moravian bases. Second, from 1 June to 
the end of that year, the 30,000 troops, 516 tanks, 1,362 armoured 
vehicles, 60 attack helicopters and 43 a irc ra ft stationed in Slovakia would 
be removed. The th ird  stage was scheduled to end on 30 June 1991, a fte r  
the withdrawal of a fina l 19,000 soldiers, 153 tanks, 284 armoured 
vehicles, 21 attack helicopters, and 41 a irc ra ft.
On 25 March 1991 the Soviet media carried reports from Vorobev 
that the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia would be completed 
by May 20, more than a month ahead of schedule. At the same time, the  
Soviet commander also announced that Czechoslovakia was free  of all 
Soviet ammunition, conventional and nuclear.'®
As soon as the withdrawal schedule began on 26 February 1990, two 
trainloads of Soviet m ilitary equipment and personnel le ft the country. 
From then on, the process advanced smoothly, with only two incidents 
being held against the Soviet Union. The firs t was the 19 January 1991 
explosion of a Soviet tank as it was being readied for withdrawal. The 
incident resulted in 17 Soviet deaths but no Czechoslovak casualties.
RFE. R eport on E astern  Europe, 5 A p r il 1991, p. 27.
221
Thereafter, armour was transported without ammunition, which was sent in 
special vehicles.
Another issue that alarmed Czechoslovaks was the sale of Soviet 
small arms and explosives. One episode involved a teenage boy swapping 
his digital watch for a live grenade. Soviet Commander Vorobev 
insisted that such incidents could not have o c c u r r e d . T o  support the  
Soviets, Czechoslovakia’s chief negotiator in the withdrawal talks, rock 
star Michal Kocab, r ig h tly  said that such problems were universal (in 
Eastern Europe) and that the situation was no worse in Czechoslovakia, 
and lauded the behaviour of departing Soviet personnel.^'* By 25 June 
Soviet forces had been completely w ithdrawn from Czechoslovakia.
Vorobev, like his counterpart in Afghanistan, was the last Soviet soldier 
to depart from Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks marked the occasion 
with a rock concert, attended by Havel and in which Kocab performed.
Some issues in Soviet- Czechoslovak relations, however, were not 
settled, and some of Czechoslovakia’s demands went unmet.
Outstanding Issues from the Withdrawal
Environmental Damage and Financial Compensation
Foremost among these issues was the environmental damage produced by 
the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. The physical presence of Soviet 
troops in Czechoslovakia was substantial. 195 square kilometres of land,
'  ^ Radio Czechoslovakia, 17 January 1991, cited in Jan Obrman, ’Withdrawal 
of Soviet Troops Completed’, Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 30 (26 
July 1991).
Mlada fronta dnes, 22 January 1991.
Czechoslovak Television, 25 January 1991, cited in Obrman, ’Withdrawal’. 
CTK, June 19, 1991, cited in ibid.
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130 square kilometres of soil and 65 square kilometres of forest were 
under the ir direct contro l/^
A bilateral commission was created in May 1990 to investigate the  
status of areas used by Soviet forces. In  addition, Kocab's commission for 
the withdrawal also considered the environmental damage caused by the 
Soviets. Czechoslovaks accused the Soviets of impeding the effectiveness 
of the commission and Kocab stated ’sometimes [the Soviet side] 
threatened us, though never openly, by re fe rrin g  to our dependence on 
its oil and trade ’.
The extent of environmental damage in some locations was so severe 
that Czech Prime Minister Petr P ithart said it was as if  ’the Soviets 
forces had declared chemical w arfare on us’.^ ^
A delegation from the Supreme Soviet consented to come to Prague 
in January 1991 to consider Czechoslovakia’s claim. Instead, it demanded 
compensation of between 4 and 5 billion crowns from Czechoslovakia for 
facilities their m ilitary was leaving b e h i n d . T h e  mayor of the city of 
Turnov, one of the main Soviet sites, retorted that the Soviets ought to 
have taken the crumblings buildings with them."^ The Czechoslovak 
negotiator on compensation. Major General Rudolf Duchâôek, estimated 
Soviet in fras tructure  at a th ird  of the Soviet estimate, and noted the 
ecological damage and the Soviet use of Czechoslovak in fras tructure .
CSFR Deputy Environment Minister Vaclav Vucka called the Soviet estimate
CTK, 1 February 1991, cited in ibid., p. 20.
The Guardian, 20 June 1991.
The Independent, 12 May 1990.
CTK, 11 January 1991, cited in Obrman, ’W ithdrawal’, p. 17, 
F ran k fu rte r Rundschau, 14 February 1991, cited in ibid., p. 17. 
Rude pravo, 4 July 1991.
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of 2,500 million crowns ($83.3m) for environmental damage insufficent.*^^
The Soviet Union fina lly  agreed on 290 million crowns compensation for 
buildings damaged by its forces, but the Czechslovaks considered that 
amount inadequate as well.^^ On 13 June 1991, the Czechoslovak 
government announced acceptance of a d ra ft agreement with Moscow on 
compensation for damage done by Soviet forces, but which did not include 
environmental damage.®^ The Soviet Union probably could not have 
afforded to pay the total compensation. Nevertheless, the evident 
environmental damage caused by Soviet forces, as well as the ir attitude to 
compensation, must have added to a sense among Czechoslovaks of 
national abuse. Havel’s conciliatory approach toward the Soviet Union was 
sullied by the fact that the Soviet Union was not taking responsibility for 
its wrongdoings. However, Czechoslovakia had failed in its objective of 
receiving payment from the Soviet Union.
In ternational Front Organisation^"^
Another outstanding issue in Czechoslovakia’s relations with the Soviet 
Union concerned more than a dozen international communist organisations 
established in Prague.
Czechoslovak public opinion sought the expulsion of the 
organisations as symbols of international Communism and for their 
transgressions against Czechoslovakia.®^ The Czechoslovak government 
concurred but in April 1991 reversed itself because the organisations had
81 CTK, 26 June 1991, in FBIS, 2 July 1991.
See also Stanley J. Kabala, ’The Hazardous Waste Problem in Eastern 
Europe’, RFE, Report on Eastern  Europe Vol. 2, No. 25 (21 June 1991), p. 31.
83 RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, 21 June 1991, p. 37.
This subsection derived from J iri Pehe, ’In ternational Front Organizations 
Survive in Prague’, Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 25 (21 June 1991).
For example. In ternational Organisation of Journalists abetted the 
expulsion of journalists, like J ifi Dienstbier, during normalisation.
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not violated Czechoslovak law.”® The decision may also have been made 
out of fear of antagonising the Soviet Union.
Czechoslovakia was unable to force concessions from the Soviet 
Union on ecological damage and related charges, and it decided that 
legality dictated that Moscow’s international fro n t organisations could 
remain in Prague. While these might have been blows to the  
Czechoslovaks, the Soviet leaders, for all th e ir power potential, were 
unable to realise some demands on Czechoslovakia.
Soviet Disputes
While Czechoslovaks fe lt some issues in the ir relations with the Soviet 
Union were unsatisfactorily resolved, some Soviet grievances against 
Czechoslovakia went unmet. Disputes involved political asylum granted to 
deserters from the Soviet m ilitary and the assent of Czechoslovak officials  
to what the Soviet government called political marriages of Soviet 
deserters to Czechoslovak women in order to remain in Czechoslovakia.”^
The Soviet leaders also found that they could not substantially  
influence Prague over the issue of the 'Pink Tank’. To commemorate the  
c ity ’s liberation by the Red Army in May 1945, a Soviet T-34 battle tank 
was mounted on a three-m eter high platform in Prague’s western suburb  
of Smichov. Ironically, the tank’s number was 23, which Czechoslovaks 
were quick to point out was exactly the number of years from the 
liberation of 1945 to the invasion of 1968, and also the number of years 
from the invasion to the withdrawal of those same forces in 1991.
On 28 April 1991, a rt student David Cernÿ painted the tank pink to 
protest the use of a weapon as a symbol of peace. The Czechoslovak Army 
was ordered to repaint the tank m ilitary grey and Defence Minister and
”® ÙTK, 5 April 1991, cited in Pehe, ’In ternational F ron t’. 
Various articles in Lidové noviny  throughout 1990.
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former dissident Lubo§ Dobrovskÿ immediately apologised to the Soviet 
embassy. (Ironically , the student was then charged under artic le  202 for 
public disturbance, the same vague charge used against Czechoslovak
dissidents).88
However, on 17 May fifteen  Federal MPs repainted the tank pink.
The Soviet Union was dismayed and its ambassador to Prague, Boris 
Pankin, sent protestations to the Czechoslovak government. The Soviet 
government demanded that the Tank was to remain in place, and in its 
original colour. The eventual Czechoslovak position, offered as a 
compromise, was for the tank to be removed to a museum and an 
alternative, more pacific monument to the liberation be erected. In  the  
end, the Czechoslovak position won. Today, not even the base which 
seated the tank remains.
The success of the Czechoslovak negotiations with the Soviet Union 
reflect that Prague saw no imminent danger from making demands. Their 
actions constituted good diplomacy. As Hans Morgenthau observed 'Of all 
the factors that make for the powers of a nation, the most important, 
however unstable, is the quality of diplomacy....Diplomacy, one might say, 
is the brains of national power, as national morale is its soul. I f  its vision 
is b lurred , its judgment defective, and its determination feeble, all the  
advantages of geographical location, of self-suffic iency in food, raw 
materials, and industrial production, of m ilitary preparedness, of size and 
quality of population will in the long run avail a nation lit t le '.89
In  negotiating with the Soviet Union, the Havel leadership was 
motivated by several considerations, including necessity, urgency, and, to
88 Patrick Wright, 'Why a Pink Tank Made Prague See Red’, The Guardian, 
25 July 1991.
89 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and 
Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 158-59.
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in vert Morgenthau’s example, letting diplomacy enhance overall abilities. 
Underlying these factors, even if an allowance is made for the possibility 
that the determination w ithin which the Havel government pursued the 
negotiations was out of recognition of Soviet threat, it also seems relevant 
that the leadership functioned on the basis of regarding the two 
countries as equal. Post-Communist Czechoslovakia’s disregard for 
geopolitically-based threats from the Soviet Union are fu rth e r  
demonstrated by Czechoslovak m ilitary doctrine and its view of the  
Czechoslovak -  Soviet border.
M ilitary Doctrine and the Border: No Threats From the East
M ilitary doctrine serves to assess a country’s perceptions of threat. The 
three Central European countries revised the ir doctrines a fte r 1989 to 
reflect their perception that they faced no specific threat. Czechoslovak 
m ilitary doctrine stated the armed forces were to defend against ’the land 
and air attacks of the aggressor from whatever direction and whatever 
part of the te rrito ry  of the CSFR’.-^ ° All three Central European military  
establishments wanted an end to the overconcentration of forces along 
the ir Western flanks to be replaced by an even red istribution  throughout 
their countries. No special arrangement was made in any of these 
countries for a disproportionately large deployment to the east. In  the 
Czechoslovak case, the government was particu larly  slow in effecting a 
redeployment to Slovakia. Because Czechoslovakia was the only WTO 
country to flank both Germanics, the previously expected fulcrum of any 
in itial ground conflict, its forces were disproportionately placed in 
western Bohemia.
Zielonka, Security, p. 49.
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The m ilitary certa in ly  sought to restation some of these forces, as 
acknowledged on 31 October 1991 by Deputy Defense Minister Antonin 
Rasek.'^^ But Dobrovskÿ and Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the 
General S taff Major General Karel Pezl announced in July 1991 that of all 
the m ilitary reforms underway, the redeployment of soldiers from Bohemia 
to Slovakia was most problematic.^^
The legacy of geopolitics played out in the redeployment as well. As 
Slovakia was distant from the NATO-WTO faultline , it  lacked airfields. The 
restationing of m ilitary a irc ra ft to Slovakia under the new doctrine, and 
also of hardware a fte r the post-federation division, thus proved d ifficult. 
Even with the money and bases that would have permitted a fu ll and 
rapid redeployment to Slovakia, there was clearly no sense of threat.
This is fu rth e r  demonstrated by the lack of security on the 
Czechoslovak-Soviet border. While only fifty -m iles  long, it could have 
been easily patrolled. Even though Dienstbier said in January 1991 ’we 
know that there are armed bands roving the western Ukraine and we 
have been expecting something like’^^  the attempt by Soviet citizens to 
force their way into e ither Czechoslovakia or Hungary in early 1991, it 
took precisely that kind of incident to a le rt the Czechoslovak leadership 
to the need for border security. A Slovak MP discovered that the 
Czechoslovak -  Soviet border was apparently patrolled by only 37 
p o lic e m e n ,D ie n s tb ie r denied contemplating a modest security measure 
like erecting a fence along the b o r d e r , s u g g e s t i n g  that defense of the 
border was not of concern to the Czechoslovak government.
CTK, 31 October 1990, in FBIS, 2 November 1990. 
Narodna obroda, 8 July 1991.
The Guardian, 25 January 1991.
The Independent, 26 January 1991.
The G uardian, 25 Ja n u a ry  1991.
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An objective assessment of the Czechoslovak government’s disregard  
of threats from the Soviet shared border can he taken from the case of 
Hungary which recorded that of 19,000 people attempting to cross its 
borders in the f irs t eight months of 1991, only 21 were Soviets. 
Nevertheless, from the provisions contained in the new m ilitary doctrine 
and the lack of security along the Czechoslovak-Soviet border, in its f irs t  
year the post-Communist Czechoslovak government seems to have 
discounted threats from the East.
At the same time, however, developments within the Soviet Union 
increasingly alarmed the Czechoslovak leadership. Throughout 1990, 
Czechoslovak Foreign M inistry s taff noted the increased influence of 
Soviet 'hard liners ’, a sinister development culminating f irs t  in the 
resignation of Shevardnadze. This was followed by the January 1991 
suppression of Baltic nationalist movements by SAS-style OMON or 'Black 
Berets’. The Czechoslovak leadership had extended as much good will and 
tru st to Gorbachev as could be expected but it was growing increasingly  
concerned about the power of such 'hardline' forces, particu larly  in the  
armed forces and KGB.-^ ^
The Baltic events suggested one of two developments: either 
Gorbachev had lost control of parts of the Soviet security forces, or he 
was aware of their activities, perhaps having even issued the ir orders. 
Neither scenario could have been reassuring for the Central Europeans 
who had supported Baltic secession ism, and a fte r January 1991, Prague 
became unambiguous in seeking the Warsaw Pact’s disbandment.
The extent to which that policy, as opposed to a non-existent policy 
on the border, was the function of geopolitical concerns is treated
9 6 SWB, 11 September 1991, cited in Zielonka, Security, p. 75.
This general view of the Czechoslovak assessment of Gorbachev is from 
Dr Miloslav Had, head of the Policy and Planning Section of the Czechoslovak 
Foreign M inistry. Interview s with the author, September 1994 and 1995.
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presently. F irst, however, Prague’s understanding of Moscow’s decision to 
cut oil supplies must be examined.
The Oil Crisis
The Czechoslovak government was soon reminded of the co u n try ’s 
dependence on the Soviet Union for oil. Small cuts in Soviet energy  
deliveries occurred shortly a fte r the Velvet Revolution, such as the  
January 1990 twenty percent reduction in some f u e l s . I n  July 1990, 
without informing the Czechoslovak government, Moscow cut oil supplies 
by 35 percent. In  response the Czechoslovak government enacted a f if ty  
percent increase in gas prices. Federal Economics Minister Dlouhÿ 
announced that the country had oil reserves for only a few days and 
anticipated the situation to deteriorate, expecting oil supplies to be cut 
fu rth e r in 1991 than by the 2.6 million tonnes already in 1990.^^
In  the oil crisis, the Czechoslovaks were clearly treated as an 
unequal partner by the Soviet Union, even if the Havel government may 
have had a d ifferent vision previously. Prague sought talks with Moscow 
several times during the oil crisis, but was rebuffed by Soviet economic 
officials who claimed that they had to prepare fo r the forthcoming Party  
Congress. Klaus explained in the same month ’I  became increasingly angry  
in my letters to [Soviet Finance] Minister Popov but they were not 
prepared to meet us’ until much later.
A series of efforts were undertaken by the Czechoslovak 
government to open talks with the Soviet Union on energy shipments. 
Federal Foreign Trade Minister Slavomir S trancaf went to Moscow but
Le Monde, 21-22 January 1990. 
International Herald Tribune, 20 July 1990. 
The Financial Times, 18 July 1990.
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conceded on 27 July 1990 that his talks with Soviet officials had failed  
and a shortfall in oil supply of 2.6 million tonnes was to be expected.
By October, filling  stations in Czechoslovakia had quarter-m ile  
queues, and Calf a fe lt obliged to cancel his foreign visits. The 
Czechoslovak government rationed fuel and raised fuel prices a fu rth e r 33 
percent. On 29 October 1990, Calfa said that the energy cutback 
could threaten the functioning of the country and was a p rio rity  in his 
visit to Moscow.
Czechoslovakia showed its desperation by seeking oil on the world 
market, approaching M e x i c o , a n d  had contracted in July to buy
50,000 tons from the West, but the government was highly reluctant to 
spend any more hard currency.
The situation was moderated somewhat when the Soviet Union 
agreed to provided the country with sufficient quantities of oil for 1991. 
After a six-hour meeting of Calfa and Dlouhÿ with Soviet Premier 
Ryzkhov, Moscow agreed to ship 13 million tonnes of oil, 3.5 million less 
than the usual yearly  quota, with the difference expected to be made up 
by supplies from Iran  and Venezuela. At the same time, Czechoslovak 
representatives overcame Soviet resistance to an atypical oil deal with the  
Tyumen oil re fin e ry  in Siberia
Despite these stopgap arrangements, the problems of energy supply 
continued throughout the period under study. On 2 January 1992, the
The Financial Times, 27 July 1990.
The Independent, 5 October 1990.
Le Monde, 6 October 1990.
Narodna obroda, 29 October 1990.
The Daily Telegraph, 17 August 1990. 
The Financial Times, 18 July 1990.
The F inanc ia l Times, 31 October 1990.
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former Soviet Union undertook to supply Czechoslovakia, with some 10,000 
tons being shipped by pipeline to the most severely affected city of 
Litvinov. This came at a time when Radio Ceskoslovensko reported that 
the major refineries at Bratislava, Kralupy and Vltavou had supplies for 
only a few days.^^®
The Czechoslovak government made the best of the situation, using 
agile diplomacy as in the case of troop negotiations. While Prague 
succeeded in getting some oil from Moscow, the oil crisis provides the one 
instance in which geographic factors determined the Czechoslovak policy 
agenda.
New Diplomatic Relations, the August Coup, and Soviet Collapse
With Soviet institutional leverage over Czechoslovakia ever diminishing, it 
was Moscow which attempted to foster new relations with Prague. In  doing 
so, the Soviet Union used references to inexorable links between the two 
countries. For example, in June 1991, Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov 
attempted to portray relations between Czechoslovakia and the USSR as 
inalterably close and intertw ined. A day before the Soviet w ithdrawal was 
completed, Yazov denied that the WTO 'invaded’ Czechoslovakia in 1968 
and re ferred  to the 'b ro therly  relations’ of Czechs and Russians and 
insisted that Czechs would always be closer to Russians than to 
Germans.
Despite these disagreements, relations between the two countries  
proceeded reasonably amicably and fru itfu lly . The Soviet-inspired 1970 
Friendship Treaty was due for renewal in April 1990, and in its  
successor, the Soviet Union insisted on a clause in the bilateral treaties
Stan ice Ceskoslovensko, 3 January 1992, in FBIS, 3 January 1992. 
Obrman, 'Withdrawal’, p. 16.
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with each former satellite effective ly  vetoing the ir r ig h t to jo in any 
security arrangement seemingly aimed against the Soviet U n i o n . W h i l e  
Romania accepted the c la u s e /C z e c h o s lo v a k  decision-makers were 
admanantly opposed to it.^^^
The August 1991 ’Coup’ confirmed the change in Czechoslovak 
opinion of the risks emanating from the Soviet Union. Members of 
Gorbachev’s Politburo took advantage of his absence from the Soviet 
capital in order to attempt a seizure of power, almost certain ly to prevent 
the signing of an all-Union Treaty relaxing Soviet control over 
constituent republics.
The coup-makers proved themselves inadequate M arxist-Leninists, 
having not digested Lenin’s 'April Thesis’, which provided practical 
instructions for a coup, such as securing control over communications 
centres and arms depots. As clumsy and short-lived  as it proved, the  
coup nevertheless sparked the three Central European states into even 
closer m ilitary cooperation.
Moscow dropped its insistence on the clause vetoing membership in 
alliances a fte r the coup and, a d raft Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, 
Friendly Relations, and Cooperation was initialled on 3 October 1991 by 
Boris Pankin and Dienstbier. The Treaty became redundant with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union three months later.
Finally, the Czechoslovak leadership’s view of the fu tu re  of the 
Warsaw Pact requires consideration. Its  m ultilateral significance and the  
relevance it held beyond Czechoslovak-Soviet relations accord it analysis 
in its own righ t.
110 The Independent, 8 June 1991.
Vladimir Socor, 'The Romanian-Soviet Friendship Treaty  and Its  Regional 
Implications’, Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 18 (3 May 1991).
Interview s with Had and Vondra.
This motivation in regional cooperation is discussed in chapter 6.
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THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION
The Czechoslovak government did not in itia lly  seek the disbandment of 
the WTO. I t  believed that the Pact could be, and in fact was in the 
process of being transformed into a s tric tly  political organization. I t  
furtherm ore believed that the WTO would thereby serve its overarching  
foreign policy goal of eliminating power politics from Europe.
In  keeping with its belief in legality, the post-Communist 
Czechoslovak government acknowledged its commitments to the WTO. 
In itia lly , the Czechoslovak leadership was satisfied that the Soviet Union’s 
condemnation of the 1968 WTO intervention would give new life  and 
meaning to the organisation. On 28 December 1989, Federal Deputy Prime 
Minister Jan Carnogurskÿ said the Warsaw Pact remained significant in 
Czechoslovak foreign and defense policy th inking , even though the 
country was seeking relations with other states. He added that 
Czechoslovakia’s WTO membership had gained ’new impulses’ a fte r the 
Soviet denunciation of the 1968 intervention.
When Havel became Supreme Commander of the Czechoslovakia 
armed forces on 2 January 1990, he acknowledged the legality of the WTO 
and Czechoslovakia’s obligations to the T r e a t y . T h e  Czechoslovak 
government in itia lly  appeared so much in favour of adhering to its 
m ilitary commitments that the Czechoslovak Army -  with Havel’s explicit 
approval - conducted jo in t exercises with Soviet forces stationed in the  
country. The size of the exercises were scaled down due to protests, but 
nonetheless it is rem arkable that the exercises were held at all. The 
Dru&ba 90 (Friendship 90) manoeuvres involved 5,000 Czechoslovak troops
ÔTK, 28 December 1989, in FBIS, 2 January 1990. 
113 c tK . 2 January 1990, in FBIS, 2 January 1990.
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and over 1,200 Soviet soldiers around the north Bohemian c ity  of 
Zatec.^^®
Unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia did not seek continuation of the WTO 
because of fears of a united Germany. The Czechoslovaks did not expect 
German demands for te rrito ria l concessions, whereas the Poles anticipated  
such not only out of historical fear but because Kohl hesitated to 
guarantee existing borders.
Instead, Havel and Dienstbier attribu ted  a role for the WTO, along 
with NATO, in the ir overarching scheme for the unification of Europe and 
the elimination of traditional power politics from the c o n t i n e n t . O n  10 
March 1990 Havel explained that NATO and the WTO were already evolving  
into political organisations, and, with the agreement of re levant countries, 
the two m ilitary alliances would be integrated into the Helsinki process, 
and thus would no longer function as independent organizations.^^®
Havel’s and Dienstbier’s idealism was to include the Soviet Union in 
Europe, and the Warsaw Pact posed no obstacle to that goal. Rather, while 
they wanted the m ilitary aspect to be abolished, they saw the Pact’s 
transformation in the context of contributing to a new pan-European  
structure.
Evidence that this view was being thwarted by factors of power 
and geography -  precisely the elements that should not be prime to 
idealists -  came with Soviet m ilitary actions against separatist forces in 
the Baltic republics in January 1991. While certain ly a moral consideration, 
the ’Baltic crackdown’, must also have been seen in geopolitical terms.
The Commander of the Western M ilitary Zone, Colonel-General Mojmir 
Zacharias explained that because Czechoslovakia was still a member of the  
WTO, it was obliged to hold jo in t exercises. ÔTK, 1 March 1990, in FBIS, 2 
March 1990, p. 29; for groups opposing the exercises, see Prague Domestic 
Service, 28 February 1990, in FBIS, 1 March 1990, p. 17.
This is discussed in chapter 7.
Die Welt 10 March 1990, in FBIS, 12 March 1990. Dienstbier reiterated  
these developments in his speech to the Royal In s titu te  of In ternational 
Affairs in London. See J ifi Dienstbier, ’From the Europe of the Blocs’, 
Speech to the Royal Institu te  of In ternational Affairs, 3 April 1990, passim.
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The Baltic, particu larly Lithuania, where the m ajority of killings occurred, 
was neither geographically nor sp iritua lly  fa r  from Prague. In  saying 
that there was no similar th reat to Czechoslovakia, Havel’s government 
in itia lly  attempted to deny that the Baltic events were a geopolitical 
threat, but they soon came to recognise that there was a physical threat.
With the Baltic crackdown Czechoslovakia became adamant about 
withdrawing from the WTO, even unilaterally , unless the organisation was 
terminated by mutual agreement of its members. Hungary, by contrast, 
had advocated unilateral w ithdrawal since it had been able to pursue an 
independent foreign policy in 1989. The Czechoslovak leadership’s 
in terpretation  of the Baltic crackdown resulted in its defin itive decision 
to seek the swift and irrevers ib le  dissolution of the WTO.
The swiftness and re lative  ease with which the WTO was terminated 
on 30 June 1991, once the decision to do so was taken, ironically  
undermines the strength of idealism in Czechoslovak foreign policy. Havel 
expressed pleasure with the course of events, declaring on the day of 
termination of the WTO: ’Now it is confirmed how far-s igh ted  it  was that 
we did not wish to withdraw unilaterally  from the Warsaw Pact as some 
radicals recommended, and that instead we wanted to stay w ithin it and 
through a peaceful and m atter-o f-fact way and [hold] talks toward  
disbanding the Warsaw Pact...’ .^^° Such a statement, however, appears 
to contradict the Czechoslovak expectation that the WTO could evolve into 
a political organisation. As Dienstbier explained in April 1990: ’we should, 
as speedily as possible, transfer the h itherto  functions of the blocs to 
new all-European structures based on the shared resolve to uphold the  
law, to observe treaties and human rig h ts ’. The former m ilitary  
structures, he continued, were to be ’rebu ilt into new structures of
At the time of the Baltic killings g ra ffit i appeared on both Prague and 
Vilnius walls comparing that event with the 1968 intervention.
C eskslovenskÿ Rozhlas Radio, 30 June 1991, in  FBIS, 1 J u ly  1991.
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cooperation and European integration’. T h e  role of the WTO in the  
larger plan of Czechoslovak foreign policy leads to the discussion of 
European security in the final chapter.
The post-Communist Czechoslovak government recognised the need to 
achieve certain goals in its relations with the Soviet Union. Foremost was 
regaining Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty by severing the Soviet mechanisms 
of economic, m ilitary and political control. Had the new Czechoslovak 
leadership simply perceived the Soviet Union as an unchallengeable 
threat, then post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign policy would have been 
stunted from b irth . Not only was there a requirem ent for the 
Czechoslovak government to see the two countries as equals, it  is like ly  
that there were objective reasons for the leadership to think so.
Chapter 3 illustrated the historical influence Germany had over 
Czechoslovakia and the way in which this influence was perceived also as 
inalterable. By contrast, this chapter contended that Soviet influence -  
while still appreciable -  was based overwhelmingly on constructed  
mechanisms that could ultimately be dismantled.
Of foremost importance to Czechoslovakia’s policy toward the Soviet 
Union a fte r the November Revolution was the humanist belief adopted by 
the Czechoslovak leadership that once the Soviet Union had apologised, 
the two states could be considered as equals.
Various issues in post-1989 Czechoslovak -  Soviet relations illustrated  
that the Soviet Union did not reciprocate sovereign equality. Paramount 
among these were the negotiations for Soviet troop withdrawals. While the  
withdrawal can r ig h tly  be seen as a v ictory  for Czechoslovakia, 
substantial evidence suggests that the Soviet Union did not want its 
forces out at all, and certain ly not according to the deadlines imposed
J ifi Dienstbier, ’From the Europe of the Blocs’, Speech to the Royal 
Institu te  of International Affairs, 3 April 1990,’ p. 7.
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sought by Czechoslovakia. Yazov’s statement concluding the m ilitary  
Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia negated the apology for the  
intervention, which apparently had influenced Czechoslovak policy towards 
Moscow. The fact of the withdrawal can only be seen as a necessity on 
the Soviet Union’s part. I t  was not motivated out of civic responsibility to 
Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovak vision of equality and partnership between the  
two countries was fu rth e r eroded by the oil crisis. By its own admission, 
the Czechoslovak government said that the Soviet Union was treating  it 
as unequal partner. The idealist content of foreign policy was curtailed  
abrup tly  by the dependence on the Soviet Union for energy.
As in other foreign policy areas, the Czechoslovak government 
became increasingly aware of geopolitical factors in its dealing with the 
Soviet Union. Much as in its view of unified Germany, Havel’s leadership  
in itia lly  appeared to disregard any threats from the Soviet Union based 
merely on its size. This was demonstrated by the lack of security along 
the common border and in Czechoslovakia’s new m ilitary doctrine. I t  was 
also shown in Czechoslovakia’s in itia l -  and unusual -  view that the WTO 
was not in itse lf a threat, that unilateral withdrawal as proposed by 
Hungary was radical and inappropriate, and, even more significantly, that 
the m ilitary structure  could be transformed and used in redrawing the  
security of Europe.
German unification was widely seen as the most fundamental 
geopolitical change since the Second World War. The collapse of the Soviet 
behemoth usurped that title . The implosion of the Soviet Union and the  
dispersion of its demographic, m ilitary and natural resources power 
across several new frontiers meant that, ironically, Havel’s concept of 
treating all countries on an equal basis could become more realistic. That 
possibility arose, however, not through the promotion and acceptance of 
universal humanist values but in the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.
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CHAPTER 6
REGIONAL RELATIONS:
THE MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT OF IDEALS AND GEOPOLITICS
Post-Communist Czechoslovakia’s relations with its Central European 
neighbours a fte r 1989 was overtly  inspired by the idealist th inking and 
common experience of dissidents before the 1989 Revolutions. But unlike  
in other areas of Czechoslovak foreign policy, the expectation of regional 
relations was also conditioned from the outset by an awareness of 
geopolitical' and systemic limitations on that cooperation. Achievements of 
Central European regional cooperation included the creation of common 
bargaining positions, and thereby policy successes, in relations with the  
Soviet Union, the Atlantic Alliance and European organisations. These 
successes were a ttributab le  to the measured combination of dissident 
ideals and recognition of geographic possibilities and limitations. Regional 
cooperation faltered, however, a fte r the June 1992 Czechoslovak elections 
when the idealist support for regional cooperation personified by Havel 
was replaced by the antithetical cost-benefit approach of Vaclav Klaus. 
The chapter concludes that dissident ideas were necessary but not 
sufficient for regional cooperation.
The chapter begins with a brief historical background to notions of 
'Central Europe’ and regional cooperation. I t  proceeds to establish the 
political and geographic basis for the objective and subjective definition  
of contemporary Central Europe and considers Havel’s vision of regional 
relations.
Debate surrounds the cu ltural and geographic meaning of 'Central Europe’ 
and is considered b riefly  below. 'Central Europe’ here is taken to mean 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia a fte r Communism. For the changing 
geographic borders of this region, see Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price o f 
Freedom: A History o f East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the 
Present (London and New York: Rout ledge, 1992), pp. 12-17. For a
contradictory use of the terms, see the otherwise useful volume by Zbigniew 
Dobosiewicz, Foreign Investm ent in Eastern Europe (London and New York: 
Routledge. 1992), pp. xi, 1 and 126).
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In terpretations of geography by the Czechoslovak leadership and 
how they were used are then examined through four post-Communist 
regional cooperation initiatives: the Baltic Council; Czechoslovak-Polish 
federation; the Alpen-Adria Group and the Pentagonale and Hexagonale 
initiatives; and the Bratislava process and the Visegrad Group.
The chapter then considers how geopolitical considerations 
conditioned the in itiatives and achievements of the Visegrad Group, 
considering how outside factors played on the workings of the Group, 
both limiting and facilita ting  its undertakings. These include geopolitical 
perceptions of developments in the Soviet Union and West Europe’s 
geopolitical understanding of Central Europe. The chapter closes with an 
assessment of what other elements Central European co-operation had to 
overcome to suggest that Central Europe cooperation was not like ly  and 
that dissident ideas therefore featured significantly in achieving that 
level of cooperation. As much as the Czechoslovak leadership was aware of 
systemic and geopolitical conditions and sought to use them to its 
advantage, those conditions still came to determine the course of regional 
cooperation.
NOTIONS OF CENTRAL EUROPE
No preordained reason demands that neighbouring states should 
cooperate. I f  anything, contact can generate adversarial relations and the 
discipline of International Relations often takes as its starting  point the 
assumption that cooperation is an anomaly ra ther than the norm, even 
when common interests suggest otherwise.^
The history of Central Europe contributes substantially to such an 
assertion. While Casimir 111, Jan, and Charles 1, the kings of the Poles,
- See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of In ternationa l Politics 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
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Czechs and Hungarians met in Visegrad in 1335 to create the foundation  
for co-operation, ra re ly  since then have these nations been cordial let 
alone trustw orthy allies. Before 1989, only external threats precipitated  
any sort of commonality among the three nations and not even that was a 
guarantee of co-operation.
Under Austrian rule, and then even under the Austro-Hungarian  
Ausgleich, there was a sense of commonality among Poles, Czechs and 
Hungarians.' Nevertheless, the Hungarians were seen not as fellow 
minorities but as co-colonisers. R.W. Seton-Watson called the Ausgleich 
'the work of statesmen who knew how to take occasion by the hand, [and] 
pitted it against others to whom this a rt was a sealed book’."^  As one 
Hungarian intellectual observed, 'The fact is that Hungary had been 
proclaimed the arch-enem y of the Central European nations regardless of 
the fact that it had acceded only to the second rung of the power 
structure a fte r Austria.
For all the drawbacks of the Austro-Hungarian empire, leading 
Czech intellectuals idealised its merits. The important n ineteenth-century  
Czech liberal FrantiSek Palackÿ contender; that if the Austro-Hungarian  
monarchy did not exist, it would have had to have been created. Masaryk 
maintained that Czech and Slovak interests were served by the retention  
of the m ulti-ethnic empire until the outbreak and denouement of the Great 
War made other contingencies necessary.®
® See Péter Hanak, 'Central Europe: An A lternative to Disintegration’, New 
Hungarian Q uarterly  Vol. 33 (August 1992), p. 6.
 ^ R.W. Seton-Watson, German. Slav, and Magyar (London: Williams and 
Norgate, 1916), p. 34.
' Miklos Duray, 'The European Ideal: Reality or Wishful Thinking in Eastern  
Central Europe?’, in George Schopflin and Janet Wood (eds). In  Search of 
Central Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 100.
For a brief introduction to the factors behind M asaryk’s position, see 
Wandycz, Price o f Freedom, esp. pp. 189-191. This is not to say that he was 
not critical of the Empire, particularly of its foreign policy, and thereby  
unconsciously aided his fu tu re  efforts at Czech independence. See Skilling,
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In  the in ter war period, Czechoslovakia was unable to develop 
security arrangements with Poland, and could not with revisionist 
Hungary. Restraining Budapest was the key factor in the creation of the 
Little  Entente, composed of the three beneficiaries of Hungarian te rrito ry  
transferred  at Trianon. The response of both Poland and Hungary to 
German aggression against rump Czechoslovakia in 1939 was to occupy 
parts of the prostrate country, acts considered by some to rank among 
the 13 most important European conflicts of the interw ar period."
Even under the common experience of Communist occupation. Poles 
and Hungarians resented the apparent indifference of the Czechs to the  
respective national challenges each made to Communist rule in 1956. Heir 
to the Austro-Hungarian throne Otto von Hapsburg displayed both his 
pleasure and his surprise at the Sopron 'p icnic’ of summer 1989 which 
aided the fligh t of East German holidaymakers to Austria which he said 
allowed Hungarians and Austrians to cooperate to free  'Prussians’.®
In  spite of. or more likely because of the lack of co-operation  
among the nations of the region, notions of federations and confederations 
have been circulating for almost 150 years, beginning with Lajos 
Kossuth’s Danube Confederation of the 1860s and Oszkar Jaszi’s Danube 
United States.^ Debate over the content and meaning of Central Europe 
was sparked in the 1980s by an essay by Milan Kundera published 
originally in French as 'Un occident kidnappé -  ou la tragédie de 
l ’Europe centrale’. I t  was published in English under the somewhat less 
impassioned title  'The Tragedy of Central Europe’, which resulted in
T.G. Masaryk, ch. 9.
 ^ Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Fu ture ’, p. 22.
® BBC. 'Fall of the Wall’ , broadcast October 1994.
Kumiko Haba. 'Central European Regional Co-operation and European 
Integration - A Study of Hungary’, Japanese Slavic and East European 
Studies Vol. 13 (1992), p. 66; and Tôkés, 'Visegrad’, p. 102.
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responses from independent intellectuals throughout the r e g i o n . A s
much as this discussion highlighted the elusive cu ltural and geographic
definition of Central Europe, it underscored one feature: that even
discussion of mutual issues, let alone their resolution, was prompted by
external forces, in this case, the region’s ’Soviétisation’.
A specific proposal for Central European confederation was
advanced by the leading Czech historian and official of the wartime
governm ent-in-exile Hubert Ripka. For its apparent relevance today,
though w ritten in 1944, it is worth lengthy quotation:
I f  a federation is to work, the three following conditions, to my 
mind, would have essentially to be fu lfilled:
(1) The countries which are to form a federation should f irs t  of all 
have the desire and prove the need for the ir grouping. The 
federation, in other words, should be spontaneous, and not imposed.
(2) A federation can only exist between States which have the same 
alignment in foreign policy and co-ordinate the ir systems of m ilitary  
defence.
(3) The internal regimes of the States in a federation should be 
based on the same political and social principles -  and that last 
condition seems to me to be essential. (There is certa in ly  a 
difference between an alliance among States and a confederation: 
States possessing d ivergent interna' regimes can jo in in a political 
and military alliance, but a Confederation which, to a greater or 
less extent, also intervenes in the internal life of its members of 
necessity demands that the internal regimes of all its members 
should be based on the same principles - it is impossible to 
conceive a federation one of whose members would have a 
collectivist, socialist system, another a liberal democratic system, a 
th ird  a feudal one, in which one would be a monarchy, another a 
republic, e tc .)
The th ird  criterion of common domestic polities and societies was probably 
best fu lfilled  afte r 1989. But despite proposals to this end, no federation  
was to be forthcoming. Even though it was unlikely that Hungary and 
Poland would have pursued a tr ip a rtite  federation, it was Czechoslovak
Milan Kundera, ’The Tragedy of Central Europe’, The New York Review of 
B(X)ks (26 April 1984), pp. 33-8. For responses, see Schopflin and Wood. In  
Search.
Hubert Ripka. SmaJI and Great Nations: The Conditions o f a New 
In ternational Organisation (London: Czechoslovak M inistry of Foreign Affairs, 
1944), p. 20.
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leaders who did most to suggest the idea but who were also responsible 
for limiting its success.
Havel’s Notion of Regional Relations
The idea of regional cooperation had not received the detailed attention  
among Czechoslovak dissidents that characterised the ir th inking on the  
general reconstruction of European relations. Even once Civic Forum 
began formulating foreign policy, it neglected regional relations. The 
foreign policy section of Civic Forum’s 7 -point programme of 25 November 
1989 re ferred  to the WTO and the CMEA specifically, but spoke only 
generally about establishing good relations with all countries. The 
establishment of good regional relations was probably omitted for one of 
several possible reasons. F irst, regional relations could be subsumed in 
the notion of creating universal good relations, to which the programme 
aspired; second. East European populations had heard for decades the  
artific ia l imperatives of constructing friend ly  relations with the ir socialist 
brethren so that such a call during the Revolution would have seemed 
anachronistic; and th ird , a major plank of Civic Forum was the slogan 
’Back to Europe’, and specific parochial references to equally bankrupt 
countries would have been unnecessary.
In  addition to these reasons, regional leaders like Havel probably 
did not need specific references to regional relations because for them 
this had become something of a personal matter in the 1980s. Herein lies 
the role of ideas in inspiring regional co-operation. Under Communism, 
especially in the 1980s, Czechoslovak dissidents, including Havel and 
Dienstbier, met personally with leading Central European dissidents. 
Meetings were held of Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity in the mountains
'' See chapter 7.
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forming the common border between the two countries. Havel was known 
to hate hiking but nevertheless climbed those mountains five  times for 
the 'rew ard ’ of meeting Polish dissidents like Michnik and Jacek 
Kuron.'^ Participants in Polish-Czechoslovak solidarity interviewed for 
this study confirmed the importance of these personal contacts to post- 
Communist regional relations. "^  Contacts by Czechoslovak dissidents with 
the ir Hungarian counterparts were fewer than with the Poles, but 
nevertheless were sufficient for the discussion of common Central 
European questions and solutions.^  ^ Transnational dissident friendship  
continued a fte r 1989, with figures like Michnik, Konrad and Havel meeting 
in Prague.’®
I f  a dissident-intellectual notion of Central Europe existed, it  was of 
a region which shared a common cultural iden tity  and which surpassed 
the ethnic and nationalistic animosities which characterised the region’s 
history. For the Czechoslovaks, in particu lar, there was nostalgia for the  
Austro-Hungarian Empire. That was seen as a time and space of re lative  
ethnic tolerance and of cultural flourish. This is not to suggest that the 
Czechoslovak image of Austro-Hungary So; accurate.'" One of these 
impressionistic liberties was neglect of the fact that the borders of post- 
Communist Central Europe did not equate with those of Austria-Hungary.
Havel, Dâlkovÿ vÿslech, p. 126.
 ^ Interview s with participants on Polish-Czechoslovak solidarity Dienstbier, 
Fialkovâ-Nëmcovâ and Vondra. Had, who was not involved, confirmed the 
influence of these personal connections on post-Communist Czechoslovak- 
Polish relations.
Discussion of common Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Polish dissident views 
of Central Europe are provided in Carton Ash’s essay on, respectively, 
Konrad, Havel and Michnik. See Timothy Carton Ash, 'Does Central Europe 
Exist?’, in The Uses of Adversity.
® See Konrad’s account. The Guardian, 5 April 1990.
’ ■ Tony Judt, 'The Dilemmas of Dissidence: The Politics of Opposition in East- 
Central Europe’, Eastern European Politics and  Societies Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring  
1988), p. 224.
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Because of the illusive meaning of Central Europe it is necessary to 
establish how the three countries, and not others, came to define 
themselves and be constituted as a common entity .
Defining Regional Partners
Scholars of 'Central Europe’ and Western policy-makers who reacted to 
events in the area each employed c rite ria  to define Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland as an individual category of post-Communist states.
The f irs t  criterion used to group the three countries was their 
perceived common historical experience. The leaders, particu larly  the 
independent intellectuals of these three countries did much to emphasise 
that the ir historical experience was d ifferen t from the peoples to their 
East.^® Western observers and many policy-makers a fte r 1989 came to 
share this position.'®
The post-Communist lands have been divided into areas on the 
basis of historical legacy: ' I t  has become clear that there is an East- 
Central European area, that there is a successor to the Russian Empire 
and that there are also the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. What 
has also become clear is that these d ifferen t historical traditions are  
becoming increasingly s ignificant’.®® These countries underwent events 
crucial to western development -  the Renaissance and the Enlightenment,
As evidence of Czech perceptions of cu ltura l and political d ifferentiation  
in the region, Havel stated 'Thanks to its former democratic traditions and 
to its unique Intellectual and sp iritua l climate, the Czech Republic, the 
westernmost of the post-Communist countries is re lative ly  well o ff’ . Havel, 
'Post-Communist Nightmare’, p. 8. Emphasis added.
® As will be discussed in chapter 7, this is not to say that Western analysts 
and policy-makers have come to accept the 'Central European’ historical 
experience as synonymous to that of Western Europe, or that that such a 
claim is sufficient for membership in 'European’ institutions such as the 
European Community.
Georg Brunner, 'The Rule of Law, Democracy, the Social State: Signposts 
on the Road to Transformation’, in Weilemann, p. 183.
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in particular -  albeit later and perhaps with lesser impact. Just as their 
backwardness relative to the West separates them from the West, so does 
the ir re lative advancement over the East again d ifferentia te  them.^^
Historical development, and policies derived from an in terpretation  
of that development, then, created an identifiable region. These criteria , 
however, should have meant that East Germany was included in post- 
Communist Central Europe. I t  was, however, largely excluded.
Germany
The impact of German reunification on Czechoslovakia in general and on 
Czechoslovak foreign policy in particular was given some consideration in 
chapter 4. I t  is necessary here to consider how East Germany would have 
fitted  into the context of regional co-operation.
The solidarity manifested in relations between Czechoslovak and 
Polish dissidents did not extend to East Germans. Czech-born Jacques 
Rupnik refers to Polish dissident newspaper Nowa Koalicija as asserting  
that 'the natural representative of the Interests of East German citizens 
is the German Federal Republic’, which takes to signify 'a Central 
Europe without Germans’. Poles also fe lt that the German rapprochment of 
the 1980s did not extend to freedom for P o l e s . T h u s ,  common belief 
and personal comradery was lacking to ensure East Germany’s inclusion in
See Daniel Chirot (ed.). The Origins o f Backwardness In Eastern Europe. 
See Anton Spiesz, 'Czechoslovakia’s Place in the Agrarian Development of 
Middle and East Europe in Modern Times’, Studia Historica Slovaca Vol. 6 
(1969), pp. 7-62 offers a useful counterpoint. Much of this discussion can 
also be drawn from the contributions by Schopflin, Seton-Watson, Bibo, and 
Hanak in Schopflin and Wood (eds).
- Jacques Rupnik, 'Central Europe or M itteleuropa’, in Stephen R. Graubard 
(ed.). Eastern Europe...Central Eu rope... Eu rope {Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1991), pp. 253-4.
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the creation of any type of post-Communist construct in Central 
Europe.
The role the Czechoslovak dissidents attribu ted  to Germany in the 
much larger goal of reconstructing European security: German unification  
was considered as a necessary pre-condition fo r the reassembly of the 
European continent.
Exclusion o f Other East European Countries
I t  is in the instance of the ’southeastern’ former Soviet satellites that the  
argument of historical development becomes exclusionary. At least one 
senior Romanian official acknowledged that Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia had a natural proclivity towards co-operation with each 
other. When asked at a conference in Budapest in April 1991 if Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia were not seeking regional integration to the 
exclusion of Romania, Ion Pancu, security and foreign policy adviser to 
Romanian President Iliescu replied: ’In  the wake of the disintegration of 
the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, the intention to create new structures is 
natural. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary r ig h tly  wish to strengthen  
the traditional ties that link them’."  ^ Despite Pancu’s enlightened  
comments. The Economist wrote that Romania fe lt ’h u rt to be left out’ of 
the trila te ra l Central European co-operation.^® Indeed, Romania 
occasionally suggested that the creation of the Visegrad Group was a
The Czechoslovak Foreign M inistry was preparing a jo in t position with 
East Germany on the CSCE in summer 1990.
See Dienstbier, Snëni o Evropë, chapter 5.
Budapest Domestic Service, 8 April 1991, reported as ’Policy Conference 
Delegates In terv iew ed ’, in FBIS, 15 April 1991, pp. 1-2.
® The Economist, 13 J u ly  1991.
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conspiracy against it, a part of which aimed even at including  
Transylvania, while excluding the remainder of the country.
Bulgaria acknowledged that its political development a fte r  
Communism was not as advanced as that of Poland, Hungary or 
Czechoslovakia and that it was using those three countries as a standard  
against which to measure its own progress. Bulgarian President Zhelev 
told a political party conference in June 1991 that one of the main 
measuring sticks for transition from its Communist past 'whether Bulgaria 
will no longer be apart from the three central European countries -  
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia’.-®
The international community d ifferentiated among these countries in 
the policies advanced to them. For example, Bulgaria and Romania were 
deemed ineligible for European accords at the same time as the Visegrad 
group because they were 'fu rth e r behind in their democratic, and in the  
restructu ring  of their economies’.-^ When the United States began to lift  
arms embargoes to former Communist countries in December 1991, these 
together were the f irs t beneficiaries. Similarly, France lifted visa 
requirements for the three countries on he grounds that their domestic 
political situation merited it. '  Policy decisions based on the seemingly 
'ob jective’ criteria  of historical development reinforced the perception 
that certain countries belonged inside and outside 'Central Europe’.
Dan lonescu, 'Transylvania and Romanian-Polish Relations’ , Report on 
Eastern Europe  Vol. 2 (11 October 1991), pp. 24-7.
He added 'all this depends on the new elections’. Demokratsiya, 24 June 
1991, in FBIS, 1 July 1991.
- 9 Financial Times, 22 August 1991.
Douglas L. Clarke, 'Central Europe: M ilitary Cooperation in the Triangle’, 
RFE/RL Research Report, 10 January 1992, p. 44.
Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security  (London: IISS  
Adelphi Paper No. 268, Spring 1992), p. 26.
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REGIONAL GROUPINGS
Before presuming that Poland and Hungary had no other option than to 
co-operate with Czechoslovakia, it is important to recall that both 
countries pursued regional relations based on geography and history, and 
which thereby excluded Czechoslovakia. The response to several of these 
in itiatives by Czechoslovakia’s leadership showed that it was not 
motivated purely by idealistic notions of regional identity .
Poland and the Baltic Council
The Baltic Council was a loose organisation which had its origins in the  
Nordic Council of 1952. A jo in t Swedish-Polish proposal in September 1990 
resulted in a Conference which eventually saw the participation of all 
countries bordering the Baltic: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Denmark, 
Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Russia and Poland. Another Conference 
was held in March 1992 which generated the Council of Baltic Sea States. 
The Baltic Conferences and the subsequent Council dealt prim arily with 
functional issues such as environmental and transportation issues. 
Landlocked Czechoslovakia was thus not included.
The Baltic Council was one example of how Poland was drawn away 
from cooperation with Czechoslovakia. Some commentators, such as Roman 
Szporluk in a contribution appropriately entitled T h e  Burden of History - 
Made Lighter by Geography’, encouraged the Poles to establish  
multifaceted relations with its traditional geographic neighbours of 
Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania in order to feel more in the centre of 
Europe and less on the f r i n g e s . P o l i t i c a l  developments in the areas of
Roman Szporluk, T h e  Burden of History - Made Lighter by Geography’, 
Problems of Communism (July-August 1990), pp. 45-48. See also Stephen R. 
Burant, 'International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern 
Neighbours - Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine’ , Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 45, No.
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the Soviet Union adjacent to Poland arguably demonstrated differences in 
Polish perceptions of regional relations as distinct from Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. Wrote one newspaper, 'Poland is interested in joining the  
Pentagonal group, but the Baltic unrest shows that its historical and 
geographic values are d ifferen t from those of central Europe’.-^
'Inherent' Polish geographic links to regions with which Czechoslovakia 
had less contact turned geography against it.
Federation Foregone: Czechoslovak-Polish Relations
One possible form of regional relations to f it  Czechoslovak rhetoric about 
regional cooperation and even confederation was rejected by its 
leadership because it threatened the country's sovereignty and the
overall Czechoslovak ambition to redesign Europe. This was the idea of a
Polish-Czechoslovak federation.
I f  grounds exist to argue that common historical experience and 
culture facilitate cooperation. Czechoslovakia and Poland provide a leading  
example. The two countries were home to Uhe three West Slav 
languages'^ and until the end of the Czechoslovak federation, each 
shared its longest border with the other.
The idea of binding together the three countries, and in particular
the two Slav states, found support among many observers as well as from 
historical antecedents. Polish-born former National Security advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski suggested on 2 January 1990 on Radio Warsaw that, 
because of the 'geopolitical and economic situation’, Poland and
3 (1993), pp. 395-418.
Roger Boyles, 'East Europe Split on Baltic Unrest', Times, 18 January 1991.
‘ Excluding Croatian and Slovenian, and deceased Upper and Lower 
Liisatian.
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Czechoslovakia should form a f e d e r a t i o n . T h e  proposal found popularity  
in some Polish circles and provoked ’intense political discussion’ in 
advance of Havel’s v i s i t . D i e n s t b i e r  noted, in spite of an in terlude of 
four decades, the undiminished valid ity  of a regional proposal made by 
the Beneâ g o v e r n m e n t - in - e x i le .T h e  precursors date even to 1918, 
when Masaryk suggested to the Czechoslovak National Assembly that: ’A 
common fro n tie r and similar history prompt us to political friendship with 
Poland. I have had a great deal of discussion with the Polish leaders. We 
even considered a federation...’ . Masaryk concluded instead, as his 
successors did in 1990, that ’in the near fu tu re  each nation is like ly  to 
face much constructive work of its own and that it would be better not 
to complicate matters at this point’.
Senior Polish dissident leaders were interviewed by the  
Czechoslovak media in 1990 on the possibilities of cooperation. The 
universal view was that such cooperation was highly desirable and 
f e a s ib le .S im i la r l y ,  Polish journalists Gazeta Wyborcza asked Dienstbier 
about the curren t significance of the previous meetings in the Tatra  
mountains between Polish and Czech dissident who now hold positions of 
power. Dienstbier replied that ’I  th ink that the friendship that was 
established years ago will now benefit both countries’.'^  ^ Even so.
35 In ternational Herald Tribune, 4 January 1990.
Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, ’Havel in Poland: Beyond B ilateral Relations’, 
Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 1, No. 7 (16 February 1990), p. 37.
J ifi Dienstbier, ’Central Europe’s Security ’, Foreign Policy  83 (Summer 
1991), p. 121.
Speech to the National Assembly, on 22 December 1918, reproduced in 
George J. Kovtun, (ed).. The S p irit o f Thomas G. Masaryk (1850-1937). An 
Anthology (London: Macmillan in association with the Masaryk Publications 
Trust, 1990), p. 197.
See, for example, the interviews with Bronislav Geremek and even General 
Wojciech Jaruzelski in Lidové noviny.
Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 December 1989, in  FBIS, 2 Ja n u a ry  1990.
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Dienstbier was opposed to the idea of federations generally. He wrote 'the  
creation of a m ilitary-political minibloc or the formation of confederations 
or similar entities offers no greater promise of s tab ility ’.
Confederation aside, even basic forms of co-operation between 
Czechoslovakia and Poland seemed in fact to have deteriorated after 1989. 
Cultural contacts apparently disappeared, with Polish newspapers no 
longer available in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak leaders were also 
criticised for tardiness in opening the Czechoslovak-Polish frontier.
Bilateral relations between the two countries continued to develop, 
with agreements on economic co-operation and settlement of outstanding  
d e b t s , a s  well as m ilitary co-operation,^"^ but any notion of 
confederation received little  public or political support. Prague’s inability  
to keep the Czechoslovak federation together a fte r the June 1992 elections 
underscored the unlikelihood of that country forming a federation with 
any other country.
Czechoslovak-Polish relations demonstrated that there were 
limitations to the extent to which Czechoslovakia was willing to integrate  
with a neighbour. I t  made this calculation not on the basis of common 
cultural identity  or as an antidote to regional tensions, but on the 
practical implications to itself of such an arrangement.
Hungary and Regional Relations
Hungary, like Poland, undertook to co-operate with its other immediate 
neighbours, both on a m ultilateral and, in the case of Austria in
Dienstbier, 'Central Europe’s Security ’, p. 122.
See the le tter to the editor, 'Polsko a My’, Lidové noviny.
See for example, the agreement signed on 14 December 1990; reported in 
Lidové noviny, 15 December 1990.
Discussed in the section on regional m ilitary arrangements, below.
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particular, on a bilateral basis. M ultilateral cooperation included the  
Alpen-Adria Working Group, initiated in 1978. Conceived as a sub-state  
forum, it orig inally consisted of five  Austrian Lander, three Western 
provinces of Hungary, four northern regions of Ita ly  and Bavaria. The 
Group sought to develop regional co-operation on matters including  
’tourism, energy, the environment, transport, sport and cu ltu re ’.
On 11 November 1989, in the wake of the breeching of the Berlin 
Wall, the Alpen-Adria Foreign Ministers met in Budapest and announced 
the creation of a larger, national- ra ther than regional-based entity . 
Czechoslovakia entered the Group in May 1990 and a heads of government 
meeting was convened in July and, in recognition of the Ita lian  impetus 
behind the creation of the Group, it adopted the name Pentagonale. 
Thereafter, Poland also joined, resulting in the name Hexagonale.
The Czechoslovak government’s use of geography in the foreign  
policy of regional relations is evident on its view of the competing bodies 
of the Pentagonal Group and the Baltic Council. ’For some time, 
Czechoslovakia was hesitant about Poland’s intended partic ipation’ in the 
Pentagonale, due in part because Czechoslovakia sought ’to play the 
profitable role of middle-man between the Danube/Adriatic commonwealth 
and the envisaged commonwealth of the Baltic states, which included 
Poland’. H a v e l  was seen as suggesting Poland’s admission and of 
proposing both the Baltic and Hexagonale cooperation so that 
’Czechoslovakia, conveniently situated, would be the geographical and 
cultural link between the two’."^  ^ Because the Baltic Council and the 
Alpen-Adria Community were explicitly organised around geographic 
commonalities they tended to exclude Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia,
The Economist, 13 July 1991. 
Zielonka, Security, p. 42.
’ In te rv ie w  w ith  Havel, The F inanc ia l Times, 19 March 1990.
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however, not only recognised this fact, but f irs t  undertook to gain 
membership and then to use its own position to its advantage.
While the Pentagonale was inspired by the legacy of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, it was also meant to serve as a geopolitical tool. Italian  
Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis said regional groups such as the  
Pentagonale were not at odds with the Helsinki P r o c e s s . B u t ,  
nevertheless, he said the Pentagonale 'was to serve as a vehicle for 
Italian influence as well as a barrier to German expansion into post­
communist Central E u r o p e ' . A n  editorial in the generally pro-leadership  
Czech daily Lidové noviny  also commented that the Pentagonal Group was 
a counterweight to united Germany, a s trik ing  suggestion in view of 
Havel's unanxious attitude to the impact of German unification on 
Czechoslovakia.
The lack of development in these organisations in the duration of 
the Czechoslovak federation meant that they did not pose d irect 
challenges to Prague. The Baltic Council failed to institutionalise itse lf in 
the period under study, thereby avoiding a situation whereby Poland 
would have divided its loyalty between regional organisations. This 
served Czechoslovakia, as Havel could consent to the inclusion of Poland 
in the Pentagonale. Thus, Czechoslovakia was able to retain a position of 
geographic middleman and potentially to reinforce its position in the 
region by making use of its central location.
Havel may have been inspired in his plans for regional cooperation 
by humanist notions and by imagined ideals of the Austro-Hungarian  
Empire. Nevertheless, Czechoslovak policy also indicated a recognition of 
several geographic contingencies. F irst, Czechoslovakia sought to avoid
Rude pravo, 27 April 1991.
 ^ The Economist, 13 July 1991.
L idové n ov iny , 23 May 1990.
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exclusion or isolation, this seeking membership in organisations which 
operated in geographic vicinities which did not immediately include 
Czechoslovakia, such as the Baltic or the Alpen-Adria. Second, some have 
suggested that Czechoslovakia sought to create a regional role for itself 
by being the middle ground between such regional organisations. Third , 
Czechoslovakia’s hesitation regarding federation with Poland, despite close 
personal contacts between the two national leaderships and historical 
pedigree to the idea, stemmed from a fear of being overwhelmed by a 
demographically and te rrito ria lly  larger state. Thus, Czechoslovakia’s 
regional relations operated on a basis of certain ideas as well as an 
awareness of geographic limitations and possibilities.
The origins and operation of what is considered the most successful 
form of post-Communist regional relations fu rth e r demonstrates the  
combination of these tendencies. The chapter now turns to the Visegrad 
Group.
IDEAS, GEOGRAPHY AND THE VISEGRAD GROUP
What became known as the Visegrad Group or Visegrad Triangle was 
considered the most successful form of post-Communist regional 
cooperation. Observers have called it the ’most in fluentia l’ of the new 
regional groupings, ’the most significant attempt at regional cooperation 
in East Central Europe to date’, and said that it  ’marked an en tire ly  new 
kind of security mechanism’. T h e  Declaration of the Visegrad Summit of 
15 February 1991 auspiciously proclaimed ’a new pattern of relations in 
Central Europe’. Its  aims were ambitious, if  not also somewhat idealistic.
Adrian Hyde-Price, The In ternational Politics o f East Central Europe 
(Manchester: Manchester U n ivers ity  Press, 1996), p. 122; and Joshua Spero, 
'The Budapest-Prague-Warsaw Triangle’, European Security  Vol. 1, No. 1 
(Spring 1992), p. 58.
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including the transcendence of ethnic hatred and political r iv a lry  that
characterised Central Europe:
Building on the most important elements of the European tradition, 
a society of people, working together in harmony, must be brought 
about which, supported by individual national identities, is 
committed to universal human values. This society - free  of hatred, 
nationalism, xenophobia, and hostility to its neighbours -  is tolerant 
towards the individual, the family, and towards local, regional, and 
national communities.^^
Havel expressed his hopes for cooperation between Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia in his address to the Polish Sejm: 'Before us is a historic
opportunity to fill a large political vacuum created in Central Europe
afte r the fall of the Hapsburgs’. He proposed that a 'federation' be
created, although he added, that it was not yet known what shape it
might take. He then drew parallels with Central European dissident
solidarity and said that instead of competing against one another for
Western institutional memberships, 'we should do ju s t the opposite: help
each other in the sp irit of that solidarity with which in worse times you
protested against our repression and we against yours’.
Such references to dissident solidarity, however, existed alongside
Czechoslovakia’s concern that geography night work against it.
Czechoslovakia issued a memorandum in February 1990 which was seen as
establishing the basis for Visegrad cooperation. The memorandum’s firs t
aim, however, was to achieve the country’s membership in the Alpen-Adria
group.
In  his January 1990 addresses to the Polish and Hungarian 
Parliaments, Havel called for the three countries, along with Ita ly  and 
Austria as observers, to meet in Bratislava. A meeting was held in the
'Declaration of the Cooperation of the Republic of Hungary, the Czech and 
Slovak Republic and the Republic of Poland on the Road to European 
In tegration ’, in Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 9 (1 March 1991), pp. 
31-2.
“ In ternational Herald Tribune, 26 January 1990.
* Tbkés, 'From Visegrad,’ p. 103.
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Slovak capital in April 1990. There were no tangible results from it, 
although this was more the result of problems specific to that meeting 
rather than the inability of Central European cooperation to occur. The 
ability  of the meeting to generate meaningful results was hampered 
because of differences in the types of representatives sent. Poland was 
represented by Communist General Jaruzelski who had not yet vacated the  
Presidency to Lech Walesa. The Hungarian delegation was headed by 
reform Communists who had ju s t been defeated in that country ’s f irs t  
free post-Communist elections.
The meeting was considered a hastily arranged a ffa ir. As one 
commentator wrote, T h e  host country did not have much of an agenda, 
the Ita lian and the Austrian spokesmen did not have much to say, and 
the "born-again democrat", then Hungarian foreign minister Gyula Horn 
said even less...’ ."" Others noted that the meeting was marred by 
personality conflicts. For all these problems, however, it began the 
process of sustained regional consultation, one not paralleled by any 
other regional formation.
Whatever the impetus, the meetings of officials became more regular, 
the m ilitary, economic and political a ffa irs  of the three being discussed 
jo in tly  throughout later 1990 and 1991, paving the way for more senior 
meetings. In  February 1991, the three national leaders convened for a 
meeting which was officially called a Summit. I t  was held in the traditional 
residence of Hungarian kings, whereupon Havel’s ’Bratislava Process’ took 
the name of the location as its own and became the Visegrad Group.
The Visegrad Summit saw a jo in t declaration by the three pledging  
mutual support for membership in West European institutions. Stressing  
that the three countries belonged to the cu ltural and political traditions  
of Western Europe, the Declaration:
Ib id . For a Czech account, see L idové  n o v in y , 10 A p r i l 1990.
258
I t  is the conviction of the signatory state that the ir cooperation, in 
view of the political, economic, and social challenges facing them 
and in view of the ir efforts  for renewal on a democratic basis, is 
an important step towards the integration of the whole of 
Europe.^®
Thus, not only were the Visegrad countries historical descendants of 
European historical developments, they were also contributing to the  
realisation of Europe’s political destiny.
A second ’summit’ of Presidents and senior Ministers was held in 
Krakow on 5-6 October 1991.^^ A th ird  Summit was held in Prague in 
May 1992, and was considered by some to have been the most 
successful.^® Again, the Group’s communiqué spoke of ’a new pattern of 
relations’ in the region.
In  April 1992 agreement in principle was achieved among the 
Triangle for a Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). 
Negotiations proceeded slowly in the course of that year but were 
concluded in December. Asked in September 1995 the extent to which the  
sp irit of Visegrad cooperation still existed, Dienstbier exclaimed ’Look at 
CEFTA: Visgrad lives!’®- But, as we shall see, it is precisely the 
limitations on CEFTA that illustrate  the political limitations of Central 
European cooperation.
GEOPOLITICS AND VISEGRAD COOPERATION
As much as the antecedents for regional cooperation came from the region 
itself, the motivation and the impetus for it came from the recognition by
'Declaration of the Cooperation of the Republic of Hungary, the Czech and 
Slovak Republic and the Republic of Poland on the Road to European 
In tegration ’, in Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 9 (1 March 1991), pp. 
31-2.
See Jan B. de Weydenthal, ’The Cracow Summit’, Report on Eastern Europe 
Vol. 2, No. 43 (25 October 1991), pp. 27-9.
® Hyde-Price, In ternational Politics, p. 125.
“ Interview  with Dienstbier.
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its leaders of the influence of outside forces. The extent and nature of 
regional cooperation in defence, economics and political lobbying was 
overwhelmingly conditioned by these influences.
Defence and Security Policy
The Visegrad Group co-operation was encouraged by th e ir recognition of 
threats from the Soviet Union as demonstrated by the Baltic crackdown of 
January 1991 and the August Coup. Indeed, it  was suggested that the 
impetus for Visegrad may even have come out of Soviet m ultilateral 
structures. The inspiration for cooperation did not come from the group 
itself, for all of Havel’s intentions. Instead, ironically, some would maintain 
that it was not the Bratislava Meeting itself, but ra th er the 7 June 1990 
WTO meeting in Moscow which 'gave b irth  to what became the working  
trila te ra l relationship...’. This was due, firs t, to Hungarian Prime Minister 
AntalTs 'courageous decision to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, Poles and 
Czechoslovaks had the opportunity to experience firsthand what political 
will can accomplish in face of expected Soviet opposition. Second, work in 
the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee between June and 
November 1990 brought the three states together in a negotiating  
environment that enabled them to c larify  the commonalities in the ir  
security needs and juxtapose those needs to those of Moscow
Later events in the Soviet Union underscored for the Central 
European states the ir common exposure and weakness, and made them 
more will to cooperate. As discussed in chapter 5, in January 1991, Soviet 
security forces, attacked nationalist protestors in Vilnius and Riga, 
starkly  suggesting that the Soviet Union was revertin g  to the violent 
suppression of independence movements. The three Central European
Tbkés, 'From Visegrad’, pp. 103-04.
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Foreign Ministers convened a meeting in Budapest on 21 January in 
response to these events. I t  was then that 'the decision to firm up the  
agenda for the Visegrad summit was made’.®^
The Baltic crackdown also changed Czechoslovak policy toward the 
Soviet Union, which brought its position more in line with Hungary’s, 
thereby aiding the creation of a common position. Reversing its previous  
willingness to extend humanist principles to the Gorbachev leadership, 
Czechoslovakia declared clearly its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw 
Pact. As will be discussed in chapter 7, Prague had originally expected 
the Warsaw Pact to evolve from a m ilitary into a political organisation, 
which with NATO could then be collapsed into a pan-European security  
system.
In this context, the Czechoslovak government made use of the  
shared geopolitical concerns of the Visegrad Group to achieve its 
objectives. A fter consultations in Budapest with his two counterparts on 
21 January 1991, Dienstbier announced that they were pressing for a new 
meeting with Moscow to end the Pact, which the Soviet Union had 
postponed since November 1990. - Visegrad Group cooperation was also 
considered to have been significant, although not to as great an extent as 
for the Warsaw Pact, in achieving the termination of the CMEA.®^
Because of their reaction to Soviet policy, the Visegrad Three  
coordinated the ir position on larger m ilitary-political issues. For example, 
the jo in t proposals of the Three for the division of WTO conventional 
weapons authorised for the whole bloc under the CFE Treaty were
'Hungarian, Polish, CSFR Foreign Ministers Meet’, Budapest Domestic 
Service, 21 January 1991, FBIS, 25 January 1991, p. 1.
See 'Soviet Union Pressed for Early Talks on Fate of Warsaw Pact’, The 
Financial Times, 22 January 1991.
Tokés, 'From Visegrad’, p. 106. Also see TASS, 27 February 1991, in FB IS - 
SOV, March 1, 1991, p. 3.
261
credited as 'instrum ental in overcoming the e leventh-hour Soviet 
intransigence that threatened these negotiations’.®^
The 'August Coup’ of 1991 also provided a stimulus to regional 
cooperation. An emergency meeting of Deputy Ministers and other senior 
officials was convened in Warsaw on 20 August, with the result that 'the  
decisions were prompt and firm ’. A summit meeting was to be held the 
next day (which was subsequently rescheduled for October once the coup 
disintegrated). Official tr ila te ra l structures were created in the form of 
the deputy ministerial Standing Committee to coordinate the Three, 
particu larly  on security issues, as well as a working group on migration 
in anticipation of a mass influx of refugees from the USSR. 'The meeting 
also agreed on the principal points of letters that Walesa, Havel and 
Antall were to send to the EC and other Western leaders’. The impact of 
the coup on regional cooperation continued with other measures enacted 
'to widen and deepen trila te ra l cooperation’. Czechoslovak Defense Minister 
LuboS Dobrovskÿ said that the Visegrad Group countries were going to 
'coordinate all m ilitary activities, including modernizing the m ilitary  
equipment of the Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian m ilitaries’.®® Thus, 
the impetus for cooperation came from the need to 'co-operate on 
economics and security -  not least to give them stronger bargaining  
powers in dealings with the Soviet Union’.®®
Only when external influences prompted m ilitary cooperation among 
the Visegrad countries did they act together trila te ra lly  in a meaningful 
way. Otherwise, they sought bilateral m ilitary agreements, and this was 
out of geopolitical recognition of th e ir position in Europe. Certainly, there  
were occasions of trila te ra l discussions. In  September 1990, for example.
®"^ Douglas L. Clarke, 'Central Europe: M ilitary Cooperation in the Triangle’, 
RFE/RL, Research Report, 10 January 1992.
®® Rzeczpospolita 9 September 1991, in FBIS, 16 Sept. 1991, pp. 12-13.
®® The Economist, 13 J u ly  1991.
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the civilian deputy Defense Ministers of the three countries held 
consultations in the southern Polish city of Zakopane. At Visegrad, the 
three Presidents agreed to confer on defense matters. At Krakow on 2 
August 1991, Defense Ministers finalised a proposal to coordinate defense, 
ju s t in time that an emergency meeting could be held less than three  
weeks later in order to develop jo in tly  responses to the Soviet coup.
Central European officials, however, were keenly sensitive to the  
geopolitical limits of the ir co-operation. At the Krakow meeting of Visegrad 
Defense Ministers 2 August 1991, Dobrovskÿ qualified th e ir in itiative, 
stating that the meeting did not signify the establishment of a ’m ilitary  
minibloc’ but ra th er ’an agreement on co-ordinated ac tiv ity  of the three  
countries’ armies’. To underscore the functional limitations placed on 
m ilitary co-operation, it was announced that the three countries would not 
undertake jo in t m ilitary exercises. Dobrovskÿ added that the agreement 
resulting from the Summit was predominantly concerned with economic 
m a tte r s .M o r e  te llingly , the three countries only signed bilateral 
m ilitary agreements. When there was any suggestion of a formal trila te ra l 
m ilitary cooperation, Czechoslovak officials were quick to re itera te  that 
formal m ilitary cooperation was s tric tly  bilateral.®®
The explanation for this behaviour lay in the region’s perceptions 
of how both NATO and the Soviet Union viewed Central European security  
cooperation. By 1991, Czechoslovakia, along with both Poland and Hungary, 
sought formal security guarantees from the West. But they were cognisant 
of NATO’s hesitation about offering such a guarantee, let alone extending 
formal Alliance membership to them. Creating an effective  military
CtK 2 August 1991, in SWB, 10 August 1991.
Response to author’s paper at the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, U niversity of London, 7 March 1992, by Dr Svatopluk Buchlovskÿ, 
Director of the European Security Department, Czechoslovak Foreign 
Ministry.
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structure  of their own would doubtless have removed the pressure on 
NATO to o ffer a meaningful security guarantee.
From the Soviet Union’s viewpoint, an integrated m ilitary structure  
in Central Europe, keen on membership in NATO, represented a threat on 
its doorstep. For these reasons, then, Czechoslovak officials were adamant 
that m ilitary agreements in Central Europe were s tric tly  bilateral, and did 
not amount to any sort of ’bloc’.
Economics
Shortly a fte r the 1989 revolutions Western countries encouraged regional 
economic cooperation. On 7 February 1990, US Secretary of State James 
Baker delivered a w ell-crafted speech at Charles U n ivers ity  in Prague. He 
said the United States welcomed the discussions on economic co-operation, 
and he lauded the possibility of a fre e -trad e  agreement, facilitating  
unrestricted movement of capital and labour, the development of 
corresponding financial systems, and the introduction of a convertible  
accounting unit. ’Economic integration’, he explicated, ’can enhance 
efficiency and growth. Common in fras tru ctu re  projects can assure 
compatible communication, transport, and energy networks’.®® Despite 
Western effo rts  to advance the benefits of economic cooperation for its 
own sake, domestic political agendas and economic realities meant that 
economic synchronisation would be limited and that agreements were 
largely the result of outside pressures.
Thus, as with defence, co-operation among the Visegrad Three was 
limited by considerations emanating from outside the region. Janos 
Czibula, departmental head in the Hungarian M inistry of International 
Economic Relations, said that any free trade agreement among the three
Baker, 7 F e b ru a ry  1990, p. 10.
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countries must concur with the present negotiations of the three with the  
EC. ° This might have reflected Hungary’s hesitation to become too 
closely aligned to countries it deemed economically weaker.
An announcement was made in April 1992 that the three would begin 
preparations for creating a ’new free  trade area’, with the three Foreign  
Ministers to meet in Budapest later in that year to ’remove trade  
b arrie rs ’."^  A long and slow process of negotiation began, which 
surprised observers when it fina lly  resulted in agreement in December 
1991."^ Again, concern was that success in this realm, if  indeed 
achievable, would undermine the efforts  of the Visegrad Group to gain EC 
membership.
The Central European Free Trade Agreement has been called the 
’f irs t  tru ly  pragmatic measure’ by the Visegrad g ro u p .N e v e rth e le s s ,  
none of its provisions exceed the demands or expectations that 
membership in the EC would dictate. Again, the extent of regional 
cooperation was motivated by outside conditioning. The lack of regional 
impetus was evident from the fact that no measures were taken to exceed 
the scope or timing of regional e c o n o m ic  oo per at ion that external 
pressure prescribed.
Lobbying
MTI, 26 July 1991, in SWB, 8 August 1991.
By contrast, Poland favoured greater trila te ra l economic cooperation, for 
example, wanting proposed trila te ra l economic agreements to become effective  
by 1 January 1992.
The Daily Telegraph, 22 April 1992.
Karoly Okolicsanyi, ’The Visegrad Traingle’s Free-Trade Zone’, RFE/RL 
Research Report Vol. 2, no. 3 (15 January 1993), pp. 19-22.
Ib id ., p. 22.
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Cooperation in security and economy illustrated the impact of outside 
influences on the extent of regional cooperation. Group efforts  proved 
beneficial in aspects of lobbying, particu larly  in relation to the EC and 
the CSCE. The benefits of concerted efforts  by the Visegrad group in 
gaining better or quicker concessions from the EC are d ifficu lt to judge. 
The th inking w ithin the EC itself and within the governments and the 
publics of its member states on the breath and depth of EC membership 
was often equivocal or mercurial. The pragmatism of Central European 
cooperation, particu larly  in relations with West European institutions, 
coincided with Havel’s references to a supranational Central European 
culture. To the Polish Sejm, Havel stated ' I f  we were to re tu rn  to Europe 
indiv idually it would certa in ly  take much longer and it would be much 
more complicated than if we act together’. T h i s  proved to be a tactical 
and realistic assessment, as the EC sought to retain  barriers  on Central 
Europe’s three most competitive exports: textiles, steel, and agricu lture  
produce. Coordinated bargaining by the Three was credited with 
successes in the negotiations with the EC.
Joint lobbying was also a feature in Czechoslovak policy towards 
the CSCE. Under Havel, Czechoslovakia saw the CSCE as a crucial 
institution. The potential to use the CSCE as a European-wide forum was 
advocated by several states, including some from Central and Eastern  
Europe.
Czechoslovakia harnessed the Visegrad Group in order to add voices 
to its aims. This is not to say that the three countries had inherently  
differen t objectives, but this organisation, based on perceptions of 
geopolitics, allowed for synchronised external policies. One such example 
was their proposal for Japan to be granted observer status at the CSCE. 
At the 6 May 1992 Visegrad meeting of Central European Presidents, Antall
In te rn a tio n a l Herald T ribune, 26 Jan u a ry  1990.
266
and Walesa 'expressed the ir support for the Czechoslovak idea of 
associate membership for Japan, and the three countries also intended to 
raise at the CSCE the idea of forming CSCE peace-keeping units, possibly 
using NATO resources’/^  The Czechoslovak leadership pursued its vision 
of European security through bilateral talks with major powers, it also 
mobilised the Visegrad Group to that end as well.
OBSTACLES OVERCOME TO MAKE THE VISEGRAD GROUP WORK
An assessment of the
numerous challenges which the Visegrad Group had to overcome in order 
to achieve it successes helps to determine how important dissident ideas 
and an understanding of geography were to its operation. As Timothy 
Garton Ash wrote in mid-July 1990, 'between Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, the present rea lity  is as much that of competition as it is 
of co-operation; the fact that they have common problems does not 
necessarily mean they have common solutions’. "
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
Each of these countries pursued its own domestic agenda. While sharing  
the legacy of socialist rule, each sought to do in a somewhat d ifferen t 
way. Post-Communist Poland and Hungary were both described, perhaps 
acceptably, as 'deeply self-absorbed’ a fact which did 'not bode good for 
the broad Czechoslovak vision’ advanced by Havel.
Summary of Radio Czechoslovakia broadcasts [date and time not given], 
in SWB, 8 May 1992.
Timothy Garton Ash, 'Blindly Smitten by Democracy: Central Europeans 
Attracted by Change May Not Foresee All The Dangers’, The Independent, 5 
July 1990.
In te rv ie w  w ith  Havel, The Guardian, 15 Septem ber 1990.
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Havel called in January 1990 for a united approach to Western 
institutional memberships, a policy endorsed by subsequent Visegrad 
declarations. Nevertheless, domestic agendas dictated a level of 
competition among the Three. While the Hungarian daily Magyar Nemzet 
noted that the three Central European countries had no ’systematic 
anomaly’ and therefore the Visegrad Group ’might have better prospects’ 
than the varied Pentagonale,^® Hungary saw itself as economically more 
advanced than Poland or Czechoslovakia, and therefore eligible for earlier 
membership in the EC. In  addition, while apparently interested in regional 
economic co-operation, Hungarian officials were quick to indicate the  
economic insignificance of co-operation. For example, Hungary’s 
In ternational Economic Relations Minister Bela Kâdâr was asked to what 
extent Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia had prepared for a currency  
or customs agreement. He replied: ’We have moved closer in political 
cooperation with these two countries -  indeed, we have a kind of Central 
European common fate at play -  but we must clearly see that the share of 
Czechoslovakia and Poland in Hungary’s foreign trade was hard ly  5 
percent in 1990 and will not be greater this year [1991] either; rather, if 
anything, it will be less’.®®
Another example of a national p rio rity  undermining regional 
cooperation was the dispute between Hungary and Czechoslovakia over the 
GabCikovo-Nagymoros dam. The Hungarian withdrawal from the vast 1977 
hydroelectric project ’jeopardisefd] the new relationship’ of the Visegrad 
Group. In  addition to the ecological and indeed national question the dam 
provoked (physically slicing apart the Hungarian minority of southern
Maygar Nemzet, 2 March 1992, cited in Haba, ’Central European’, p. 71, 
-® KR, 7 July 1991, in FBIS, 8 July 1991.
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Slovakia), the resulting diversion of the Danube also threatened a de 
facto  revision of the Hungarian-Slovak border.®^
As we saw earlier, the success of the Bratislava meeting in April 
1990 was hampered by the mix of old Communists and new dissidents 
present as representatives. Even among former dissidents, however, 
personality problems caused d ifficu lt relations, as occurred between Havel 
and Walesa. A biographer of Havel anticipated in September 1990 that 
were Walesa to become the Polish president, ’the chemistry at bilateral 
head of state level will be almost unworkable.®^
Walesa was apparently jealous that Havel became Czechoslovak 
president already in December 1989 merely by an uncontested vote in the  
Federal Assembly, while Walesa, was forced to await Jaruzelski’s 
resignation in September 1990 and then face a national vote.®®
Personality differences emerged when Havel visited Poland on 25 January  
1990. According to one organiser of Havel’s trip , he had limited time and 
could only go Warsaw. Walesa refused to trave l from Gdansk to meet him, 
despite the pleading of close associates and members of the Czechoslovak- 
Polish solidarity movement of the 1980s. The inability  of Walesa and Havel 
to co-operate became well-known, if not also an embarrassment to both 
countries.®*^
Lack of personal cooperation appeared to affect not only relations 
between Prague and Warsaw. Personal relations between post-Communist 
Czechoslovak leaders and the ir Hungarian counterparts were not as 
intense as those with the ir Polish counterparts. The Hungarian Havel
®^ See Richard Owen, ’Hungary Risks Breach with Prague A fter Abandoning 
Dam’, The Times, 21 May 1992.
3 2 Michael Simmons interview  with Havel, The Guardian, 15 September 1990.
®® For a critical account of Walesa’s self-importance, see the biography by 
his former spokesman: Jaroslaw Kurski, Lech Walesa: Democrat or Dictator? 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
In te rv ie w  w ith  Fialkovâ-Nëm covâ. See also. The Times, 19 F e b ru a ry  1991.
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knew best and with whom he met personally during 1990 was the exiled 
w rite r Konrad, who was not directly involved in Hungarian policy-making.
Whatever co-operation the three countries achieved, it was unlikely  
to have been the result of personal loyalties or understanding.
Resurgent Nationalism
The Visegrad Declaration had the specific aim of transcending Central 
Europe’s nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies. But it was precisely this  
legacy that hindered and ultimately undermined regional cooperation.
While in name, international Communism sought to transcend national 
identities, it in fact divided the peoples of Eastern Europe. This enforced 
isolation meant that 'the old stereotypes of the in te r-w a r period have, to 
a large extent, been preserved. In  the present period, these manifest 
themselves in the a ttitude of "let each country save itself as best it 
can"’.®^
The noted Slovak dissident Miroslav Kusÿ observed before the 1989 
Revolutions 'So far, no spontaneous grassroots process of integration has 
happened since the war (in any sense comparable with the West European 
integration process) and each of us secretly hopes that it never will in 
the near fu tu re . Our mutual national antagonisms are still suffic iently  
alive as to push us in the opposite direction. Your average Slovak still 
finds the idea of a closer te rrito ria l union with Hungary unthinkable. 
Czechs and Poles are hard ly  going to form a community with the Germans, 
but then nor are the Czechs and Slovaks with the Poles, for that 
m atter...’.®® Even contacts through tourism, 'the universally  accepted 
means for d ifferen t nations to get to know each o th er’, had a negative
85 Vogel, 'CMEA’, p. 66.
®® Kusÿ, 'We, Central-European East Europeans’, in Schopflin and Wood, 
(eds), p. 92.
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effect on the nations of the region. Continued Kusÿ, 'The actual effect is 
the contrary: sharpened mutual hostility and the entrenchment of our 
division’.®^  When interviewed for this study, Kusÿ called the above piece 
'old', but evidence suggests that such an assessment is not outdated.
Some commentators may have exaggerated the threat of nationalism  
in post-Communist Central Europe. The v e ry  existence of a Hungarian  
diaspora alarms some, despite Budapest’s denial of revisionist 
ambitions.®® Others have stated, not en tire ly  correctly, that rig h t-w in g  
extremist parties have done well in all of the Visegrad countries.®® Some 
of the issues discussed above, like the GabCikovo-Nagyaros Dam, have 
been cast by Western observers in nationalist terms.®® Even though  
other commentators suggested optimistically in 1990 that the region could 
overcome its traditional problems of nationalism,®^ this is a fea tu re  of 
the region which presents substantial challenge to meaningful cooperation. 
Havel was certain ly aware of the problems of racism and nationalism. He 
condemned specifically the 'fascis t-like  hatred ’ of his countrymen of 
gypsies and Vietnamese in 1990 and generally observed manifestations of 
racism and xenophobia.®® Central European cooperation was achieved 
despite nationalistic constraints.
®^ Ib id ., pp. 96 and 95.
®® Paul Lendvai, 'What about the Hungarian Minorities?’, The World Today 
Vol. 48, No. 12 (December 1992), pp. 215-6.
®® Thomas S. Szayna, 'Ultra-Nationalism  in Central Europe’, Orbis Vol. 37, No. 
4 (Fall 1993), p. 527.
®® Vera Rich, 'The Battle of the Danube’, The World Today Vol. 48, No. 12 
(December 1992), pp. 215-7.
®^ Istvan Deâk, 'Uncovering Eastern Europe’s Dark H istory’ , Orbis Vol. 34, 
No. 1 (Winter 1990), p. 65.
®® Havel, 'Post-Com m unist N igh tm are ’ , p. 8.
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The impact of nationalism on regional cooperation was no more 
clearly  demonstrated than with the breakup of Czechoslovakia.®^ The 
fra ilty  and a rtific ia lity  of the ’Czechoslovak’ nation was exposed with the  
geopolitical shifts brought by Nazi aggression in 1939. Arguably, the  
country was retained as a unified entity  a fte r the Second World by the  
anaesthetising effect of Communism on nationalist aspirations in Eastern  
Europe. Once that lid was removed, the differences w ithin the country  
resurfaced.
The June 1992 elections in Czechoslovakia resulted in the election of 
leaders in the two constituent republics who had unreconcilable views of 
the transition to a market economy. As Prime Minister of the Czech 
Republic, the m arket-oriented Vaclav Klaus made clear that regional 
cooperation was actually a hindrance to the Czech Republic’s overall 
economic performance.
Whatever the results of Havel’s efforts to generate a common 
Central European policy on seeking Western institutional memberships, 
a fte r June 1992 Klaus discontinued such th inking.
Remarkably, also, with the split of Czechoslovakia, some participants  
in the Polish-Czechoslovak solidarity of the 1980s and supporters of post- 
Communist regional cooperation believed that it could not function because 
Poland had become re la tive ly  too big.®® Thus, the notion of supranational 
iden tity  and cooperation had been stunted by realpoHtik  calculations of 
size and power.
®® Jeffrey  Simon, ’Czechoslovakia’s "Velvet Divorce", Visegrad Cohesion, and 
European Faultlines’, European Security  Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 482- 
500. For the breakup generally, see Bibliography, section 16.
®"^ See chapter 3.
®® In te rv ie w  w ith  F ialkovâ-Nëm covâ, 13 September 1995.
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Regional relations were the result of Havel’s recognition of geographic 
possibilities and limitations, as well as dissident th inking  and experience. 
I t  is the one area of post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign policy on which 
both selection and execution of policy was based on geographic factors, 
and as a result, Havel was able to make some of Czechoslovakia’s most 
important foreign policy achievements. And this was in face of other 
obstacles, including competing domestic agendas and personality conflicts 
among the Visegrad leaders. Central European leaders shaped the ir  
policies around how they understood Western and Soviet governments to 
view their geopolitical place in Europe. Thus, not even the semblance of 
formal trila te ra l m ilitary cooperation was permitted for fear of alarming 
the Soviet Union or of relieving NATO of any sense of responsibility  
towards the region.
The construct of a regional foreign policy and its use in wider 
affa irs denotes a recognition of the uses and limitations of geography.
The specific use of geography as the basis for policy is, however, 
unusual in Central Europe. Precisely because the region has always 
lacked geographic boundaries it has usually been defined by cultural 
terms, particu larly the German and Austrian conceptions of Mîtteleuropa. 
One of the assumptions of Czechoslovak policy towards its Central 
European neighbours was that the idea of a shared historical legacy 
would help to outweigh or even overcome negative features and traditions  
of the region’s history. I t  is laudable that the attempt was made. 
Ironically, one of the greatest misunderstandings of that legacy was the 
impermanence of Czechoslovakia itself, which then had a profound impact 
on the functioning of the Visegrad Group.
Suggesting that the impetuses for regional cooperation and any 
tangible results arising from it were conditioned by forces external to the 
region is not to imply that this is unusual. I f  one accepts cooperation as 
an anomaly rather than the usual in the international, then the logical
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expectation is th a t circum stance forces cooperation. M ilita ry  cooperation  
never developed in to  a ’bloc’ (w ere it  even possible) because th is  was 
seen as counterp roductive to th e  reg ion ’s re lations w ith  both W estern 
Europe and th e  Soviet Union. Even more rem arkable, th e  provisions of 
CEFTA w ent no fu rth e r than th e  conditions of th e  Association Agreem ents 
req u ired . Cooperation thus did not exceed w hat outside forces demanded 
or would to le ra te .
N evertheless, the  o rig inators o f V isegrad cooperation, and many 
analysts, have suggested th a t it  represented  a new form  of cooperation in  
C entral Europe. I t  can only be considered a new form  of cooperation to  
th e  exten t th a t th e  m otivations fo r its  b irth  and subsequent successes 
and fa ilu res  w ere influenced so considerably by outside forces. The 
rh e to ric a l emphasis on the qu a lita tive  novelty  of V isegrad cooperation may 
be the only end uring  fea tu re  o f Czechoslovakia’s idealism  in its  reg ional 
policy.
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CHAPTER 7
IMPLEMENTING IDEAS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF GEOPOLITICS 
FROM THE SECOND 'NEW EUROPE’
One of Josef Lada’s cartoons illustrating  The Good Soldier § v e jk  features  
the incapacitated Czech character being pushed in a wheelchair, flailing  
his crutches, and exclaiming his intention to enlist in the Austro- 
Hungarian Army to fig h t in the Great War.^ The original cartoon was 
reproduced in a December 1990 issue of the intellectual newspaper 
L ite ra rn i noviny; now, however, instead of declaring 'To Belgrade, to 
Belgrade’, the dilapidated ève jk  proclaims 'To Europe’.^
Rather than seeing itself or its citizens as u n fit to re jo in  Europe, 
the post-Communist Czechoslovak government asserted the country ’s 
r ig h tfu l place in it. Accordingly, like Masaryk’s aims for the 'New Europe’ 
afte r the F irs t World War,^ Havel’s proposals for a second New Europe 
a fte r 1989 were ambitious and far-reach ing . These proposals illustrated  
the overall 'c iv ic’ nature of Havel’s foreign policy: to redemocratise 
European politics and security. This was to be done in principle through  
the elimination of power politics and an emphasis on the ru le  of law and 
respect for human rights , and in practice by stressing the institutions  
which the Czechoslovak leadership believed represented and embodied 
these values, particu larly  the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, as well as the Council of Europe and the European Community. 
According to the post-Communist Czechoslovak leadership, NATO and the  
WTO should be transformed into political entities, and then collapsed into 
an invigorated Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
 ^ The cartoon appears in the chapter 'Svejk Jde na vo jn u ’, in Jaroslav 
HaSek, Osudy dobrého vojaka Svejka za svëtové va lky  (Praha: 
Ceskoslovensky spisovatel, 1990), part 1, p. 72.
 ^ L ite ra rn i nov iny , 13 December 1990.
 ^ See chapter 1.
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which would be transformed into a pan-European post-security  structure.
These aims were complex and both th e ir content and the strategy  
used to achieve them were compelled to change during the time under 
study. Because of the changing conditions, this chapter will f irs t  offer an 
account of the post-Communist Czechoslovak leadership’s proposals for the  
New Europe. I t  will then discuss Czechoslovakia’s positions on the various 
main institutions. Thereafter the interconnections of these policies and the 
problems that arose will be considered.
Much lite ra tu re  has been generated to contemplate post-Cold War 
European security. I t  is not the aim of this chapter to summarise, critique  
or advance on this material. While the chapter draws on such lite ra tu re  in 
order to offer contrasts of opinions and perceptions, the emphasis rests 
on the Czechoslovak conception of the ’New’ Europe and how it was 
forced to change in form and content.
I t  is also not meant to suggest here that Western institutions, 
prim arily the EC and NATO and associated structures, projected d ifferent 
policies towards Czechoslovakia than to its Central European neighbours. 
As the chapter on regional relations demonstrated, there  was at least a 
tacit, if not an overt understanding, between the Vlsegrad Group and 
Western organisations that the three countries were to be considered 
collectively and to advance jo in t positions.
PAN-EUROPEAN STRUCTURES: IDEAS AND THEIR ORIGINS
The contributions of the Havel-D ienstbier leadership to debates on post- 
Cold War Europe surpassed what might be expected from a small country  
and made Czechoslovakia a disproportionately vocal partic ipator in those 
debates. Havel was also seen as the East European leader ’who forced the
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issue of security ’ for his region by advocating the reform and
enhancement of the CSCE/
This was particu larly  strik ing because East European dissidents
generally neither contemplated foreign affa irs  nor were prepared for them
when they assumed office:
The new leaders were distinguished playw rights, journalists, labor 
leaders, museum directors, and even u n ivers ity  professors, who had 
courageously resisted communist regimes, but who, for obvious 
reasons, paid little  attention to the fu tu re  of the ir countries, to 
their respective place in the European and world order, and, last 
but not least, to th e ir foreign policy and security concerns and 
dilemmas/
By contrast, general issues of the Cold War and the Cold War division of
Europe had been debated among Czechoslovakia dissidents since the
1970s. The Czech author Milan Kundera sparked debate on the fate of
Central Europe and its historical, political and cultural place in Europe
with his 1983 essay ’Un occident kidnappe -  ou la tragédie de l’Europe
central’ .^  Dienstbier was made post-Communist Foreign Minister because
of his interest and work in world politics.
Dissident debate in Communist Czechoslovakia also drew upon the
historical example of the efforts of the F irst Republic to secure a new,
democratic, peaceable Europe. Jaroslav Sabata, who was known to have
influenced Dienstbier’s th inking on world affa irs , wrote in November 1988:
Masaryk’s important memorandum from the end of the F irs t World 
War, entitled ’The New Europe (A Slavonic Standpoint)’ is still today 
a remarkable testimony as to how European political th inking  
worked its way towards an understanding of the new era at a time 
when a crisis had already broken out at one of its extremes. 
Masaryk addressed his memorandum to the Peace Congress. He 
concentrated on try in g  to work out ways in which Eastern Europe 
(and therefore Europe as a whole) could be reorganized along
 ^ Sarah Helm, ’NATO Resists East European Request for Protection’, The 
Independent 27 April 1991.
 ^ Andrzej Korbonski, ’Facing the Legacy of Post-Stalin ist Regimes’, in Jacob 
Kipp (ed.), Central European Security Concerns (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 
p. 44.
Published in English as ’The Tragedy of Central Europe’, The New York 
Review of Books, 26 April 1984, pp. 33-8.
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democratic lines; on ways in which the political freedom of all 
nations could be en s u re d .../
I t  is not the specific content of either M asaryk’s proposal or of Sa data’s
reference to it  that it relevant here, if  only because Masaryk’s proposals
were also aimed at the restra in t of Germany. The significance lies in the
continuity of interw ar ideals and of Czechoslovak dissident concern with
global politics.
The existence of such debate does not mean that world politics were
central to Czechoslovak dissident discussions or that a coherent
programme was created or that all of the dissidents agreed with it. Milan
Simehka was derogatory about the role of European affa irs  in independent
Czechoslovak debate:
What to the West looks like the ebb and flow of a dark threatening  
tide or an alternating pattern of Cold War and detente actually  
feels to us in the East like an alternating  pattern of b ru ta l and 
less brutal forms of political culture, and the ebb and flow of the  
in ternal frustrations of the system we inhabit. This is about the  
extent of our selfish insight into European and global issues.®
In  fact, the discussion of foreign affa irs  was limited and one Prague-
based dissident organiser interviewed for th is study had not read
Dienstbier’s essays.®
The somewhat peripheral importance of world politics in
Czechoslovak dissident circles was partly  due to the nature of the
dissident movement and the way it had had to operate: its foremost
concerns were domestic and there was much d ifficu lty  in disseminating
samizdat But the re latively  limited discussion of foreign affa irs  also
represented the cleavages within the dissident community, with some
members being less urbanised and less concerned with more global and
 ^ Sabata, 'New Form of Detente’, p. 94.
® Milan Simecka, 'From Class Obsessions to Dialogue’, in Kaldor et al (eds), 
p. 351.
® Interview  with Vondra, September 1994; and interview  with Fialkova- 
N&mcova, September 1995.
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abstract issues. In  addition, what th inking there was on global politics, as 
will be seen presently, appeared to be so outlandish that Western 
publishers were hesitant to adopt the works. Dienstbier, for example, was 
to have had his main work, appropriately entitled Snèni o Evropè  
(Dreaming about Europe), published in both German and English, but the 
respective publishers decided the work was too unrealistic to market.
As discussed in chapter 2, Havel was adamant that the civic values 
the Czechoslovak dissidents advanced before 1989 were even more 
applicable once in power, a belief he extended specifically to foreign  
policy. Chapter 4 showed how Czechoslovak dissidents believed that the  
Prague Appeal of 1985 on the unification of Germany was realised in 1990. 
Dienstbier said it was a shame that his book was not published in 
Western languages because it could have provided gris t for debate on the 
restructuring  of post-Cold War Europe.
That the dissidents used 'utopian' ideas as the basis for their 
foreign policy does not mean that they were completely naive, that they  
misunderstood the nature of the Cold War and the superpower arms race. 
In  'An Anatomy of Reticence’, for example. Havel was critical of the 
Western peace movements, suggesting that proponents of disarmament, 
especially unilateral disarmament, had a flawed understanding of the 
international dilemma.
Once in office, the Czechoslovak leadership began advocating the 
removal of the tangible effects of the Cold War. Because Czechoslovak 
policy was taken to imply, especially by the US, the rapid disappearance 
of the m ilitary blocs and, with the disappearance of NATO also the
Interview  with author, 13 September 1995. 
Ib id .
Havel, 'Anatomie je dné  z d r& e n llv o s ti'.
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m ilitary commitment of the US to Europe, Havel was forced quickly to
re trea t and qualify his position.
In  Washington in February  1990, in particu lar, he suggested that he
was simply cultivating such an impression to create media attention.
Addressing a jo in t session of the US Congress, Havel declared: ' I t  is not
tru e  that the Czech w rite Vaclav Havel wants to dissolve the Warsaw Pact
tomorrow and the NATO the next day.’ Even in try in g  to diffuse American
scepticism and hostility , Havel’s qualified position nevertheless still
suggested that the m ilitary blocs would dissolve at some point.
Two months later, however, Dienstbier re iterated  to an audience in
London the need to change the nature and role of the alliances:
The allegation that the two m ilitary and political blocs wiU be a 
safeguard of peace and security in Europe fo r a long time yet is 
based on inaccurate premises. I t  is the old, ideological concept of 
conflict and the ideological concept of security and, at the same 
time, the old concept of a balance of forces...can two widely 
d ifferent ideological blocs, which moreover today find themselves in 
totally unequal positions, represent a balance of forces and, at the 
same, be a safeguard of security?^'’
This thinking became Czechoslovak policy, when on 6 April 1990, the
Foreign M inistry circulated to Embassies in Prague the Czechoslovak
Memorandum on the European Security Commission. The Memorandum
proposed a three-stage transformation of European security. In  the f irs t
stage both m ilitary alliances should be transformed into s tric tly  political
organisations. The second stage involved collapsing them into a pan-
European structure. The th ird  stage would result, presumably organically
as a corollary of the second, in a confederation of Europe. Thus,
geopolitics in Europe would be reduced simply to geographic references.
These policy changes are discussed in the section below on Havel’s views 
on the role of the US in Europe.
Dienstbier, 'From the Europe’ , pp. 6-7.
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Before proceeding with the Czechoslovak plan for a new Europe, 
and particu larly  the role of CSCE in it, it  is necessary to determine the  
place accorded to the superpowers in this programme.
The Superpowers in Czechoslovak’s New Europe’
The proposal to eliminate the m ilitary alliances from Europe might seem to 
suggest -  and was taken as such by the US -  that the Czechoslovak 
vision of the new Europe did not include the two superpowers. In  fact, 
they accorded a place to each in their vision of the new Europe. Evidence 
of Havel’s desire to retain the US and the Soviet Union in Europe came 
from his offer to host a summit of the two superpowers in Prague.
This section provides an overview of the place the Czechoslovak 
leadership attribu ted  to each of the superpowers in Europe.
The Soviet Union
I t  was shown in chapter 5 how Havel tried to have a positive attitude to 
the Soviet Union. Several of Czechoslovakia s policies aimed to keep the
Soviet Union tied to Europe. In his address to the US Congress, for
example, Havel explained that the US could help Czechoslovakia most by 
helping the Soviet Union on its 'on its irrevers ib le  but immensely 
complicated path to democracy’, and added 'The millions you give to the  
East today will re tu rn  in the form of billions in savings’. H a v e l ’s 
proposal was made more concrete by Dienstbier. In  what became known, to 
his chagrin, as the 'Harvard Plan’, he suggested the creation of an 
economic triang le  whereby Western money went to the USSR to allow it to
'Former Playwright and Czech President Havel Enjoys High Politics’, 
Associated Press, 28 February 1990.
Martin Walker, 'Havel’s Congress Play a Box Office Hit’, The Guardian', 22 
February 1990.
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purchase Central European goods, which in tu rn  would permit the ir  
economies to retool without fu ll and unsympathetic exposure to the 
in ternational market.^?
When Havel led a diplomatic mission to France, he drew for French  
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas an impressionistic sketch of Europe. A 
portion of the rig h t-end  of the map featured the Soviet U n i o n . W h i l e  
the Soviet Union was neither included in its en tire ty  nor was it given a 
central place, it was significantly still included.
Even in cu ltural terms, Havel and Dienstbier would certa in ly  re ject 
Kundera’s assertion that Russian culture did not belong in Europe.
While neither Czech leader believes in a ’national’ cu lture over a 
universal culture, they both expressed the ir personal liking for Russian 
culture, and Dienstbier only objected to the ’u n -cu ltu ra l’ features of 
Soviet art.^°
The United States
George Bush might have been appealing to the Czechoslovak sense of the 
new political order when the American president re ferred  to Europe as 
becoming ’whole and fre e ’ .^  ^ A ’fre e ’ Europe did not necessarily mean 
the exclusion of the US from the continent; rather, Czechoslovaks perhaps 
even tended to exaggerate the intensity and significance of th e ir ties to
Interv iew  with the author, 13 September 1995. For the logic of the costs 
of the proposal, see, for example. In ternational Herald Tribune, 23 May 1990.
In terv iew  with Jaroslav âedivy, 12 September 1995, who was party  to 
these talks as Czechoslovak Ambassador to Paris.
See Kundera, ’Tragedy of Central Europe’; and the rep ly  by Josef 
Brodsky, ’Why Kundera is Wrong about Dostoevsky’, Cross Currents  Vol. 5 
(1986), pp. 477-83.
See, for example, Jana Klusakova a JiTi Dienstbier, and interview  with 
Dienstbier.
Cited in Robert Mauther, ’A Security Limbo: The Threat of Instab ility  in 
Eastern Europe has Persuaded the West that the CSCE is Worth Backing’, 
The Financial Times, 19 June 1991.
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the US. The fact that the plans for an independent Czechoslovak state 
were laid in the US and signed during M asaryk’s wartime v is it to 
Pittsburgh was seen by some as the preeminent ’shaping influence’ on the  
nascent Czechoslovak id e n t i t y . P e r s o n a l  connections to the US of 
Czechoslovak leaders also suggest a possible national bond. Masaryk’s 
mother was American and, unusually, he adopted her maiden name as his 
middle name. Alexander Dubcek’s parents migrated to the US, although 
they later returned to Slovakia.
A fter the Velvet Revolution, both Czechoslovak and American 
officials attempted to accentuate these historical connections. Thus, US 
Secretary of State James Baker referred  to Woodrow Wilson and Masaryk 
as friends and mentioned the commonality of being former professors. He 
also cited a note Masaryk sent to Wilson when Czechoslovakia became 
independent, reflecting the words of the US Declaration of 
Independence.^^ For his part, Havel received one of his several standing  
ovations in the US Congress by saying that the Velvet Revolution was 
’inspired by the U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights and Declaration of 
Independence’.
While Czechoslovakia may not have been particu larly  important to 
the US, Havel sought to make the most use of his v is it to Washington in 
February 1990. When he visited the White House as the f irs t Czechoslovak 
head of state on an official visit, differences in vision became apparent, 
but he seemed to avoid confrontation. Bush informed him that a united 
Germany as a member of NATO would foster stab ility , a proposal Havel had 
originally opposed. Nevertheless, at this moment at least, he expressed no 
opposition. Moreover, while Havel still re ferred  to the inevitable  
dissolution of the two Alliances, he agreed that US forces were required
2^  Smelser, ’Castles’, p. 88. He adds the experience of the Legion in Siberia. 
22 Baker. Speech, pp. 2-3.
24 International Herald Tribune, 22 February 1990.
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in Europe until the continent could provide for its own s e c u r i t y . B y  
his second meeting with Bush during the Washington visit, Havel seemed 
to have assented to Bush’s position and the White House claimed that 
Havel agreed that American forces contributed to stab ility  and security in 
Europe.
Havel’s whole v isit to Washington, as Martin Walker keenly  
described it, was tantamount to a preconceived lite ra ry  plot. His 
programme of dissolving the m ilitary alliances and withdrawing American 
forces from Europe set him against Bush and astutely generated media 
attention. His speech on Capitol Hill, as Walker described it, provided ’the  
carefully  crafted denouement, a final peroration by the playw right 
himself, with the stage filled with characters. Congress as chorus, 
resolving all the contradictions of the plot’ .^ ^
But Havel hinted at the need for a European-made security  
structure, since ’for another 100 years American soldiers should not have 
to be separated from their mothers’. His sense of responsibility and 
apology came through when he stated that Europe had an obligation to 
become ’guarantor of world peace’ as a compensation ’for having given  
the world two world wars’. His idealism was present also: not only had 
Europe to make amends, but it would also need to determine its own 
security requirements ’so that its own security  might radiate peace into  
the whole world’.
Havel’s February 1990 speeches in Washington demonstrated that he 
had to change both the presentation and the content of his programme 
for the reconstruction of Europe. Undeterred, however, his government 
issued its Memorandum on the European Security Commission in April
Lionel Barber, ’Havel Win US Pledge of Trade Ties’, The Finanical Times,
21 February 1990.
See Martin Walker, ’Havel’s Congress Play a Box Office Hit’ , The Guardian',
22 February 1990.
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1990. While he may have endured the in itia l resistance the US posed to 
his plans, the additional opposition from the US and from other major 
countries, as well as unforeseen developments in European politics, 
eventually forced post-Communist Czechoslovakia to dispense with its 
ideals and to adopt more traditional policies.
Role of the CSCE
Czechoslovakia’s post-Communist government was enthusiastic about the
post-Cold War u tility  of the CSCE process. Indeed, the central plank in
Prague's programme for reconstructing European security was an
enhanced CSCE. Part of the role the new Czechoslovak leaders accorded
the CSCE may have derived from their experience under communism. While
the CSCE did not furnish d irect support to Czechoslovak dissidents in the
late-1970s and 1980s, it provided inspiration and e x a m p le .S o m e
Czechoslovak dissidents had been derisive of the role and importance of
the Helsinki Accords. Milan Simetka wrote of the Third Basket which
forced the European Communist regimes "o acknowledge human rights as:
the price the Soviet Union had to pay for recognition of the status 
quo in Europe. The Soviet Union was only too happy to pay it, 
since our political cu lture contained thousands of a rtfu lly  contrived  
methods for sk irting  hum an-rights obligations. Indeed, in 
Czechoslovakia the immediate post-Helsinki period was a time of the  
worst persecutions. A deaf ear was turned to any references to the 
Helsinki Final Act and, as I know from personal experience, any talk
For the origins and nature of the CSCE, in particular its emphasis on 
human rights , see John Freeman, Security  and the CSCE Process (London 
Macmillan, 1991); John J. Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security  
and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-1975 (Durham, NC: Duke U n ivers ity  Press, 
1985); Vojtech Mastny (ed.), Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security: 
Analysis and Documentation (Durham, NC: Duke U n ivers ity  Press, 1986); and 
Kari Môttôllà (éd.), Ten Years a fte r  Helsinki: The Making o f the European 
Security  Regime (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). For recent developments in 
the CSCE, see Alexis Heraclides, Security  and Cooperation in Europe: The 
Human Dimension, 1972-1992 (London: Frank Cass, 1993); and H e ls in k i-II and 
its .Aftermath: The Making o f the CSCE into an In ternational Organization 
(London & New York: Pinter Publishers, 1993).
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of Helsinki in those days would send police officers into fits  of 
laughter.^®
Despite Simecka’s pessimistic account. Charter 77 sought to force 
the Czechoslovak government to recognise the principles of human rights  
to which it had agreed by signing the Helsinki Accords. Charter 77 also 
attribu ted  its emergence, as well as that of other independent civic 
movements throughout the Soviet bloc, to the Helsinki Process.^® This is 
not to suggest that Czechoslovak dissidents saw the CSCE as a panacea 
for the establishment and maintenance of human rights . Some members 
were disappointed with aspects of the CSCE, such as the ’double 
expectation’ of the Helsinki-Belgrade meetings, which Czech philosopher 
Jan Patotka qualified the ’double disappointment’. Similarly, Ladislav 
Hejdânek called the CSCE a modern Treaty of Westphalia, which allowed 
each state to run its domestic affa irs  as it  choose, free  of interference  
from without.®®
Irrespective of nostalgia for, or emotional attachment to, the CSCE, 
once in power Czechoslovakia’s dissident-leadership became v e ry  active in 
and a proponent of the CSCE. Havel advocated holding a second Helsinki 
Conference earlier than the scheduled date of 1992, for example, and 
using it confirm borders in Europe. He also suggested holding what he 
called a Helsinki I I  Conference as a European peace conference to 'put a 
formal end to the Second World War and all its unhappy  
consequences.’®^
Simetka, 'From Class Obsessions’, p. 363.
See, for example, Dienstbier, Snèni o Evropë, p. 126; and the Charter 77 
Declaration of 12 March 1978, reprin ted  in Skilling, C harter 77, pp. 275-77, 
esp. at p. 275.
®° Ibid., pp. 159-60.
®^ Cited in Martin Fletcher, 'Havel Urges Peace Conference to End Post-War 
Divisions’, The Times, 22 February 1990.
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Such a conference was held in Paris on 19-21 November 1990, 
attended by 34 heads of s t a t e s . H a v e l  demonstrated his commitment to 
a 'democratic’ Europe by advocating the representation of the three Baltic 
republics, then still part of the Soviet Union. This caused problems with 
the Soviet Union. Gorbachev cancelled a prearranged meeting with Havel 
at the Conference, although the official explanation was for 'technical 
reasons’. The three republics were allowed to observe the Conference as 
the guests of France.
Havel could Justly draw inspiration for his European programme 
from actual developments, including Helsinki I I .  The Paris Conference 
occurred, despite domestic challenges to many of the key figures. On 20 
November the government of French Prime Minister Michel Rocard 
narrowly escaped defeat in the National Assembly, a fate which befell 
Thatcher as leader of the British Conservative Party  the next day.
But if the Paris Conference was a success, it was not due to 
Havel’s efforts , which demonstrates perhaps that a small country may 
propose ideas but cannot implement them. His idea and its practical 
implementation were taken over by others. The basis for the Conference 
has been a ttribu ted  to a proposal made by Gorbachev in November 1989 to 
Mitterand, who in tu rn  'snatched at the chance of holding it in Paris’. In  
fact, however, German officials did much of the work and the CSCE 
meeting earned the nickname of 'Genscher’s baby’.^ ^
Nevertheless, Havel seemed confident of the fu tu re  success of the 
CSCE. On his re tu rn  from Paris, he commented 'this summit actually
For the text of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, see NATO Review  
Vol. 38, No. 6 (December 1990), pp. 27-31.
'The T h rill of Europe’s Rebirth: The Paris CSCE Conference’, Economist 
24 November 1990.
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represents quite a new step forward, a kind of second breath, a new 
dynamism of the Helsinki process.
His optimism coincided with the views of some participants. Thatcher 
called the Charter of Paris Europe’s 'Magna Carta’, a n d  some 
commentators believed that the CSCE had acquired 'an institutional life  of 
its own’ .^ ® This assessment derived from the establishment of fiv e  CSCE 
bodies: a Council; a Committee for Senior Officials (CSC); a Secretariat; the  
Conflict Prevention Centre; and the Office for Free Elections.
However, even those most sympathetic recognised the CSCE’s 
limitations, stemming from the democratic nature of its consensus voting, 
its lack of s tructure  and the absence of enforcement mechanisms. The 
CSCE attempted to overcome some of the legal restrictions on its  
effectiveness. The Czechoslovak leadership was neither alone nor 
misguided in supporting the CSCE’s potential despite certain weaknesses.
The defining feature of the CSCE was its basis in sovereign  
egalitarianism and consensus voting. This probably appealed to the  
Czechoslovak sense of state equality. Nevertheless, sovereign equality  
reduced the practical effective of the process, since any member could 
veto a resolution. Ironically, Czechoslovakia experienced the effects of the 
practice when Lichtenstein unilaterally  blocked proposals to locate the  
CSCE Secretariat in Prague in retaliation fo r Czechoslovakia’s refusal to 
recognise the m icro-principality’s claim to land in Czechoslovakia.^^
Problems created by consensus voting were addressed in the 
Prague Document, which adopted the voting practice 'consensus-minus- 
one’, whereby resolutions could pass if  all but one member agreed.
Prague Home Service, 21 November 1990, in SWB, 23 November 1990.
The Independent, 19 November 1990.
'The T h rill of Europe’s Rebirth; The Paris CSCE Conference’, The 
Economist, 24 November 1990.
R euters, 14 November 1990.
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Resolutions could thus by brought against a single member transgressing  
CSCE norms. This was firs t invoked by the CSO on 12 May 1992 when a 
resolution was passed against Yugoslavia for 'clear, gross and uncorrect 
violations of CSCE commitments’ in the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina.^®
The assessment of the Paris meeting was generally that the CSCE 
was 'no longer seen even by its most ardent backers as a panacea for 
the new Europe’s security problems.’ At the same time, it must be noted 
that Western scepticism about the CSCE decreased as they began to 
acknowledge that Eastern Europe might become a power vacuum.
Despite this heightened interest in the CSCE as an institution to 
cope with the problems of the new Europe, Czechoslovakia’s intellectual 
contributions to that end generally went u n n o t i c e d . R a t h e r  than being 
a starting point for discussion, as intended, Czechoslovakia’s proposal to 
use the CSCE as a security system to replace the m ilitary alliances was 
observed with concern by major powers fearing adverse affects on their 
European interests. Nevertheless, perhaps it was recognition of 
Czechoslovakia’s contributions to the post-Communist debate on Europe 
that motivated the placement of the new ^SCE Secretariat in Prague.
The success of the Czechoslovak programme to reform the CSCE will 
be discussed in the fina l section of the chapter, which considers the  
interrelationship between European institutions. I t  is necessary f irs t  to 
comment on Czechoslovak policy towards the evolution of the CSCE and 
how Prague’s expectations for the Helsinki process were met.
First, it must be said that the Czechoslovak government pursued a 
gradual programme, perhaps in keeping with dissident t h i n k i n g . T h u s ,
Cited in Heraclides, H els ink i-II, p. 84.
39 Mauther, 'Security Limbo’.
See, for example, the one reference, with the D ienstbier’s f irs t name 
incorrect, in Heraclides, H els ink i-II, p. 14.
See chapter 2.
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Prague did not expect an immediate transformation of the European order. 
For all the problems in achieving the European institutional order that 
Havel and Dienstbier orig inally  stipulated, they continued to speak of the  
gradual and eventual convergence of existing institutions."^^
I t  soon became clear that CSCE members were unwilling to equip 
the process to be able to replace the two m ilitary alliances, nor to 
provide a comprehensive security system for Europe. Nevertheless, 
several measures were initiated to make the CSCE more effective and 
credible as an international organisation. As we have seen, several 
permanent bodies were established, regu lar meetings arranged, and 
measures undertaken to overcome some of the idealistic and paralytic  
practices such as consensus voting. While the CSCE proved ineffective in 
the Yugoslav conflict, other organisations were equally ineffective and 
therefore the CSCE cannot be considered a fa ilu re  on those grounds 
alone.
I t  was the threats and problems emanating from Central and 
Eastern Europe that gave rise to the understanding that the CSCE could 
not solve many, and certain ly not all, of these challenges. I t  was, 
however, precisely the example of these problems that the Czechoslovak 
government used to bolster interest in and support fo r the CSCE.
'BACK TO EUROPE’: WESTERN INSTITUTIONS AS POLITICAL IDENTITY
The essence of post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign policy was the 
're tu rn  to Europe’. I t  is in this context that Prague’s relations with, and 
expectations of. Western institutions, particu larly  the Council of Europe 
and the EC, must be seen.
See, for example, the conclusion of this chapter for Dienstbier’s comments 
following the 31 January 1992 CSCE Foreign Ministers Council Session in 
Prague.
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The Council of Europe: Values Confirmed?
The Council of Europe embodied Western democratic ideals. Founded in 
1949, it was the f irs t  political-democratic organisation of post-war Western 
Europe. I t  had been vocal in criticising human rights violations in 
Communist Czechoslovakia, frequently  declaring that such behaviour 
contravened international laws and endangered meetings of the CSCE. In  a 
resolution of 28 September 1978, the Council expressed Tull solidarity  
with the ideas of Charter 77 and associated itse lf with the many protests 
at the continued victimisation of all those associated with the Prague 
Spring and with the C harter’.
So insistent is the Council on a member’s democratic credentials  
that the anti-Communist revolutions of 1989 did not in themselves entitle  
the Central Europeans to entrance. Only a fte r free elections would 
membership be extended. Czechoslovakia thus gained membership in 
February I9 9 I, behind Hungary’s en try  in November 1990, whereas Poland 
was only able to join the Council In N(jvf^mber I9 9 I. In  addition, the  
Council made a much s tric ter assessment of Slovakia’s political 
development and behaviour before admitting the independent state in 
1993.
Nevertheless, the Council of Europe’s political influence is limited 
and its economic leverage non-existent. Thus, the Czechoslovaks secured 
cultural-po litical recognition from membership but other benefits were not 
forthcoming. However, symbolic recognition should not be underestimated. 
The Central European states saw membership as an affirm ation of having 
’rejoined the European mainstream’ and as a means to increase their
Quotation from Skilling, Charter 77, p. 158.
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contacts with the EC/"* The Council’s Secretary-General, Catherine  
Lalumière, welcomed Havel’s call that the organisation serve as Europe’s 
’political, legislative, and ideological centre’/^
Havel also exercised his access to the Council as a platform to 
press his reconceptualisation of European security. For example, speaking 
to the body’s Parliamentary Assembly on 10 May 1990, he called for the  
transformation of the two m ilitary alliances and for a new European 
security  system, to be based on a revamped Helinski p r o c e s s .
While political démocratisation was suffic ient for membership in the  
Council of Europe, it was an insufficient prerequisite for jo in ing the  
European Community. Post-Communist Czechoslovakia’s perceptions of the  
New Europe were challenged in it dealings with the EC.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The views held in Czechoslovakia of the EC before the Velvet Revolution 
fa ll into two categories: the official and the dissident.
The official policy on the EC was hesitant if not hostile. The Soviet 
bloc only recognized the existence of the EC in 1 9 8 8 . Even though  
Hungary, with extensive trading ties with the West, had signed an 
agreement with the EC in 1988, Czechoslovakia merely signed a trade  
agreement in January 1989 which lifted quotas from half of the cou ntry ’s 
industria l goods. This move was viewed as the ’basis for fu rth e r
Richard Weitz, ’The Expanding Role of the Council of Europe’, Report on 
Eastern Europe Vol. 1, No. 34 (24 August 1990), p. 49.
Catherine Lalumière, ’The Council of Europe’s Place in the New European 
A rchitecture’, NATO Review (December 1994/January 1995), p. 12.
See, for example. The Independent, 11 May 1990.
See van Ham, EC, Eastern Europe, p. 121.
292
expansion’ of Czechoslovak trade with the EC/^ Such optimism was still 
tempered by accusations against the EC in the Czechoslovak Communist 
press of ’in terference’ in CMEA countries by linking assistance to 
’positive change’
Independent th inkers in Czechoslovakia, however, had different 
perceptions of the EC. To them, it embodied the European ideal. While the  
revolutions of 1989 came from the people, some inspiration for those 
events came also from ’Western policies and by the lure of Western 
institutions’. N o t  only could part of the credit fo r the 1989 revolutions 
be a ttributed  to the EC, but its response to the post-Communist states 
was a test of how well the EC put its own principles into practice. As one 
commentator noted, ’Coordinating western assistance to the East was a 
prestigious assignment which corresponded with Brussels’ ambitions to 
assume greater responsibility in the field of foreign policy’.
In  its responses to systemic change in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the EC engaged in two tests: one of its own ideals, and the other of the  
way in which Central Europeans conceptualised Western Europe. The EC 
had no founding principle to suggest that democracy was in itself 
sufficient grounds for membership. At the same time, however, its 
treatment of other potential members suggested that démocratisation was a 
key issue in e lig ib ility  for membership. Outside observers and Central 
European leaders alike made the case that Greece, Portugal and Spain 
were assured e n try  in order to encourage and stabilise their
Wolchik, Czechoslovakia, p. 269.
For criticisms of the EC, see Rudé pravo, 1 December 1988 and 29 June 
1989, cited in Wolchik, ’Czechoslovakia’, p. 269.
Dawisha, Eastern Europe, p. 152.
Van Ham, The EC, p. 168.
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democracies.'’  ^ In  addition, while there might not be a specific EC tenet 
to admit all democracies, according to Wallace, no specific cu ltura l or 
geographic restrictions on membership are to be found either.
Reaffirming Czechoslovakia’s place in Europe became a fundamental 
tenet of post-Communist foreign policy, and the foremost means of doing 
so was perceived to be through membership in the Community. Havel saw 
his country, and its neighbours, as already forming what he called ’a 
European community’, for which the criterion  was democracy.^"*
East Germany’s en try  into the EC by the ’backdoor’ of unification  
with West Germany provoked some into critic ising the Community’s 
hypocrisy. As Timothy Garton Ash argued, the grounds for East 
Germany’s admission were conceivably no d ifferen t from those of 
Czechoslovakia. Both were former Communist states, each with Soviet 
troops on th e ir te rrito ry . I f  the Federal Republic could fund East 
Germany’s economic transformation, then the whole of Western Europe 
could do the same for the East.^^ Even if Garton Ash’s last argum ent 
was implausible, the expected effects of the rapid integration of the East 
European economies into world market -  namely, a substantial decline in 
industria l production and high unemployment -  were allowed to occur in
William Wallace, ’From the Twelve to Tw enty Four? Challenges to the EC 
Posed by the Revolutions in Eastern Europe’, in Colin Crouch and David 
Marquand, Towards Greater Europe? (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), pp. 
39-40; and van Ham, The EC, p. 196. See the la tte r for cases when Central 
Europeans used these examples.
Wallace, ’From the Twelve’, p. 40; and William Wallace, The Transformation  
of Western Europe  (London: Pinter, 1990), ch. 2.
Speaking in the context of Czechoslovak relations with NATO, Havel said, 
’We are building democracy. The NATO members or the whole of Europe, non- 
aligned countries and democratic countries -  all of us together form a 
European community’. Stated on Hungarian television, 15 February  1991, in 
SWB, 18 February 1991.
Timothy Garton Ash, ’Poor But Clubbable’, The Independent, 19 January
1990.
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the case of East Germany’s absorption into West G e r m a n y . B y  this 
logic, Western Europe could have extended large-scale aid to Central 
Europe.'’^
Garton Ash’s arguments demonstrated how the EC did not fu lfill 
Central European expectations of it. These were summarised by Polish 
Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka: ’I t  is not that we are "obsessed with 
having no roof a fte r the collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact" -  as 
one EC politician suggested sometime ago. I t  is not that we desperately  
look for some multilateral s tructure  to take care of us....The family of 
democratic West European countries, supported by the trans-A tlan tic  
partnership, is what we aim at. Not because we need some umbrellas, but 
because we all share the same values and ob jectives....’ The original 
mission of the EC was not being fu lfilled, she continued: ’The bold vision 
of Monet and Schuman has not been enriched by equally bold offer [sic] 
to the new democracies in Eastern Europe’ .^ ®
The Central Europeans did not accept the ideals of Western Europe 
unconditionally. Slovak dissident and human rights lawyer Miroslav Kusÿ 
supported the ’Return to Europe’ but qualified it not ’as a substitute for 
fu lly  understanding ourselves and discovering our own id e n tity ’. 
Nevertheless, without re turn ing  to Europe, Kusÿ maintained, not even 
such self-understanding would be possible. He cautioned: ’We’ve seen 
what was possible in cu ltura l and political isolation: what little  there was 
has long since been e x h a u s te d .C o m m u n is t  émigré Zdenék M lynâf
This is a reversal of the argument made by August Pradetto, Studies in 
Comparative Communism Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 23-30.
The flaw in such an argument might have been Havel’s rejection of 
economic ’handouts’.
58 Hanna Suchocka to Chatham House, 3 March 1993.
Miroslav Kusÿ, L ite ra rn i tydennik, 4 May 1990, in Whipple, ’Nationalism, 
Totalitarianism and Democracy’, p. 251.
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warned against any policy resulting in overly  close integration in any 
bloc, undertaken rap id ly  out of ideological or consumer reasons.
While there was domestic caution on the speed and intensity of 
potential membership in Western institutions, a tro ika  of leading Western 
commentators best summarised the case for Central European cultural 
a ffin ity  with Western Europe. In  the unambiguously entitled artic le 'Let 
the East Europeans In !’, Garton Ash, Michael Mertes, and Dominique Moïsi 
wrote ’Historically and culturally , Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 
belong to Europe. A Europe which contains Crete but not Bohemia, Lisbon 
but not Warsaw, is historical nonsense.’ Admission of the Central 
Europeans, the authors argued, 'is a challenge the EC cannot refuse, if  it 
is to live up to the ideals of its founders...’ .®^
The EC could and did refuse the challenge, arguing that economic 
performance of a prerequisite to even considering political ties. The 
negotiations of an economic agreement between the EC and Central Europe 
are therefore illustra tive  of the misplaced and unfu lfilled  aspirations that 
Central Europe had of the EC.
Negotiating with the EC
EC Foreign Ministers held a Council Meeting on 5 February 1990 to 
discuss relations with former socialist Eastern Europe. The result was a 
general response by the Council to developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe by which the Community 'then set about a simple programme of 
basic agreements, being mostly extensions of existing frameworks’.^ ^
60 Rudé pravo, 14 May 1991.
Timothy Garton Ash, Michael Mertes, and Dominique Moïsi, 'Let the East 
Europeans In !’ , The New York Review of Books 24 October 1991, p. 19.
Ian Manners, 'The Double Game’: Negotiating the Association Agreements 
Between the European Community and the Visegrad’ , in Patrick Dunleavy and 
Jeffrey Stanyer (eds). Contemporary Political Studies 1994. Vol. 1 (Political
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Czechoslovakia had signed a limited trade agreement with the EC on 
19 December 1989. The fact that Czechoslovakia, which was fa r  behind 
Hungary in liberalising its economy and the extent of its foreign trade, 
was quickly put on the same negotiating level as Hungary demonstrates 
the EC’s positive attitude towards the country.
The negotiations themselves were conducted fa ir ly  equitably. The 
European Commission, however, was not given a wide enough mandate to 
negotiate free ly  so that when differences between the EC and the Central 
European states arose, the Commission had to re tu rn  to the Council, as 
happened on 15 April 1991. For the Central European states, the key  
difference was political; fo r the EC, it was economic. This illustrates the 
divergent conceptions each side had of the symbolic role and practical 
aims of the Community.
The Visegrad Group wanted explicit reference in the Agreements to 
the ir eventual membership of the EC. The EC, by contrast, was concerned 
with the nature of ta r if f  concessions made to the Central Europeans. While 
it offered an asymmetrical lifting  of tariffs, it sought to retain  
restrictions on three commodities: agricu ltu ra l goods, textiles and steel. 
These were the three economic sectors for which the Visegrad Group most 
wanted restrictions lifted because it expected to be able to sell them to 
the Community. Finance Minister Klaus expressed his fru stra tion  when he 
calculated that Czechoslovak textile exports to Western Europe accounted 
for one hundredth of a percent of its consumption. Thus a 10-fold  
increase would be significant for Czechoslovakia but unnoticed for 
Western Europe, a situation which he said made him 'angry ’.
On 16 December 1991, Agreements of Association were signed 
between the EC and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland separately. The
Studies Association, 1994), p. 107 
Respekt 22-28 July 1991.
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Agreements were a major achievement and had substantial political 
importance since they specifically recognised th a t ’the ultim ate aim of [the  
th re e  countries] is accession to the EC’. The more immediate task, 
however, was to provide fo r the development of trad e  and economic 
cooperation between Central Europe and the  Community.
Cooperation between the Visegrad Group and the  EC was made more 
rea l by the stipulations in the  Agreements fo r a te n -y e a r transition  
period, sp lit into two fiv e -y e a r periods, in  which the  th ree  countries  
would undertake to prepare themselves fo r membership.
Czechoslovak Views of ’Real’ Europe in  Action
While the  EC seemed to be equitable in  its  dealings w ith the Central 
European states, the EC was occasionally seen in  the  region as setting  
conditions on Central Europe’s behaviour and eroding indigenous values. 
This is not to suggest th a t o ther prospective members, and fo r th a t 
m atter, c u rre n t members, need not a lte r in te rn a l policies in o rder to 
conform or converge with Community practices. Generally, the view of 
Central Europe’s treatm ent by the  EC is viewed thus: ’Taking into account 
the  domestic political restric tions under which EC politicians had to 
negotiate the  agreements, and having regard  to the  trad e  situation of 
other th ird  countries, the cen tra l and east European states greatly  
improved th e ir position in the  h ierarch y  of EC trad e  regimes with non- 
Mem her states’.®^  In  addition, the  EC’s demands th a t the  Central 
European states improve th e ir  economies was in keeping w ith its  practice.
Cited in Jan B. de Weydenthal, ’Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland Gain 
Associate Membership in the  EC’, RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, No. 6 (7 
F eb ru ary  1992), p. 24.
Heinz Kramer, ’The European Community’s Response to the ’New Eastern  
Europe” , Journal o f Common M arket Studies  Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993), p. 
237. Thus, fo r example, the Visegrad Group probably advanced over Turkey  
in the membership queue.
298
The Central European economies were clearly below EC standards. Against
an EC per capita GDP average of 100 percent, Czechoslovakia measured 52,
Hungary 44, and Poland only 37. These figures compared unfavourably
even to the weakest national economies in the EC: Spain averaged 75 and
Greece and Portugal 54.®  ^ Economic observers also suggested that as
much as a decade would be necessary for the Central European economies
to become internationally competitive.^^
Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia had to conform to EC stipulations
without receiving the moral and cultural confirmation the country
expected from membership, as several statements suggest.
An obvious division existed between the EC and the Central
Europeans about the meaning of Community membership. The Central
European slogan of 'Entering Europe’ was
equated with membership of the European Community, with the 
arriva l of large sums of investment capital and the opening of 
western markets to their products, with political integration and 
incorporation into the western security system. I t  all resembled a 
vague idea that entering Europe was ra ther like going into a bar, 
where the landlord would greet one with open arms and press a 
drink into one’s hand.®®
Czechoslovak’s expectation of its treatment by the EC was probably less
indulgent, but nevertheless disappointed. Former Czech dissident Petr
Pfihoda wrote:
The real Europe is cautiously sympathetic but not very  
understanding. I t  imposes its conditions: Think, act, and manage 
business as we do; how is it possible that you are failing? The 
dictum of the superficially conceived Europeanism overly emphasizes 
imitation. We hasten to establish institutions of parliamentary
®® Martin Rady, 'East-Central Europe and the EC’, Journal o f Common Market 
Studies Vol. 31. No. 1 (March 1993), p. 119, citing OECD figurs for 1988.
See, for example, John Pinder, The European Community and Eastern 
Europe (London: RIIA, 1991), p. 60.
®® George Schopflin, 'The Rise of Anti-Democratic Movements in Post- 
Communist Societies’, in Hugh Miall (ed.). Redefining Europe: New Patterns  
of Conflict and Cooperation (London: RIIA, 1994), p. 45.
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democracy, and advertising agencies are adopting Western styles, 
although it is not at all certain that we can afford them.’®^
While the Central European states all faced the same conditions for
membership from the EC, Czechoslovakia was particu larly  dissatisfied with
the delay of admission. At times, Havel simply spoke as if  membership was
taken for granted. For example, he addressed MEPs on 20 March 1990
almost as if Czechoslovakia had an automatic r ig h t to jo in  the EC: 'We
want to become a fu ll member of the European Community no later than
the end of the decade but we might have to jo in  much sooner than th a t.’
He stressed that 'the political need to be integrated into the European
Community far outweighed the difficulties posed by the parlous state of
the Czechoslovak e c o n o m y . S o  positive were his views of
Czechoslovakia’s relations with the EC that he 'indicated he was already
thinking beyond the association agreement’ before the country had even
begun to negotiate with the C o m m u n i ty .A l th o u g h  the membership issue
was unclear during the Association Agreements negotiations, at NATO
Headquarters in March 1991, Havel anticipated that the Agreements would
allow Czechoslovakia some participation in discussion on political union.
By contrast, the EC insisted that associate membership would not
necessarily become fu ll membership.
In  fact economic criteria  dictated the speed of en try  and Havel’s
political criteria  were effectively ignored. Even in the economic realm.
Petr Prihoda, 'On the Cutting Edge’, Forum, 26 February 1991, in JFRS- 
EEU, 3 April 1991, p. 5.
John Palmer, 'Havel Urges East-West In tegra tion ’, The Guardian, 21 March 
1991.
David Buchan, 'Havel Warns of Potential "Choas'” , Financial Times, 21 
March 1991.
Boris Johnson, 'Havel Feels Let Down by West over Nato Bar’, Daily 
Telegraph, 22 March 1991.
See, for example, Sarah Lambert, 'Havel and Walesa Woo the West’, The 
Independent 21 March 1991.
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however, the EC did not appear to treat Central Europe by the standards  
it set for its own members, or by those that were stipulated in the  
Association Agreements. For example, Poland’s chief negotiator with the 
EC, Andrzej Olechowski, found it unacceptable that the EC insisted on 
free access to the Polish market whereas Polish produce, steel, and 
textiles faced EC ta r if f  and n o n -ta riff b a r r i e r s . H a v e l ’s assessment of 
the EC’s response to Central Europe was the creation of ’second class 
countries’, a situation which he considered both ’deeply wrong’ as well as 
’dangerous’ for the stab ility  of E u r o p e / ^
Czechoslovakia’s dissident-leadership had seen the EC as the  
embodiment of cultural, historical and political values to which they  
believed that they had a r ig h t to rejoin. The EC, by contrast, did not 
conceive of itself as having any mission or obligation towards these post­
socialist societies, let alone one defined by Central Europeans.
Although Central and Eastern European governments probably resented  
the EC’s response to their political and economic liberalisation, in many 
respects, they received more favourable and prompt treatm ent than a 
country such as Turkey, which had long-standing negotiations with the 
EC. Unfortunately, the Czechoslovak leadership ascribed values and 
significance to the EC that the EC itself either did not hold or could not 
demonstrate. Czechoslovak leaders believed that the EC was the concrete 
manifestation of political practices to which the Central Europeans, and 
perhaps the Czechoslovaks foremost, both subscribed and contributed. 
The Central Europeans fe lt that they had a rig h t to be reunited with
74 Buchan, 'Havel Warns’.
Andrej Hejma, ’Czechoslovak President Havel Says North America S till Vital 
to European Security’, Associated Press, 12 June 1991.
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th e ir political heritage and not to be queued and subjected to what they  
saw as a rb itra ry  conditions.
Doubtless, the Central Europeans recognised the need for economic 
convergence before fu ll membership. Nevertheless, the EC response did 
not seem to recognise the region’s historical orientations and post­
communist achievements. Membership in the Council of Europe provided 
some confirmation but was not seen as the equivalent to Community 
membership. Czechoslovaks fe lt that the country had a r ig h t to 
membership and that it would be able to partic ipate in the debates on the 
EC. This may have been a tactic by Havel to convince the EC to think  
sim ilarly but it also reflected Czechoslovak expectations.
Asymmetry offered the Central Europeans (or any economically 
weaker partner or potential member of the Community) what were in 
effect concessions from the stronger partner to the weaker. The weaker 
partner was thereby theoretically offered the conditions on which it could 
develop in accordance with EC expectations. This included the ab ility  to 
protect certain domestic industries and to trade advantageously in the  
EC. The Czechoslovaks should have been satisfied with that. Havel, a fter  
all, had stated he did not want economic hand outs or to be treated as a 
poorer b r o t h e r . T h e  Agreements conceivably allowed the Czechoslovaks 
to work for their rewards.
However, the practical application of the Agreements provided a 
d ifferen t scenario. I t  is not the remit of this thesis to discuss the EC 
generally or its internal functions, including foreign political or economic 
policy-making. I t  is clear, however, that the domestic politics of member 
countries had a profound effect on EC policy towards Central Europe.
Just as the scope of trade concessions under the Association Agreements
He expected from the US 'some significant economic help’, but 'on the 
basis of equality, and not on the basis of somebody big and rich giving  
presents to somebody small and poor’. In ternational Herald Tribune, 13-14 
January 1990.
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were determined by national lobbies in the EC, so the question of Central 
European membership was affected by the general debate w ithin the EC 
on the order of p rio rity  between widening and deepening the Community’s 
membership.
The Czechoslovaks may have fe lt dismayed or disappointed with the  
EC, but the delay in membership was not targeted against them in 
particu lar. The EC signed identical Agreements with Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia on the same day. Moreover, they received more focused 
attention than that obtained by other post-Communist states.
Michel Tatu wrote in May 1989, ’There are not so many things the  
West can do to help [Eastern Europe], except to remain what i t  has been 
for so many years: an example of success’. C e n t r a l  Europeans did what 
they believed necessary to emulate the example of success which they saw 
to be the Community. But in denying the Central Europeans the chance to 
partake fu lly  and immediately, impracticalities notwithstanding, the EC 
deflated the salience of the example it provided.
NATO
Havel’s position on NATO shifted substantially during his Federal 
Presidency. He in itia lly  viewed it as a tool in the organic transform ation  
of European security. As his programme met resistance, his position on 
NATO changed. Ultimately, he concluded th a t NATO had to continue its 
existence and that Czechoslovakia would be best served by firm  security  
guarantees from it and even membership of it. This section traces the  
reasons for these changes in Czechoslovak policy and their implications 
for Havel’s plan for a reconfigured European security architecture.
In ternational Herald Tribune, 30 May 1989, cited in van Ham, The EC, p. 
173.
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Throughout 1990, Havel saw NATO as ’almost as an anachronism’.^ ® 
A fter all, the overall Czechoslovak aim was a new security s tru ctu re  in 
Europe, in which both alliances would be transformed into political 
entities before collapsing into a regenerated Helsinki process. Thus, the 
role orig inally  consigned to NATO by the Czechoslovak leadership was as 
an agent of h istory which, its role fu lfilled , would w ither away.
In  February 1990 US Secretary of State Baker discovered that the  
Czechoslovak negotiations fo r the withdrawal of Soviet troops were 
actually at crosspurposes with American policy: Havel saw the withdrawal 
as the f irs t  phase in the dismantling of the two m ilitary alliances. The 
American efforts ’to give the playw right a quick counter-lesson in  
m ilitary s tra tegy’ ®^ may have changed Havel’s presentation in 
Washington the following week, but not its content.
Havel denied that he planned to disband the Warsaw Pact one day 
and NATO the next. Moreover, he stated that Czechoslovakia owed its 
existence to NATO. However, he attempted to make his policy palatable to 
American decision-makers. According to an American official, he did not 
object to Bush’s position that a united Germany should be in NATO, even 
though he had opposed the idea before.®® He also emphasised 'tha t West 
European security, with US troops, is a guarantee of the trem bling  
security of Europe’. Nevertheless, he added that, ’with the setting up of 
a new European security system, all this will change -  probably’.®^
®^ Nick Thorpe, ’Havel: The Loneliness of Power’, The Observer, 16 June
1991.
Lionel Barker, ’Baker’s Soviet Visit Seals New Relationship’ , The Financial 
Times, 12 February 1990.
®® Lionel Barber, ’Havel Wins US Pledge of Trade Ties’, The Financial Times, 
21 February 1990.
®^ Cited in Edward Luca, ’Havel Returns from US as the Conquering Hero’, 
The Independent, 24 February 1990.
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No matter how much he repackaged his views of the US commitment 
to Europe and the fu tu re  of NATO, Havel was considered naive for 
proposing European security without NATO, particu larly  in view of the  
centrality  of the Alliance in the US’s post-Cold War policy towards 
Europe.®^
Havel, however, was not deterred from pursuing his vision of post- 
Communist pan-European security. In  a v is it to London on 22 March 1990, 
he openly opposed Thatcher on the role of NATO, saying *I th ink it is 
unfortunate to keep insisting on NATO’. While acknowledging the  
importance of Nato as the ’guarantor of freedom’, he argued that ’the  
situation is quickly changing’.®^  Later, Havel maintained that ’some 
differences of opinion were not as great as orig inally  we had thought’. 
Nevertheless, he then returned to his in itia l view, that ’the fu tu re  
solution will be a common security system in Europe in which the existing  
systems (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) would merge gradually ’.®'*
The extent to which NATO members were at odds with Havel’s 
conception was illustrated by the coincidence of a meeting of the  
alliance’s 14-member Nuclear Planning Group at a ski resort in Western 
Canada while Havel addressed the Council of Europe. His speech ’got much 
less attention than the theological debates of the nuclear planners in 
Canada’.®^
By summer 1990, the Czechoslovak leadership had begun to realise 
that its programme of converting and then collapsing the two m ilitary
82 The Eœnomist, 24 February 1990.
®® Thatcher was to known at least not to oppose Central European admission 
and made clear, albeit several months a fte r Havel’s v is it, th a t the EC should 
’declare unequivocally that it is ready to accept all the countries of Eastern  
Europe as members if  they want to jo in ’. Reuters, 5 August 1990, cited in 
Weitz, 'Council of Europe’, p .56.
®'* Cited in Andrew McEwen, ’Havel and Thatcher Disagree’, The Times, 23 
March 1990.
®^  The Guardian, 12 May 1990.
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blocs into a new Helsinki process was unachievable. According to one 
observer, it ’apparently lost interest in the preservation of the [Warsaw] 
Pact a fte r it realized that NATO was here to stay and that Prague’s vision 
of a bloc-free, pan-European security system appeared unrealistic in the  
foreseeable fu tu re ’.®^
Following the Baltic events of 1991, Czechoslovakia joined Hungary  
and Poland in advocating the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact.®^ I t  was 
gradually moving towards accepting NATO and wanting close ties with and 
even membership in it. Prime Minister Calfa said on 6 February 1991 that 
Czechoslovakia was contemplating ’some form of co-operation’ with NATO 
and called the organisation a ’stable force’.®® Havel abandonned his 
idealist vision for European security of collapsing the two m ilitary  
alliances into a new Helsinki process; instead, he unambiguously sought 
the cessation of the Warsaw Pact and relations with NATO.
He also showed realism regarding the pace by which Czechoslovak 
relations with NATO would develop. In  an interview  with Hungarian 
Television following the Visegrad Summit, Havel answered a question on 
whether Czechoslovakia would want to jo in  NATO by stating: ’I t  is not as 
simple as that. F irs t it would be necessary to know whether NATO would 
accept us. Secondly, to jo in  NATO is a process lasting several years. The 
entire  m ilitary arsenal must be changed to ad just to the new one. Still, 
we feel -  ju s t as the Hungarians or Poles -  that we must maintain good 
relations with NATO. Now NATO is the only effic ient and proven democratic 
alliance in Europe’.®®
®® Libor Roucek, A fter the Bloc: The New In ternationa l Relations in Eastern  
Europe (London: RIIA Discussion Paper 40, 1992), p. 5.
®^  See chapters 5 and 6.
®® Cited in Leslie Colitt, ’Czechoslovakia Considering Links with NATO’, The 
Financial Times, 7 February 1991.
®® In te rv ie w  on ’Panorama’ , H ungarian TV, 15 F e b ru a ry  1991, in  SWB, 18
F e b ru a ry  1991.
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On 21 March 1991, Havel became the f irs t  head of a Warsaw Pact 
country to v is it NATO headquarters in Brussels. There he attempted to 
deploy his humanist values, apologising on behalf of Czechoslovaks for 
the lies his predecessors had told the West and commending the West for  
'understanding’ the dilemmas facing Central Europe. However, he combined 
his humanist views with geopolitical references, 'b itte r ly ’, according to 
some r e p o r t s , e x p l a i n in g  that 'An aUiance of countries united by the 
ideals of freedom and democracy should not be forever closed to 
neighboring countries that are pursuing the same goal’. He tried  to evoke 
a sense of responsibility by declaring that 'the West bears a tremendous 
responsibility’ to secure the transition process, especially as, in his view. 
Communist rule had been 'shaken o ff’ with the encouragement of the  
Western democracies.
Neither his appeal to the universality  of democratic principles nor 
to responsibility achieved Havel’s aims. Instead, as a commentator wrote, 
his appeal merely 'won fine words and sympathy from NATO, but no 
concrete commitments’.^  ^ Havel’s sense of 'good taste’ in politics may 
have dictated that he thank and commend the West for its 'understanding’ 
of the dilemmas facing Central Europe. A more accurate sentiment was 
probably expressed by Hungarian President Goncz who re ferred  to 
Western 'ind ifference’.^ ^
NATO’s distant a ttitude towards Central European membership was 
reinforced the month following Havel’s v is it to NATO Headquarters. The 
acceptance by NATO of a v is it to the Czechoslovak Foreign M inistry at the 
end of April 1991 was recognized as 'extraord in ary ’. But at the same time
Michael Binyon, 'Warsaw Pact Break-up Leaves Security Vacuum’, The 
Times, 30 March 1991.
David Buchan, 'Havel Secures L ittle  But Fine Words from NATO’, The 
Financial Times, 22 March 1991.
Nick Thorp , 'Havel: The Loneliness o f P ow er’ , The O bserver, 16 June 1991.
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there prevailed ’a strong sense that the men from NATO were here for 
the freebie. The East Europeans must be listened to and the ir hospitality, 
of course enjoyed. But the ir guests were in no mood to make promises in
r e t u r n / 9 3
While the East European countries did not then apply for NATO 
membership d irectly, Havel made clear to the NATO Council in March 1991 
that he sought membership for Czechoslovakia. He also proposed at the 
Paris CSCE meeting that Czechoslovakia join NATO, and he also suggested 
en try  into the WEU. "^* Both suggestions were rebuffed. He also sought 
some sort of association agreement with NATO, which was also re f used. 
While Baker proposed during a four-d ay  v is it to Moscow in February 1990 
that an ’association’ of Germany with NATO might have been the best way 
to soothe the fears of its n e i g h b o u r s , s u c h  an option was not extended 
to the Central Europeans. Regardless of the outcome of these requests, 
they broke Havel’s pattern of seeking security by securing the Soviet 
Union in Europe. Ironically, however, NATO’s rejection of Czechoslovak 
membership was justified  on the grounds, as NATO Secretary General 
Manfred Worner declared, that for any nev. European security system to 
work, it had to be ’built in co-operation with the Soviet Union’.
99 Sarah Helm, ’NATO Resists East European Request for Protection’, The 
Independent 27 April 1991.
9"^ The WEU offerd ’Associate Partnerships’ to nine post-Soviet states only 
in May 1994. For an overview of Havel’s fluctuating positions on security  
institutions, see Helm, ’NATO Resists’.
99 This is within the time period covered. Arguably, programmes such as 
Partnership for Peace may have come from pressure such as Havel’s. In  
addition, the Czech and Slovak Republics were among 9 post-Communist 
states granted associate status in the WEU, a position not extended to 
Russia.
96 Barber, ’Baker’s Soviet V is it’ .
9^  ’Nato’s decision was correct. A new European security system if it is ever 
to work, must be built in co-operation with the Soviet Union’. Mauther, 
’Security Limbo’.
308
Rebuffed by NATO, Havel said that Czechoslovakia would attempt to 
obtain bilateral security guarantees from its neighbours, Germany and the  
Soviet Un ion .C zech o s lo va k ia  pursued this policy with Germany during  
Genscher’s April 1991 v is it to Prague. The result was both German 
support for Czechoslovakia’s European vision and also discussions on 
bilateral matters ’intended to help fill the gap le ft by the Warsaw 
Pact’ .^ ® While this was trad itional diplomatic practice, it  deviated from 
post-Communist Czechoslovakia’s previous assessments of and aspirations 
for European security.
This chapter has concentrated thus far on Czechoslovakia’s views and 
relations with European institutions. Nevertheless, it  is necessary to offer 
some explanation for NATO action, or inaction, toward Central Europe. The 
f irs t  issue to note is that NATO was simply taken by surprise by the  
events that occurred in Eastern Europe and was slow to enact policy. I t  
can also be argued that NATO followed a policy that can be called 
’constructive disengagement’, that is, it adopted policies to appease the 
Central European desires and demands for a fu ll NATO security  guarantee 
without offering such a guarantee.
The June Copenhagen meeting of NATO Foreign M inisters, for 
example, announced NATO’s intention of ’developing a tru e  security  
"partnersh ip"’ with all of the post-Communist governments’ . At the Rome 
Summit in November 1991, NATO heads agreed to expand the scope of the 
Alliance’s liaison program w ith ’ the Baltic and East European states. In  
Spring 1992, a US State Department official stated that NATO wanted ’to 
consider creative new ways to work with other institutions to maintain
David Buchan, ’Havel Warns of Potential "Chaos"’ , The Financial Times, 21 
March 1991.
Susan Greenberg, ’Genscher Backs Prague In it ia tiv e ’, The Guardian, 12 
April 1991.
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stab ility  and integrate the Eastern states into the new European 
or der ’. T h e  concrete policy which followed was the establishment of 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a forum of the Foreign  
Ministers of NATO’s 16 members with nine Central and East European 
counterparts. I t  f irs t convened on 20 December 1991.^°^
On 1 March 1991 NATO agreed three types of cooperation with  
Czechoslovakia. They included visits by Czechoslovak civil and m ilitary  
representatives to NATO headquarters, representatives of NATO and SHAPE 
to Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovak officials would go to SHAPE. These 
visits were to be followed by higher level visits to the c o u n t r y .
While important from a symbolic point of view, these exchanges did not 
fu lfil Czechoslovak designs.
While Czechoslovakia, like many of the former Warsaw Pact 
countries, sought close ties with NATO, the a ttitude of the Western allies, 
especially the US, was that it was they  who wanted to expand the 
security guarantee to the post-Communist states. An American official 
intimated that these states were satisfied with the consultative process, 
that 'many Eastern governments saw liaison [with NATO] as one of a 
growing web of relations that reinforced the notion that they were part 
of Western Europe’. By contrast, the official wrote, it was the Bush 
Administration which wanted to offer the region a more tangible security  
structure: ’The administration believed that it was no longer adequate for 
NATO simply to applaud the transformation of the East and express its 
political support for this process. These states will require  concrete 
Western advice and assistance if  they are to succeed in their
Stephen J. Flanagan, ’NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison 
to Security Partnersh ip ’, Washington Q uarterly  (Vol. 15, No.2, Spring 1992), 
p. 141.
See, generally, Guido Gerousa, ’The North Atlantic Cooperation Council’ , 
European Security  Vol. 1, No. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 273-94.
CTK 1 March 1991, in SWB, 5 March 1991.
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res tru ctu rin g  efforts and become members of the emerging Euro-A tlantic  
community of free nations that the United States and its NATO allies are  
working to develop’. D e s p i t e  such apparent intentions of the Atlantic  
Alliance, the Central European countries did not formally apply for 
membership because ’it was made clear to them that the ir applications 
would be turned down’.^ ®"^
On 2 October 1991, Baker and Genscher called for extensive  
consultations on m ilitary conversion in Eastern Europe and the  
formalisation and régularisation of the liaison process between NATO and 
the post-Communist states. For all the ta lk  of a specific formal 
security structu re  or even a guarantee, none was forthcoming.
By 1991 it seemed to the Central Europeans that the lack of firm  
security guarantees or fu ll en try  into NATO im plicitly meant that the 
Alliance intended to use Central Europe as a new b u ffer or shatter belt.
Havel took political risks to advance his plan to transform  NATO. He 
was in open disagreement with Washington, London and Paris. Ironically, 
his position on European security, though for d iffe ren t reasons, came 
most to resemble that of the Soviet Union. The strength  of 
Czechoslovakia’s conviction and determination makes its re trea t from the  
in itia l idea of eliminating NATO remarkable.
Havel was forced to come to this position for two reasons, both 
beyond his control. The firs t was the resistance of his Western partners  
and NATO to his ideas. The second reason was the course of events, 
particu larly  the instability in Eastern Europe that Havel came to use 
himself in order to ju s tify  Czechoslovak membership of the Alliance.
1 0 3 Flanagan, ’NATO’, p. 146.
Robert Mauther, ’Pillar in the World of In s ta b ility ’, The Financial Times, 
7 May 1991.
A summary of the statement is provided in Flanagan, ’NATO’, pp. 146-7.
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THE IRONIES OF THE SECOND NEW EUROPE
By the second year of Havel’s foreign policy, it was clear that the an ti­
political politics of his foreign policy had receded. The efforts to 
transform  the two m ilitary and then collapse them into a new Helsinki I I  
had yielded to efforts  to secure formal m ilitary partnership with 
NATO.^°^
This change resulted from the Czechoslovak government’s 
recognition that, regardless of its diplomacy and confidence in the 
ultimate success of humanism, forces within the international system 
determined the country ’s place in the new order. The Prague leadership 
adjusted its policies accordingly, demanding not only security guarantees 
from the West but also fu ll membership of NATO.
The Revival of Geopolitics
By 1991 Havel was using the threat of insecurity in Eastern Europe in his 
attempts to secure membership in West European institutions. He still 
tempered his words but he also began to play the Western game, both in 
form and content. He conformed more closely to diplomatic practices and 
expressed appreciation of how ’understanding’ the West was towards 
Central E u r o p e . T h i s  may have been a tactic but it suggests that he 
was not as condemning of the dividing lines imposed in post-Communist 
Europe as he might have been, and as his counterparts were.
Havel also started to adopt the language of alarm. Instead of 
re fe rrin g  to a supranational, confident and cooperative Central European
106 pqj, an overview, see the appropriately titled  Jan Obrman, ’From Idealism 
to Realism’, Report on Eastern Europe Vol. 2, No. 50-51 (20 December 1991), 
esp. p. 9.
Thorpe, 'Havel’.
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ethos, he portrayed a fragmented, volatile and incapable region. For 
example, speaking to West European politicians on 20 March 1991, he 
re ferred  to the possibility of his region becoming a ’zone of chaos and 
helplessness’. He also warned of the danger of ’demagogic, nationalist, 
tota litarian messiahs’.^ ®^ He claimed to the European Parliament that by 
not admitting Central Europe to the EC, the Community would contribute  
to the construction of a ’zone of helplessness and chaos’. Similarly, in 
June 1991 he told a Conference on European security he jo in tly  sponsored 
with Mitterand that the Community’s exclusion of new members would 
undermine the continent’s s t a b i l i t y . I n  using this language, he began 
to sound like Western neo-realist analysts who adopted security  
justifications for the extension of Western institutions into the  
region.
In ternational relations scholar and Czechoslovak diplomat-émigré 
George Liska maintained in 1990 that ’Today’s pro-Westernism has assumed 
the guise of enthusiasm fo r taking part in supranational European un ity  
with the greatest possible detachment from the East. I t  is the generic 
equivalent of membership in the Franco-English system of collective 
security, a mere façade in the pretended s tructu re  of security against a 
vanquished, but re la tive ly  strengthened, Germany th a t provided the 
foundations of hopes in the years a fte r 1918’.^ ^^
Cited in John Palmer, ’Havel Urges East-West In teg ra tio n ’, The Guardian, 
21 March 1991.
109 Mark Lawrence, 'Czech President Havel Says Czechoslovakia Wants EC 
Membership by 2000’, Associated Press, 20 March 1991; and Hejma, 
’Czechoslovak President’.
110 For example, ’the West should use its economic leverage to encourage 
Eastern European states to adopt democracy, protect human rights of 
national minorities, accept cu rren t borders, and eschew the propagation of 
hyper- nationalism’. Stephen van Evera, ’Primed for Peace: Europe a fte r the 
Cold War’, In ternational Security  Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57.
George Liska, Fallen Dominoes, Reviving Powers (Washington: The Johns 
Hopkins Foreign Policy Institu te , 1990), p. 6.
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HaveJ strove for the integration of Central Europe into Western 
structures and institutions; but his government was anxious to keep the 
Soviet Union and Russia in any new European system as well. While he 
believed that Czechoslovakia had a rig h t to membership of West European 
institutions on cultural grounds, he began to assert cu ltural dividing  
lines of his own. In  1994, he said with regard to security arrangements  
that 'the nature and substance of the "Partnership for Peace" project will 
be one thing if  we are talking about the Central Asian republics that are  
today members of the Commonwealth of Indepedent States, and something 
en tire ly  d iffe ren t in the case of countries such as Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia or Slovenia. By v irtu e  of their entire  h istory, sp iritual 
and intellectual traditions, culture, atmosphere and geopolitical position, 
the la tter countries belong to the classical European West, and any  
separation of them from that West would be suicidal for the whole of 
Eur ope’. S i n c e  Havel used exclusionary terminology and drew 
dividing lines across the Eurasian continent, it should not have come as a 
surprise to him that others would do the same to Central Europe.
The increased recognition of the need for NATO suggests that the  
Czechoslovak government had begun to reduce the importance of an 
inclusionary foreign policy, one that included the Soviet Union. By early  
1991, as we have seen, Czechoslovakia had become adamant about the  
dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the need for a fu ll security guarantee 
from NATO. I t  seemed that the Czechoslovak position was arguably  
converging with that of NATO: that NATO should continue to exist in its 
own rig h t but in cooperation with the CSCE.^^^
112 Havel, ’Call for Sacrifice’, p. 6.
Still outstanding would have been the question of fu ll membership for 
Central Europe of NATO, a policy which NATO could have been expected to 
resist.
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To this end the North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement of 
Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation of 20 December 1991 aimed to 
strengthen:
the role of the CSCE and to the achievement of its objectives  
without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. We seek an 
architecture for the new Europe that is firm ly based on the  
principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter 
of Paris.
NATO’s Rome Summit acknowledged the role of the CSCE in crisis  
resolution and conflict prevention. The extent that Czechoslovakia’s 
policies coincided with those of NATO was not so much the achievement of 
Czechoslovak diplomacy as a two-fold recognition by the Czechoslovak 
leadership: firs t, that its ideas challenged the interests of and therefore  
met the resistance of major powers; second, Prague realised that its own 
interests could not be met by its previous ideas. A pan-European security  
stru ctu re  as envisaged by Prague might eventually emerge. But Havel’s 
conception of Central European supranationalism evaporated, not least 
with the evidence of the Yugoslav conflict; and general security seemed 
to be providable only by NATO. In  order to fu lf il both its idealistic 
objectives and those modified by practice, the Czechoslovak government 
was obliged to engage in trad itional b ilateral diplomacy, a form which 
departs substantially from its concept of h ighly plural decision-making 
among states, and particu larly  the emphasis it gave to ’people’s 
diplomacy’. Not only did that diplomacy diverge from its original form, it 
also had implications for its content.
In  tactical terms, in order to fu rth e r its programme for Europe, the 
Czechoslovak government sided with national governments sympathetic to 
it. This had two repercussions, one relating to the principle of 
Czechoslovak foreign policy and the other to its practice. In  order to
North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement of Dialogue, Partnership and 
Cooperation, 20 December 1991, reproduced in NATO Review Vol. 40, No. 1 
(February 1992), p. 29.
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achieve its aim of an a lliance-free Europe, Czechoslovakia had to ally  
itself with particular countries. Czechoslovakia had explained Central 
European cooperation not as the creation of formal structures but as a 
means to re tu rn  to Europe. Czechoslovakia found itse lf seeking bilateral 
partnerships. The practical consequence was that Czechoslovakia became 
more politically relian t upon, and vulnerable to, any country which 
supported Czechoslovakia’s policies and was capable of fu lfilling  them.
The country which was overwhelmingly supportive of the  
integration of the Central European states into Western structures and 
most sympathetic to Czechoslovakia’s European proposals was Germany. I t  
was suggested in chapter 4 that post-Communist Czechoslovak policy 
towards Germany was to some degree conditioned by the hope and 
expectation that Germany would aid in Czechoslovakia’s ’Return to 
Europe’. Some commentators a ttribu te  Havel’s endorsement of German 
reunification and efforts  at Czechoslovak-German reconciliation ’as the  
cornerstone of his new European foreign policy and of economic 
integration with the West’ .^^ ^
On 11 April 1991, Foreign Minister it^nscher 'spoke warmly’ in 
Prague of D ienstbier’s plans for a European Security Commission which, 
among other functions, would supplant MATO. The two Foreign Ministers 
agreed to advance jo in t proposals at the June CSCE meeting of Foreign 
Ministers. Germany, it seemed, was 'giving Czechoslovakia substantial 
backing’ in its European proposals.
Havel and D ienstbier’s ideas for restructuring  Europe were radical. 
Consequently, they met much resistance. Their personal auras and 
credibility  in the international community almost certa in ly  gave them
Bugajski, Nations in Turmoil, p. 204.
Susan Greenberg, 'Genscher Backs Prague In it ia tiv e ’, The Guardian, 12 
April 1991.
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larger audiences than the ir country’s size merited or the radical nature  
of their ideas might have permitted. They also used th e ir abilities, 
including ’staging’, to press their ideas as far as possible. I t  is fa ir to 
say that they created the best conditions possible.
Nevertheless, political developments forced the post-communist 
Czechoslovak leadership to change the content of their proposals. True, 
Havel and Dienstbier expected a gradual process of change, much as they  
undertook in the ir opposition to communist rule. Throughout his time as 
Foreign Minister, Dienstbier maintained that the CSCE not only had 
potential but that it was already being realised. Despite Czechoslovakia’s 
altered policies on European institutions, Dienstbier stressed the  
importance of new ideas and continued to illustrate  the merging of 
institutions, particu larly  NATO and the CSCE. For example, at the close of 
the CSCE Foreign Ministers Council session in Prague on 31 January 1992, 
he explained:
I t  is necessary to bring up new ideas. The idea of making use of 
the experiences of the Atlantic Pact and its logistics and mechanism 
for the resolution of certain tasks within the framework o f the 
Helsinki process in only natural during the gradual coming together 
of European and transatlantic institutions.
. .. It  is necessary to realize that all these institutions, and not 
merely some of them, are being transformed at the present time and 
are seeking ways of cooperating.
In  the end, however, Havel and Dienstbier reverted  back to a 
realpolitik view of Europe. The Czechoslovak hope for the eventual 
emergence of the CSCE as an effective pan-European security system was 
ironically dashed at the very  time when the CSCE had the greatest 
potential. Prior to 1990, the CSCE had ’reigned supreme over the realm’ of 
the notional idea of ’Greater Europe’. This was precisely because during  
the Cold War Greater Europe could only be a fictional idea; but once the  
potential arose for the CSCE to take on such a role, it had to compete
Prague Federal 1 Television Network, 31 January 1992, in FBIS, 3 
February 1992, p. 8. Emphasis added.
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with other i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t  was partly  the existence of institutions  
like NATO which, by presenting itself as fu lly  operational, precluded the  
success of the CSCE. As the achievement of a pan-European security  
structu re  became increasingly unlikely, the Czechoslovak leadership began 
to stress fu ll NATO membership for the country. Prague thereby  
contributed to limiting any fu tu re  success for the CSCE.
In  stressing NATO membership, the Czechoslovaks and other Central 
Europeans reinforced the ir acceptance of Western institutions as they  
were, ra th er than through reform. Instead of working to abolish or 
transform NATO, it became an ’important factor generally in b ring ing ’ 
these countries into the ’European, or Western, "mainstream"% ^
The final and fata l irony is how the Czechoslovak, and perhaps also 
the Central European, view of the ir place in ’Europe’ was confounded by 
the experience of ’Europe’ a fte r 1989. Instead of being allowed to re turn  
to Europe, permitted to have their historical path reconverge with the 
Western European, these countries were to be dictated to. Certainly West 
European institutions have a role as a model for emerging liberal 
democratic and market-economy polities: ' hey may also have a duty to act 
a conditioning force on the internal behaviour of these countries. But 
while the Central Europeans countries believe they understand what 
’Europe’ is, it is, in the Central European view, the Western European 
countries that actually have Europe. The experience of Central Europeans 
is not only that the ir ’Europeanness’ is not recognised, but that in order 
to become fu lly  European, they have to change themselves. Thus, for the 
central Europeans, in order to re tu rn  to Europe, they have had to 
surrender some of the ir ’Europeanness’.
Victor-Yves Ghebali, 'The July CSCE Helsinki Decisions -  A Step in the 
Right Direction’, NATO Review  Vol. 40, No. 4 (August 1992), p. 3.
J.F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows (Durham, NC: Duke U n ivers ity  Press and 
London: Longman, 1994), p. 273.
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CONCLUSION
THE PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATING IDEAS INTO POLICY
Czechoslovakia [is] a tree which stands most erect where 
winds from two sides blow upon it. The Czechoslovak people 
have lived and will live between West and East, uniting the  
respect of the West fo r man’s ind iv iduality  with the emphasis 
of the East on the common good, ra ther than on the  
selfishness of the individual.^
The passage is the close of J.V. PoliSenskÿ’s 1947 History o f
Czechoslovakia in Outline, w ritten  to advance the status of the country. I t
illustrates the contention of this thesis that two competing and
necessarily related influences have existed in Czechoslovak history. The
firs t  is Czechoslovakia’s unique geographic location. The second is the
belief of its intellectuals and political leaders that the country could make
a philosophical contribution to European civilisation. This humanism was
partly  derived from and also aimed to change the systemic and
geopolitical forces that threatened the country. The tension and the
symbiosis between these two features of Czechoslovak political and
intellectual life are the contours with which its foreign policy was created
and executed.
This thesis has concentrated on the in terp lay of geopolitical 
pressures and humanist values in post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign  
policy. In  the same way that Czechoslovak dissidents had a notion of a 
domestic ’civic’ political life, they had what has been termed here a ’civic’ 
foreign policy. The term has been extrapolated from the ir own writings  
and statements, and the term civic foreign policy has been used in this  
study as the encapsulation of those ideas.
As chapter 2 indicated, Czechoslovakia’s dissident-leaders did not 
call the ir foreign policy ’c iv ic ’. Nevertheless, they professed that their  
pre-1989 beliefs were valid a fte r the Velvet Revolution. Dienstbier
PoliSenskÿ, History o f Czechoslovakia, p. 131.
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expressed disappointment that his dissident essays on international a ffa irs  
Snëni o Evropë were not published in Western languages before 1989 
because they could have served a basis for discussion for events 
thereafter.^ Vondra argued that what the 1985 ’utopian’ Czechoslovak 
dissident proposal in the Prague Appeal calling for the unification of 
Germany became ’rea lity ’ .^  In  1992, Havel confirmed that post-Communist 
Czechoslovak foreign policy ’should grow and, more important, continue to 
grow from’ the same morality as Czechoslovakia’s pre-1989 dissidence.^ 
Chapter 2 also demonstrated that Havel was thoroughly conscious that 
analysts would study every word he said and wrote. This thesis has 
therefore accepted Havel’s challenge.
This conclusion will f irs t review the ideas constituting a civic 
foreign policy. I t  will then consider its successes before turn ing  to the  
problems and constraints of translating these ideas into policy.
THE IDEAS OF A CIVIC FOREIGN POLICY
The foremost element of a civic foreign pohcy, as indicated by Havel’s 
comment, is the centra lity  of morality and tru th . Ind iv idual responsibility  
was central to this approach, and everyone had a duty to th ink and act 
within tru th  and act with morality. This in itself would be a source of 
power. As Havel argued in ’Power of the Powerless’, living in tru th  could 
challenge and ultimately overcome the structures of the domestic 
totalitarian regime. By extension, the rig id  and unjust international order 
of Yalta would also eventually be transformed. Several Czechoslovak 
dissident intellectuals, like SemiCka, Sabata and especially Dienstbier,
" Interview , 13 September 1995.
- ’A View from the Castle’, p. 12.
Havel, Summer M editations, pp. 98-9.
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considered how to end the armed polarisation of Europe and the  
cen tra lity  of the two m ilitary blocs to European political life. They  
advanced an anti-pow er politics approach to international a ffa irs  to 
negate the traditional uses of power in the international system. Their 
views of domestic and international politics were paralleled by the need to 
ensure that the security and power of one could not derive from the  
insecurity and powerlessness of another. Havel confirmed the va lid ity  of 
this approach in 1991 when he wrote unequivocally that Communism was 
defeated by thought and human d ignity  and that, consequently, the world 
was transformed not by weapons or force, but by the strength  of free  
sp irit, the power of the word, and the power of the tru th fu l word.^ A 
civic foreign policy involves the reimagination of how power is, and ought 
to be, d istributed in the international system.
Similarly, as the dissidents sought a revitalisation of domestic 
politics, so too did they foresee popular participation and representation  
in international political life. The dissident-leadership believed that 
democracy would make foreign policy dealings easier. Civic politics was 
thus an organically democratic practice which advanced selfless and 
cosmopolitan values pursued by v irtu e  of the ir universal value ra ther  
than for individual gain.
Drawing from its sense of morality, a civic foreign policy possessed 
a redem ptive quality. Shortly a fte r becoming President, Havel said: 'there  
is something good in each person, whether the person in question is a 
ju s tly  sentenced prisoner or a tyrannical w arder’. He was confident of 
success in 'creating an atmosphere that evokes better qualities in 
people’.®
Havel, Letni pfemitani, pp. 98 and 97.
Prague Domestic Service, 11 Janu a ry  1990, in  FBIS, 12 Ja n u a ry  1990, p. 16.
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But tru th  and the creation of ’better qualities’ could not be 
achieved, according to the civic foreign policy, without f irs t  dealing with 
historical injustices. This was done by apology, and Havel apologised for 
wrongdoings for which neither he nor many of the existing Czechoslovak 
population were responsible. Thus, he apologised to the German people for 
the postwar expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and to NATO for the lies 
his predecessors had propagated about the organisation. He argued that 
Europe as a whole had to make amends for the costs to the world of its 
previous wars so that, in re tu rn , ’its own security might radiate peace 
into the whole world’. But because a civic foreign policy relies on tru th  
and common standards of morality, it would expect apologies to be 
reciprocal and therefore to provide the basis for new relations. Hence, 
the Soviet denunciation of its 1968 intervention provided the grounds, in 
the Czechoslovak view, for new relations.
The combined importance of morality and common responsibility in a
civic foreign policy means that it must concern itse lf with issues
transcending national interest. Post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign policy 
demonstrated this as Havel pursued his o r e - 1989 preoccupations with 
man’s alienation and what he termed the commonality of crisis’. He 
rejected nationalism, commercialism, and overconsumption and, despite the  
problems facing Czechoslovakia’s transition, was concerned about general 
underdevelopment and environmental degradation elsewhere. He saw all 
crises, whether regional such as the Yugoslav conflict and East European 
ecological predicament, or larger crises as part of a universal crisis and 
responsibility. He supported political dissidents elsewhere, nominating 
persecuted Burmese activ ist Aung San Sun Kyi for the Nobel Peace Prize  
and inviting the Dalai Lama to Prague despite the threats of economic 
sanctions by China. He offered to negotiate between the Palestinians and
Israelis, and to find 'a nice little  chateau’ in which to host a summit
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between Bush and G orbachev/ As a matter of principle, post-Communist 
Czechoslovakia was quick to restore relations with both Israel and the  
V atican /
SUCCESSES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA’S CIVIC FOREIGN POLICY
The ideals in post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign policy did not harm its 
overall success. Rather, an unintended consequence of Havel’s 
preoccupation with morality, but doubtless in combination with his 
personality, they advanced the image of Czechoslovakia abroad. For 
example, upon hearing Havel’s address to a jo in t session the US Congress, 
one Senator proclaimed T f I  could speak like him I  could run  for God’.®
A Washington Post editorial wrote that Havel’s speech to Congress 
'provided stunning evidence that his country, fa r from being only an 
inheritor -  let alone borrower -  of the European intellectual trad ition , is 
a prime source of i t ’ .^° So successful was Havel that some fe lt that in 
'the United States, Czechoslovakia suffers from its own wonderful 
publicity -  the exhilaration that President Vaclav Havel aroused in 
Congress, the crowd of celebrities that turned  out for him in New York, 
the stories about golden Prague becoming the absolutely essential tr ip  for 
everybody in the know’ .^ ^
 ^ Prague Domestic Service, 28 February 1990, in FBIS, 1 March 1990, p. 11.
® J iri Pehe, 'Diplomatic Relations with Is rae l To Be Resumed’, Report on 
Eastern Europe  Vol. 1, No. 5 (2 February 1990), pp. 6-9; and Peter Martin, 
'Czechoslovakia and the Vatican Restoring Relations’, ibid.. Vol. 1, No. 12 (23 
March 1990), pp. 8-11.
® Cited by Democratic Representative Robert J. Mrazek, chairman and (sole 
member) of the House’s Czechoslovakian-American Caucus, In ternational 
Herald Tribune, 23 February 1990.
Reprinted in In ternational Herald Tribune, 23 February 1990.
' ' A.M. Rosenthal, In te rn a tio n a l Herald T ribune , 11 May 1990.
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Returning from his February 1990 v is it to Washington, he stood on 
the same balcony of the Kinskÿ Palace where Gottwald had stood in 
February 1948 when he proclaimed the advent of socialist Czechoslovakia. 
This time, however, Havel pronounced 'Czechoslovakia is the most popular 
country in America’. T o  the extent that Hans Morgenthau was rig h t to 
call diplomacy 'the brains of national power’, Havel put this to fullest use, 
and symbolism was an important part of his diplomatic packaging.
The image of Czechoslovakia may thus have been elevated abroad. 
For Vondra, Czechoslovakia lost nothing in pursuing the kind of foreign  
policy that it did. The only failure he mentioned was the continued war in 
Yugoslavia,^^ a conflict which actors better equipped than 
Czechoslovakia failed to resolve. In  other areas, the humanist values of 
post-Communist Czechoslovak foreign poHcy did not ultimately harm 
national interests. Havel proved correct in his assessment of the  
consequences for both Czechoslovakia and Europe of German unification. 
Domestically, while the economic absorption of East German into the 
Federal Republic meant the w rite -o ff of debts and the loss of trade, the 
overall impact on Czechoslovakia of unification itself was small. Havel’s 
only qualification on the process of unification -  that it be done 
democratically -  was subjected to certain criticism in chapter 4. But most 
observers ultimately agree that unification occurred with widespread 
discussion among major powers and Havel was satisfied with the process.
The Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia was widely, and 
rig h tly , considered a major foreign policy success. But it was not the  
result of civic values. In  fact, as chapter 5 suggested, the Soviet Union 
did not recognise, let alone respond to the idea of mutual respect. The 
Soviet Union did much to obstruct the negotiations; some of its officials
Cited in Edward Lucas, 'Havel Returns from US as the Conquering Hero’, 
The Independent, 24 February 1990.
Interview .
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retracted or qualified the apology for the 1968 intervention. The Soviet 
Union neither offered an apology for ecological damage nor consented to 
fu ll financial compensation. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia’s approach to the 
Soviet Union was indicative of the leadership’s belief in possibilities (in 
combination with a measure of necessity); it refused to accept that Soviet 
control over Central Europe was a preordained and unchangeable fact. 
Moreover, ju s t as the Czechoslovaks did not have every  demand 
satisfactorily met by the Soviet Union, Moscow also failed to extract all 
that it wanted from Prague.
Similar th inking on the nature and distribution of power was 
evident in Havel’s policy towards Germany. While Czechoslovakia risked at 
least as much as other countries from German unification, not only did 
Havel refuse to fear unification, but he also saw it, in keeping with 
Czechoslovak dissident views, as a prerequisite for the unification of 
Europe. And while Czechoslovakia risked ’Germanisation’ through market 
forces ra ther than m ilitary prowess, Havel’s government used the surge 
of German investment to prod other countries into investing.
For Havel, the meaningful measure of ’success’ of his civic foreign  
policy would be the extent to which he acted tru th fu lly  and morally. By 
these terms, he must be considered successful. While his tactics had to 
change, his belief in morality remained above considerations of national 
interest. For example, he risked antagonising the Soviet Union by 
endorsing the presence of the three Baltic Republics at the Paris CSCE 
meeting, and he invited the Dalai Lama to Prague despite jeopardising  
valuable trade with China.
His universalist values often contained elements of se lf-in terest as 
well. His plea to the US to help the Soviet Union was made in the context 
of aiding Central Europe by ensuring it a continued market for its 
partially-com petitive goods and in order to retain the Soviet Union’s 
connections to democratic and market societies.
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Havel’s apology to Germany has been seen by many as a s tric tly  
tactical move to gain Bonn’s support for Czechoslovak membership of 
Western institutions. This thesis rejects this interpretation, and points 
out that a moral foreign policy does not necessarily preclude the  
attainment of national interests. Havel cannot be faulted if, in acting 
according to his conscience, his actions served Czechoslovak interests.
Similarly, while a civic foreign policy ultim ately aimed to remove 
power politics as a feature of international life, Havel blended idealistic  
humanism with the need to respect force. In  the case of the Gulf War, he 
specified that aggression had to be countered with force and committed 
Czechoslovak troops to the liberation of Kuwait. As much as he 
idealised the restructu ring  of European security, leading ultimately to 
pacific union, it did not prevent him from recognising the necessity of a 
viable security guarantee from NATO.
Thus, Czechoslovakia’s civic foreign policy contained pragmatic 
elements which contributed to its success. Nevertheless, these were 
insufficient to offset the many problems of implementation that it faced.
CONSTRAINTS ON A CIVIC FOREIGN POLICY
Czechoslovakia’s civic foreign policy encountered numerous problems 
which forced the leadership to retreat from its original ideas. The very  
making of foreign policy forced a re treat from these values. The 
Czechoslovak leadership spoke of a people’s diplomacy. Observers and 
participants in the foreign policy process, however, have maintained that 
foreign policy was concentrated in the Foreign M inistry. In  chapter 3, the  
thesis examined two hypotheses. The firs t argued that, contrary to the
The Czechoslovak contingent numbered 200 hundred but being an a n ti­
chemical w arfare unit, it was meant to o ffer expertise the coalition required. 
The Czechoslovaks were among only six armies that penetrated Ira q i 
te rrito ry .
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standard opinion, foreign policy decision-making and implementation were 
not in practice exclusively in the M in istry ’s control. Foreign policy, 
especially in its outcomes, was influenced and even distorted by several 
competing and entrenched interests. These included continued arms sales; 
energy production in terms of nuclear power stations and the Gabôikovo- 
Nagymaros dam; Slovak efforts to generate its own foreign policy; and 
in itiatives taken by the Presidential Palace of which the Foreign M inistry  
was unaware. As a result of these competing influences, the Foreign  
M inistry was forced to qualify and re tra c t some of its earlier policy 
statements.
The related second assertion advanced regarding civic foreign  
policy-making was that these distortions of policy were made by entities  
antithetical to a civic foreign policy. The dissidents were concerned about 
the power of megamachinery and the alienation of man as a resu lt of 
modernisation. The influences that ultim ately influenced the civic foreign  
policy, however, were Communist-era nuclear power plants, arms factories  
and massive hydroelectric installations. Various interests in Czechoslovakia 
were served by the continued sale of arms to rogue countries, even if  
the sales contradicted the ethics of a civic foreign policy. The point is 
that these influences were generally unforeseen and forced changes in 
the content of Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy.
Moreover, it  soon became evident th a t the dissident leadership’s 
outlook was not synonymous with that of the population. The Czechoslovak 
leadership saw the righting  of historical wrongs as the only way to allow 
new policy to begin. This view appeared extreme to much of the  
population, and even created contradictions. Thus, Havel was concerned 
about individual responsibility and, in the case of the Germans, rejected  
the idea of collective guilt. Nevertheless, by making an apology on behalf 
of Czechoslovaks for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, he was implying
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collective Czechoslovak g u i l t I t  is almost certain that extending the 
apology encouraged Sudeten German claims on Czechoslovakia for the  
restoration of property. Havel himself recognised the limitations of 
apology when he called for the process of mutual apology between Czechs 
and Germans to cease. Nevertheless, the difference between his attitude  
and the response of public opinion indicates that the civic foreign policy 
could not accommodate both morality and public opinion.
The Czechoslovak leadership believed too strongly that the Soviet 
apology would create the foundation for new relations. However, 
demonstrations by ord inary people in 1990 for the immediate withdrawal of 
Soviet troops indicated that the Czechoslovak population did not share his 
view of the practical importance of the apology. Soviet indifference to 
Czechoslovak demands demonstrates the limitation of apology in foreign  
policy. Regardless of the practical difficulties of w ithdrawing Soviet 
troops quickly, Soviet representatives were also uncooperative in talks on 
the ecological damage caused by their forces. Similarly, the Soviets cut 
back oil supplies in 1990 without even the diplomatic courtesy of f irs t  
informing, or later, discussing the issue with Czechoslovak ministers.
Not only did popular sentiment have to give precedence to dissident 
ideas (such as the apology to the Sudeten Germans) in foreign policy, but 
the grassroots representation that one might have expected was also not 
forthcoming. Agreements marking regional cooperation called for the 
creation of a new ethos of mutual tolerance and understanding. Civic 
initiatives, such as 'cross-border diplomacy’, were stunted by central 
governments which delayed the opening of frontiers  and retained high
' ' 1 am not challenging the Czechoslovak dissident idea that an apology had 
to be made. In  fact, all former dissidents interviewed on this question 
remained adamant that the apology had to be extended. But a distinction can 
be made between a collective Czechoslovak apology made by the President, 
and the individual apologies made by dissidents and exiles.
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ta r iffs  on Central European goods. Contrary to th e ir expectations, 
Czechoslovakia’s leaders discovered that democracy in Central Europe did 
not make the resolution of regional issues easier. The policies of Klaus 
as Prime Minister did much to scuttle the en tire  prospect of regional 
cooperation. Ironically , perhaps the only case of grassroots representation  
in Czechoslovak foreign policy occurred when Havel was forced to reverse  
his policy of not dealing with unofficial Sudeten German lobby groups.
A civic foreign policy called for the respect of legality which meant 
that existing legal structures would have to be respected even if they  
were objectionable, ju s t as the dissidents had worked within the laws the 
Communist regimes had issued. Thus, the post-Communist Czechoslovak 
government pledged allegiance to the Warsaw Pact and Havel ordered 
prearranged jo in t m ilitary exercises to be held. Similarly, the new 
government reversed its decision to expel Soviet bloc international 
organisations because they had not broken existing law. While Havel was 
adamant that Sudeten German claims for the restoration of land and 
citizenship would not be met, Czechoslovakia’s d rive  for membership of 
the EC meant that, ironically. Community provisions would give Sudeten 
Germans the rig h t to live and buy property in Czechoslovakia.
In  advancing its ideas for a new Europe, Czechoslovakia was 
restrained by the diplomatic power and interests of other countries, and 
Havel was forced to repackage and qualify the meaning and content of his 
proposals. While done with fla ir, Havel contradicted his in itia l views in his 
address to the US Congress. And, to the extent that Czechoslovak ideas
Jan B. de Weydenthal, 'Cross-Border Diplomacy in East Central Europe’, 
RFE/RL Research Report Vol. 1, no. 42 (23 October 1992)’ and 'Cross-Border 
Cooperation in East Central Europe, ibid.. Vol. 3, No. 2 (14 January 1994), pp. 
32-5.
'  ^ For example, Dienstbier expected that sensitive issues in relations with 
Hungary such as the GabCikovo-Nagymaros Dam and minorities would be come 
're latively  easy to solve’ by v irtu e  of each country becoming democratic. 
MTI, 10 January 1990, in FBIS, 12 January 1990, p. 17.
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for the new Europe were adopted, particu larly  the enhancement of the  
CSCE, those ideas were implemented by German diplomats.
Just as Havel had to reformulate the content of his foreign policy 
to suit his major partners, he also had to dispense with many of the  
unusual and dramatic features of its form that he f irs t adopted. He 
engaged in symbolism, but this presumed that his interlocutors shared his 
symbolic references. His personal overtures to Gorbachev clearly failed; 
and Thatcher and M itterand declined Havel’s intended symbolism of having  
them coming to Prague to mark the anniversary of Munich Agreement.
Even the symbolism that he expressly attributed  to the ambassadorial 
appointment of Slânskÿ to Moscow was later categorically rejected by 
Dienstbier, who stressed that the selection was done s tric tly  on a 
professional basis. A civic foreign policy need not have dramatic features, 
and this was doubtless Havel’s personal contribution; what is evident is 
that if the form of a civic foreign policy does not ad just to common 
diplomatic conventions, it will be misunderstood.
Of all the problems of translating Czechoslovakia’s civic ideas into  
foreign policy, none was as profound as the effect of geopolitics. In  
regional relations, Havel demonstrated an awareness of the u tility  and 
limitations of geography, and he crafted some of his regional in itiatives to 
ensure Czechoslovak membership. In  other respects, however, geographical 
considerations worked against the leadership. For example, Czechoslovakia 
feared the consequences of a close union with large Poland; when 
Czechoslovakia broke apart, regional relations floundered because Poland 
was consequently even b i g g e r / ^
The largest casualty to geopolitics in post-Communist Czechoslovak 
foreign policy was its central aim: the remaking of Europe by 
transform ing and then collapsing the two m ilitary alliances into a
" In te rv ie w  w ith  Fialkovâ-Nëm covâ.
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revamped CSCE. This was defeated by Czechoslovakia’s perception of a 
Soviet th reat and the need to retain NATO, and to seek membership in it. 
The Czechoslovak leadership adopted the language of geopolitics to ju s tify  
its claim to membership in NATO. The strength of Havel’s conviction and 
determination to recreate Europe makes his re trea t from the in itia l idea of 
elim inating NATO remarkable. The constraining effects of geopolitics are 
well summarised in D ienstbier’s rep ly to the question what he would have 
done d iffe ren tly  in his foreign policy. He answered that there  is always 
geography and that results come down to the country ’s size. ^  ^
The real outcome of Czechoslovakia’s civic foreign policy may not 
ye t be known. Just as dissident th inking on power in the Soviet system 
was largely ignored before 1989 but vindicated thereafte r, so it  may be 
with th e ir th inking on international relations. In  domestic affa irs , the  
dissidents identified that the Communist system rested on an ideal.
They also outlined the programme by which to challenge, and ultimately, 
as they believed, undermine the basis of that ideal. This was a gradual, 
but cumulative, process whereby the individual re-recognised reality , 
which would in tu rn  increase the capacity to influence rea lity .
Dissident lite ra tu re  has now been said to ’answer questions of tactics and 
s tra te g y ’.
1 9 In terv iew  with Dienstbier.
This is not suggest that it was a laudable ideal. D ienstbier’s starting  
point is that European civilisation rests on ideals, even if they involve
violence. Similarly, he contended that power was never used for its own
sake, but in pursuit of some ideal. Snëni o Evropë  and interview .
This is the logical reversal of Havel’s observation that ’When we lose 
touch with reality , we inevitably lose the capacity to influence reality  
effective ly . And the weaker that capacity is, the greater our illusion that we 
have effective ly  influenced rea lity ’. Havel, ’On Evasive Th ink ing ’, pp. 14-5.
For example, Knud Erik Jorgensen, ’The End of Anti-politics in Central 
Europe’, in Paul G. Lewis (ed.). Democracy and Civil Society in Eastern
Europe (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 44.
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I f  dissident analysis and tactics were even p artly  responsible for 
the unexpected Revolutions of 1989, then th e ir  contributions to th inking  
on international a ffa irs  must be given serious consideration. Havel has 
compared the historical importance of the changes brought by the 
collapse of Communism to the fa ll of the Roman em pire’. He has cautioned 
that ’to build a new world on the ruins of communism might be as 
extended and complex a process as the creation of a Christian Empire’. 
With hindsight, domestic c iv il society as envisaged and advocated by 
dissidents was central to undermining the Communist regimes which had 
hitherto  been believed to be unshakable. The force of dissident ideas, 
however, ushered in immense change. Despite the overwhelming impact of 
these ideas, however, this thesis has illustrated  the problems of 
translating them into policy and sustaining them.
While students of In ternational Relations may observe that 
'intellectual moods’ come and go, '^^  it would be inaccurate to suggest 
this of Czechoslovak dissident civic politics. A caveat runs through  
Havel’s writings: while he believed that m orality would ultim ately trium ph, 
the tangible results of a moral existence would be gradual. He saw the  
moral measures he advised DubCek to take in 1969 as having been 
realised by the events of 1989. I f  this is applied to his ideas on 
international relations, the fu ll implications and achievements of 
Czechoslovakia’s civic foreign policy might not ye t be appreciable. In  the  
shortterm, however, that foreign policy has had to conform and adapt to 
existing patterns.
Czechoslovakia always suffered in the in ternational system. 
Producers of ideas about international security, Czechoslovaks suffered
Havel, 'Post-Communist Nightmare’, p. 9.
See, especially, Ian Clark, The H ierarchy o f States: Reform and Resistance 
in the International Order (Cambridge: Cambridge U n ivers ity  Press, 1989), 
passim, and pp. 208-9.
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p artly  because of the ideals they  attempted to universalise, from the  
Hussites to the  Prague Spring. But because of th e ir  s trateg ic  location, the  
Czechoslovaks were forced to be consumers, and ultim ately victims, of 
in ternational security . Czechoslovakia could not escape the effects of 
geopolitics.
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